Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress with the Annual Message of the President, December 2, 1872, Part II, Volume III

VIII.—The Georgia.

June 10, 1872.

This vessel was built at Dumbarton, on the Clyde, a few miles below Glasgow, by William Denny and Brothers.¹ She was launched on the 10th of January, 1863, and was then called the Virginia. A Miss North, daughter of Captain North, of the insurgent States, was prominent at the launch and gave the ship her name.² All this was reported by the consul at Glasgow to Mr. Seward on the 16th of January.³ On the 9th of October, 1862, Mr. Adams communicated to Earl Russell a copy of an intercepted letter from the insurgent secretary of the navy to Captain North, which fully explained the position that gentleman occupied toward the insurgents.⁴The Georgia at Glasgow.

On the 12th of February an article in the form of a communication appeared in the London Daily News addressed to Lord Palmerston, then at the head of Her Majesty’s Government, in which the attention of his lordship was particularly called to the great activity in the ship-building yards for the construction of a fleet of war-steamers alleged to be for the “Emperor of China.” Among others, mention was specially made of the two “iron-clads” in the yard of the Messrs. Laird, and also of a steam ram, afterward the Pampero, (or Canton,) being built by Thompson Brothers, at Glasgow, where they were subsequently, when they were approaching completion, seized and detained by the Government. In this article it is expressly stated that, “the term ‘Chinese’ is in general use in the building-yards of the Clyde and the Mersey, to designate the Confederates, and the ‘Emperor of China’ has no other signification, in this connection, than to personify Jefferson Davis.”⁵Notoriety of the construction and purposes of the Georgia.

The Virginia is also specially mentioned as one of this class of vessels, and it is then stated that “the Government, indeed, professes a policy of non-interference; but such a profession is neutralized by the moral support which the noble lord, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, lends to the rebellion, when, in his place in Parliament, he expresses the view that the ‘subjugation of the South by the North would be a great calamity.’” On the 17th of February, another article appeared as a communication in the same paper, addressed in the same form, in which this language is used: “It is simply incredible that it (the Government) alone is not cognizant of facts notorious in commercial circles, and the evidence of which is more easily accessible to its agents than to lookers on.”⁶

It is quite true that these were anonymous communications in a newspaper, but the newspaper was one of a large circulation and important political influence in London, and the articles professed to state facts. One of these facts was that many vessels were being built in Great Britain, intended for vessels of war; and another, that it was pretended they were for the Emperor of China.

The Oreto and the Alabama had, before that time, escaped from English ports under pretense of being intended for foreign governments. They were then under the flag of the insurgents, engaged in the destruction of the commerce of the United States.

It now appears that Her Majesty’s Government had ample means within its own control of determining which of the vessels referred to in these articles was and which was not intended for “the Emperor of China.” The real Chinese Government had an “agency” at “6 Little George street, Westminster, London.” As early as the 10th of September, 1862, Earl Russell caused a letter to be addressed to Mr. Lay, “inspector-general of Chinese customs, then on leave in England,”¹ in which it was said:

It appears to Her Majesty’s Government that, unless you are already provided with a written authority from the Chinese Government for the steps which you are taking to provide that Government with naval assistance, you should procure such authority; and I am accordingly to request that you will take steps for obtaining such authority as soon as possible, although, in the meanwhile, Her Majesty’s Government are prepared to act on the assurances of Mr. Bruce, and not interpose any delay in your proceedings.²

The Mr. Bruce referred to in this letter, the United States infer from the correspondence which afterward occurred, to have been Sir Frederick Bruce, who was at that time the representative of Her Majesty’s Government at Pekin, and who subsequently succeeded Lord Lyons at Washington.

On the 9th of October, Mr. Lay addressed a letter to the Foreign Office from the “Chinese government agency, 6 Little George street, West-minister,” a copy of which is as follows:

My absence from England has prevented my receiving before yesterday your letter of the 10th September. With reference to Earl Russell’s desire that I should obtain a written authority from the Chinese government for the steps I am taking to provide it with naval assistance, I have the honor to state that I hold such written authority, dated the 15th March, 1862, from my locum tenens, Mr. Hart, to purchase and equip a steam fleet, in accordance with instructions from the imperial government. I have since received regular remittances from the foreign customs for that purpose, by direction of Prince Kung. I may add for his lordship’s information, that on the 28th of June last I received, through Mr. Hart, a dispatch from the Chinese Foreign Office relative to the proposed fleet. This dispatch prays the inspector-general of customs in earnest terms to use the utmost dispatch in procuring the vessels. It repeats the instructions issued to the governors of various provinces as to the amounts to be contributed by them toward the cost of the fleet; refers to the Emperor’s anxiety that no time be lost; and closes with a second earnest appeal to the inspector-general for these reasons “not to lose a day.” With respect to the flag for the fleet, I have written for precise authority. As soon as I receive it, I will not fail to apprise Earl Russell of the fact.³

The subsequent correspondence preceding the 17th February, 1863, is not given by Her Majesty’s Government in the documents and evidence presented for the consideration of the arbitrators; but it is stated in the British Case, on page 47, that “in March, 1862, the Chinese Government gave authority to Mr. Lay, inspector-general of Chinese customs, then on leave in England, to purchase and equip a steam fleet for the Emperor’s service, and a sum of money was placed at his disposal for the purpose. Mr. Lay accordingly entered into an agreement with Captain Sherard Osborn, an officer in Her Majesty’s navy, according to which the latter was to take command-in-chief of the fleet, receiving orders from the Chinese Government through Mr. Lay. Her Majesty’s Government, by orders in council, gave permission to enlist officers and men for this service.”

The United States cannot state with certainty that such was the fact, hut they have reason to believe that some of the vessels mentioned in the first article above referred to, published in the London Daily News, were, in fact, being built under the above-mentioned arrangement, and were, in fact, intended for the “Emperor of China.” But it is certain that all were not so intended, and particularly was this the case with the Laird iron-clads, the Pampero (or Canton) and the Virginia, (or Georgia.) It is also certain that the steps “taken to provide the Chinese Government” with “naval assistance” were made use of by the insurgents as a cover to their transactions, and that this was so notorious in commercial circles as to have become the subject of newspaper comment.

When a foreign government comes to the ship-yards of Great Britain to replenish or strengthen its navy, it has, or should have, no concealments. If at peace, it is lawfully there, and Her Majesty’s subjects may and do invite contracts for that kind of work; but in such case, the representative of the government should do as was done during the war in the United States by the representative of the Danish government, who, “wishing to spare Her Majesty’s Government all the embarrassment possible, came forward and gave the fullest information that a vessel was being constructed for the Danish Government.”¹

When, therefore, as in this case, vessels suspected to be for warlike use against a nation with which Great Britain was at peace, were being constructed in the ship-yards of the subjects of Her Majesty, and it was said that they were for the use of a nation which could lawfully contract for their construction, Her Majesty’s Government had the right, and it became its duty at once, to demand the “fullest information.” Answers from a nation that could lawfully contract would be prompt and direct. There would be no necessity for concealment, and consequently none would be attempted.

If Inspector-General Lay, or Captain Osborn, had been requested by Her Majesty’s Government to name the vessels actually being constructed under their supervision for the Emperor of China, a prompt and truthful answer might have been expected and would doubtless have been given. So far as appears, no such request was ever made, and the insurgents enjoyed the full benefit of the omission.

It is quite true, that neither Mr. Adams nor any other representative of the United States, at any time brought his suspicions as to the Virginia to the special attention of Earl Russell, or any other officer of Her Majesty’s Government, before she left the Clyde. The Consul at Glasgow had strong suspicions as to her character and destination, but he had not and could not, with his means of information, produce “such evidence of the fact as would support an indictment for the misdemeanor;” and nothing short of that, Mr. Adams had been informed in July previous, in the case of the Alabama, would, in the opinion of the solicitor of customs at London, furnish “justifiable grounds of seizure.”²

The building of vessels for the insurgents upon the Clyde had but just commenced. The consul at Glasgow had not then perfected his arrangements for procuring information, as had been done at Liverpool, where the operations of the insurgents began, and had been continued with so much activity. Consequently the United States could not then comply with the rules that had been already prescribed, and so strenuously insisted upon, in previous cases, for the guidance of the officers of Her Majesty’s Government in such matters. Such, however, was not the case with Her Majesty’s Government itself. It had in full operation all the machinery by which for years it had been accustomed to carry on its police and revenue departments. It needed only to put this machinery into operation, and suspicions could be raised to the dignity and importance of evidence, or set aside as unfounded.

This was never done. “Facts notorious,” “the evidence of which was more easily accessible to the agents of the Government than to lookers on,” were passed by without the notice of the government, and this vessel was permitted to escape.

But it is said that, “when surveyed by the measuring surveyor, she presented nothing calculated to excite suspicion; that she had the appearance of being intended for commercial purposes, her framework and plating being such as are ordinary in trading-vessels of her class.”¹

The surveyor’s certificate bears date February 4. He commenced his survey on the 17th of January, seven days after her launch, and he visited her on two separate occasions afterwards for the purpose of completing his survey.² These visits must, therefore, have all been made previous to the date of his certificate, (February 4.) She was not registered until the 20th of March, nor cleared until the 1st of April, and did not sail until the 2d. The evidence presented is, therefore, only of her appearance on the 4th of February. Her Majesty’s government does not appear to have caused any examination to be made after that time; or if it did, it has not seen fit to famish the arbitrators with the result.Registry, clearance, and departure.

It is true that after she had sailed and it was known she had already been converted into a cruiser, the collector of the port did say, in a report to the commissioners of customs then called for, that the “officer who performs the tide surveyor’s duty afloat, and who visited her on the evening of the 1st instant, to see that the stores were correct, informs me he saw nothing on board which could lead him to suspect that she was intended for war purposes.” He also said that he, himself, could “testify that she was not heavily sparred; indeed, she could not spread more canvas than an ordinary merchant steamer.”³

But this can hardly be looked upon as having the effect of an examination actually made.

On the 14th of February, eight days after the certificate of the surveyor, the first article above referred to appeared in the Daily News. Three days after, on the 17th, the next appeared. The vessel remained in port for nearly two months after these suspicions assumed shape and became “notorious in commercial circles.”

That she was specially adapted to warlike use when she left port, is proven by the fact that, as soon as the armament was transferred to her, off the coast of France on the 9th, she set forth as a vessel of war, complete and ready for active service. She needed, when she left Greenock, nothing but arms and ammunition. Those were soon obtained out of Her Majesty’s dominions, and without entering any port she commenced her work of destruction.

She was registered on the 20th of March, in the name of one “Thomas Bold, a merchant residing at Liverpool,”⁴ as the owner. He was a relative of Lieutenant Maury, her commander.⁵ On the 27th she commenced shipping her crew at a shipping office and before a shipping master in Liverpool for a voyage “from Greenock to Singapore and Hong-Kong, (with liberty to call at any port or ports on the way, if required,) and after arrival there to be employed in trading to and from ports in the China and Indian seas, the voyage to be completed within two years by arrival at a final port of discharge in the United Kingdom.”¹ Her crew left Liverpool for Glasgow on the 30th March,² and they went on board the vessel whilst lying in the Clyde, off the port of Greenock.³ On the 1st April she cleared from Greenock in ballast for Hong-Kong.⁴

It is said in the British Case, page 123, that “the men believed that this was the real destination of the ship.” The United States will reply in the language of one of the distinguished gentlemen who now compose this honorable Tribunal, the Lord Chief Justice of England, on the trial, in 1864, of the parties indicted for procuring the enlistment of the men, and say, “No doubt it was possible they might have been under the delusion that the ship was engaged for a voyage to China;”⁵ but they think that, after a consideration of the affidavits and correspondence, found in vol. i, pages 412 to 415, 430 to 439, and 443 of the Brit. App., the Arbitrators will conclude that such a delusion was hardly probable. One witness, Thomas Matthews, said in his affidavit, “I understood that the vessel was not going to China, although she would be entered out for that place;”⁶ and it is hardly possible to believe that many of the crew did not, when they shipped, have the same understanding.

The steamer Alar cleared from the port of Newhaven on the 4th of April, for Alderney and St. Malo, under circumstances which attracted the attention and excited the suspicions of the collector there. The same night, after her clearance, about thirty men, twenty of whom appeared to have been British sailors, and ten mechanics, arrived by train. Her agent admitted she had munitions of war on board.⁷ She took to the Japan her armament and equipment, which were transferred to her off the coast of France, near to Brest. This transfer was completed on the evening of the 9th. On the 6th the collector at Newhaven addressed a letter to the commissioners of customs advising them of the circumstances of suspicion attending the clearance of the Alar, and adding, “leaving no doubt on my mind nor on the minds of any here, that the thirty men and munitions of war are destined for transfer at sea to some second Alabama.”⁸The Alar.Armament of the Georgia.

On the 8th, Mr. Adams, in behalf of the United States, addressed a note to Earl Russell calling his attention to the Virginia [Japan] and the circumstances of her escape, as well as to the fact that the Alar, loaded with guns, shells, shot, powder, &c., intended for her equipment, was then on the way to her. This note was received at the foreign office at 12.45 p. m. of the day of its date.⁹ At that time it was supposed by Mr. Adams that the vessels would proceed to, and meet at, the island of Alderney. Instructions were immediately sent, on the request of Earl Russell, to the officers of the Government at that station to take such steps in the matter as they might be advised to do by their legal advisers.¹⁰ No instructions were sent to the naval officers at Plymouth or Portsmouth. No cruisers were sent out.Mr. Adams gives information to Earl Russell.

The Alar was of only eighty-five tons burden.¹ Of course she could not be expected to take her cargo a great distance. The place from which she cleared was given by Mr. Adams in his letter to Earl Russell. The letter from the collector of customs to the commissioners of customs reached that department of the Government in London on the 7th, and was at once transmitted to the lords commissioners of the treasury.² When the letter of the collector reached the treasury, the Alar was “lying to,” not having yet reached the Japan. When Mr. Adams’s letter reached the Foreign Office, the two vessels had but just joined each other and the transfer of armament had not been commenced.³

The Government, however, acted only on the suggestion of Mr. Adams that the vessels were to meet at the island of Alderney. It originated no plans of its own. It did not institute any inquiries for itself; it did not even pay any attention to the suspicions of its own officers. The consequence was that the vessel escaped; and thus Great Britain furnished the insurgents with another completed, equipped, and manned vessel of war ready to prey upon the commerce of the United States. The Navy of the insurgents by this addition was increased to three effective and powerful vessels, only one of which had ever entered their ports, but all of which had proceeded from the ports of Great Britain, with no attempt on the part of Her Majesty’s Government to prevent their departure. All these vessels, too, were freely admitted into the ports of Great Britain as vessels of war set on foot legitimately, and without any insult to the sovereignty of Her Majesty.Insufficient action of Her Majesty’s government.

All the facts in relation to the escape of the Japan (afterwards the Georgia) were made known to Earl Russell by Mr. Adams on the 16th of April, through affidavits of two men who had left her at Brest.⁴

After her armament she first made the port of Bahia, on or about the 11th of May, where she went to “meet her coal-ship,” the Castor, which had been ordered there from England;⁵ but, after taking in a part of her supply, she was “stopped by the authorities,” and compelled to get the remainder from the shore.⁶ This the United States suppose was for the same reason which was assigned by the Brazilian Government at the same time for refusing to permit the Alabama to coal from the same vessel, to wit, “the circumstance of suspecting that the bark had gone direct to that port by preconcerted agreement.” His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil had determined that his ports should not be made a place of rendezvous by belligerents from which to carry on their hostile operations. Banishment, as has been seen, was his penalty for a violation of his neutrality.At Bahia.

Leaving Bahia the Georgia next stopped at a desolate island called Trinadi, where it had been arranged to meet the English bark Castor, for coal. She remained there about a week waiting for her tender, but, it not arriving, she sailed and captured a vessel which she had sighted from port. The prize was a vessel laden with coal, from which a supply was taken, and the Georgia proceeded on her cruise.⁷ Her next port was Simon’s Bay, in Cape Colony, in Her Majesty’s dominions, where she arrived on the 16th of August, requiring “coals, provisions, and calking.”¹ She remained there about two weeks, receiving all she needed without objection on the part of the authorities,² and then started north. She coaled at Teneriffe about the 10th of October, and arrived at Cherbourg, in France, on the 28th of the same month.³At Trinadi.At Simon’s Bay.At Cherbourg.

There she was admitted into the Government docks, but “her repairs were inconsiderable.”⁴ She left the roads and sailed from Cherbourg on the 16th of February, 1864. In the mean time she was in constant communication with Great Britain. Recruitment of men for her account was going forward in Liverpool.⁵

During her cruise after leaving Cherbourg no prizes were made, and on the 2d of May she found her way back to Liverpool. She had not been a successful cruiser. Her commercial value in money was worth more to the insurgents than her powers as a vessel of war, and, on her arrival, she was dismantled and offered for sale. Great Britain made no objection to the use of her ports for such a purpose. Her Majesty’s Government contented itself with a simple notice to the purchaser that he must purchase at his own risk. This notice may have reduced the amount of the proceeds of the sale, but it kept open the ports of Great Britain to the insurgents as a base for their naval operations. They had no ports of their own. The right of a belligerent to make use of the ports of a neutral for the sale of its ships of war was, to say the least, doubtful. Great Britain had been accustomed to resolve all doubts in favor of the insurgents. This new experiment was therefore tried; a sale was effected, and the proceeds went into the treasury of the insurgents.At Liverpool.Sale.

1. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 423.
2. Am. App., vol. vi, p. 503.
3. Ibid.
4. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 216.
5. Am. App., vol. vi, p. 505.
6. Ibid., p. 509.
1. Brit. Case, p. 47.
2. Brit. App., vol. ii, p. 681.
3. Ibid., p. 681.
1. Mr. Layard in the House of Commons, March 7, 1834, Am. App., vol. iv, p. 499.
2. O’Dowd’s Opinion, Brit. Case, p. 90.
1. Brit. Case, p. 122.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 123.
5. Dudley to Seward, Am. App., vol. vi, p. 519.
1. Brit. App., vol. i, p: 426.
2. Dudley to Seward, Am. App., vol. vi, p. 509.
3. Brit. Case, p. 123.
4. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 407.
5. Am. App., vol. iv, 567.
6. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 443.
7. Report of collector, Brit. Case, p. 123.
8. Brit. Case, p. 123.
9. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 399.
10. Arbuthnot to Hammond, ibid., p. 401.
1. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 406.
2. Gardner to Hamilton, Brit. App., vol. i, p. 405.
3. Statement of the master of the Alar, Brit. Case, p. 125.
4. Brit, App., vol. i, p. 412.
5. Cruise of Alabama, Am. App., vol. vi, p. 493.
6. Affidavits, Am. App., vol. vi, pp. 522, 524, 527, &c.
7. Am. App., vol. vi, pp. 523, 525, and 528.
1. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 307.
2. Am. App., vol. vi, p. 525.
3. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 441.
4. Ibid.
5. Affidavit of Shanley, Brit. App., vol. i, p. 448; affidavit of Matthews, ibid., p. 443; Queen vs. Campbell, Am. App., vol. iv, p. 613.