IX.—The Shenandoah.
Open hostilities were commenced by the insurgents against the Government of the United States on the 12th of April, 1861, by an attack on Fort Sumter, in the harbor of Charleston and State of South Carolina, Previous to that time, W. L. Yancey, P. A. Rost, and A. Dudley Mann had been appointed by the insurgent president “a commission” to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty. They proceeded to London, and on the Saturday previous to the 11th day of May (being the 4th) were admitted by Earl Russell to an informal interview.1General review of facts establishing want of due diligence.
On the 30th of April, Fraser, Trenholm & Co., a branch at Liverpool the commercial house of John Fraser & Co., at Charleston, became the financial agents and depositaries” of the insurgent Government, through whom contracts required abroad” were to be carried out.2
On the 10th of May the insurgent congress authorized the president “to cause to be purchased, if possible, otherwise to be constructed, with the least possible delay, in France or England, one or two war-steamers of the modern and improved description, with a powerful armament and fully equipped for service.”3 On the same day another act was passed making an appropriation “to enable the Navy Department to send an agent abroad to purchase six steam propellers, in addition to those before authorized.”4 Of the sums appropriated by these acts and others which had preceded them, “six hundred thousand dollars” were placed at once in England and agents dispatched abroad to purchase gun-boats.55
On the 1st of July the insurgent secretary of war, in a letter of instruction to a Mr. Charles Green, who had been appointed to go to London and act with Captain Huse and Major Anderson in the purchase of arms, &c., desired him to give or cause to be given special attention to the shipments. It is then said, “in this connection it is proper to remark that Captain North, of the Confederate States Navy, is now in Europe to purchase vessels for this Government, and it is probable that, being a British subject, you might secure the shipments under British colors.”6
About the same time James D. Bullock was appointed “head agent of the confederate navy in England.”7 He immediately went to England and established his “headquarters” at Liverpool, in one of the rooms of the office of Frazer, Trenholm & Co., the “financial agents and depositaries.”8
As early as the 4th of July the Consul of the United States at that port (Liverpool) informed the head constable of the city and the collector of customs of the port that he had reason to believe Bullock had “come to England for the purpose of procuring vessels to be fitted as [Page 112] privateers to cruise against the commerce of the United States, and that he will make Liverpool the scene of his operations.”1
On the 14th of August, the above named commissioners, having on “two different occasions” before “verbally and unofficially informed” Earl Russell of their appointment, took occasion to address to him a formal communication in writing, and in that communication, among other things, said “this Government [that of the insurgents] commenced its career entirely without a navy. * * The people of the Confederate States are an agricultural, not a manufacturing or a commercial, people. They own but few ships. * * But it is far otherwise with the people of the present United States. * * They do a large part of the carrying trade of the world. Their ships and commerce afford them the sinews of war, and keep their industry afloat. To cripple this industry and commerce, to destroy their ships or cause them to be dismantled and tied up to their rotting wharves, are legitimate objects and means of warfare.”2
On the next day (the 15th) Mr. Adams addressed Earl Russell as follows:
From information furnished from sources which appear to me entitled to credit, I feel it my duty to apprise Her Majesty’s Government that a violation of the act prohibiting the fitting out of vessels for warlike purposes is on the point of being committed in one of the ports of Great Britain, whereby an armed steamer is believed to be about to be dispatched with the view of making war against the people of the United States. It is stated to me that a new-screw-steamer, called the Bermuda, ostensibly owned by the commercial house of Frazer, Trenholm & Levy, of Liverpool, well known to consist in part of Americans in sympathy with the insurgents in the United States, is now lying at West Hartlepool, ready for sea. She is stated to carry English colors, but to be commanded by a Frenchman.3
To this Earl Russell replied on the 22d of the same month that he had been advised by the Law-Officers of the Crown “there is not sufficient evidence to warrant any interference with the clearance or the sailing of the vessel.”4
This vessel turned out to be only a “transport,” and not an “armed vessel of war;” and the United States admit that the evidence, then in the possession of the two Governments, might not have been sufficient to justify her condemnation by the courts upon the proper proceedings instituted for such purpose; but they insist that the complaint of Mr. Adams, following so closely as it did upon the remarkable communication of the insurgents already quoted, was worthy of being kept in the remembrance of Her Majesty’s Secretary of Foreign Affairs. As has been seen, Bullock contracted in Liverpool, shortly after his arrival, for the construction of the Florida; not long after a contract was made for the Alabama; and later still, others for the Alexandra and the Laird iron-clads at Liverpool, and for the Georgia and Pampero, (or Canton,) at Glasgow. A purchase was also made of one of Her Majesty’s cast-off gun-boats, the Victor, afterward known as the Rappahannock.5 The Florida, Alabama, and Georgia (the first two after having been made the subject of special complaint by the United States to Her Majesty’s Government) escaped from the ports of Great Britain, and their ravages upon the commerce of the United States formed the subject of much correspondence between the two governments As early as the 20th November, 1862, Mr. Adams called the attention of Earl Russell to this subject by letter, and in so doing said: [Page 113] “I have the honor to inform your lordship of the directions which I have received from my Government to solicit redress for the national and private injuries already thus sustained, as well as a more effective prevention of any repetition of such lawless and injurious proceedings in Her Majesty’s ports hereafter.”1
The Alexandra was made the subject of judicial proceedings, and Her Majesty’s Government, through the inefficiency of its laws as actually administered, was compelled to pay the insurgents damages and costs for the detention.
The iron-clads were detained, and, to avoid another Alexandra experience, were purchased from the insurgents by Her Majesty’s Government at a price which, the United States have reason to believe, did not entail a pecuniary loss upon the sellers. The Pampero (or Canton) was seized, and, by arrangement with the builders, a decree of forfeiture obtained, which was never enforced except for the detention of the vessel until the final defeat of the insurgents. The Rappahannock escaped, but was detained by the Government of France and was never made available against the United States. But she became a subject of annoyance and vexation to Her Majesty’s Government, and furnished additional proof that, in the midst of the state of feeling which surrounded Her Majesty’s courts of justice in England, her laws could not at all times be made available there to enforce her international obligations and protect her from liability for national wrongs.
An offending officer acquitted by a jury on a trial before a judicial tribunal, was punished by the Government by being put on half-pay for life.
The Navy Department of the insurgents had and maintained its headquarters at Liverpool. Bullock, the “head agent,” issued his orders and commissioned his officers from these headquarters. His seamen were recruited there; his officers congregated there, waiting the preparation of the vessels on which they were to cruise, and when the vessels got out of port, clandestinely or otherwise, had no difficulty in finding the means to reach them. Bounties, advances, half pay notes, and wages were made payable and paid there. When a ship went out of commission or enlistments expired, officers and other seamen made their way back there to the “Department.”
In the mean time the British flag was allowed to cover cargoes, contraband of war, intended to pass a blockade maintained by the United States and supply the insurgents with the means of carrying on their operations. Ships were purchased by the insurgents intended for and maintained as “transports,” all which were permitted to and did sail under the British flag. Constant complaint of this was made by the United States to Her Majesty’s Government, and the reply uniformly came back that international obligations did not make it incumbent upon Her Majesty to interfere.
In the fall of 1864 the insurgents were again without any available Navy. The Florida and the Alabama had been sunk; the Sumter and the Georgia had been dismantled and sold in British ports to British subjects, the proceeds of the sales finding their way from thence into the Treasury of the insurgents. The Tallahassee had succeeded in running the blockade and in making a port of the insurgents after her short though destructive career, but was then held by the blockade maintained by the United States. The Rappahannock was held firm in the hands of the Government of France, and the Chickamauga, although [Page 114] commissioned, was still detained by the blockade. In the mean time the commerce of the United States had largely disappeared. Nearly two hundred vessels, with their cargoes, had been committed to the flames.1 Over seven hundred, with an aggregate of nearly half a million of tonnage, had been transferred for self-preservation from the flag of the United States to that of Great Britain.2 All or nearly all of this had been caused by vessels fitted out in the ports of the Clyde or the Mersey. They had been manned and supplied from Great Britain. Their commissioned officers were chiefly from the insurgents; but they were commissioned in Great Britain and took their orders and departure there.
But there was still left in the frozen seas of the North Pacific a little fleet of vessels from which it was supposed the flag of the United States could be floated with safety. This fleet was largely owned, and entirely officered and manned, by bold and daring seamen who made the Arctic seas their home in order that they might supply the inhabitants of more favored regions with such necessaries as those seas alone produced. This little fleet destroyed, and the commerce and carrying trade of the United States would be substantially gone. This “legitimate object and means of warfare,” so early brought to the attention of Earl Russell by the “commission” sent from the insurgents, would then have fully accomplished its work. No vessels or cargoes had been condemned as prize and sold, but all had been destroyed.
To accomplish this further destruction a Navy must be provided. It need not be large, but still something must be had. It could not be obtained from France, because “no violation of its neutrality would be permitted,”3 and work upon vessels of war would not be allowed there unless the builders could satisfy the Minister of Foreign Affairs that they “were honestly intended” for a government other than that of the insurgents.4 The minister of marine there had also declared that suspected vessels “should not be delivered to the Confederates.”5
The hospitalities of the ports of Great Britain had never been refused to a ship having a commission of the insurgents. Her Majesty’s Government had acknowledged the inefficiency of her laws as enforced in her courts and executed by her officers, yet Her Majesty’s prime minister had declared, from his place in the House of Commons, that the Government and people of the United States “must not imagine that any cry which may be raised will induce us (Her Majesty’s Government) to come down to this House with a proposal to alter the law.”6
If by chance a vessel was detained, no pecuniary loss to the insurgents would be likely to follow, for the money invested would be paid back, and, possibly, a profit be added. The “navy agent” and the only efficient “Navy Department” of the insurgents were still tolerated and permitted to maintain “headquarters” at the principal commercial port of the Empire. Great Britain had never yet resented an insult to her neutrality by the insurgents. There never had been so great activity in the construction and purchase of steamers in Great Britain for “transports” as at this time.7
Consequently the Navy Department, located in Great Britain, sought there to obtain its means of operation. A vessel known as the Sea King, which, while building at Glasgow, a year previous, had attracted [Page 115] the attention of the officers of the United States as suspicious, was found in port on her return from a voyage to the East Indies. On the 20th September, 1864, she was purchased and a bill of sale given of her to the father-in-law of the managing partner of the firm acting in Liverpool as “financial agents” of the insurgents.1 This bill of sale was registered in a public office of Her Majesty’s Government on that day.2
Purchase of the Sea King.
On the 5th October a crew for that vessel was shipped, at a shipping-office in London, and before a shipping-master, for “a voyage from London to Bombay, (calling at any ports or places on the passage that may be required,) and or any other ports or places, in India, or China or Japan, or the Pacific, Atlantic, or Indian Oceans, trading to and from as legal freights may offer, until her return to a final port of discharge in the United Kingdom, (or Continent of Europe, if required;) voyage not to exceed two years.”3
The Arbitrators will in all this see a striking resemblance to the circumstances attending the purchase and sending forth of the Georgia eighteen months before. On the 7th October, at 3 p. m., a certificate of sale was filed in the office of the registrar of shipping, in accordance with section 76 of the merchant-shipping act, 1854,4 by which the owner empowered the master to sell the ship at any port out of the United Kingdom, for not less than £45,000, within six months from the date of the certificate.5 Her master was Peter S. Corbett, who had previously commanded the insurgent transport Douglass, afterward known as the Margaret and Jessie.
The Sea King was cleared and sailed from London on the 8th of October, with a cargo of coal. She commenced engaging her crew as early as the 25th September.6Her departure.
On the 7th of October, the attention of the Consul at Liverpool was drawn to some suspicious circumstances connected with a screw-steamer called the Laurel, which he understood had been recently purchased by the insurgents,7 but his knowledge was not such as to justify a presentation of the case to Her Majesty’s Government, under the rules prescribed for the action of its officers. Therefore, no report was made by Mr. Adams to Earl Russell. She was cleared from Liverpool on the 8th of October for Matamoros, &c.8
As early as the 12th October, an article appeared in the Liverpool Journal of Commerce announcing her sailing and using this language:Departure of the Laurel with her crew and armament.
Her cargo is of such a mixed nature that no belligerent State would have the slightest doubt as to its usefulness. * * * But the Laurel must not be supposed to be intended for a cruiser; she is merely a tender, and carries out to a certain latitude guns and ammunition for a new screw-steamer of which Captain Semmes is to take command. * * * To show that Captain Semmes does not go unattended, we may here state that he took with him on board the Laurel eight officers and one hundred men, most of whom served with him on board the Alabama.9
There were errors in the statements contained in this article, but the very errors show that the air was at that time filled with rumors, and that intelligent action at the proper time by the Government might have traced these rumors to their source, and, in all probability, prevented this new escape.
The Laurel did, however, clear with the armament of the Sea King [Page 116] as cargo, and with all, save one, of her officers (twenty-four) and some (seventeen) seamen as passengers.1
Of these officers, five had previously served on the Alabama alone, two on both the Alabama and Sumter, one on the Georgia alone, one on both the Rappahannock and Georgia, and two on the Rappahannock alone; and of the men, five had served on the Alabama. Three of the officers had avoided capture at the time the Alabama was sunk in the engagement with the Kearsarge, by escape upon the English yacht.2
On the 17th October the two vessels, the Sea King and the Laurel, met at the island of Madeira. They proceeded from thence to the island of Desertas, where the armament, and the officers and seamen who came as passengers, were transferred to the Sea King. No bill of sale was ever given by the captain under the certificate of sale. No purchase money was paid there. The certificate of sale was never returned to the office of the registrar in Great Britain as was required by section 81 of the merchant-shipping act, 1854,3 and the registered British character of the Sea King remained during her whole career. But the armament transferred, in the same manner as had previously been done in the cases of the Alabama and Georgia, the Sea King became the Shenandoah, an insurgent cruiser. She had, however, no sufficient crew. Of officers and men she mustered not to exceed forty-four. All the seamen were, however, British subjects, and the officers came together on British soil to be placed on board the new cruiser under the protection of the British flag. If a ship of war of the United States had met the Laurel on her passage and taken these officers from her deck, Great Britain would have considered her neutrality violated, and demanded their return amidst the most active preparations for war, as had been previously done in the case of the Trent.4Armament of the Shenandoah.
It may be admitted that if the Shenandoah at this point in her history stood alone, and there had been no other cause of complaint against Her Majesty’s Government, the United States could not now hold Great Britain responsible for her original escape and armament. But this vessel was purchased in, and armed from, Great Britain, three years and a half after the insurrection in the United States had put on the form of war. The insurgents had found the laws and the Government of Great Britain favorable to their operations. They had, under those laws and under that Government, availed themselves of the “ports of the Clyde and the Mersey,” (their only ports,) and made a navy. Under the warfare of that navy, the commerce of the United States, which at the commencement rivalled that of Great Britain, had been transferred to the English flag. Her Majesty’s Government had never punished the insurgents for any violation of her neutrality. It had not then even remonstrated. On the contrary, it had tolerated and thus encouraged violations. It seems never to have conceived the idea which was so significantly promulgated by His Majesty, the Emperor of Brazil, that toleration of abuse was “equivalent to permitting the ports of the empire to serve as bases for operations.”5
The negligence which enabled the Florida and the Alabama to escape fastens itself upon the Shenandoah. The excessive hospitality which had always been extended gave the insurgents to understand, as they rightfully might, that the ports of Her Majesty’s dominions could be [Page 117] made the bases of their naval operations, and in consequence they operated from there, and from there alone.
When the commander of the Shenandoah left Liverpool to join her, and take command, he had in his possession a letter from Bullock, bearing date of October, 1864;1 and when he returned in November, 1865, he addressed Earl Russell as follows:
I commissioned the ship in October, 1864, under orders from the naval department of the Confederate States; and, in pursuance of the same, commenced actively cruising against the enemy’s commerce. My orders directed me to visit certain seas in preference to others; in obedience thereto I found myself in May, June, and July of this year, in the Okhotsk Sea and the Arctic Ocean.2
Thus she started, under orders issued from Great Britain, to reach the most distant commerce of the United States.
Her first point of destination on the course she was ordered to make was Melbourne, in Her Majesty’s dominions. To that port a transport, bearing the name of John Frazer, (one of the firm of John Frazer & Co., at Charleston, of which Frazer, Trenholm & Co., the Liverpool depositary, was a branch,) was sent from England by the insurgent Navy Department with her supply of coal.3
Her Majesty’s Government received notice of the equipment of the Shenandoah, and its attending circumstances, on the 12th November It came in the form of a report from the Consul of Her Majesty at Teneriffe, and was accompanied by the captain of the Sea King, under arrest, and affidavits of witnesses detailing the facts.4
On the 18th Mr. Adams also communicated the same information to Ear Russell, with additional affidavits.5
The November mail from Europe, which arrived at Melbourne about the middle of January, carried there the news of her departure and her conversion into a vessel of war.6
After starting upon her cruise she “boarded at sea the galley Kebby Prince, from Cardiff, to the port of Bahia;” and in such act her commander opened the manifest of such “galley, breaking the seal of the Brazilian Consulate.” For this offense His Majesty, the Emperor of Brazil, true to his principles of enforcing neutrality, as well as proclaiming it, promulgated au order in the official gazette at Rio Janeiro, on the 21st of December, prohibiting “the entrance into any port of the empire of said steamer, or of any other vessel commanded by the said Waddell.”7
On the 25th of January, 1865, she arrived at Hobson’s Bay, near Melbourne, and asked leave to coal and repair. Commander King, of Her Majesty’s ship Bombay, then at that station, in reporting to Commodore Wiseman, under date of the 26th, said:Arrives at Melbourne.
The crew at present consists of only seventy men, though her proper complement is one hundred and forty. The men almost entirely are stated to be either English or Irish. Captain Waddell informed me that the Shenandoah is fast under canvas and steams at the rate of thirteen knots; that she is fourteen months old, and was turned into a man-of-war on the ocean. He also told me that he had lately destroyed nine American vessels. It is suspected that the Shenandoah was lately called the Sea King, and that remains of the old letters are still perceptible; but of that I cannot speak from personal observation. * * * * From the paucity of her crew at present she cannot be very efficient for fighting purposes.8
The Governor of the Colony also, in reporting to Mr. Cardwell under [Page 118] the same date, says: “Since closing my dispatches for the mail, a Confederate States steamer of war, called the Shenandoah, but supposed to have been formerly the Sea King, has anchored in Hobson’s Bay.”1 She had then on board four hundred tons of coal remaining of her original supply on leaving London,2 which was a full cargo of eight hundred and fifty tons.3
Upon his arrival on the 25th, Lieutenant Waddell asked permission of the Governor to make the necessary repairs and supply himself with coals to enable him to get to sea as soon as possible; also to land prisoners.4 He also, as he came into the bay, informed the tide-inspector that his object in visiting Port Phillip was to have some machinery repaired, and to procure coals and provisions.5Permission to coal and make repairs granted.
Thus the officers of Her Majesty’s Government at Melbourne were at once, upon the arrival of the vessel, informed that the Sea King, which the November mail from Europe, received a few days before, advised them had left England with the intention of being converted into a vessel to carry on war against the commerce of the United States,6 was then in port short-handed, asking permission to repair, provision, and coal. The request of Lieutenant Waddell was taken under consideration by the governor, who informed him that it should receive early attention and be replied to the next day.7 On the next day the executive council was specially summoned by the Governor and under their advice the permission asked for was granted.
Against these hospitalities the Consul of the United States protested on the 26th, and in so doing called the attention of the governor to the circumstances under which she had been armed and equipped, and of her identity with the English vessel Sea King. His protest was repeated on the 27th and 28th, but on the 30th his excellency replied that after advising with the law-officers of the Crown he had “come to the decision that, whatever may be the previous-history of the Shenandoah, the Government of this Colony is bound to treat her as a ship of war belonging to a belligerent power.” It now appears also that the advisers of his excellency tendered to him their opinion that it would not be expedient, to call upon the lieutenant commanding to show his commission from the Government of the Confederate States authorizing him to take command of that vessel for warlike purposes.8Protest of the consul.
Against this decision the Consul most earnestly protested, and notified his excellency that “the United States Government will claim indemnity for the damages already done to its shipping by said vessel, and also which may hereafter be committed by said vessel * * upon the shipping of the United States of America, if allowed to depart from this port.”9
The commander of the Shenandoah having received his permission to repair, provision, and coal, had leave to take his vessel into the public docks, which were at the time controlled by private parties as lessees. The vessel and her officers were received with open arms by the people of Melbourne. The Governor of the Colony did not dine with or participate in the public or private hospitalities to the [Page 119] officers of the vessel, but the mayor of Melbourne and its inhabitants did.1 Crowds of people flocked to obtain sight of the “stranger,” which bore the flag of insurgents that were supposed to have the sympathies of the English people at home; and the officers of the ship, “whose history was so brief, but so brilliant,” could remember gratefully “the hospitalities of Melbourne and Ballarat.2Unfriendly conduct of the colony.
In short, at Melbourne, “in Australian waters, where a vessel of war belonging to the Confederate States” had never before been seen, the feeling which at home had permitted a Florida and an Alabama to escape, was found to exist in all its English vigor. The insurgent flag was hospitably received and courted there, as for nearly four years it had been in the ports of other British Colonies, and of the United Kingdom itself.
But the Consul of the United States having failed, upon the proof furnished by him, to induce the Governor of the Colony and his executive council to act as other nations had acted, and refuse the Shenandoah the hospitalities of the port, set himself about finding other testimony, and that which would be more effective.
The vessel came into the port short-handed, and “at present she could not be very efficient for fighting purposes.”3
When she arrived at Liverpool, after her career was ended, her complement of officers and men, according to the report of Captain Paynter of Her Majesty’s ship Donegal, was one hundred and thirty-three.4 Her officers numbered twenty-six, leaving for her crew one hundred and seven. Temple, in his affidavit, makes the total number of enlistments on board the vessel, during her entire cruise, one hundred and eleven. Of these, two deserted at Melbourne and two died on the cruise, leaving the number of men on board when she arrived at Liverpool the same as stated by Captain Paynter. According to the same affidavit, the total crew on board, when the Laurel left her at Desertas, including those that originally came on the Sea King and those upon the Laurel, was nineteen. Twelve joined her from the crews of the captured vessels previous to her arrival at Melbourne; but two of these deserted there, leaving, as the aggregate of her crew on her arrival, and before any new recruitment, only twenty-nine men, and with the officers then on board, fifty-four. The officers which left Liverpool on the Laurel numbered twenty-four. One, Lieutenant Whittle, went by the Sea King, and one joined from a whaling-vessel captured in the Arctic Ocean, giving her, when she finished her cruise, twenty-six.5Recruitment of men at Melbourne.
As has been seen, Commander King, when he visited her upon her arrival at Melbourne, reported her as having seventy men. Of course he got his information from the officers, who were not likely to give the number smaller than it actually was. It would not do to make it much too large, because “the paucity of the crew” was such as to attract the attention of the officer.6
The Consul at Melbourne, in writing to Mr. Adams on the 26th of January, the day after her arrival, mentioned the fact that her crew, all told, consisted of seventy-nine men.7 But his knowledge at that time must have been derived from rumors in circulation; he had no means of verifying the statement himself. On the 10th February, Captain Payne, secretary of the naval board at Melbourne, who visited her at the request of the Governor, said in his report, “there appeared to me [Page 120] to be about forty to fifty men on board, slouchy, dirty, and undisciplined. I noticed also a great number of officers, and could not help remarking that the number appeared out of all proportion to the few men I saw on board.”1
Silvester, in his deposition, as printed among the documents submitted in evidence, says that when the Laurel left her the crew, including officers, consisted of twenty-three men.2 This is undoubtedly a mistake. It may have been a clerical error in the original draught of the deposition or in transcribing.
It is clear, therefore, that when the Shenandoah reached Melbourne she was short-handed, and that an increase of her crew was absolutely necessary to make her an efficient vessel of war. Even after the additions she received at Melbourne she continued short-handed. Captain Nye, the master of the ship Abigail, captured on the 27th of May, says:
The Shenandoah, at the time I was taken on hoard, had a full complement of officers, hut was very much in want of seamen. * * * At two different times during the first ten days that I was on hoard, all hands, and my own crew besides, were obliged to he up all night working the ship in the ice. The officers and crew complained of being short-handed, and my own men were urged to join her.3
Thirty-eight men were shipped from the crews of vessels captured after leaving Melbourne, and seventeen of these were from the Abigail.4 These made part of the one hundred and seven on board when the Shenandoah arrived at Liverpool.
As early as the 1st of February the Consul set about bringing the fact that she was short-handed to the knowledge of the government, and he commenced procuring affidavits, and employed his counsel.5
On the 2d of February he left with the chief clerk of the law-office of the Crown, in the absence of the Attorney-General and the Minister of Justice, affidavits of three persons; on the next day he called in person, with his solicitor, upon the Crown Law-Officers: on the next day, the 4th, he handed in two other affidavits; and on Monday, which was the 6th, he and his solicitor called again, in pursuance to an appointment made, and produced seven additional affidavits.The colonial authorities informed of the contemplated recruitments, and do not prevent them.
In nearly every one of these affidavits, among the other important facts developed, is the one that during the entire cruise previous to her arrival at Melbourne, great efforts were made by the officers of the Shenandoah to increase their crew by the enlistment of men from the prisoners taken on the different prizes. For that purpose such as would not join were put in irons.6
At this interview the Consul was given to understand, in fact, as he said in his dispatch to Mr. Seward subsequently, the Law-Officers “seemed to admit that she would be liable to seizure and condemnation if found in British waters; but would not admit that she was liable to seizure here, unless she violated the neutrality proclamation while in this port, and if she did they would take immediate action against her.”7
From this it appears that the same doctrine prevailed among the Law-Officers [Page 121] of the Crown at Melbourne, which had permitted the escape of the Florida at Nassau.
Although that doctrine is now repudiated by Her Majesty’s Government, it was known at the Foreign Office as early as the 16th of September, 1862, that the Florida had been released at Nassau upon that, ground, and that ground alone. It was a doctrine that had a most important bearing upon the constantly recurring attempts at the evasion of the laws of Her Majesty by the insurgents; but it does not appear to have been considered of sufficient importance to justify instructions from Her Majesty’s Home Government to any of the numerous Law-Officers of the Crown upon whom the responsibility of these prosecutions “in so great a measure rested.”
The United States agree with Her Majesty’s Government when it says, as it does in its Counter Case, that it should not be, and they hope it is not, in the power of Her Majesty’s Government to instruct a judge, whether in the United Kingdom or in a colony or dependence of the Crown, how to decide a particular case or question. No judge in Her Majesty’s dominions should submit to be so instructed; no community, however small, should tolerate it; and no minister, however powerful, should ever think of attempting it.1
But the United States cannot but think the Law-Officers of the Crown occupy a different position, and that when Her Majesty’s Government sees so striking an error prevailing among those whose duty it is to conduct the judicial proceedings, by means of which international obligations are to be enforced, it is not only the right of the Government, but its imperative duty, to correct the error, and see to it that such important rights are not again “admitted” away, to the great injury of a nation with which Her Majesty was at peace. A judge whose duty it is to decide may not be instructed; but a mere agent whose duty it is to present a case for decision may be. If such an agent fails in his duty or errs in his opinion, and such error or such failure in duty is likely to be repeated by the same or other agents, it is neglect in a government if it fails to attempt, at least, to prevent the repetition, and if the repetition should affect other nations the government must answer for the consequences.
But accepting this doctrine of the Law-Officers for the time being, the Consul on the 9th of February forwarded to the Governor the affidavits which he had already presented to the Law-Officers; and on the 10th he sent the affidavit of John Williams, who swore that on the 6th February, when he left the ship, “there were fifteen or twenty men concealed in different parts of said ship, who came on board since said Shenandoah arrived in Hobson’s Bay; and said men told me they came on board said Shenandoah to join ship. That I cooked for said concealed for several days before I left. That three other men, in the uniform of the crew of the said Shenandoah, are at work on board of said Shenandoah, two of them in the galley, and one of them in the engine room. That said three other men in uniform also joined said Shenandoah in this port. That I can point out all men who have joined said Shenandoah in this port.” This was received by the Governor at 3.30 p. m. of the 10th, and he made an order that it be referred to the Attorney-General.”2
On the same day Captain Payne, who had been instructed by the Governor to report upon the vessel, among other things, informed him that there appeared “to be a mystery about her fore-hold, for the fore-man [Page 122] of the patent slip, when asked to go down to that spot to measure her for the cradle, was informed he could not get to the skin at that place. The hatches were always kept on, and the foreman states that he was informed they had all their ‘stuff’ there.”1
On the 13th February the following reports were forwarded to the “honorable the chief secretary” of the Colony:
Detective Kennedy reports, in reply to certain questions submitted to him for inquiry on the 11th instant:
First. That twenty men have been discharged from the Shenandoah since her arrival at this port.
Second. That Captain Waddell intends to ship forty hands here, who are to be taken on board during the night, and to sign articles when they are outside the Heads.
It is stated that the captain wishes, if possible, to ship foreign seamen only; and all Englishmen shipped here are to assume a foreign name.
McGrath, Finlay, and O’Brien, three Melbourne boarding-house keepers, are said to be employed in getting the requisite number of men, who are to receive £6 per month wages and £8 bounty, &c.
Peter Kerr, a shipwpight, living in Railway Place, Sandridge, stated about a fortnight ago, in the hearing of several persons, that Captain Waddell offered him £17 per month to ship as carpenter. A waterman named McLaren, now at Sandridge, is either already enlisted or about to be so.
The detective has been unable, up to the present, to collect any reliable information as to whether ammunition, &c., has been put on board the Shenandoah at this port, or whether arrangements have been made with any person for that purpose.
(Urgent.) For the chief commissioner’s information. C. H. Nicholson, superintendent.
Mr. Scott, resident clerk, has been informed, in fact, he overheard a person represented as an assistant purser state, that about sixty men engaged here were to be shipped onboard an old vessel, believed to be the Eli Whitney, together with a quantity of ammunition, &c., about two or three days before the Shenandoah sails, The former vessel is to be cleared out for Portland or Warrnambool, but is to wait outside the Heads for the Shenandoah, to whom her cargo and passengers are to be transferred.
Superintendent.2
- Russell to Lyons, Am. App., vol. i, p. 37.↩
- Am. App., vol. vi, pp. 29 and 182.↩
- Am. App., vol. vi, p. 29.↩
- Ibid., p. 30.↩
- Ibid., p. 31.↩
- Ibid., p. 30.↩
- Testimony of Prioleau, Am. App., vol. vi, p. 186.↩
- Ibib.↩
- Am. App., vol. vii, p. 72.↩
- Am. App., vol. i, p. 336.↩
- Brit. App., vol. ii, p. 133.↩
- Brit. App., vol. ii, p. 138.↩
- Am. App., vol. vi, p. 174.↩
- Adams to Russell, Nov. 20, 1862, Am. App., vol. i, p. 666.↩
- Am. App., vol. iv, p. 446.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 504.↩
- Am. App. Counter Case, p. 897.↩
- Ibid., p. 904.↩
- Am. App. Counter Case, p. 916.↩
- Am. App., vol. iv, p. 531.↩
- Bullock to Memminger, and other correspondence, August 23, 1864; Am. App., vol. vi, p. 169.↩
- Am. App., vol. vi, p. 560.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 495.↩
- Ibid., p. 496.↩
- Am. App. Case, p. 1144.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 495.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 486.↩
- Am. App., vol. vi, p. 556.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 492.↩
- Am. App., vol. vi, p. 558.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 477.↩
- See Temple’s affidavit, Brit. App., vol. i, p. 701; inclosure No. 2, in Mr. Adams to Earl Russell, ibid., 379.↩
- Am. App. Counter Case, p. 1145.↩
- Am. Case, p. 82.↩
- Brit. App., vol. 1, page 294.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 667.↩
- Ibid., p. 667.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 696: Am. App., vol. vi, p. 698.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 477.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i. p. 484.↩
- Blanchard to Seward, Brit. App., vol. i, p. 584.↩
- Am. App., vol. vi, p. 588.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 499.↩
- British App., vol. i, p. 500.↩
- Am. App., vol. vi, p. 698.↩
- Ibid., p. 630.↩
- Brit. Case, p. 144.↩
- Brit. App. Counter Case, vol. v, p. 68.↩
- Am. App., vol. vi, pp. 589 and 659.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 500.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 515; Brit. Case, p. 146.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 594.↩
- Brit. App., Counter Case, vol. v, p. 61.↩
- Am. App., vol. vi, p. 697.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 499.↩
- Ibid., p. 675.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 701.↩
- Ibid., p. 499.↩
- Ibid., p. 589; Brit. Case, p. 156.↩
- Brit, Case, p. 155.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 598.↩
- Am. App., vol. vii, p. 93.↩
- Temple’s affidavit, Brit. App., vol. i, p. 702.↩
- Am. App., vol. vi, p. 590.↩
- See protest Captain Nichols, Brit. App., vol. i, p. 589; affidavit, Bruce, ibid., p. 594; Colby, ibid., p. 597; Silvester, ibid., p. 598; Jones, ibid., p. 599; Ford, ibid., p. 601: Brackett, ibid., p. 602; Bollin, ibid., p. 603; Sandall. ibid.; Scott, ibid., p. 604; Lindborg, ibid.↩
- Am. App., vol. vi, p. 530; Brit. App., vol. i, p. 585.↩
- Brit. Counter Case. p. 77.↩
- Brit. App., Counter Case, vol. v, pp. 107. 108.↩
- Brit. Case, p. 155.↩
- Brit. App., Counter Case, volv, p. 108.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 646.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 647.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 536↩
- Brit. Case, p. 150.↩
- Brit. Case, p. 151.↩
- Brit. App., Counter Case, vol. v, p. 110.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 647.↩
- Brit. Case, p. 152; Brit. Counter Case, p. 96.↩
- Am. App., vol. vi, p. 626.↩
- Am. App., vol. vi, p. 627.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 526.↩
- Speech of McCullock in the colonial assembly, Am. App., vol. vi, 666.↩
- Brit. App., Counter Case, vol. v, p. 112.↩
- Ibid., p. 113.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 596.↩
- Ibid., p. 546.↩
- Ibid., p. 614.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 615.↩
- Ibid., p. 621.↩
- Ibid., p. 532.↩
- Lord Blanchard, Brit. App., vol. i, p. 617.↩
- Affidavit of Bobbins, Am. App., Counter Case, p. 115.↩
- Brit. App. Counter Case, vol. v, p. 120.↩
- Ibid. p. 121.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, pp. 701, 702.↩
- Brit. App. Counter Case, vol. v, p. 108.↩
- Ibid., p. 117.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 616.↩
- Am. App., vol. vi, p. 683.↩
- Ibid., p. 684.↩
- Ibid.↩
- Ibid., p. 685.↩
- Brit. App. Counter Case, vol. v, p. 119.↩
- Brit. App. Counter Case, vol. v, p. 120.↩
- Affidavit of Captain Nye, Am. App., vol. vii, p. 92.↩
- Affidavit of W. G. Nichols, Am. App., vol. vii, p. 102.↩
- Am App., vol. vi, p. 698.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 614.↩
- Ibid., p. 520.↩
- Ibid., p. 529.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 530.↩
- Ibid.↩
- Ibid.↩
- Ibid., p. 615.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 617.↩
- 2 Am. App., vol. vi, p. 698.↩
- Brit. App. Counter Case, vol. v, p. 85.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 674.↩
- Ibid., p. 640.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 517.↩
- Ibid., p. 641.↩
- Am. App., vol. vii, p. 97.↩
- Affidavits collected in Am. App., vol. vii, pp. 92 et seq.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 509.↩
- Am. App., vol. i, p. 631.↩
- Am. App., vol. vi, p. 595.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 295.↩
- Am. App., vol. vii, pp. 94, 95. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 693.↩
- Brit. Case, p. 157.↩
- Brit. App., vol. i, p. 653.↩
- Ibid.↩