You will observe in the communication to which I refer a confirmation of
the views heretofore expressed in my dispatches; and as this testimony
comes from sources known to be favorable to the past administration in
Cuba, which until within a month or two have concealed and denied the
facts now confessed and disclosed, it is safe to assume them as a basis
for the obvious reflections they suggest.
Appendix B, No. 388.
[Translation.]
[From La Epoca, Madrid, June 18,
1872]
LETTERS FROM CUBA.
When it is generally understood that patriotism consists in hiding
the truth and spreading error, in inventing victories and concealing
disasters, sad and embarrassing, indeed, is the position of a
correspondent who holds the firm conviction that the story of the
rebellion of Yara, for forty-four mortal months, has been a lie, and
nothing less than a lie; a farce, and nothing less than a farce; a
deception, and nothing less than a deception.
To be ignorant of the extent of the evil, and to seek to apply a
remedy thereto, is an absurdity; and the national government has
never known the extent of the evil because it has been, willfuly
concealed for the purpose of leading the nation to believe that it
would be completely extinguished within a given time; that it would
be overcome with given resources, and, above all, that the greater
part of the road had been already safely passed, and that but one
final step was needed to grasp the laurel crown of victory.
This system has cost the peninsula the eighty thousand men it has
sent us, and the treasury of this province sixty or seventy millions
of dollars, three-fourths of which it owes. This system has cost the
peninsula much gold and many tears, much blood and mourning.
Why has this course been so systematically followed? It has been
followed because private interests have ever overshadowed the public
good; because noisy intrigues have been more potent than silent good
faith; because ambition has sought companionship and aid in vanity
and greed; because petulance has overruled prudence. Some have grown
rich under this system, but the nation and the province have
suffered, and we have given our enemies the chance to smite us in
the face with the continued vitality of the moribund
insurrection.
The “year V of the Cuban republic” is a sambenito (robe of infamy) for the valor of our soldiers
and sailors, for the sublime abnegation of our volunteers, and for
the drospless patriotism of all Spaniards on either side of the
ocean. And we wear this sambenito still,
because, when your correspondent cried for thirty thousand soldiers
to be sent at once, and fearlessly showed the obstacles to a
restoration of peace, others called the rebellion mere brigandage,
and the camps of the enemy mere picket-stations, and said that we
only had to close our hands to crush between our fingers those who
hid their impotence in the wildnesses of our forests. May God pardon
these false prophets all the evil they have wrought, for they should
never hope for pardon from the outraged justice of the nation.
I have felt this preamble necessary, in order that I may enter with
less embarrassment on the subject-matter of my letter.
I said in my last, of the 30th of April, that we had made little or
no progress since November, up to that time, and to-day I am forced
to say that we have gained nothing—absolutely nothing—from that day
to this. Within the vast domain, seventy leagues in length and
thirty-six in breadth, which stretches from the trocha (cross-path) to Las Tunas, and from sea to sea,
Ignatio Agrimonte marches freely with his Cama-giieyans; Villamil
leads his skirmish bands, and Vicente Garcia guides his mountain
rangers, re-enforced by a band of deserters. Each of these bands is
composed of some three hundred or four hundred men, half naked, but
generally well armed, and now abundantly supplied with munitions of
war. They only face our troops when they have an overwhelming
advantage. They oftenest seek to wear them out, because fatigue
[Page 558]
thins our ranks more than
bullets. Powerless to carry out operations of any importance, they
have strength enough to keep the troops from moving in columns less
than two hundred strong; they hold our detachments in check, and
prevent agricultural operations from being carried on outside of the
military lines. This is the state of Camagüey, and he who says the
contrary either does not know its true situation, or does not wish
it to be known.
In the eastern district, moving from place to place at will, are
Cespedes, the so-called government and house of representatives,
Modesto Diaz, Maximo Gomez, Figueredos, Calixto Garcia Yiiiguez,
Inclau, and several other leaders, with a number of followers which
neither I nor any one else can fix, but which our extreme optimists
estimate at four thousand. These forces, which always occupy the
fastnesses of the Guantanamo chain, and the hills of Santiago de
Cuba and Jiguani, have established a system of rotation in such a
way, that, supposing that Modesto Diaz quits the neighborhood of
Holguin, he goes by way of Mayaré to Guantanamo, Santiago de Cuba,
Jiguani, Manzanillo, Bayamo, and Las Tunas, to return to Holguin
while other forces occupy in succession the points he abandons,
although with some irregularity. It is needless to say that these
pre-arranged marches also take place in the reverse direction.
The pirate steamer Edgard, recently seized at Kingston, has been set
at liberty, and has landed the arms, munitions, and filibusters she
carried on the Guantanamo coast. A gun-boat met her and fired into
her, but at the first discharge her cannon became useless. Could
there be a greater misfortune?
Having thus hastily sketched the military situation, which has been
in no wise bettered by the winter campaign, I turn to the financial
question, which has grown worse in a most notable manner. Pounds
sterling were yesterday sold at 27¼ premium at sixty days’ sight;
bills on Spain at 17; francs at 12; and gold bills on the United
States at 14. Thus much for exchange. The premium on gold has here
reached 12 per cent.; and discontent is general among the poorer
classes. Much alarm exists, since a turbulent demonstration against
the money-brokers, and even against the bank, is apprehended. I
repeat the rumor, but I think that nothing unpleasant will occur,
since, although there are ungovernable elements (discolos) always ready to create disturbances, the great
majority are anxious to maintain order. It is indispensable,
absolutely indispensable, that the Cortez should immediately decide
the economical question of Cuba, and that it should be settled in
such a way that twenty or twenty-five millions in gold may be
speedily sent here to replace an equal amount in bank notes, since
this is the only remedy.
I shall now treat of the captain-general. The latter has quitted his
encampment at El Canto, just as the house he was building there was
completed, and has gone to Santiago de Cuba. From that city he has
dated his resignation, which goes by to-day’s mail, founding it,
according to my information, on the fact that he has not been able
to restore peace to the island within the time he himself had fixed.
I have not read his resignation, and consequently I cannot vouch for
the terms in which it is couched; but I am told that he says that,
if the government will retain him in command, he will finish up
matters very soon; that the hopes of the enemy have been kept up by
the prospect of his recall; that Las Villas, Sancti Spiritus, and
Camaguey are already pacified, and that there are only three or four
hundred bandits left in the eastern district. I have been told this,
but I am far from believing it, for it seems to me every way
impossible that the Count de Valmaseda, who knows better than I what
is going on in Camaguey, should announce its pacification, still
less that he should reduce to three or four hundred bandits the
three or four thousand which exist in the eastern department. The
Count de Valmaseda has proclaimed to all the world that, conqueror
or conquered, he would resign the 30th of May, and quit the island
immediately, and it is impossible that he should not keep his word.
In view of his resignation, it is necessary that the government
should send us a general capable of cutting this military,
economical, and political Gordian knot.
I have already said that the true remedy for the monetary crisis and
the rates of exchange is to bring hither twenty or twenty-five
millions of dollars in gold; but this would help us very little if
the expenses of the contest should render indispensable fresh
emissions of treasury notes.
If the strife is much longer protracted, want of confidence will
become greater, and the gold which might come in on one hand would
go out on the other, without our feeling the good effects of its
presence.
It is high time that the government should leave off temporizing here
and there, and, rising to the due height of its mission, command
what it may deem expedient, and make its commands obeyed. The
immense majority in this island, and the bulk of its generous
volunteers, almost without exception, desire nothing but a lasting
peace, the maintenance of order, respect for authority and for
honest men, and will stand by any government which has no other
criterion than that of law, and is firmly disposed to dispense
justice.
This is the general wish, the only popular wish, and the day that it
is fulfilled will give us a better Island of Cuba than we had at the
breaking out of the rebellion.
