Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress with the Annual Message of the President, December 2, 1872, Part I

No. 21.
Mr. Clapp to Mr. Hunter.

United States Legation,
Buenos Ayres, June 12, 1872. (Received July 26.)

No. 15.]

Sir: I. have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the dispatch from the Department of State?. No. 8, bearing date April 19, 1872, directing me to keep the Department fully apprised of anything which may take place in relation to the apprehended designs of Brazil and the Argentine Republic to appropriate portions of the territory of Paraguay, and thereby endangering its independence. Since sending dispatch No. 5, bearing date February 13, 1872, I have learned nothing of importance bearing upon this subject until within the last week.

I have just obtained, and send to the Department of State by this mail, an appendix to the annual report of the Argentine minister of foreign affairs, containing the recent correspondence of this republic with the government of Brazil on the Paraguayan question. I also send a condensed translation, cut from the Standard, of the principal dispatch contained in the above-mentioned report, which, although very defective, gives some idea of its import. This dispatch of Minister Tejedor, dated April 27, 1872, to which, I am informed, no answer has yet been received, makes several specific and very grave allegations against the government of Brazil, of violating the terms of the treaty of alliance made at Buenos Ayres at the beginning of the Paraguayan war.

It is a very common belief here that Brazil encouraged the Paraguayan government to refuse to acknowledge the claims of this republic to the territory of the Grand Chaco, although she had distinctly acknowledged and agreed to sustain these claims in an article of the above-mentioned treaty of alliance. It is also very evident that under the conditions of the recent treaty with Brazil the independence of Paraguay is little more than a myth. She has surrendered all the territory that Brazil claims that is of any value. She has acknowledged an indebtedness to Brazil of a war indemnity of an amount that is probably twice as large as the total value of property in all of Paraguay, which is equivalent to a practical mortgage on her existence as a nation which can be foreclosed at the pleasure of Brazil. She has accepted a virtual protectorate, in that Brazil guarantees the maintenance of her present government for a term of years, and agrees to maintain an army in Paraguay for that purpose.

As to the probability of a war resulting between Brazil and this republic there is great difference of opinion. Ex-President General Bartolomé Mitre has been appointed on a special mission to Brazil. In an interview which I had with him last evening he expressed great confidence that the differences would be peacefully arranged, and that Brazil would make good all the obligations that she had undertaken in the treaty of alliance. Still, considering the extreme nature of those obligations in contrast with her action in the matter of the Paraguayan treaty, her supposed encouragement to Paraguay to resist the claims of the Argentine Republic to the Grand Chaco, and the very strong allegations of Dr. Tejedor’s published dispatches, it appears that she is placed in an exceedingly equivocal position.

It has been suggested that one object of Brazil in sustaining the claim of Paraguay to the Chaco is to prevent the execution of a project which has been laid before the Argentine and Bolivian governments for constructing a railroad from Bolivia through that wilderness to the banks of the Paraguay, thus destroying the monopoly which she enjoys of the tropical productions of the valley of the La Plata. It has also been suggested to me by persons whom I understand to be familiar with the views of this government that Brazil regards with much anxiety the probable course that may be taken by the United States, and that the recent change of Brazilian representatives between Washington and Buenos Ayres had in view the presence at Washington of a gentleman who was thoroughly acquainted with affairs of the river Plate countries. I am convinced by this, and by remarks made by General Mitre in the interview of last evening, at least that this government is very anxious to have the moral support of the United States in the present emergency. As to the nature of the territory of the Grand Chaco I respectfully refer to my dispatch No. 5, of the 13th of last February.

As to the justice of the Argentine claim, Paraguay took no part in the war of independence. Her independence was never acknowledged by the viceroyalty of Spain nor by the South American republics until a very late date; and was only obtained by the isolated and peculiar position of her territory, situated between the Paraguay and Parana Rivers.

Bolivia and the Argentine Republic claimed, and apparently established, their claim to the whole of the right bank of the Paraguay by their long and successful war with Spain, but have never agreed on a boundary-line.

Under the viceroyalty Jesuit missions were established in the Chaco; but they have long since disappeared. The elder Lopez established a French colony at Ville Occidental. This was protested against by both President Urquiza and Bolivia; but they were not in a position to enforce their claims.

Señor Benites, minister of foreign affairs of Paraguay, is now in this city on a special mission, of the nature and probable results of winch. I have received no information. In an interview with him I took occasion to speak of the earnest good wishes of the United States for the future welfare of Paraguay, and said that I should be glad to learn any facts with reference to the recent treaty made with Brazihand other matters connected therewith, with a view of communicating the information to the honorable Secretary of State, taking care to explain that my remarks were entirely unofficial. Señor Benites replied that, although he might expect that the United States minister would communicate with his Government upon a matter of this nature, he would nevertheless, with much pleasure, explain the views of his government in an unofficial manner. He was much pleased with the friendly interest of the United States Government toward his unfortunate country. He and his government had always considered the United States as their best friend; that some cession of territory had already been made to Brazil, viz, that portion north of the river Apa, which, however, was comparatively worthless; that this cession had been made because the demands of Brazil could not be opposed by Paraguay in her present condition; but that it does not in the least affect her independence as a republic.

With regard to the Grand Chaco, he said that it had always belonged to Paraguay, and that the attempt on the part of the Argentine Republic to wrest it from her would not be submitted to, as it would seriously affect her independence. He spoke with much feeling and eloquence upon the subject of the late war, by which his country had been ruined, dwelling principally upon the fact that a sister republic was the prime mover in the matter, and had leagued with an empire to crush Paraguay.

Señor Benites is certainly mistaken in his statement that the Argentine Republic was the prime mover in the late war.

Brazil had been for a long time endeavoring to induce her to join in declaring war, but Yiscount Paranhos, the Brazilian envoy, who had come here for that purpose, had completely failed in his mission, and had returned to Rio, when the news of the seizure of the Argentine steamers and the invasion of the province of Corrientes by Lopez, without previous intimation of war, forced this republic to make the alliance with Brazil.

I trust that the Department will not consider that I have transcended ray duty in seeking this unofficial interview with the Paraguayan minister.

A memorandum of our conversation has been forwarded to Hon. John L. Stevens, at Montevideo.

I have made every effort in my power to obtain reliable information, and shall not fail to keep the Department advised of everything of importance that may occur, before the arrival of a minister resident.

I am, &c,

DEXTER E. CLAPP.

[Inclosure with dispatch, No. 15.]

Buenos Ayres, April 27, 1872.

Mr. Minister: Your note of February 3 only reached me on the 23d of said month, explaining the reasons of the separate treaty by your minister at Asuncion.

Your note of March 22, in reply to mine of February 15, suffered a still greater delay. Both have caused my government a painful impression. In the first you forget the protocols of Buenos Ayres, and seek to repel newspaper criticism by trying to justify separate treaties, not only for limits but for matters of mutual interest. We might, if we chose, pass over the first note without discussion, but that it serves to explain the course of the dispute. Let me trace the same in that spirit of friendship which becomes the representatives of two nations, until recently united in defense of their honor and right.

The history of broken treaties is nothing new in the world, but the triple alliance compact seemed so clear as to preclude one-sided interpretation, the commencing clauses, from the first to the seventh articles, being of a transitory nature, but all the rest permanent. The stipulations regarding the war were to cease with it, and up to Article 7 no shadow of doubt could arise; the first seven articles, being purely of an offensive alliance, in virtue of which the Argentine government never hesitated, even when fortune was against us, our treasury empty, and strong opposition rising up, which might have well excused us if we entertained an idea of retiring from the contest and leaving our allies to themselves. But the succeeding ten articles have no reference to the war, but to subsequent contingencies, and imply collective fulfillment.

Articles 8 and 9 stipulates that the allies [not one only] shall respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Paraguay for five years.

Article 11 says, that the allies shall arrange among themselves, after the overthrow of Lopez, such measures as may insure the free navigation of the Parana and Paraguay.

Article 12 reserves for the allies to settle such steps as may insure peace with Paraguay hereafter.

Article 13 declares that the allies shall duly appoint plenipotentiaries to conclude treaties and conventions with the new government of Paraguay.

Article 14 stipulates that the allies shall make Paraguay pay the cost of the war.

Article 16 says that the allies, to prevent troubles on the question of limits, are entitled to require the Paraguayan government to conclude with the respective allied powers definitive treaties of frontiers on the bases herein laid down.

Article 17 guarantees the allies mutually that the treaties and conventions concluded with Paraguay shall be faithfully fulfilled, until which event the alliance is to stand in all its vigor.

Article 17 further engages that, if the Paraguayan government fail to carry out its agreement with any of the allies, the others shall lend their forces to oblige the fulfillment.

Article 15 stipulates that the allies shall determine by special convention the mode of paying for Paraguay.

Article 8 says that Paraguay must not demand the protectorate of any of the allies.

Article 10 expresses that any concessions from the government of Paraguay must be common to all the allies.

You say it is absurd to suppose that Brazil should have to ratify a treaty of limits between this republic and Paraguay, or Vice Versa.

The objection of absurdity can have no weight against written compacts. Meantime the alliance-treaty was ratified by all the legislatures and governments, and the limits therein expressed. The protocols of Buenos Ayres made the conventions about limits, separate acts, but stipulated, as your note confesses, that the allies were to proceed of accord, either separately or conjointly.

You say that our plenipotentiary wanted the allied governments to maintain that the territory expressed in Article 16 belonged to this republic before arranging with Paraguay. This is not correct, but when your envoy, without rhyme or reason, demanded a revision of the protocols, the Oriental minister, and then the Brazilian, said the alliance had nothing to say with the definitive treaties. Dr. Quintan a fouud it impossible to make his views prevail, and retired.

All our envoy had wanted was to carry out the alliance treaty unaltered. Neither is it true that we delayed the treaties two years; after the conferences of Buenos Ayres the unexpected absence of the Brazilian minister caused the delay. We were always ready to accede to any invitation on your part, even when the war of Entre Rios was on our shoulders. Nor did we want you to impose our limits on Paraguay, nor to shut out Bolivian pretensions, but merely to recognize the obligations of the triple alliance, which were then for the first time questioned. Any dispute with Bolivia was quite a matter for ourselves. Where, then, was the difficulty about admitting Dr. Quintana’s request?

But the spirit of your note is the most painful of all; forgetful of the alliance and our common triumph, you think Paraguay justified in attaching importance to the Chaco limits. As yet we had no complaint from Bolivia, but you, our ally, officiously tell us of her claims and side against your ally of yesterday.

As regards your note of March 22, it is well to remind you that national sympathies have no fixed date.

The battle of Ituzaingo did not make us enemies forever, nor the overthrow of Rosas allies. But the triple alliance was a pledge of confidence between us, for the influence of battles lost or won.

You say it was notorious that the Chaco question would prevent a definitive treaty, but this does not appear from any document.

The agreement of June 20, 1.870, in Buenos Ayres, applies equally to Brazilian or Argentine limits with Paraguay. You had your question of limits with Paraguay pending since 1856, and now you wind it up all of a sudden.

The secret of this miracle is that you had 3,000 men in Paraguay territory, backed by a strong fleet. It was neither loyal nor noble of you to leave out in the cold the ally who was in the same position as yourself, but without the army and fleet.

You have questions of limits pending with all the republics around you, whereas we are so conciliatory that our patience with our neighbors amounts to longanimity.

You talk of your generosity to Paraguay in ceding your claim to the territory between the Igurey and the Igatemy, which the alliance-treaty gave you; but it never was yours by right, and always belonged to Paraguay. And how do you know but we should have made concessions to Paraguay likewise, if the negotiations were proceeded with?

You say the alliance remains, but do you mean for the purposes only of the war? The treaty shows there are also purposes which should have maintained us united until a definitive treaty.

Now, you make a distinction between bases and their development which seems futile. You offer us the faculty to make separate treaties with Paraguay, which you will guarantee, but we do not want your guarantee. If the alliance cannot make good our rights, the republic has, herself, sufficient power to enforce them.

The separate treaty is an infraction of the whole alliance-treaty, and your occupation of Paraguay after the treaty is a violation of the protocols of Buenos Ayres, besides being a permanent cause of jealousy which, sooner or later, must end in war.

In the conference at Buenos Ayres it was agreed, “When peace is restored the Argentines and Brazilians shall evacuate Paraguay in three months.”

We only kept a small guard at Asuncion; you had an army and navy, besides able diplomatists resident there, who had bought up the local papers.

You stipulated for Paraguay to pay you your war expenses; how, then, are we to be paid? Article 15 of the alliance said we were to arrange this by previous convention.

Meantime we trust in the wisdom and moderation of your cabinet yet to come to an arrangement, as we should regret to see the alliance knocked on the head after so many common glories.

You ask us whether the allies are expected again to make war on unhappy Paraguay if our pretensions be ignored? But your compassion for that country is something new, since you persistently refused to forego, as we suggested, any claim against Paraguay for the cost of the war.

What is the desert of the Chaco in value, compared to the enormous sum that you have obliged Paraguay to recognize as war expenses?

You profess to wish to uphold the alliance, and when passing through this city you had two conferences with me, and were so enthusiastic as to say that the arrangement I proposed should he carried out, even though an adverse dispatch came from Rio Janeiro. Yet the Asuncion treaty was ratified in Brazil seventeen days after your arrival. It would be hypocrisy on our part were we to conceal the profound grief your note causes us, or accept your explanations as satisfactory. The alliance-treaty is at stake. We expect your frank concurrence to uphold it, in return for our loyalty to it during seven years. But if the death-knell of the alliance has been rung, we still have confidence that the future will always be favorable to those nations, weak or strong, which never depart from the strict line of duty, at the promptings of self-interest.

Permit me to renew my assurances.

• CARLOS TEJEDOR.
• The Foreign Affairs Minister,
  Rio Janeiro.