Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session of the Fortieth Congress
Mr. Romero to Mr. Seward
My Dear Sir: I have the honor to remit to you various articles from the principal daily papers of Paris, published during the late days of November last, in which there is very ably discussed the important question, Who is the responsible party, in France, for the ill results which the Mexican adventure has had? The semi-official press treats of throwing the responsibility on the opposition and on public opinion, while the independent journals attribute it to the Emperor Napoleon.
I gladly avail of this opportunity, sir, to repeat that I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
Hon. WilliAM H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.
The Mexican empire.
The expedition to Mexico was inspired by a grand and generous thought, and under the circumstances in the midst of which it was carried out, was a political conception as ably prepared as energetically conducted. That England and Spain should associate themselves, from the outset with France, must have been because they comprehended that the higher interests of civilization and of justice called upon them to go so far to avenge the wrongs done to their subjects. The three allied powers well knew that there was something else to be done in Central America besides calling for an ephemeral reparation. They wanted to obtain, through the establishment of a strong regular government, essential guarantees against the revolutionary powers which, through all time, have been in conflict in those countries, and against the cupidity, hidden or avowed, which, by invasion of South America, might destroy the equilibrium of the whole world.
[Page 501]France has been left alone in this work worthy the ambition of a great prince and a great people. Sagacity counselled perhaps to follow the course of the English and Spaniards, and to withdraw upon an appearance of satisfaction, without having secured anything in the present or settled anything in the future; but honor demanded energy, and, as always, when the flag of France is unfurled, honor alone is listened to. At the close of some triumphant military movements, the French army entered Mexico a short time afterwards, and were received as liberators by a population which had long grieved in disorder and anarchy; and the Mexican nation, restored to freedom of thought, solemnly consulted, restored again the empire of Mexico amid the plaudits of Europe. The work of France then found for its accomplishment a mind bold in initiative, strongly imbued with the great ideas of our times, a strong mind, a brave heart, a choice intellect in the Archduke Maximilian of Austria. Impartial posterity will justly appreciate the self-devotion of this prince, who, braving difficulties and dangers, accepted the crown of Mexico and undertook to found, in a policy of order, of peace, and of progress, the future of a country whose past history had been so brilliant. If he has not been able to accomplish the noble self-imposed task, he will at least enjoy the ineffaceable honor of having generously undertaken it. He was, in fact, permitted to believe in his success. The French army protected the Mexican throne, restored by the national vote, and all respectable men, all conservative interests, grouped themselves around Maximilian to aid and sustain him in his task. But at this moment, it must be admitted, an unlooked-for movement of opinion showed itself in France. The public mind grew restless under the possible consequences of our intervention in Mexico. The feeling of the country, of which the opposition took hold with much skill, pronounced itself markedly each day more and more tor the recall of our troops and the prompt closing up of this distant expedition. It was a regretable error. No serious danger then menaced the expeditionary army, nor the empire of Maximilian. No one would have dared to address to our country a humiliating injunction; and, as long as our flag sheltered the Mexican territory, no foreign power would have dared to intervene. But the public sentiment which arose among us had, beyond the ocean, an influence easily to be foreseen. It encouraged the hopes of all enemies of the Mexican empire, and discouraged the confidence of all its friends. The discontented found, within and without, gatherings on which they had not reckoned; conservatives, disquieted about the future, ceased to act in favor of the imperial government, fearing to commit themselves further, and all the force that sustained the Mexican throne vanished at once. We avow, with a feeling of sadness which we do not seek to dissemble, that this was a fatal solution of this grand experiment; but, at any rate, let us not aggravate it by regrets or by unjust appreciations. The responsibility for the actual condition must not be placed in the wrong quarter.
The Emperor’s government had conceived a grand affair; had pursued its realization with a perseverance worthy of the grandeur of the purpose and an elevation of views worthy of the policy of France.
The army, on its part, had accomplished its mission with its traditional bravery. In Mexico it added new laurels to its crowning glory. It retires not before any conquering enemy, nor any menace. It leaves Mexico because a controlling will prevents it from finishing its work. This will is that of the country, which on all occasions has expressed a wish to put an end to the Mexican expedition. It is that opinion which governs public authorities and the sovereign, and which, according to an august expression, “must always carry the final victory.” Such is the truth; and if it be possible to look at it without sadness, it should at least be looked upon without passion. But whatever be the issue of this glorious enterprise of civilization and of national regeneration, we cannot too much honor the generous prince who consecrated his most devoted efforts, and that noble woman—that touching empress Charlotte—whose griefs and sorrows have shaken her fine intelligence. These vast misfortunes cast a funeral veil over the close of the Mexican empire, but leave no place for anything but respect and sympathy in all quarters.
The Responsibility.
The art of mixing up questions, and of casting upon others the responsibility for one’s own acts, truly, at this time, makes astonishing progress. The journal of France which understands how to bedeck the reader with garlands, and bind with flowers the temples of the victims he is going to sacrifice, attempts to-day to play a scurvy trick on public opinion. He seeks to make it responsible for the ill success of our intervention in Mexico.
To listen to La France, the government happily conceived and admirably conducted this adventurous enterprise, which would have succeeded if public opinion, interpreted by the journal and deputies of the opposition, had not encouraged the hopes of the enemies of the Mexican empire, and discouraged its friends.
Even to-day public opinion alone must be responsible for the evacuation of Mexico; the opposition must bear the burden of the evils which fall on Maximilian. Was this not public [Page 502] opinion ? The government always, to believe La France in the matter, would have persevered and carried out the task undertaken.
Here we perceive the tactics, and La France scarcely takes the trouble to conceal it. “History,” says it, “disengaged from the prejudices and passions of contemporary time, will certainly do justice in the end to the great purpose of which this great enterprise was the medium.” Therefore, when history shall be written the check of Maximilian, the ruin of Mexican bondholders, the cordial understanding between the United States and France compromised, so many millions spent, and so many lives sacrificed for the regeneration of Mexico, so many errors committed—all these will revert to those who from the first cried out, with as little success as Cassandre of old, “No interventions, no distant expeditions.”
In the name of history, which is invoked, we cannot allow such allegations to pass without protesting against similar allegations. La France speaks of public opinion absolutely as does L’ Etendard, and quite as justly. If public opinion is the cause of the present evacuation of Mexico; if the votes of the citizens are sufficiently listened to now, so that after four years’ of heroic, yet powerless efforts, the field is left open to Juarez, why has this public opinion, so well heard when the heavens were overcast, been so little attended to by the journal La France, when at the commencement of the embarcation it foresaw the storm and predicted the tempest ?
Has the journal La France, yes or no, approved the expedition ? Yes or no has it boasted of the infraction of the convention of La Soledad? Has it or not attacked with vigor the journalists and the deputies, who, through forecasting patriotism, maintained that the result of the enterprise would not compensate the risks ? Is it not still La France which, notwithstanding the affirmations of M. Rougher, has done everything to convince the holders of Mexican bonds that they had made a good investment; that the sad recitals of the situation of Mexico were false, and that at all events the government had, in respect of them, come under moral obligations ?
And after holding this language for years La France attempts to decline responsibility for events, and throws it altogether on other shoulders. No, a hundred times, no. At the outset we invoked the principle of non-intervention, and we placed our finger on the perils of the enterprise. The campaign commenced; we, accepting the situation made for us, indicated the best measures for consolidating, if the thing were possible, the throne of Maximilian. When this throne was cracked throughout, we asked that the country should not, suffer too much from this catastrophe, and in recommending to treat with Juarez we have, in all conscience, shown the best way to pursue to secure the safety of French interests still connected with Mexico.
During this time what has this journal La France done ? Exactly the contrary to what we were doing; praising what we blamed, blaming what we praised; putting aside our propositions as Utopian, and doing the indignant when, in our devotion to the country, we spoke of treating with Juarez.
“The responsibility for the present situation,” said La France, “must not be placed in the wrong quarter.” That is our opinion. Let La France therefore take it on herself, and not endeavor to make it fall upon public opinion, assuredly very innocent of the mishaps of the emperor Maximilian.
The Mexican expedition has twice failed of its purpose; it failed at first with the three powers which undertook it in common; then when the French government, refusing to ratify the convention of La Soledad, alone continued the war begun by three, and took under her protection the empire raised on the ruins of the republic. This double check the opposition had not only foreseen, but had announced. However, it maintained reserve, abstaining from reprisals too easy to be made, when it was unexpectedly called forth by the inconceivable accusations of La France. It was not possible to suffer the parts to be thus changed, and we were obliged, in recalling the facts, to cast back the responsibility for this expedition on those on whom it rests entirely. La France calls that denigration, and adds: “Nothing-is more sad than this system of denigration in view of the checks on our policy.”
What is sad is to see writers who, by their imperturbable approbation of an undertaking which miscarried and brought about such disastrous checks, descend to such controversial expedients, and seek to turn the bearing of opinion. If they think to embarrass us they are mistaken, and so long as they do not get tired of misstating facts, we shall not weary of reasserting them.
The provocations of La France place us between two difficulties: to stir up or smother the discussion. We would avoid the one and the other, but we would, in recalling facts, prevent a deceit upon public opinion, and a change of parts.
At the outset the expedition was concerted between France, England, and Spain. What, did those three powers want ? To appearance they had one common and avowed object; in reality each a purpose privily entertained, and indeterminate at least as to the means of attaining it.
[Page 503]The common and avowed object was indicated by the very terms of the convention. The three powers had to claim from the Mexcan government reparation for numerous and divers wrongs, and observance of engagements contracted and guarantees for the future. They did not bind themselves to acquire any portion of territory, or to seek any special advantage, nor to exercise any peculiar control over the domestic affairs of the republic, nor to make any attempt against the right of the Mexicans to choose the form of their government, and to administer it as they understood it.
On the first arrangement the agreement was easy and might last: vagueness and doubt begun with the second understanding. In fact, to declare that the Mexicans should be left to make choice of their form of government, was to say that they regarded the government of Juarez as less regular than the future government, such as might be that which afforded the surest guarantee.
In this second arrangement lay the germ of difficulty of disagreement, each of the three powers being entitled to interpret it differently, according to its opinions or private wishes. Two things are equally incontestable: First, the three powers thought the presence of the allied troops would lead on to a rising of the people and the subversion of the government; next, it was evidently privately understood that the civil war in the United States should be taken advantage of to found in Mexico a government able to check the expansion of the great republic, suspected of wishing to absorb Mexico and Central America, at least as far as the isthmus of Panama.
England, who only thought of the preponderance of her commercial interests, left to the others, according to her wont, the greater part of the expense and responsibility. Spain, who made pretension to play the leading part, dreamed of making Mexico one of her dependencies, and if the throne should be restored in Mexico, of placing a Bourbon thereon. The French government, if it wished a monarchy, certainly did not want it for a Bourbon, which soon dissipated the views of Spain, and explained the strange part which General Prim made his troops play.
The three governments were alike deceived in their expectations. The inventors of the candidature of the Archduke Maximilian had announced as certain a general pronunciamiento; but the country did not stir, and, as General Lorencez acknowledged in his order of the day at Pueblo, the resistance surpassed all anticipations; consequently, the calculations settled upon being found mistaken, it was necessary to think of new combinations, and to change the natural current of the expedition.
Then it was that the opposition accentuated its protests, its notices, and called the government only to follow up “reparation of its wrongs.” All was useless. The counsels of wisdom and sound policy were considered as acts of systematic hostility, as a want of patriotism. The majority of the legislative body, by votes, the official journals, royalist and clerical, by their approbation encouraged the government to follow up the expedition alone. Thus encouraged the government went to extremes; our army entered Mexico, the monarchy was re-established, and the Archduke Maximilian mounted the throne of Montezuma. To-day he is on the way to Miramar.
La France pretends that the opposition should glory in revindicating a share of responsibility in this great check. Why! a part in the responsibility for an enterprise which it blamed in its first days, of which it pointed out the dangers, announced the result, and against which it has never ceased to protest. You don’t speak seriously. If the expedition had succeeded you would have reproached the opposition for its false calculations, its predictions confuted by events; you would have claimed all the glory for yourself. Well, then, keep all the responsibility for the check, for it is not you that it weighs upon exclusively.
La France persists in charging upon our check in Mexico the shortcomings of the country The enterprise was “grand,” and the government had the honor of it; the winding up was “sad,” and the fault of this lies on the French people. Power “nobly sacrifices its wishes to the nation from which it emanates;” but those projects were unimpeachable; nothing was wanting to their success but agreement of opinion. “Even now, should our soldiers return from their glorious expedition before the purpose is gained for which the enterprise was planned, it is because public sentiment has spoken out in the chambers and elsewhere in a sense contrary to keeping up our intervention,”
Here you have what is well understood. All the annoying anticipations of public opinion have been realized; nevertheless, it is that which is wrong; it is that public opinion which has done all the mischief. The responsibility for the present state of things must not be misplaced. The government of the Emperor had conceived a great thing; it pursued its realization with perseverance worthy of the grandeur of the purpose, and with a loftiness of views worthy of the policy of France.
The army, on its part, had accomplished its mission with its traditional bravery. In Mexico it gathered fresh laurels around the crown of its glory. It has not fallen back before any conquering enemy, nor in presence of any menace; it leaves Mexico because a higher will has uttered the wish that a term should be put to the Mexican expedition.
[Page 504]So the matter admits no doubt; not only is it public sentiment, perceived by the opposition, which, expressed out here for the recall of our troops, has caused the “vanishing at once of all the forces that sustained Maximilian;” but it is opinion, even opinion alone, that invited the withdrawal of our soldiers. This withdrawal is not brought on by the recognition of our powerlessness to found anything in Mexico; even at this hour, by maintaining our intervention, we might achieve a glorious end for the expedition, and would incur no danger. But public opinion has pronounced for the recall of our intervention, and the authority inclines to it; only as opinion has not had in this sense any legitimate reason which draws it out, either from the interior of Mexico, or from the possibility of foreign complications, or any other considerations, it follows that the wish of the country is purely a caprice, and an inexplicable caprice. The French people has shown itself unworthy of understanding and carrying through this great enterprise of civilization. Honor to every one, even Maximilian who flies; but it must be imputed as a regretable error to the nation this want of courage, this fatal winding up!
Such is the way they reason in a country of universal suffrage, and are astonished to hear us say that such language is an injury to the country. “History freed from contemporaneous prejudices and passions, will certainly do justice,” France says, “to the great aim of which this glorious enterprise was the means.” What, then, will history say of the people which refused association with this “grandiose attempt,” except that it was a nation cowardly and degenerate? We supplicate La France to advance for us a little the hour of history, and not deprive us any longer of our appreciation of the voluptuous pleasure of admiration so rare in these days. Let her show us the great aim, admirable yet concealed, for which the expedition to Mexico was to be the means; let us know this unknown plan; let her show it written out in authentic documents; let her produce these official papers, of which history will have need to judge of this mysterious conception; let her, in fine, tell us under what solemn circumstances, through what authorized organ, the government invited the nation to concur in its vast projects by making them known to it; for, if the nation was ignorant of them, how can you reproach it for not having adopted them with enthusiasm ? If the recovery of some debts and reparation for some injuries have been the sole causes assigned by our authority for the expedition, is that the reason why public opinion could divine the hidden causes? She has predicted what has happened. In return for all your splendid prophecies, “which,” do you say to us, “has been realized? ”
There is a dictum to express that which opinion has always felt and always said since the outset of the Mexican affair: “The game is not worth the candle.” The expression is vulgar; but who can now say that the expression was not apt and just ? The “last victory,” you say, must always be carried by opinion. Is that enough? And who does not see that this triumph comes too late when produced, after a manner, at the last moment ? Who does not see that it is opinion that should carry things before it at once, and that it is necessary, in order that it be manifest in season, to count upon checks and mistakes, and to meet them all, those popular freedoms without which it rests unknown and powerless ?
But no! rather than draw conclusions from the event, you prefer to say that opinion went astray; the error belongs to it and not to you. Ah! you know well the fortune of Cassandre; but the fable itself has not told us that after the fall of Troy there were still Trojans weak enough to wonder at the wooden horse, and to jeer at the daughter of Priam.
[Enclosure No. 5.—From the Journal des Debats, November 28.]
It would be high time to write dispassionately about the Mexican question now that fate has pronounced, and that it might be considered as almost within the domain of history. But really it is putting the patience of the enlightened portion of the community to a test far above its powers to frame, as has just been done, a regular indictment against the French people, whose faltering, we are told, has upset and disconcerted the grand designs of its government. A little memory is sufficient to enable the public to ascertain that popular opinion is no more answerable for the issue than for the outset of that undertaking, and that on that question, as on all others, the government was left wholly unfettered. The votes of the chamber are there to prove it. The truth is that public opinion, warned by that marvellous instinct of self-preservation which communities possess in the same degree as organized beings, felt alarmed at the consequences of the Mexican expedition, at the very time that that expedition was exposing us to a serious risk, which no serious interest justified the country in incurring. The French public watched at first with more curiosity than apprehension the attempt that was being made to found an empire in Mexico, and to establish an Austrian archduke on the Mexican throne. Without feeling any degree of interest in the regeneration of the Latin, or rather the Indo-Latin, races in that distinct region, without feeling the slightest desire to reduce to subjection a new Algeria, at such a distance from our coasts, the French public at first viewed with patience the Mexican expedition, regarding it as a kind of costly and risky experiment, which might possibly turn out well. That which changed the public feeling, which abruptly ended that relative indifference, was the aspect of the United States, relieved of the cares of their civil war, their open hostility toward the [Page 505] Mexican expedition, and their determination to oppose it. There can be no doubt that the sudden apparition of such an adversary would only have acted as a stimulant on public opinion, and roused the national spirit among us, if the French people had really thought that their interests or their honor were involved in the success of the Mexican venture. But the idea of going to war with the United States to solve in our own way the philosophical question of the regeneration of the Latin races, or the equally idle question of the relative advantages of a monarchy over a republic, was not calculated to become popular, and induce France to submit to such a heavy sacrifice of blood. It is from that day that popular opinion, deeply roused, was able to exercise indirectly some influence on the decisions of the government. But let us be just. Even if that influence had not existed, the final resolve of the French government would have been the same, for the simple reason that it never contemplated founding Maximilian’s throne at the cost of a war with the United States. It is, therefore, insincere to say that it is the nation which restrained the government, which was certainly wise enough to restrain itself. Instead of charging the nation with faltering, when, after all, it has done nothing to recommend and approve a retreat so necessary that it would be carried out even if public opinion were so ill advised as to disapprove it, why not acknowledge that the Mexican undertaking was founded on two opinions, both of which events have shown to be wrong ? The first was that the great majority of the Mexican population would be favorable to the new empire, and that the dissidents could be reduced without any great difficulty; the second—which was far more important as to the future prospects of the undertaking—was that the American Union was hopelessly destroyed, that the south would beat the north, and would form a bulwark for the new empire. These were the conditions on which the success of the empire depended. But while the first was secondary—as with time, blood, and money, the Mexican dissidents must have been reduced to submission—the second was vital, as the idea of founding an empire at the gates of the resuscitated United States, and at the cost of a war with them, could never have entered any mortal head. In fact, fate has now pronounced, and it may be stated that if Maximilian’s abdication be only dated yesterday, the real date of his fall goes back to the capture of Atlanta and Charleston, and to the surrender of Richmond. His fall was even foreshadowed by the two despatches by which England and Russia refused to join the French government to propose a mediation and an armistice between the federals and the confederates. The failure of the Mexican expedition rests, therefore, on two errors of judgment, from which the expedition originated. Illusions were entertained as to the internal state of Mexico, and as to the probable issue of the war in the United States. That it would have been better not to have made these two mistakes all the world agrees: but there is a newspaper which allows itself to be mastered by its zeal to such a degree as to pretend that if the expedition failed it is the country that is responsible for the blunder. It is enough to reply to that paper that it is mistaken, and that no one labors under that mistake but itself.
A lesson.
About ten months since La Presse, discussing the Mexican question with La France, the latter journal maintained that the expedition had fully completed its purpose, that purpose never having been to found a monarchy in Mexico, but only to obtain reparation from that government without scruple. La Presse in vain protested. On the approach of the debates in the legislative body, La France thought necessary to give the Mexican enterprise these moderate proportions. At this day, on the contrary, it is La France, taking the opinion sustained by La Presse ten months earlier, declares that the expedition to Mexico was a means, and that the end was very different.
In truth, this controversy, which might have had an interest in the month of February, 1866, has only an historic interest in the month of November, for whatever the purpose it matters little to know, because the purpose failed.
Was it proposed only to protect our countrymen, and to realize the pitiful sums due us from Mexico? The object has certainly failed, for Mexico, in this month of November, J866, owes more than she owed us in the month of November, 1861: and as for our countrymen, exclusive of their having died in five years a much greater number by war, connected with yellow fever, than would have died in twenty years of civil discord in Mexico, it is difficult to believe that in the future they will be better protected, more liked, more respected than they were before.
If it were purposed to re-establish in Mexico that clerical party, which, after having disturbed it for more than forty years, went out of power in 1857, and was definitively stricken down in the last months of 1860, the object again failed, for hardly had we reached Mexico, accompanied by the principal leaders of that party, than we were obliged to turn it out rudely from the control of affairs.
Was it intended to found a monarchy in the midst of republican America ? The return of Maximilian shows plainly enough how that succeeded. Was it purposed, in fine, to oppose a barrier to the ambition of the United States, and to the expansion of the Anglo-Saxon race [Page 506] in the New World? Was it, in a word, the application, by means which are not our own, of the intercontinental policy, which we object to ? The precipitate departure of Mr. Campbell and General Sherman, the alliance more intimate than heretofore between the Mexican United States and the United States, show sufficiently that we have not succeeded.
What, then, remains to us for these five years of efforts and sacrifices ? There remains one precious thing—a lesson.
To France the Mexican affair teaches that a policy of intervention is powerless, and the system of permanent armies full of peril. To the government it teaches the sterility of the juste milieu system.
The policy of intervention has not anywhere been exercised so actively as in the Hispano-American republics. The ministers of European powers accredited to those republics had no other occupation than to plead the wrongs of their countrymen. Often government yields to avoid a conflict. Sometimes it resists, and ends in those military demonstrations which So often occur. But those demonstrations are powerless. This is demonstrated in the history of Mexico for twenty years, and if it be decided to act more energetically, you come to those blind alleys with no outlets which are called the conquest of Algeria and the expedition to Mexico.
The only reasonable thing to do is, therefore, once for all, that our countrymen, in expatriating themselves, act at their own risk and perils; that they accept in advance the chances, good or bad, of expatriation; that they have, in consequence, no aid to expect from citizens who, not running the chances of the happy accidents of such enterprises, don’t expect to suffer the ill consequences; and this declaration should be absolute in the interest of all; in the interest of those who, in self-expatriation, will make for themselves no dangerous illusions; in the interest, above all, of France, who will not risk being drawn by her generosity into enterprises of no result. But that this policy should in earnest be adopted, a declaration is not sufficient; there must be a sanction; there must be disarmament.
To desire that a government should maintain a large army, and to require that it should remain inactive, is to require what is absurd and impracticable. It is to require what is absurd, because if you want a good army, it must be inured to war, and that it may be inured to war it must be that with intervals of five, ten, or fifteen years, which pass between two great European wars, there are lesser wars which keep the army in breath. It is to require what is impracticable, for a government with an army cannot leave it inactive for a thousand reasons which all the world understand very well. There must, therefore, be room for the manoeuvring of this military force and an off-drain for its need for action. Under the government of July, there was Algeria and Abd-el-Kader; under the second empire, there is Mexico and Juarez. Frankly, where is the difference ? Has Mexico cost more men and more money than Algeria ? No, only Mexico borders on the United States, while Algeria borders on Morocco; that is all the difference. Suppose that Algeria bordered on a state as powerful as North America, it would have been abandoned long ago. Suppose Mexico had for neighbor only a state powerless as is Morocco, how many good reasons there would have been for remaining there.
Those journals which wish the maintenance, the extension of armaments—armed peace, in a word—and which cry out bitterly against the expedition to Mexico, the Siècle, the Opinion Nationale, the Temps, who declare themselves partisans of the policy of intervention, and yet blame intervention in Mexico, are simply inconsistent. If the government had not its hands full with Mexico, they would probably have dragged it into Poland. Frankly, what would France have gained thereby, and in what respect is it less glorious to go and protect our countrymen in Mexico than to go and protect the Poles in Poland ? It is less dangerous, that is all. In what regards the policy of intervention, the lesson is therefore complete. It is not the less severe on the juste milieu. What were the two radical policies to be adopted toward America? On one side was our policy, that of non-intervention; on the other side, the policy set forth in the letter of 3d July, a policy having for object to found in the Gulf of Mexico a powerful state, becoming the centre of the Spanish republics, and opposing a barrier to the expansion of the Anglo Saxon race in the New World. Good or bad, our policy was precise; good or bad, the policy of the 3d July had the merit of being a policy, and we do not even say that it would not have been grand, imposing.
One policy having been put aside, what did sound logic counsel ? It counselled to follow up with resolution the policy of the 3d July.
From the moment of action in an interest opposed to that of the American Union, the day should not have been waited for when peace, re-established by the capture of Richmond, would permit the cabinet at Washington to call upon us for the evacuation of Mexico. It was logic to recognize the southern confederacy; it was not logical to place the new government we were founding in Mexico in an impossible financial condition, and, in place of authorizing loans which would not have given her more than 30,000,000 disposables, it was necessary to guarantee a suitable loan. It was sound sense to say resolutely to the country: This is what you have to do; the indefinite aggrandizement of the North American republic appears to be to us a danger as great as the ambition of Russia. We went to stop Russia at Sebastopol; we go to Mexico to interpose a dyke to the American fleet. For this we need many men and much money, for If France is not bound to undertake everything, [Page 507] she is bound to succeed in what she does undertake. The moment is opportune, for the dissensions in America furnish us an excellent opportunity; the object is grand, it only needs the means to be in proportion to the object. The government we-may found there must not be in dependence on a French general. We must give it the resources necessary for the organization of an immense country, whose natural resources are considerable, but whose disposable resources are nothing. In this way, would the undertaking have succeeded ? It is difficult to say after the affair is over, but we sincerely think it. We believe that if, in 1864, at the moment when Doblado and a great many of the liberal leaders offered to rally round the empire, there had been in Mexico a government independent and furnished with sufficient resources, it could have been sustained. How many years it would have lasted we do not know.
What changes it might have undergone we know not, but in any event it would have been founded, and the object of the expedition would have been achieved. In place of that, we adopted half-way measures. It has been said in the newspapers that Mexico had an organized army, and a well-balanced budget. Twenty-five thousand men were sent to Mexico when fifty thousand were needed to pacify that country; two insufficient loans were allowed to be made, in place of guaranteeing at once in good faith a loan which would have yielded abundantly at low interest the indispensable amounts. There is what La France has never ceased to praise, for it is the triumph of the policy of between two. When Mr. Jules Favre advised to make a finish of Mexico by giving it up to itself, and when Marshal Forey advised making an end of it by sending out a sufficient army, La France found fault with these two extreme opinions. “Neither re-enforce nor abandon,” said that paper; “a little action, and abandon at the end, that is policy.” When we said don’t lend money to Mexico, and when we said: “Don’t authorize indirect loans and inadequate to usurious charges, but lend all that is wanted or don’t lend at all; guarantee the loan or don’t guarantee it,” La France cried out: “Wilful men, be silent, the truth is in the between two conditions. You are wrong to be willing not to lend to Mexico anything, and you are wrong to be willing to lend her too much. You know you are wrong not to authorize a loan; you know you are wrong to guarantee one. It should be a small loan and a half-way guarantee.” And yet at this day it is La France that boldly puts forward this question: On whom rests the responsibility for the check ? The check ! It is on you, only on you. It lies not on the army, always victorious in Mexico; it is not on Maximilian, wanting in adequate financial resources; it is not on us. who have never ceased to protest; nor even on the primitive idea of the expedition; it rests on the between two policy, which enervated the action of government without stopping it, and which, in place of having an understanding with the opposition to blame the undertaking, only allied itself with the idea of the government to render it powerless, by counselling half-way measures in a business where the choice lay between inaction and action the most resolute. That won’t hinder the juste milien from declaring themselves the only political spirits of the age, but will the lesson profit the government or the country ? In such case, costly as it may be, we shall not count it too dear.
Public opinion.
The journals which counselled the Mexican expedition, and afterwards wished it should continue in place of adhering to the convention of La Soledad, are naturally much embarrassed in view of the results obtained. That which might best happen to us after five years of efforts and sacrifices is to obtain to-day the same benefits, the same guarantees, which were effected for us in 1861, and which then were repelled with disdain. There would still be a difference in favor of the convention of Soledad, because in 1861 we treated directly with the Mexicans, while at this day the United States will mix up in the contract in a manner to establish indisputably their controlling influence over Mexico.
A war undertaken for the purpose of placing a barrier against an invasion of the New World by the republicans of the North will then have had for result definitively the hastening of such invasion.
This is sad beyond doubt, and we understand the journals which counselled the expedition must be annoyed at the responsibility they have incurred: but what is almost laughable is the effort they are making to throw this responsibility on public opinion, which at first favoring the enterprise, afterwards manifested fears which did not permit the government to finish a work the success of which was assured.
La France, who sustained the argument against Le Temps, would be obliging if she would let us know by what signs she recognizes the satisfaction or discontent of public opinion.
If we adhere to the letter of the constitution, public opinion has no lawful interpreter other than the legislative body; but we would like to know what difference there was between the approving votes of 1862, of 1863 and of 1864, and the approving votes of 1865 and 1866. Is [Page 508] it that the white ballots cast into the urns by honorable memlers should change their significance from one year to another ?
Is it that wishing to say in 1862 “We approve your policy,” the same ballot would say in 1865 and 1866, “Your policy frightens us ?” Upon what might one judge that the ballots had so changed their signification, and that “yes” no longer means “yes?” La France would be still more embarrassed to explain that she is not embarrassed in justifying the advice she has been giving for five years.
The truth is, the lawful expression of opinion is constantly brought out in the same way; there is not a day when an attempt is not, made to oppose the continuation of the Mexican expedition. The majority approved in 1862, when M. Billault, answering to Jules Favre, declared they could not be content with the treaty of Soledad, but had no thought of establishing an empire in Mexico; the majority has remained unshaken; since our troops have gone through a thousand perils, M. Thiers said, with, reason, that the only wise thing to do was to treat with M. Juarez.
The majority could not longer hesitate when they saw the establishment of the empire of Mexico give contradiction to the assertions of M. Billault. The majority has remained compact when a clear-sighted opposition anticipated difficulties between France and the United States. The majority, the lawful organ of opinions, has then fully, confidently, incessantly shared in the responsibility of the enterprise, not merely in its primitive conception and in its general bearings, but also in its various phases.
Thus, of these two which compose the chambers, one has been clear-sighted, the other has deceived itself. The constitutional opposition was not blinded for a single day; from the beginning it foresaw the issue, and has every year given counsels that might soon close the enterprise. In 1862 it voted for the treaty of Soledad. In 1864 it proposed to treat with the Mexican government; it has always combated the idea of the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico. While it was counted in favor of this establishment on the triumph of the confederates over the federal cause, the left side never ceased to foresee the triumph of the Union, and while illusions were entertained on the sentiments of Mexico and its immediate resources, the left never ceased to dissipate those illusions by stating the facts precisely, and producing the figures. Which of the two constitutional fractions of the chambers has given proof on this occasion of the greatest discernment and of true political skill ? Has it been the fraction which voted with M. Jules Favre and M. Thiers, or the fraction which voted afterwards on the counsels of M. Billault and M. Rouher? Such is the question as it stands, and such it is well to place it before electoral France.
As for me, “if entry to the chamber through the gate of official candidature, to go and take my seat on the benches with the majority, I had for five years approved the divers phases of the expedition, I should reason thus: I thought I did well. I would say I have no reproach of conscience in voting with M. Billault and M. Rouher. I thought I voted in the interest of the country; but I see I was mistaken, for I voted in 1862 with M. Jules Favre, and in 1865 with M. Thiers; I would have spared my constituents many useless sacrifices and the government many a mortification. The conservative interest is therefore not that I always vote according to ministerial speeches; it means that I sometimes vote in accordance with the opposition. Perhaps politicians, who are themselves perfectly at home in Mexican affairs, sometimes give some foresight to the examination of questions of finance and the discussion of domestic questions. I shall this year listen to them with more attention, give them more confidence, and in some cases vote with them.”
That is what I would say if I was a member of the majority, and if I was an elector voting for the official candidate I should reason in an analogous manner.
I have voted for the candidate my prefect recommended; being conservative, I thought I acted judiciously. I have been told a liberal chamber will prevent the government from doing great things, and I have been willing to give to the government all its initiative privilege for whatever great things have been done since 1863, and which would have been hindered by the opposition of the chamber. I have sought a good deal in vain; I don’t see; I see no great victories, nor in fine does the aggrandizement of Prussia pass for a victory of France, nor great public works, nor exceptional prosperity. On the other hand, there is the expedition to Mexico, which has cost the life of many young conscripts, which has cost myself the value of more than two Mexican bonds, to say nothing of public outlays in which I have taken part, and for consolation I see myself on the eve of being called out to drill in the landwehr. If in place of voting for the official candidates we had voted for the liberals, should we have been worse off? I should have saved the amount of my two bonds, I should not be going to drill in the landwehr. But what less would I have in territorial grandeur and material prosperity? What is there, that I do not ? In what have I weakened the government? I don’t see that, either.
What is the upshot of all this ?
The conclusion is that the discussion between La France and Le Temps to find out what responsibility rests on public opinion for the Mexican check is without cause in a country which, having the right of suffrage, is fully self-possessed.
La France is wrong when attempting to attribute to a change of opinion a check to an enterprise which had the constant approval of the legislative body.
Le Temps is alike wrong when it attempts to shift off from the country the responsibility which does rest upon it. It is necessary that an electoral country should well understand [Page 509] that it has not the right to complain. Having had the power to stop what was doing, it has become fully responsible from what has happened by not preventing it. It should not be that of this country, free in its vote, it should be said, “It is the fault of the government.” It should be told severely, “It is your own fault, for a government based on universal suffrage necessarily yields to the will clearly expressed by the country, so that, in place of sending a majority favorable to the foreign policy of the government, you should have sent a majority, equally constitutional, but opposed to the policy of intervention, and the government would have abandoned these projects.”
So settled, the Mexican check will appear to the people such as it really is: a moral victory of constitutional opposition to the majority, a victory of prudence over devotedness.