Mr. Seward to Mr. Asboth
Sir: Your despatch of the 25th of March, No. 18, has been received. I learn from it that the Argentine government has not yet given you an answer to the tender of good offices which the United States have made to the belligerents in the Paraguayan war. While the delay is regretted, your proceedings in regard to that matter are approved.
You have informed me of the proposition which you submitted to Admiral Godon, that he should furnish you facilities to secure a personal interview with Mr. Washburn, our representative at Paraguay, with a view to the same proposition of peace, and of the decision of the admiral that he could convey despatches only, thus virtually declining to convey yourself to the vicinity of Mr. Washburn’s residence. You have also informed me that the admiral thought it not inconsistent with his duty to hold such communication with the Brazilian minister at Buenos Ayres as to afford ground for a report that he had so arranged with them that you should not hold the personal interview with Mr. Washburn which you desired.
Mr. Washburn, in a recent despatch, has brought the same facts to the notice of this department.
In connection with this subject it seems to be expected by yourself, as well as by Mr. Washburn, that this department will define the proper relations subsisting between the political representatives of the United States and the naval officer commanding the United Spates squadron in the South Atlantic.
I think proper, therefore, to say on this occasion that, in regard to so distant a theatre as that in which the Paraguayan war is carried on, it is not possible for the government of the United States to foresee distinctly at any time the future course of military and political events, and so to anticipate possible emergencies. For these reasons it is inconvenient to give specific instructions for the government of either its political representatives or its naval agents in regard [Page 177] to merely possible contingencies. Powers concerning political questions, as distinguished from naval affairs, are intrusted to the care of the ministers of the United States, and the President’s instructions are communicated by this department. Responsibilities of a peculiar character are devolved upon the commander of the squadron, and the President’s instructions are conveyed through the Navy Department. It seldom happens that political and naval instructions, which may bear upon such mere contingencies, are in fact or practically can be harmonized between the two departments, each of which generally holds under survey a peculiar and limited field and knows of no special occasion to look beyond that field. If in any case it is foreseen that co-operation between a minister and a naval commander would be practicable and useful, that co-operation is distinctly commanded by the President. If, however, it is not foreseen that such co-operation would be practicable and necessary, or useful, the agent of each class is necessarily left to proceed according to his own discretion, within the range of the general instructions he has received from the department under which he is employed. It is expected that, in the absence of instructions, the agents of the two classes, if practicable, will confer together and agree in any unforeseen emergencies which may arise, and in regard to which no specific instructions for the common direction of both may have been given by the President.
There is no subordination of the minister to the commander of a squadron and no subordination of the commander of a squadron to a minister. It is always unfortunate that agents of the two classes are not able to agree upon a course to be adopted in an unforeseen emergency. But that inconvenience is less than the inconveniences which must result from giving authority to a minister in one state to control the proceedings of a fleet, of whose condition he is not necessarily well informed, and whose prescribed services are required to be performed, not only in the vicinity of the minister, but also in distant fields over which he has no supervision. Nor would it be more expedient to give a general authority to the commanding officer of a squadron to control or supersede the proceedings of political representatives of the United States in the several states which he might have occasion to visit.
You had no special instructions from this department to seek or hold an interview with the minister at Paraguay. Such a proceeding would have been exceptional, and Admiral Godon seems to have regarded it in that light. Your effort, however, is regarded as judicious and is approved as an exceptional proceeding, not within the customary range of your diplomatic duties, but altogether outside of that range. On the other hand, the President sees no reason to doubt that Admiral Godon’s proceeding, in declining to favor such a personal interview, was loyal and patriotic; nor does he perceive any reason for thinking it injudicious or unwise on his part, before deciding upon that matter, to confer with the Brazilian agents at Buenos Ayres. It is not every sinister misconstruction of a public officer’s proceedings that is to be received and entertained by the government. It is even now impossible, with all the information of which the government is possessed, to determine which party—yourself or the admiral—practiced the wisest and soundest discretion in the matter referred to. Meantime the emergency has passed, and the question has become an abstraction.
While, therefore, your own proceedings are approved, those of Admiral Godon are not disapproved. In all such cases it is eminently desirable that mutual confidence shall be maintained between the ministers and the naval authorities, that they co-operate where they can agree, and that they suffer no difference of honest and loyal judgment to produce alienation.
I have now to inform you that, without any reference to the subject which I have thus considered, Rear-Admiral Charles H. Davis has been heretofore ordered to sail from Boston in the Guerrière, to relieve Rear-Admiral Godon in [Page 178] command of the South Atlantic squadron. The Guerrière is expected to sail on the 1st of June, or within a few days thereafter, and the transfer of flags will be made at Rio early in July. Rear Admiral Godon will return to the United States in the Brooklyn, his present flag-ship.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
Alexander Asboth, Esq., &c., &c., &c.