Mr. Asboth to Mr. Seward
Sir: In connection with my report of the 8th instant, marked No. 12, containing a copy of my note, No. 5, addressed February 6th, to the Argentine minister for foreign affairs, with the proposition submitted by you on the part of the United States, to each of the belligerents in the Paraguay war, for the re-establishment of peace, I have now the honor to inform you that Señor de Elizalde has sent me, on the 18th instant, another evasive answer, a full copy of [Page 136] which, in the original Spanish, you will please find in enclosure A, whilst a literal translation of it I have the honor herewith to append, viz:
Office of Foreign Relations, Buenos Ayres, February 18, 1867.
M. le Ministre: Pressing business of the public service has prevented the government from taking into consideration your excellency’s note of the 16th instant, and from communicating to your excellency the resolution it has adopted of coming to an agreement with its allies as to the answer to that note, and whilst doing so to-day, I have to beg that your excellency will be pleased to excuse this delay.
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your excellency the expression of my highest consideration and regard.
RUFINO DE ELIZALDE.
His Excellency the Minister Resident of the United States of America, General Alexander Asboth.
Before the receipt of the above note, I deemed it proper to address, on the 16th instant, the following letter to Rear-Admiral Godon, United States navy, off Montevideo, viz:
Legation of the United States, Buenos Ayres, February 16, 1867.
Sir: On the 7th of this month I had the honor to transmit to you a duplicate of my official note, No. 5, addressed the previous day to the Argentine minister for foreign affairs, and requested that you would be pleased to place it in the hands of the Uruguay minister for foreign affairs, for the information and friendly consideration of his government.
From that note you will have perceived that the war, which has for some time been waging between Paraguay on the one side and Brazil, the Argentine Republic, and Uruguay on the other, is attended to with deep concern by the people and government of the United States, and that the President having been called upon by the House of Representatives to renew the efforts he had heretofore made for the promotion of peace and harmony in South America, has now submitted specific propositions to the several belligerents with a view to the speedy termination of the Paraguay war.
I therefore deem it of paramount importance that the diplomatic representative of the United States in Paraguay should not only be in full possession of the views and intentions of our government on the subject, but that he should also have the means of communicating with the least possible delay to the Department of State the manner in which the friendly offer of the United States mediation is received by the government to which he is accredited.
No information has reached me from the Hon. Mr. Washburn since the report of the 29th of December last, of his official letter dated the 25th of the same month, and I have in consequence thought it proper to state in my last report to our government of the 8th instant, marked No. 12, that should I remain longer without direct news from Mr. Washburn, I would request you, as the United States admiral on the station, to place a steamer at my disposal, and go myself up to Paraguay to exchange despatches and confer with Mr. Washburn in person, in order to further the carrying out as speedily and as fully as possible the instructions from our government and the spirit of the resolution of the United States Congress in regard to the restoration of peace and harmony in the La Plata and Parana republics.
The steamer which arrived yesterday from the seat of war failed again to bring me news from Mr. Washburn, and having received no reply whatever from the Argentine minister of foreign affairs to the propositions which I was instructed by the State Department to lay before the Argentine government, I have therefore the honor now to request, agreeably with my foregoing statement to our government, that you may be pleased to give your orders for my being conveyed by one of the United States steamers of your squadron, with as little delay as possible, to such a point up the river as will enable me to hold personal intercourse with Mr. Washburn.
Should the requirements of the service be compatible with your absence from Montevideo for a few days, I need scarcely add how much more agreeable would become to me the discharge of what I consider, in the actual complications of political affairs here, an imperative duty, if you would join the expedition and do me the honor to associate yourself with me in my endeavors to give prompt and full effect to the above views of our government, and in the prosecution of a negotiation as important as it is delicate.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. ASBOTH.
Rear-Admiral S. W. Godon, U. S. N., Commanding South Atlantic Squadron.
Under enclosure B, I have the honor to forward in continuation to enclosure B, with my report No. 12, of 8th instant, my daily notes of political events in [Page 137] the river Plata, from the 9th to the 24th of this month. And under enclosure C you will please find a series of well-written leading articles of the “Tribuna,” advocating strongly the acceptance of the United States mediation towards the restoration of peace and the dissolution of the alliance with Brazil.
From these notes and extracts, as well as from the contents of my several former reports on the Paraguay war, you will perceive that while not only an overwhelming majority of the people in the Argentine and Uruguay republics, but also the great mass of the people in Brazil are tired of the war, and anxious for peace. The Emperor of Brazil with his army and navy is pushing on the war with the utmost vigor, and is determined to attempt as soon as possible another decisive blow to crush Paraguay; and also that it seems to be the established policy of the Argentine government to continue to afford, in spite of the internal struggle that is convulsing the republic, its moral support at least to Brazil in a war which the resolution of the United States House of Representatives styles “destructive of commerce and injurious and prejudicial to republican institutions.”
In accordance with this policy, the Argentine government is manoeuvring to procrastinate the actual taking into consideration the offered mediation of the United States until Brazil, now in reality the only combatant in the field against Paraguay, is allowed sufficient time to strike effectively the long-aimed fatal blow at a republic exhausted, as it must be, in her isolation by the long protracted war of the triple alliance, and thus, in the event of the ultimate subjugation of Paraguy, removing all occasion for the friendly mediation of the United States, consolidate undisturbed monarchical preponderance in the La Plata and Parana regions, with, moreover, full commercial control over the interior of South America.
Under these circumstances, and in view both of the reported anxiety of the blockaded republic of Paraguay to accept the mediation of the United States and of the difficulty of our minister at Asuncion to communicate with your department, I venture to express the confident hope that you will approve of my above letter to Rear-Admiral Godon as being the only course left to me by which I could further the humane views of the United States government in support of the common interests of the distressed South American people at large.
It was while influenced by these sentiments that I received, on the 22d instant, an official reply from Rear-Admiral Godon, stating that he has given the subject-matter of my letter proper consideration, and proposes to come to Buenos Ayres for a day or two in the Shamokin, with the view of meeting my wishes, if possible.
While enclosing, marked D, a copy of the note of Rear-Admiral Godon, I beg leave to report that I had the honor of a visit from the admiral the day before yesterday, (23d instant,) on which occasion he informed me verbally that he could not comply fully with my wishes, but would make such arrangements as might enable me to send through a messenger the despatches from your department to our minister in Paraguay, and bring in exchange his letters for you and myself. I requested that he would be pleased to give me this answer officially in writing, but he deferred it to a future occasion. Yesterday I went to see him at his rooms, and requested again a written answer, so as to enable me to report to you on the subject by this mail. The admiral deemed it proper, however, to postpone once more his compliance with my request, on the ground of its being Sunday. I felt, I confess, greatly disappointed, believing as I do that each day’s delay will increase the troubles of my colleague, Mr. Washburn, and lessen the chances of a friendly mediation—the prayer of millions of sorrowing people who consider it as the safest move not only to bring the Paraguay war to a satisfactory termination but also to quell effectively [Page 138] civil war here and secure true internal peace and friendly harmony in South America for the speedy development of the untold wealth of its virgin soil.
The Nacion Argentina, (government organ,) in its number of the day before yesterday, (23d instant,) makes the following remark, which reads in English thus:
Persons thoroughly well informed confirm the version we gave yesterday concerning the negotiation of peace by the United States assuring us that the Imperial government has hastened to communicate to the Argentine and Oriental governments the pretensions of the United States, in order that the allied governments may concert the best manner of rejecting them. Indeed, the great reserve maintained with regard to the mediation leads to the belief that the allied governments are treating this matter very cautiously.
Admiral Godon told me yesterday of the assurance given to him by Señor Octaviano, in Montevideo, that if Brazil were to accept any mediation it would certainly be that of the United States, while the same high Brazilian functionary confidently asserted about the same time to Señor Don Benigno G. Vigil, the Peruvian chargé d’affaires at Montevideo, that if the allies should consent to a friendly mediation it would certainly not be to that of the United States, but to that of the Pacific republics, and this assertion was made after the representatives of the Pacific republics had simultaneously and solemnly protested against the provisioning of Spanish men-of-war in the ports of Rio de Janeiro and Montevideo.
I am authorized by Señor Blest Gana, the Chilian chargé d’affaires, and through him by Señor Vigil, to take, if thought proper, official notice of these conflicting assurances of Señor Octaviano, and as I do not consider it improbable that he may ere long represent the allies in Washington, I have deemed it incumbent upon me to inform you of the above circumstances.
Time, I venture to repeat, is what the allies are manœuvring to gain in order to enable Marshal Marquis Caxias to make another combined attack upon Curupaiti, which, as rumor says, he will attempt on the 6th of March, with a force reckoned in a supplement to the Brazil and River Plate Mail of January 22d, and by the Standard of the 23d instant, respectively, as follows:
There is no news of special importance from Brazil. The following is a list of the naval forces of Brazil at present in the Platine waters, as published by the Diario de Rio:
Steamers, 21; guns, 133; horse-power, 1,920; officers, 348; men, 1,898. Iron-clads, 9; guns, 47; horse-power, 1,680; officers, 178; men, 1,079. Gun-boats, 2; guns, 6; horsepower, 120; officers, 18; men, 77. Sailing ships, 3; guns, 26; horse-power, —; officers, 38; men, 197. Despatch boats, 5; guns, 3; horse-power, 1,300; officers, 95; men, 412. Total vessels, 40; guns, 215; horse-power, 5,020; officers, 678; men, 3.663.
IMPERIAL FORCES IN PARAGUAY.
The Brazilian army in Paraguay is reckoned up at 35,000 men. The naval strength consists of the following vessels:
Steam gun-boats, 10; guns, 67; horse-power, 980; men, 1,144. Steamers, 7; guns, 17; horse-power, 265; men, 520. Iron-clads, 9; guns, 47; horse-power, 1,770; men, 978. Bombs, 2; guns, 6; horsepower, 120; men, 95. Sailing ships, 2; guns, 5; horse-power, —; men, 69. Despatch boats, 5; guns, 5; horse-power, 1,300; men, 507. Total vessels, 35; guns, 147; horse-power, 4,435; men, 3,313.
In such a critical state of affairs I can but regret that Admiral Grodon should delay my communicating with Mr. Washburn, whilst he has a number of vessels at his disposal at Montevideo that can safely steam up the river at its present high-water mark.
In conclusion I beg to report relative to the revolution in the provinces of Cuyo that the attitude of Cordova, with its new inscrutable Governor Dr. Luque, is becoming daily more important; however, the cynosure of the eyes of the great mass of the people in San José, the home of the veteran General Urquiza, who remains still passive.
I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.
[Page 139]P. S.—After closing my mail for the packet steamer Arno, I called at noon on Rear-Admiral Godon, by appointment to visit with him his excellency the vice-president, when he handed to me a second note in answer to my above request of 16th instant, for a steamer to enable me to communicate in person with the Hon. Mr. Washburn. In this note the admiral states that he cannot as yet reply in detail to my referred communication, but takes the occasion to inform me that as soon as he reaches Montevideo he will order the United States steamer Wasp to this place, with instructions to receive any despatches I may have to send to Mr. Washburn, and then proceeding to Tuyuti, the headquarters of the allied army, obtain permission for an officer to pass and deliver said despatches to Mr. Washburn, waiting a sufficient time for any return communications he may have to send either to the State Department or to myself.
Thus Rear-Admiral Godon seems to coincide with me in the propriety of sending a steamer for the exchange of official despatches with Mr. Washburn, but is not disposed to lend himself to make it the occasion of my simultaneously holding an interview with our minister in Paraguay; and while I have the honor to enclose, marked E, a full copy of Rear-Admiral Godon’s note, I am really at a loss to account for this unwillingness on his part to assist in carrying out the double object I had in view, viz: the exchange of despatches and a personal conference with Mr. Washburn. So much the less can I understand his reluctance to facilitate my proposed interview with Mr. Washburn, since it would not have entailed upon him any additional risk, responsibility, or cost, whilst it would certainly have materially contributed to bring about an advantageous solution of the pending negotiation, more in conformity with the spirit both of your instructions and of the resolution of the United States Congress.
Although I feel well assured that the admiral is actuated, as I am, by the same sincere desire to promote the best interests of our government, nevertheless I deem it proper, while submitting without further comment our conflicting views to your decision, to request at the same time that you may be pleased to define for my future guidance the reciprocal duties and obligations incumbent upon ministers resident and admirals abroad under similar circumstances.