Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session of the Thirty-ninth Congress
Señor Romero to Mr. Seward
Mr. Secretary: I have the honor to transmit to you the English translation of a decree published in the Moniteur Universel of Paris, on the 13th instant, containing a so-called convention concluded on the 30th of July last, between the Emperor of the French and his agent in Mexico, Don Fernando Maximiliano José de Hapsburg. The decree contains the following dispositions:
1. The French agent in Mexico agrees to grant to France fifty per cent of the returns of the gulf custom-houses of the Mexican republic, and twenty-five per cent. of those of the Pacific, that being the only disposable portion of the returns.
2. This appropriation is to pay the interest and to extinguish the loans contracted by Don Fernando de Hapsburg, and also to pay the three per cent. interest on the debt he supposes Mexico owes to France, which he estimates at two hundred and fifty millions of francs, more or less.
3. The duties now collected in the Mexican custom-houses shall not be changed so as to lessen the returns.
4. The duties shall be collected by French agents in Vera Cruz and Tampico, “and they shall be under the protection of the French flag.” In all the other ports the respective custom-house accounts shall be indorsed by the French agents.
5. The French Emperor shall fix the term of office of the agents in Vera Cruz and Tampico, and shall take the necessary measures for their protection.
6. This new arrangement takes the place of the so-called convention of Miramar, of the 10th of April, 1864, only in reference to financial concerns.
If this arrangement would go no further from the Emperor Napoleon and his agents in Mexico I would have nothing to say about it, as I hold he has a right to dictate as he pleases to his subordinates; but as certain obligations are pretended [Page 277] to be imposed on the Mexican nation by one who has no right to do it, I deem it my duty to make, respectfully, some remarks in relation to the arrangements, for the reconsideration of the government of the United States.
In the first place, I beg you to permit me to say, if any one really believes that Don Ferdinand Maximilian of Hapsburg is anything more than a French agent in Mexico, or that the success of French intervention will do anything more than make Mexico a dependency of France, he will be undeceived by reading the so-called convention; for by it some of the principal rights of Mexican sovereignty, as the power of changing the tariff of imports and exports, and the collecting of them by their own agents, are intrusted to France.
It is generally understood that the French government has for some time desired to make the United States believe that Mexican intervention was an error, of which it has repented, and which it means to correct as soon as possible, but in such way as to keep up appearances and save itself from the contempt of its own subjects and of the whole world. With this idea it was to be hoped that the measures adopted would really bring about the result desired, so that the French government would be free from the complications and difficulties caused in Mexico by itself. But, so far from this being the case, it seems the so-called convention only increases the impediments for leaving Mexico, and gives rise to new and immediate perplexities. If the French Emperor has the right to make what arrangements he pleases with his agents, he certainly cannot think they will be binding on the nation whose name he invokes. The conventions that the Emperor makes with his agent, Don Fernando Maximilian, cannot bind Mexico any more than the orders transmitted to General Bazaine by the French minister of war. It is now time for the Emperor Napoleon to confess frankly that he has been routed in his war with Mexico, and should accept the consequences of his defeat. Every effort to conceal this will only increase the embarrassment of his position, and make his situation more ridiculous.
I know very well the friends of the Emperor Napoleon explain this conduct by his desire to save appearances in pretending to protect French credit, but without the intention of enforcing the convention. In my opinion this explanation is very far from being satisfactory. If it is now tried to prove that all is well for the French government in Mexico, I do not think the way to do it is to make agreements that everybody knows beforehand cannot be complied with, and if they are not fulfilled, as they concern “special agents, to be protected by the French flag,” can only be another cause of discredit to the government of the Emperor Napoleon.
This explains why the convention is blamed by all those who wish to see France freed from the difficulties which its government has brought upon it in Mexico, as the accompanying extracts from various French papers will show.
In my opinion, the real object of the convention is to leave the seeds for other difficulties and complications, so as to have some excuse to remain in Mexico, in case the Emperor Napoleon sees fit to prolong his intervention and the occupation of the country beyond the time he promised the United States to withdraw from Mexico. As for the rest, if the convention has been made in good faith, what must we think of the sincerity of the Emperor of the French, when we see him deprive his agent of the only resources that enable him to live in the city of Mexico while the French army holds some portions of the Mexican republic?
As the convention mentions the loans negotiated by the French government for its agent, Don Fernando Maximilian, to oppress Mexico, I enclose some articles in regard to these loans, taken from English papers that cannot be considered friendly to the Mexican republic, nor even impartial, giving some idea of the fraud and deception with which they have been contracted, and of the distribution that has been made of them.
As to the two hundred and fifty millions of francs, the cost of the war that [Page 278] France is now making upon Mexico, as it is notoriously unjust, with no other aim than to conquer the country, it cannot be imagined how the Emperor Napoleon can expect that Mexico will pay it. If he had been successful in his expedition, he would have had a rich colony; but as he has failed, he ought in justice to indemnify Mexico for the injury he has done her, instead of asking compensation for the expenses of a cruel and unjust war.
I am pleased to have this occasion to renew to you, Mr. Secretary, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.
Hon. William H. Seward, &c., & c., & c.
Official.
Napoleon, by the grace of God and the national will, &c. Upon the report of our minister secretary of state for foreign affairs, we have decreed and do decree as follows:
Article I. A convention relating to the assignment to the French government of the customs receipts of Mexico having been signed at Mexico on the 30th of July, 1866, the said convention, whose tenor runs as under, having our sanction, will receive full and entire execution from the date of November, 1866.
CONVENTION.
His Majesty the Emperor of the French and his majesty the emperor of Mexico, animated by a desire to settle to their mutual satisfaction the financial questions pending between their governments, have resolved to conclude a convention with that object, and appoint for their plenipotentiaries—
His Majesty the Emperor of the French, M. Alphonse Dano, his envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary at Mexico, &c.
His majesty the emperor of Mexico, M. Louis de Arroyo, under-secretary of state, &c.; who have agreed upon the following articles:
Article 1. The Mexican government grants to the French government an assignment of one-half of the receipts of all the maritime customs of the empire arising from the undermentioned duties:
Principal and special import and export duties upon all objects.
Additional duties of internacion and contra-registre.
The duty of mejoras materiales as soon as the said duty shall be freed from the assignment actually in force in favor of the Vera Cruz and Mexico Railway Company—an assignment which cannot be extended.
As the export duties of the custom-house on the Pacific coast are already pledged to the extent of three-fourths, the assignment now made in favor of the French government shall be limited to the twenty-five per cent. which remains unchanged.
Art. 2. The produce of the assignment stipulated in the foregoing article shall be applied: First, to the payment of the interest to the sinking fund, and of all the obligations arising out of the two loans contracted in 1864 and 1865 by the Mexican government. Second, to the payment of interest at the rate of three per cent. upon the sum of 216,000,000 francs, of which the Mexican government has acknowledged itself indebted by virtue of the convention of Miramar, and of all the sums subsequently advanced in any shape from the French treasury. The amount of this liability, (créance,) estimated now at the approximate sum of 250,000,000 francs, shall be hereafter fixed in definite manner. In the event of the amounts received being insufficient for the full payment of the charges above mentioned, the rights of the holders of bonds of the two loans and of the French government shall remain completely reserved.
Art. 3. The amount arising from the assignment of one-half of the produce of the Mexican customs shall increase proportionally with the augmentation of the receipts, and in case the amount should exceed the sum necessary to meet the charges specified in article one, the excess shall be applied in reduction of the capital sum due to the French government.
ART. 4. The quota of duties and the mode of levying them, at present in force, shall not undergo any modification which might have the effect of diminishing the product of the proportion assigned.
Art. 5. The collection of the duties assigned, as mentioned in article one, shall be performed at Vera Cruz and at Tampico by special agents, placed under the protection of the French [Page 279] flag. All the duties received at these two custom-houses on account of the Mexican treasury shall be appropriated to the discharge of the French concession, with the sole reserve of any portion that may be the subject of any assignment now recognized, and of the payment of the salaries of the officers of those custom-houses. The amount of this latter expense, which shall include the remuneration allowed to the French agents, must not exceed five per cent. of the produce of the before-mentioned duties. A quarterly settlement of accounts shall set forth the amounts thus received by the French government and the product of the assigned duties in all the custom-houses of the empire. This settlement of accounts shall fix the sum to be immediately paid by the Mexican government to make up the amount of the revenue conceded in case there should be a deficiency, or the sum to be handed over to it should the sum received be in excess. In all the other ports than Vera Cruz and Tampico the French consular agents shall revise the accounts of the customs establishments in the ports where they are resident.
Art. 6. It shall be left to the discretion of the Emperor Napoleon III to fix the time during which the agents charged with levying these repayments shall be maintained at Tampico and Vera Cruz, as well as to define the measures which may be proper to insure their protection.
Art. 7. The arrangements above specified shall be submitted for approbation to the Emperor of the French, and shall become in force at a time fixed by his Majesty.
The convention signed at Miramar on April 10, 1864, shall from that time be abrogated on all points which relate to financial questions.
In faith of which the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present convention, to which they have affixed their seals.
Made in duplicate at Mexico, the 30th of July, 1866.
ALPH. DANO.
LOUIS DE ARROYO.
Art. II. Our minister secretary of state for the home department, provisionally charged with the department of foreign affairs, is charged with the execution of the present decree.
NAPOLEON.
St. Cloud, September 12, 1866.
Seen and sealed with the seal of the state:
The Seal Keeper and Minister of Justice and Public Worship,
J. BAROCHE.
By the Emperor:
The Minister of the Interior in charge ad interim of the Department of Foreign Affairs,
The liquidation.
A man must entertain very robust illusions not to be convinced that the monarchical experiment attempted by France in Mexico is rapidly approaching its denouement; and it may be truly said that the policy of intervention has never before exhibited so plainly the perils which it has created and the troubles which follow in its track. We went to Mexico to recover an insignificant debt; to-day Mexico owes us 250,000,000 francs, and we end where we should have begun, by taking possession of the customs.
We went to Mexico to protect the lives of our countrymen, as the names of eight Frenchmen who were assassinated were given. Now we are obliged to record—to say nothing of our soldiers killed—the murder of French residents at Saltillo, at Tampico, and on the road from Vera Cruz. We went to Mexico to support the claims of some French subjects; now these claimants complain of the enormous reductions which have been made in their demands, and of the non-payment of recognized indebtedness. Besides that, instead of a few claimants, we have before us a legion of holders of the two Mexican loans, who demand that we should reimburse them. We went to Mexico to found a stable government, and now that government, with assistance in money and men which none of its predecessors had, is unable to live without us. Deprived of its customs revenues, its only real resource, soon to be deprived of our material aid, the empire has no longer either money or men, and it has only to choose between a prompt abdication and the successive conquest of all its provinces by the dissidents, who, we have been so often told, were entirely beaten and exhausted. In such a situation, on the eve of the abdication of Maximilian, the adversaries of the Mexican expedition would be lacking in patriotism if they indulged in sterile and useless recriminations. At the same time the journals which have resting upon their conscience the aid imprudently given to an unfortunate enterprise will fail in their duty if they do not unite [Page 280] with us in seeking the means of finishing as soon as possible with an affair which has cheated their hopes and gone contrary to all their calculations. Liquidation—that is what is desired, and it should be firmly desired without, however, indulging in chimeras. To expect that Mexico, which was unable to pay an insignificant sum due to France before the intervention, can now pay us two hundred and fifty millions, is to follow a chimera. Let us get rid of the idea. To expect that Maximilian can reign in Mexico without his customs revenues—that is to say, without a budget—is still to follow a chimera. Let us abandon it. To expect that any government succeeding to the empire will ratify the convention of the 26th of July, and that it can live without a budget, is to pursue a chimera. Let us not talk of it. We will put but one question: How are we to guarantee the existence of our countrymen against reprisals of the Juarists, placed outside the law by official proclamation, and the partisans of whom have been summarily shot? It would certainly be very much to be regretted that the holders of the Mexican loans should lose in whole or in part their investment in the Mexican lottery; but after all, these are only the chances of play. That those who have furnished it or its equivalent should lose the two hundred and fifty millions which Mexico owes us would be very sad; but after all, these were the expenses of an expedition which was approved by the deputies whom the contributors elected. What would be terrible would be the massacre of our countrymen who did not ask for intervention, and who, our army evacuating Mexico, would be left as hostages in the hands of the exasperated Juarists. Now, the only means of saving them, if they are menaced, as the French journals in Mexico unanimously say they are, is to place them under the guarantee of a treaty concluded between France and a national government. Does the government of Maximilian, who cannot even defend himself, present sufficient guarantees? Evidently not; and, besides, it has just taken away from itself the means of existence. There is no necessity of our occupying ourselves further with it.
There remain three republican chiefs—Santa Anna, Ortega, and Juarez. Can we treat with Santa Anna, the ancient head of the conservative party?
Overthrown by the liberal party, absent from Mexico for many years, Santa Anna no longer has any reputation. If his party, who demanded intervention, had possessed the slightest influence, Maximilian would have governed with men of that stamp, and need not have been obliged to seek for his ministers among the liberal party. The presidency of Santa Anna would be then an anti-national and ephemeral presidency, which would furnish us with no real guarantees.
Can we treat with Ortega? Why? What claim has General Ortega to the confidence of the Mexicans? What guarantee of stability would his government present? It would be that of Juarez without his popularity.
There remains, then, only Juarez. Say and think what we please about Juarez, it is none the less true, that in Mexico he is popular. The proof of this is that, notwithstanding our efforts, in spite of our excellent soldiers, he has held the field for four years. After the departure of Maximilian, his will be the sole constituted power. Why, then, can we not treat with him? Attaining power upon the ruins of the conservative party, Juarez has given proof of a firmness, a perseverance, which we must deplore, as it has been very unfortunate for the designs of France, but which, from his point of view, is very honorable. In a country where probity is an uncommon virtue, (we have never heard his probity attacked,) and after having decided upon the sale of the clerical property, he was the only one who did not profit by the operation to which this sale gave opportunity. Again, at the time when, during the siege of Puebla, the population of Mexico loudly demanded, at one time the massacre, at another the expulsion, of the French residents, it was he, and he alone, who saved our countrymen from death and ruin France combated him with ardor as long as she believed in the duration of the empire. This was a duty, as it was necessary that it should defend the government which it had established. But the day when we recognize that the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico will demand too heavy sacrifices—the day when Maximilian disengages us by his abdication—what serious reason have we for not treating with the government of Juarez? That day our only duty will be to come to an understanding with the government which presents the most guarantees of continuation. Now what government offers more than that which has lasted four years, in spite of the intervention?
Let us then cast aside all secondary considerations, and if the empire is to fall, let us not hesitate to adopt the only reasonably course. This course, once adopted, we may be certain that we will obtain from Juarez all the desirable concessions; and, in any case, we will have assured the lives of our countrymen, whom Juarez alone is probably sufficiently influential to efficaciously protect.
The Patrie ought to be satisfied now with our explanations, and should not accuse them. of being obscure. Will it tell us, in its turn, what it proposes to conciliate the necessity of evacuating Mexico, and the duty of protecting our countrymen? Let it speak plainly; but, after assuming the responsibility of the Mexican loan by rash eulogies, let it beware of assuming the much more serious responsibility now of events unanimously predicted by all the Mexican journals.
[Untitled]
A well-informed journal, the Moniteur, publishes this morning the following note:
“By a decree of the 26th July, his majesty the emperor of Mexico has confided the portfolio of war to General Osmont, major general, chief of staff in the expeditionary corps, and the portfolio of finance to Mr. Friant, military intendant. The military duties of these two chiefs in service, attached to an army in the field, being incompatible with the responsibility of their new functions, they have not been authorized to accept them.”
It is scarcely necessary to say that we approve of this resolution of the French government in the most complete manner. What will the Patrie think of it, when it said yesterday, speaking of General Castelnau’s mission?
“We are certain General Castelnau’s mission to Mexico relates to a new plan for reorganization, containing many civil and military reforms, to be applied in December next. The appointment of General Osmont as minister of war, and Mr. Friant, military intendant, as minister of finance, is only the starting point for this entirely new situation.
“According to the basis adopted for the Mexican army, that army, commanded chiefly by French officers, would not only serve to keep order and quiet in the country, but would be employed in directing the different civil and financial services, the employés being taken from the army. This system, lasting two or three years, would be economical to the treasury, as the salaries would be paid from the army fund, and peace and economy are what the people now need, above all things.”
Our readers can judge from this what the informations and predictions of the Patrie are worth.
The convention with Mexico.
The convention with Mexico, published in the Moniteur of yesterday, although signed by M. De La Valette minister ad interim, has been in reality concluded by Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys, since on the 30th of July the latter had not yet resigned. This convention, we regret to say, seems to fall short of the object aimed at by the two governments, and contains elements of danger and complications to which we believe it to be our duty to call public attention.
The treaty concedes to France half the receipts of the custom-houses of the ports located on the gulf of Mexico, and a fourth in all the ports of the Pacific ocean. If the concession is but a fourth of the receipts in the harbors of the Pacific, it is because the other three-fourths are already mortgaged; so that the Mexican government will not get anything from these ports. It will not get much more in the gulf of Mexico, because if we are to receive fifty per cent., forty-nine per cent. being already conceded as a guarantee to the Spanish-English debt, there will remain one per cent., that is to say, the equivalent of nothing, to the Mexican government. Now the custom-houses having been the principal part of its revenue, the question occurs, what will the aforesaid government have to live upon hereafter? This, of course, is a question which we will not undertake to solve.
There is another circumstance worthy of notice. The convention allows us fifty per cent. of the produce of the custom-houses in the gulf of Mexico. Now, out of the three principal ports located on that gulf, Matamoras, Tampico, and Vera Cruz, two, Matamoras and Tampico, do not any longer belong to Maximilian. Tampico, especially, fell into the hands of the Juarists on the 1st of August, the day following the signature of the convention. Must we conquer it again?
If, as everything goes to show, Maximilian is compelled to abdicate, what will be the value of the present convention to the succeeding government?
But the point undoubtedly the most defective and dangerous of the treaty of the 30th of July is the disposition contained in article 5, stating that
“The collection of the duties mentioned in article 1 will be made at Vera Cruz and Tampico by special agents placed under the protection of the flag of France.”
This arrangement alone would be sufficient to make us condemn the treaty. With this article nothing is ended. Vainly shall we have re-embarked our troops and brought them back to Europe. Our flag remains; that is to say, France is still engaged. Abandoning the soil of Mexico, we leave upon it the germ of our complications and perhaps a new expedition.
If Mexican agents had been intrusted with the collection, we would have run but one risk, the certainty of not being paid. This would certainly have been a misfortune, which was, however, susceptible of being appreciated, estimated, and reckoned.
[Page 282]But the position which is made for us by this treaty is far more serious, because it conceals a certain peril, unknown in its form, unlimited in its bearing.
Can, in fact, the position of the custom-house officers we shall leave in Vera Cruz and Tampico after the withdrawal of our troops be easily imagined? Who will protect them? Is it Maximilian? But if he could not keep Tampico, how will he protect the agents we will leave in that city?
And if Maximilian abdicates, will the government which will take its place, and which will find the exchequer empty, leave quietly the French custom-house officers to pocket half the revenue of the custom-house in virtue of an agreement they will have not signed nor acknowledged?
On the other hand, shall we permit our agents, placed under the protection of the French flag, to be insulted? Shall we allow the funds which belong to us in virtue of the convention of the 30th of July to be seized in their hands? But if we have no more troops in Mexico, how shall we protect them? After having recalled our army, shall we be compelled to send another?
All this, it must be seen, is perfectly impracticable; it is the rock of Sisyphus; it is the Danuid’s hogshead; it is a vicious circle, in the midst of which we shall perpetually turn, imagining every day to put an end to an undertaking which we will be compelled to renew the next day.
We must have the courage to confront bad situations; the Mexican expedition is a bad business. The greatest want of France is not to economize upon the wrecks of the undertaking; it is to do away with it at once and forever, be the cost 500,000,000, 600,000,000, or 700,000,000; this is, in our eyes, a very small consideration when compared with the immense freedom of action which would follow a radical settlement. Our intervention in Mexico weighs heavily upon our European policy, and has raised clouds between the United States and us. Why? For what object? What do we hope to-day? Nothing, is it not? Well, let us end it once for all; and if we are withdrawing our soldiers, let us not leave in their stead our custom-house officers and, above all, our flag.”
[Untitled]
We have reason to believe that the mission of General Castelnau to Mexico is connected with the approaching realization of a thorough plan of reorganization. This plan embraces several administrative and military reforms, which are to be applied from the month of December. The nomination of General Osmont as minister of war, and that of the military intendant, M. Friant, as minister of finance, were only the point of departure of this new situation. According to the basis adopted for the Mexican army, this army, commanded in great part by French officers, will serve not only to maintain order and tranquillity in the country, but will be employed to direct the different administrative and financial services. The employés necessary to perform these services will be taken from it. This system, which will probably last two or three years, will have the advantage to produce notable economies to the treasury, since Mexico will have scarcely any expenses to bear excepting those of the support of its army, and it will respond to the most pressing needs of its population, who, before all, demand order and economy as the two benefits before which all other considerations ought to disappear. The organization of the new Mexican army, the base of the whole system, at the last date, was advancing rapidly. The number of voluntary enrolments was considerable, and had even permitted the dispension of the conscription. When the army-shall have been entirely formed it will take possession of the different services, and it is thought that this substitution can be made long before the departure of the last contingents of the French expeditionary corps. When General Castelnau will have regulated as French commissary the different questions in which our adhesion was considered necessary, he will return to Paris, where it is thought he will arrive in the early part of December. We are assured that Marshal Bazaine, who will no longer have a command in accordance with the high dignity with which he is clothed, will quit Mexico about the same time.
Mission of General de Castelnau to Mexico–Dissatisfaction with Marshal Bazaine.
General de Castelnau, one of the Emperor’s aides-de-camp, left Paris on Tuesday night suddenly, and was to sail yesterday by the post boat from St. Nazaire to Vera Cruz. It is said that he carries an autograph letter from the Emperor Napoleon to the emperor Maximilian, [Page 283] and I believe it will prove that he also takes with him the recall of Marshal Bazaine, whose conduct in command of the French army in Mexico has of late not given satisfaction. He is accused of various shortcomings, among others of having caused the fall of Matamoras by neglecting to send the re-enforcements repeatedly applied for by General Mejia. It is not that Mejia, but his brother, who has deserted to the Juarists. The loss of Tampico is another disaster discreditable to the commander-in-chief. The French portion of the garrison, only one hundred and seventy-five men, defended themselves so gallantly as to obtain terms of honorable capitulation, and marched out with arms, baggage, and drums beating. Their defence was favored by the arrival of three French men-of-war from Vera Cruz. Although of late people here have talked of the Mexican empire as nearly at its last gasp, in official circles this does not seem to be the tone, and hopes are cherished that it may yet survive and prosper. It is intended to have recourse to a thorough military organization of the country.
The native Mexican army is to be increased, it is said, to 50,000 men, and as it has been found from experience that nothing can be done with Mexican officers, who for the most part are incapable or undeserving of confidence, the army will be officered by Frenchmen. French officers are generally ready for anything that promises adventure and promotion, and applications to take service will not be wanting. Moreover, the functions of all the departments of the state will be confided to French military men; taxes, custom-house, administration of all kinds will be in their hands, and thus it is hoped to get the better of the corruption and sloth which have hitherto been the bane of the new empire. It remains to be seen how far all this is practicable and productive of good results. Most people will be surprised if either Maximilian or the French troops are in Mexico this time two years. Part of these troops are to be withdrawn next November, but the French government has reserved the right to keep 10,000 men there until November, 1868. Supposing Maximilian to remain on the throne, it is thought probable that a few thousand men will remain up to that time, but the French government would gladly, I suspect, withdraw them sooner did the consolidation of Maximilian’s power permit of its being done without danger to his throne.
Braggadocio.
The Patrie replies to the very calm article we produced day before yesterday, in a philippic of inexcusable violence. Instead of helping us to contrive some way to put an end to this unfortunate Mexican business, it attacks our patriotism, accuses us of taking the part of assas sins and robbers, and desiring the defeat of our armies. Such abuse we despise, and we will merely say the mode of discussion is unworthy of a journalist who has any respect for his profession in the person of his colleagues. Cannot questions of public interest be discussed with moderation, and is it necessary to calumniate a man to refute his argument? Have we accused the Patrie of bad faith, during the four years it entertained its readers with the most dangerous illusions? Did we accuse it of evil intentions, when it persuaded the credulous to buy Mexican bonds, by publishing news that was contradicted the next day? No; we continued to sustain what we thought was right, and we did not say it was a want of patriotism to insist upon France’s paying Maximilian’s debts.
Now we will resume the subject under discussion.
The Patrie pretends to believe we want Juarez restored, when it knows it is not so. All we want is, for France to withdraw from Mexico as soon as possible, consistent with the safety of our countrymen, who are threatened with retaliation. That is what we wish and what we ask. For this reason we say, that if Maximilian decides to abdicate for want of funds or soldiers, the best thing we can do is to treat with Juarez. If the Patrie knows a better plan, let it be proposed; if it is good, we will advocate it. If the Patrie knows of any way to keep up the Mexican empire, after our troops quit, when its last financial resources were cut off by the convention of the 26th of July, let us hear of it.
If it knows of none, then it must admit with us that the empire is nearly over, and all that remains for Maximilian to do is to renounce the throne he was forced to take, and retire with dignity from an enterprise he did his best to carry out If he makes this resolve he will be blameless, and history will relieve him from all responsibility. Does the Patrie want Maximilian to hold on to power, after our troops have left, and without men and without money, see his provinces taken from him, one by one, by the malcontents?
After Maximilian has left, with whom will France treat, if not with Juarez? Let the Patrie tell us.
What are the objections to our plan? The Liberié affirms (says the Patrie) that Juarez is popular, has kept up the war four years, and is the only constituted power.
If he is the only constituted power, where is this power? Where is the government that gives the best guarantee of durability?
That power fell with Puebla, and when Juarez’s constitutional term as President expired.
[Page 284]The Liberié affirms that Juarez has kept the field for four years. Nobody will deny that. Has Juarez been driven out of Mexico once in these four years? Even now half the provinces are in his hands, and the republicans hold the power in all places where our troops are not stationed. Have they not retaken Matamoras and Tampico? Are they not at Medellin, only half an hour from Vera Cruz?
The Liberté says again that Juarez is popular. What audacity! Certainly Juarez must have some influence since he has kept unhappy men without bread and without shoes, fighting for four years against the best army in the world, braving privations, defeat, and death.
We said that Juarez would be the only constituted power to treat with after Maximilian’s departure; let those who contradict us, show us some other. It is simply ridiculous for Mr. Dréolle to put the Mexican constitution against Juarez. Have there been any elections in Mexico since Juarez was elected? In every country in the world the holder of power keeps it till another is elected, particularly in revolutionary times.
The Patrie’s great argument is, that France cannot treat with Juarez because she has been fighting him for four years. Because France is at war with Juarez is the very reason why she should treat with him. Is it a rule we must not treat with those we fight? If it is, there is no end to wars, and Prussia would still be fighting Austria.
But, says the Patrie, Juarez is an agent for the United States. If the Patrie had read the history of the country before talking about it, it would know that the grants of provinces to the Americans were made by the conservative party, by Santa Anna, against the will of the liberals.
After encouraging the Mexican expedition, and urging France and its government to it, by echoing the false reports circulated by Mexicans in Paris, one ought to be more modest and more civil to those who are trying to repair the errors.
When one has upon his conscience so many counsels condemned by experience, he ought not to sit down in his office and forgot that there are thousands of French in Mexico who did not ask for intervention, and who now run the risk of being massacred the day after our departure. Under pretext of a point of honor, we ought not to expose the fortunes and perhaps the lives of our unfortunate countrymen by imprudent advice.
What the Patrie calls discussion, is: substituting abuse for argument, accusing the intentions of its opponents instead of answering their questions, endangering the lives of people three thousand leagues off; and all for the pleasure of making a few high-sounding sentences. That is not politics; it is braggadocio,
An alternative.
The Presse thus ends an article relative to the convention of the 26th of July:
“A contract has been made with the only regular authority that exists in Mexico. It is binding on the nation itself, irrevocable and finite. We need not doubt its execution, for, if the Mexicans are opposed to it, two French frigates will remind them of it.”
We do not know if our honorable colleague is aware of it, but what he says is an open condemnation of the French expedition to Mexico.
If two French war vessels could compel the Mexicans to fulfil their engagements, why did France make war on them to enforce claims? a war that is not over yet!
If two frigates could not collect a trifling debt, that the single custom-house of Vera Cruz could have paid in a few months, how can they protect French agents in all the ports of Mexico for an indefinite period?
If the two frigates were sufficient, then the expedition was unnecessary; they can do no more good now than they could before; so we must give up the contract, or continue the expedition.
The situation in Mexico.
The Patrie believes in the future of Mexico; it has a right to do so, but that is not the question; the question is to know what France ought to do now to protect its citizens in Mexico.
Does the Patrie advise France to continue military intervention beyond the time fixed for its termination? If that is our colleague’s opinion, why does he not speak it outright? Why doesn’t he say plainly, France has not spent enough men and money; why does he not propose a new loan and more troops? In his disinterested tenderness for Mexico and its [Page 285] government, why does he not advise France to risk a war with the United States, when its honor and its interests are against it?
If that is what the Patrie wants, why doesn’t it have the courage to say so? But while it laments the decrease of our effective force in Mexico, why doesn’t it blame the convention of the 26th July? Though France was not obliged to undertake the regeneration of Mexico, when it did undertake it, it should have carried it out. It should not hesitate in the efficacy of its plans, nor leave Mexico bankrupt.
On the other hand, does the Patrie want Mexico evacuated at the time fixed, and the convention of the 26th July executed? It must believe one of two things: either that the empire will survive intervention, or that it will not. If it believes the former, let it tells us by what kind of miracle that phenomenon is to be caused; let it show us the financial resources to support Mexico and pay its debts. We want no fine phrases; we want facts and figures!
If, on the contrary, the Patrie thinks Maximilian will abdicate, why doesn’t it say so, and not deceive its readers? But, what does it propose when Maximilian abdicates? It will not treat with Juarez. We don’t know why; but it will not, and that is enough. Sit pro ratione voluntas. Then, what does it want? what does it advise? Does it agree with the Epoque to cede Mexico to the United States? Does it propose to treat with Santa Anna, the representative of a broken-down party, or with Ortega, who is a second Juarez? It proposes nothing!
Again, Mr. Dréolle is certainly in jest when he says France cannot give up the Mexican job; and yet he advises evacuation, and declares the empire shall live, without saying how it shall live: and approves of the July convention that ruins the empire. On one occasion it praised the nomination of General Osmont as war minister, lauding it as a Franco-Mexican organization; and the next day, when the Moniteur announced that General Osmont was not authorized to accept a Mexican portfolio, it rubbed its hands and exclaimed, in an important air, “That’s just what we told you yesterday!”
Now, the Patrie takes refuge behind Count Keratry, when we don’t know what his singular articles in the Revue des Deux Mondes can have to do with the question in discussion.
What says our author who has lived in Mexico, not in palaces and garrisons, but in the ranks of Colonel Dupin’s gallant band, called the contra guerilla? He tells of the defects in the present government; he shows us the errors, neglects, hesitations, and precipitations that have ruined it. He knows more about it than all those who went to Mexico only to solicit grants, or obtain favors. The writer, who has lived everywhere, leading a rugged life with his heroic companions, mostly in the open air, marching from village to village after Juarists, and finding out what they were good for, after enumerating government mistakes, concludes by telling what might have been done, and what could yet be done. Not a word of discouragement falls from his pen! The empire can live by contracting its limits. Why should it seek to govern where even the vaunted republics did not rule? It can live by giving a place in the sunshine to the noble race of oppressed Indians; by ousting the bandits from their hiding-places, those lawless disciples of Juarez or of Santa Anna; and by suppressing the shameless representatives of an immoral clergy, who encourage anarchy so as to make their fortunes and ruin the country!
But what does all that prove? It shows the Mexican empire would live with plenty of money, a large army, and a firm policy, if it gave up one-third of the provinces left to it by the republic. And who denies that? Perhaps “those who went to Mexico to solicit grants or obtain favors.”
But where are those concealed whom the Patrie seems to be acquainted with? Mr. Dréolle does not mention those famous claimants, the cause of the expedition, whose claims have been greatly reduced, and are not yet paid. Will he mention those encouragers of the loan, who pocketed large commissions, and whom he took under his disinterested protection? Will he mention all those who obtained favors without going to Mexico? Why doesn’t he speak openly?
As to ourselves, we went to Mexico, but not to solicit grants or obtain favors; and we agree with Keratry, except in one particular. We think with him that Mexico is an admirable country, and that an empire might be established there; all that is wanting to this one is, money and independence! It does not lack the good will, nor the intelligence, nor the firmness. Money it never had, and it can do little with the thirty-four millions obtained from the two loans. It needs five hundred millions, and that was the sum we suggested before it was too late.
Independence! How could it be independent with an army over which it had no command? We proposed to give it an army.
Though Keratry’s writings show Mexico to be a good country, deserving an empire, they do not prove that the present empire can live unsupported by France, nor do they prove that a succession is open and is to be settled.
One word more. The Patrie is astonished at our acrimony in blaming its mode of debate. Well may it be astonished, for its article to-day confirms us in our estimation of its severity, and we persist in saying editors ought not to accuse each other of dishonesty and want of patriotism when there is no occasion for it.
Reading Dréolle’s articles suggested the above moral observations.
The Mexican Loan–October coupons
On the 5th of August, 1866, the Moniteur published a Mexican correspondence, ending with these lines:
“The convoy of the specie train of six hundred thousand dollars, to pay the dividends of the foreign debt, left Mexico on the 22d of June, and will be sent to Europe on the English packet which is to start on the 1st of July from Vera Cruz for Southampton.”
The specie was then on the way, and the payment of the coupons was sure.
We find the following notice in the Moniteur of this morning:
“Mexican finance committee in Paris.
“The president of the Mexican finance committee in Paris informs the holders of Mexican bonds and obligations that as no funds for the arrears and coupons of the 1st October have been sent by the Mexican government, the payment is necessarily postponed. The president of the committee at the same time reminds the holders of Mexican obligations that a capital of thirty-four millions, according to contract, is deposited in the bank of deposits and consignments, at three per cent., to reimburse their expenditures.
“Paris, September 18, 1866.”
What does that mean? How is it that the Mexican committee does not mention the measures adopted by the government, as announced by the Patrie, for the consolation of its bondholders?
[Untitled]
Why is the cabinet of the Tuileries morally responsible to the holders of Mexican stock? We will say why: 1. The legislative body heard one of its members, M. Corta, who was charged with an official mission to Mexico, and who, at the sitting of the 10th of April, 1865, drew the most reassuring picture of the financial situation and the resources of the new empire. 2. M. Rouher, minister of state, while disclaiming in most explicit language—we readily admit it—any special guarantee on the part, of the government, declared at the same time that incontestable guarantees were attached to the loan then projected, and that France would not recall her troops from Mexico until she had accomplished her work and assured the complete pacification of the country. 3. Count de Germiny, senator, honorary governor of the Bank of France, was named president of the committee of Mexican finance, sitting at Paris. 4. When the loan was decided on, the minister of finance authorized the comptoir d’escompte to employ the agency of the receivers general for the distribution of the scrip in all the departments of France. Such are the facts, and we could mention others no less significant; for example, the sending to Mexico a counsellor of state, M. Langlais, charged to reorganize the finances of that country, Such, we repeat, are the facts which preceded, accompanied, and followed the issue of the Mexican loans. Those facts and those measures evidently influenced the public confidence and induced the subscribers to part with their money. Why should we not add that the French treasury has received the greatest portion of the funds arising from the loans, to cover itself for funds which Mexico owed to France on various accounts? Since, from motives which we have not now to analyze, the government has been induced to renounce a policy at first adopted by it, and which was the determinate cause of the success of the loans, the fact none the less remains that the declarations which it made, and the dispositions which it took, remain for the holders of Mexican stock. Those do not come and say to the French government at the moment when Mexico—from causes beyond her control, we are prepared to admit—fails in her engagements: “We are your creditors—we have your guarantee.” In effect it is not so. But it must be allowed that the holders of Mexican securities will hardly forget that if the French government is not bound to them by a material guarantee, it is so by its moral acts.
[Untitled]
The latest device invented by the advocates of the Mexican bondholders for redeeming the “moral guarantee “of the French government without charge to the French budget—a task [Page 287] about as practical as the search for the philosopher’s stone—is the following: A bill is to be presented to the Corps Legislatif authorizing the government to advance funds for payment of interest of the debt, (as was done in the case of Greece,) the produce of the Mexican customs, secured by the convention of July, being assigned as security; and the collection of these customs being admitted to be uncertain, the 34,000,000 impounded to accumulate at compound interest for the purpose of paying off the capital of the Mexican debt in fifty years would be “such an ample collateral guarantee as to cover the French treasury against all risk of not being repaid its advances.” It is obvious that the scheme is mere thimble-rigging. Whatever payments might be made to the bondholders under it would be taken out of their own money. No contract with the public was ever more positive than that these 34,000,000 should remain a sacred fund, untouched, to secure, in the very worst case, the repayment of the principal of the loan in fifty years. To touch that fund now for the purpose of preventing grumbling about the non-payment of dividends would be confiscation. Besides, the Moniteur insisted only two days ago, by way of consolation for the announced suspension of dividend, that this fund insured the safety of the capital. I cannot think any minister would have the face to present such a monstrous measure as the one suggested to the Corps Legislatif, after M. Rouher’s explicit declaration, made to stop the mouths of the opposition deputies who objected to the encouragement given by the executive to the Mexican loan, that France would never in any way be either directly or indirectly liable. Remembering this, it is impossible to agree with the Patrie when it says to-day that, though the bondholders have no legal claim on France, they have an “equity.” Not so; equity is all the other way, and should be steadily appealed to to protect the tax-payer. Nothing can be more “immoral” than the pretended “moral” guarantee.
The Mexican loan.
The undersigned, José Hidalgo, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of his majesty the emperor of Mexico, and Count Carlos de Germiny, senator, appointed by his majesty the emperor Maximilian president of the treasury commission of Mexico in Paris, by a decree of the 10th of April, 1864—
Having examined the powers conferred the 26th November, 1864, by his majesty the emperor Maximilian, to Messrs. Corta, deputy in the Corps Legislatif; Barron, proprietor in Mexico; Bourdillon, a lawyer residing in Mexico; de Germiny, a senator, to contract a loan in Europe, their powers being countersigned by Don Joaquin Velazquez de Leon, his majesty’s minister of state—
We have decided and do decide as follows:
Article 1. There shall be inscribed in the great book of the foreign debt of Mexico a first series of 500,000 obligations, of 500 francs each, yielding an annual interest of 30 francs, payable on the 1st of April and 1st of October of each year, making a nominal capital of 250 millions of francs. The emission of these titles shall be at the price of 340 francs for the first interest coupon which falls due the 1st of October, 1865.
The rest shall be issued as follows:
| Francs. | |
| On subscribing 60 francs per obligation | 60 |
| From the 5th to the 15th June, 1865 | 80 |
| From the 5th to the 15th August, 1865 | 50 |
| From the 5th to the 15th October, 1865 | 50 |
| From the 5th to the 15th December, 1865 | 50 |
| From the 5th to the 15th February, 1866 | 50 |
| Total | 340 |
The coupon of 15 francs which falls due on the 1st of October shall be received in deduction from the entire fourth.
The holders shall have the privilege of discounting all the terms not due, at the rate of six per cent. profit per annum.
Subscribers not paying their instalments when due shall be charged an interest of ten per cent, per annum for delay.
Art. 2. The liquidation shall be effected every six months by lot The drawing shall be made by the treasury commission of Mexico in Paris, on the 2d of January and 2d of July of each year, so that the reimbursements may be made, within three months at most, to those having a right to them.
The first drawing shall take place on the 2d of July, 1865. In each half-yearly drawing every obligation drawn shall be paid in the sum of 500,000 francs; every two obligations, 100,000 francs; every four obligations, 50,000 francs: every sixty obligations, 10,000 francs; a certain number, the sum of which shall be determined in the annexed table, 500 francs. In this manner the loan will be paid in fifty years.
[Page 288]Art. 3. The Mexican government shall appropriate fifty annuities of the value of 18,756,340, to pay the interest on this debt and to extinguish it.
Art. 4. There shall also be granted to subscribers to the loan a premium for the repayment of the capital first paid up, to be paid in fifty years.
For this purpose the Mexican government binds itself immediately to set aside a sum of seventeen millions of francs in the French three per cents.
These funds shall be deposited in the French bank of deposits and consignments, and the interest shall be added every three months, as a duty of the establishment.
In case these funds at the end of fifty years do not represent a sum sufficient to pay the premium of 340 francs to whom it is due, owing to the fall of French rentes, the Mexican government binds itself to make up the difference; and if there is an excess it shall belong to the Mexican government.
Art. 5. The present decision is made in duplicate, one to be deposited in the archives of the treasury commission of Mexico in Paris, the other to be sent to his majesty the emperor Maximilian.
An English official statement of Maximilian’s finances.
The sudden arrival of the empress of Mexico heightens the interest which so many Englishmen have reason to take in the affairs of that country. It is natural to suppose that the emperor Maximilian would not have permitted the partner of his throne to make a sudden voyage to Europe in the ordinary French mail steamer unless the business on which she came was extremely urgent. The empress Charlotte is no merely ornamental appendage of a court; she is a woman of courage and dignity, of capacious understanding and practical aptitude, formed in all respects to figure with distinction in the great world. She has had a full share of the responsibilities as well as the perils attending her husband’s remarkable adventure in the New World; and now that that enterprise has reached its crisis, the public will not be far wrong in supposing that the emperor Maximilian, tired of the periphrasis of diplomacy, has permitted his other self to visit the distant source and centre of his power to learn at first hand what further aid he was to expect from the creator of his throne and empire. There can be no doubt that this was the wisest step he could take; if the truth is to be got at, the empress will find it. The Emperor of the French, however, may justly complain, if he will, for it is rather sharp practice to introduce feminine naïveté and persistence into an affair so mysterious and sacred as diplomacy without a moment’s warning. The empress left Mexico before the great events which have recently taken place in Germany could be known there. Unless the emperor Maximilian had better information than was accessible to the European public two months ago, he must have been expecting when he parted with the empress to hear soon that Marshal Benedek had chastised Prussian insolence in the neighborhood of Berlin. The empress would probably receive intelligence of the battle of Sadowa, though scarcely of its vast political consequences, on her way to Europe. She finds the Emperor Napoleon preoccupied with affairs compared with which the Mexican enterprise was a holiday diversion. No one in France now thinks of the laurels which Marshals Forey and Bazaine have gathered in the New World, and it is to be feared that the empress will not be able to dazzle Napoleon with prospects that will withdraw him from the cares that now crowd upon him in Europe. The empress of Mexico is a sensible woman, and will take in the situation at a glance. She will be able to judge for herself what are the chances of her husband receiving succor from Europe. The French army and the French treasury have been the reserve on which the emperor of Mexico has freely drawn for these two years. The empress will perceive that this is a crisis in which the imperial banker at Paris must in justice to himself draw together all his resources, close outstanding transactions, taking from his debtors whatever they are able to pay, but on no account parting with more. If the Mexican empire can stand when the French troops have been recalled, and supplies of French money have ceased to flow, well; if not, the empress will hardly find it worth while to make another voyage across the Atlantic.
The political, military, and financial condition of Mexico has been sketched with a masterly hand by the present French minister of foreign affairs in more than one despatch since the beginning of the year, and the facts constitute a full justification of the resolution announced by the French government to withdraw from its intervention in Mexico. But there are certain results of that intervention which will remain after the final settlement of accounts between the two emperors, and which greatly concern the British creditor. At the beginning [Page 289] of the year Mr. Middleton, secretary of the British legation in Mexico, sent home an approximate estimate of the amount of the revenue and expenditure of the Mexican empire to be calculated on for the year 1866. We reprint it:
| Revenue. | |
| Maritime custom-houses | $12,500,000 |
| Internal custom-houses | 5,200,000 |
| Direct taxes upon property in town and country | 1,200,000 |
| Direct taxes upon commercial and industrial establishments | 250,000 |
| Mining duties | 650,000 |
| Stamped paper, post office and other miscellaneous taxes | 1,000,000 |
| Total | 20,800,000 |
| Expenditure. | |
| Imperial house | $1,740,000 |
| Ministry of the imperial house | 30,000 |
| Ministry of state | 340,000 |
| Ministry of foreign affairs | 290,000 |
| Ministry of the interior | 3,700,000 |
| Ministry of justice | 900,000 |
| Ministry of public instruction | 438,000 |
| Ministry of war | 12,970,000 |
| Ministry of public works | 1,626,000 |
| Ministry of finance | 3,400,000 |
| Total | 25,434,000 |
Mr. Middleton suggests that the customs revenue may produce a million dollars more than the amount stated above; but when he expressed that opinion he did not know that the French occupation, which had given such an impulse to consumption and importation, was about to cease. On the other hand, he points out that the cost of the French contingent is not included in the estimate. He observes, moreover, that “owing to the little progress being made in the pacification of the country,” the amount set down for military expenditure will not prove sufficient. The charges of the public debt remain to be added. They are as follows:
| Public debt. | ||
| Interest and sinking fund on British convention | $750,000 | |
| Interest and sinking fund on Padre Moran convention | 150,000 | |
| Interest and sinking fund on Spanish convention | 450,000 | |
| Interest and sinking fund on the internal debt | 1,200,000 | |
| The government estimate of interest payable on the Mexican stocks in London, including the deferred bonds, and on the amounts of the Miramar and Paris loans, is calculated at | 10,280,000 | |
| $12,830,000 | ||
| Unpaid balances on Laguna, Seca, and Guadalajara conductas, estimated at | 150,000 | |
| Sundry recognized claims | 265,000 | |
| Subvention to Vera Cruz railway | 1,350,000 | |
| Total | 14,595,000 | |
| The general result is thus stated by Middleton: | ||
| Total revenue | 20,800,000 | |
| Imperial house and the different departments of state | $25,434,000 | |
| Interest on public debt | 14,595,000 | |
| 40,029,000 | ||
| Total deficit | 19,229,000 | |
Here, then, we find the Mexican government, in the third year of the French expedition, with an annual deficit nearly equal in amount to the gross revenue. But this is not all. Since Mr. Middleton wrote, the French government has come to an agreement with that of the emperor Maximilian, under which the debt owing to France for the expenses incurred in setting up the emperor Maximilian’s throne is taken at ten millions sterling, upon which sum [Page 290] interest is to be paid at the rate of three per cent. So, then, it comes to this, that the French intervention, which was to have regenerated Mexico, but which, in fact, has merely intensified all the evils previously existing there, has saddled Mexico with an additional annual burden of two and a half millions sterling—a souvenir of the French occupation which the Mexicans will doubtless be careful to preserve.
[Correspondence of the London Times.]
The holders of Mexican debentures are beginning to make some stir; they consider that the French government, who set them the example of confidence, and thus encouraged them to lend their money, is morally bound to bear them unharmed. Of the encouragement given by the government there is no doubt; and the consciousness that they may have to make good the unavoidable shortcomings of Mexico may be one of the reasons why the Emperor Napoleon is unable to give further financial assistance to that country. The grounds on which the creditors found their claims are obvious.
In April, 1864, the Archduke Maximilian took possession of the throne; and his first, or one of his first acts of sovereignty was to authorize a loan purporting to yield a revenue of near ten per cent. It was issued in Paris and in London; and the French government, with a view to inspire confidence in the solidity of its own work, took the new stock to the amount of 54,000,000 francs on account of its own claims on Mexico. In spite of this high patronage the loan did not succeed. In his report of 1865 the director of the credit mobilier said: “We have shrunk from no sacrifice to better the condition of our clients, but we regret to say that our efforts have brought us nothing but serious loss.” Only a portion of the loan was realized, and the French treasury had, as security for its advances, stock completely unproductive.
Twelve months later the necessities of the Mexican government grew so pressing that indispensable military operations could not be continued vigorously. The emperor Maximilian was unable to raise money, and he naturally looked to France for help. The French government had only one of three things to do: to renounce the enterprise of founding a government in Mexico and recall its troops, to pledge the credit of France for the advantage of Mexico, or to give publicly such encouragement to a new loan as to insure its success. It chose the last as the least difficult and the least onerous. The illusions of the government were not dissipated, and whatever the majority of the legislative body may have thought individually, they seemed by their vote to partake them, and scouted the objections of the few who were well informed of the condition of Mexico as part of the systematic opposition. The condition of the loan, together with the lotteries, corresponded to an interest of 12 per cent. A week or ten days before the subscription opened a debate took place on Mexican affairs in the legislative body. A member of the house, M. Corta, who had been some time before sent to Mexico for the purpose of collecting exact information, completed his mission and returned. He was present in the house when the debate began, and he was requested to give his opinion. He did so. Nothing could be more reassuring than his account of the resources of the country, and of the future reserved for it under the new monarchical regime. The opposition, not convinced by this, flattering description, expressed their doubts of its accuracy, but the minister of state, M. Rouher, finished with a few vigorous touches the sketch which M. Corta had drawn. The minister’s speech was, like all his speeches, copious, earnest, and eloquent. He pictured the crowds of immigrants who were about to pour into Mexico, the numerous banks that were to be founded, the commercial and navigation companies that were only waiting to be formed, the great manufactories that were to be opened, the mines of gold and silver, of iron and of coal, that were to be worked; “and as for the finances of Mexico,” he said, “has not the information just given us by M. Corta satisfied the chamber beyond the possibility of a doubt as to the resources of the country? Have no fear, gentlemen; the able administration of the emperor Maximilian will restore and secure real prosperity to the finances of the empire, and give undoubted guarantees to those who lend him their money.” The majority of the chamber applauded. It is right to observe that the minister of state added: “There is here no question of the responsibility of the French government. France gives no guarantee, direct or indirect, in the matter of the Mexican loan.” The minister could not have said less. Had he uttered only one word implying a positive guarantee of the French treasury, the debentures would have risen at one bound from 340 to 1,000 francs. The government desired and expected the success of the loan without the direct intervention of the treasury. A member of the opposition, M. Picard, objected: “The subscribers have already lost 20 per cent. on the first loan, and you speak now of a second;” to which the minister replied:
“You are thinking of the loan about to be made, and certainly if the holders who will [Page 291] read your speech have confidence in your assertions, they will be slow to give their money. This mistrust, this distrust, the criticism expressed by an irresponsible person, which spread disquiet and alarm in the country, will be powerless and vain. Your words will not be listened to, and they who do not listen to them are perfectly right.”
These words were again applauded vociferously.
The second loan was issued by the comptoir d’escompte, and the comptoir d’escompte is debarred by its statutes from opening subscriptions of the kind without the special authorization of the minister of finance. The receivers general throughout France were authorized by the minister, whose immediate subordinates they are, to receive subscriptions. The Mexican finance commission, under the presidency of M. de Germiny, senator, formerly minister of finance, and formerly governor of the Bank of France, took charge, at the instance of the government, of the funds collected and of the payment of the interest. A member of the council of state, M. Langlais, was sent by the government to Mexico for the purpose of introducing order in the Mexican finances. During the time the subscriptions were coming in, the confidence of the public was constantly kept up by the favorable accounts the Moniteur published every fortnight of the state of affairs in Mexico; and these accounts were regularly reproduced in the French papers.
The French treasury held, on account of its own claims, 54,000,000 francs in paper of the first loan; and it became necessary, with a view to reduce the floating debt, to realize that sum. The operation was not easy. Mexican credit was so low that the stock of the first issue, yielding more than 12 per cent. at that period, was not salable. The conversion of that stock, or rentes, into debentures, or obligations, with premiums and lotteries, was effected, and the minister of finance transferred his unproductive rentes into obligations. In his report to the Emperor, on the 20th of December last, he stated that he had utilized, “not without loss, the stock of which he had been the holder.” The minister evidently thought that the new Mexican obligations which were thus thrown on the market were a safe investment.
From a statement published by M. Cochut it seems that the mode in which the funds raised for Mexico have been employed is as follows:
“The French government, in the first loan of 1864, received 6,600,000 francs of rente in payment of expenses incurred and to meet private claims.
| Francs. | |
| “Of the portion offered to the public, in Paris and London, only 10,162,000 francs, of 6 per cent. rente, were negotiated, and produced | 102,000,000 |
| “The second loan, that of 1865, by the issue of 500,000 bonds, at 540 francs, produced | 170,000,000 |
| “Total | 272,000,000 |
| “The commissions, expenses, &c., amounted to | 26,000,000 |
| “The two loans, therefore, produced only | 246,000,000 |
“From the net amount several sums were retained for different objects—for the reconstitution of the capital at the end of fifty years, for interest reserves, premiums, and lotteries, dividend due to Europe—forming a total sum of 212,000,000 francs, so that Mexico received only 34,000,000 francs of her loan. There remains at present in the French treasury 114,000 francs Mexican bonds not realized, 47,000 francs held in reserve for indemnities to be paid to French subjects, and about 83,000 francs, representing the portion of the first loan unconverted, and which remain in the hands of the Mexican commission. The number of bonds held by the public is, therefore, about 756,000 francs, distributed over 300,000 families. Those people it is who have alone provided the necessities of the French army, and who even aided in reimbursing certain English creditors.”
The creditors, then, look to the French government, whom they consider to have morally guaranteed the Mexican loan by the quasi official character given to the subscription, for relief.
[Untitled]
The Paris papers that copy the above document from the Moniteur add the following interesting remarks:
The Liberté asks what are the resources of Mexico to carry on the government, and says:
“According to documents furnished by the Constitutionnel a few weeks ago, the budget of receipts was fixed as follows:
“Custom-houses of the Gulf, 38 millions; of the Pacific, 15 millions; other sources, 42 millions; making a total of 95 millions.
“Mexico had already appropriated 75 per cent. of the Pacific revenues, and now gives 25 [Page 292] percent.; therefore 15 millions must be deducted from the budget. In the second place, Mexico having given up 49 per cent. of the customs revenues to extinguish the English and Spanish debt, and now giving 50 per cent. of the same revenues, there remains but one per cent. on the Gulf custom-houses. The budget will then remain thus:
| “Gulf customs, one per cent | 380,000 |
| “Pacific customs | |
| “Other revenues | 42,000,000 |
| “Total | 42,380,000 |
“Thus 42 millions is all the Mexican empire has to pay the internal debt with, to keep up the army, to endow public services and to pay the civil list.
“Where are these 42 millions except upon paper? We cannot tell; we think them problematical. Everybody will agree with us, then, in saying the Mexican empire cannot last, and that the convention of July is equivalent to abdication.
“On the other hand, what are the custom-house revenues now worth? As much as 38 millions in the Gulf? Perhaps so, if Tampico and Matamoras—two ports out of the three— were not in the hands of the rebels.
“And what will Maximilian’s assignment be good for after the fall of the empire and the evacuation of Mexico by our troops?”
The Avenir National is alarmed to see the French flag engaged for an indefinite time in Mexico. It says:
“Who does not see that if the French remain in Mexico to secure the payment of interest and the extinguishment of the Mexican debt, they cannot quit when they please? It is not possible to preserve freedom of action, and measure the exercise of rights by the exigencies of its policy, curbed by the convention of the 30th of July, which is nothing less than the continuation of that great error called the Mexican expedition. Now France would like to quit, for fear of danger in that direction; and we think she would prefer to have, instead of the convention of the 30th July, some arrangement to incur a present sacrifice, to save greater ones in future.”