Mr. Washburn to Mr. Seward.
Sir: In my last despatch, bearing date March 16th, I expressed the opinion that my long and vexatious journey was almost at an end, and that in a very few days I should be once more at my post in Paraguay. I was then awaiting the arrival of my baggage and other things that I had been obliged to leave on board the unfortunate steamer on which I had taken passage for this place, and which ran high and dry ashore the first night after leaving Buenos Ayres. I hoped, however, that she would soon get off and reach here within two or three. days after I did. But she was obliged at last to send her cargo by another steamer, and this did not reach here till the 6th instant. The same day started for the camp of President Mitre, going up by a transport steamer to the Paso de la Patria. It was late when I reached there, and I learned that General Mitre had just left for his encampment, some two leagues from the river. The minister of war, General Gelly y Obes, was there, however, and he told me the President would be in to the landing the next morning, or, if for any treason he could not come, he would send me a horse and escort to go out to his camp. So I went back on board the transport and waited, and about one o’clock the next day the minister, General Gelly y Obes, came off to inform me that President Mitre was too unwell to leave his camp that day, but had sent him to request me to have an interview with the Brazilian admiral, Baron Tamandare, with whom matters could be as well arranged as with himself. The minister offered me his boat to take me to the flag-ship, and I accepted it. I was courteously received by the admiral, and after a few general remarks we came upon the subject of my business at that place, which was no more nor less than to get to Paraguay. The admiral said that, as the allied squadron had moved up the river and commenced active operations, no person or vessel would be allowed to pass up. He said that when he was in Buenos Ayres he had an interview with Admiral Godon, of our navy, and told him that so long as the squadron was at Corrientes he would not object to an American war vessel going up to Paraguay, inasmuch as the gunboats of other neutral nations had been permitted to go up and down, but when the squadron moved up the river fend became engaged in active operations the circumstances would be entirely changed, and no one would be allowed to pass.
[Page 568]This statement of Admiral Tamandare very much surprised me, as it was in flat contradiction to what Admiral Godon had stated to me before I left Buenos Ayres. One of the strongest reasons he bad for sending a gunboat to Paraguay was the. objection made by Admiral Tamandare. He represented that he was as decided then not to permit anything to pass up as I found him afterwards when operations were being vigorously prosecuted. This discrepancy of statements I do not pretend to reconcile. I considered that it was my right to pass through the lines at any time, when it could not cause any embarrassment or delay in the military operations. The admiral, however, said that he should take the responsibility and not allow me to pass, be, the consequences what they might. I told him that he could of course, stop me; he could even make me a prisoner, but if it were in my power to go, go I would.
The admiral expressed his regret that his orders and duty imposed on him the necessity of doing what might seem to me an act of discourtesy, and said that anything else that I might require, either for my pleasure or comfort, I could have. He would place a steamer at my disposal that I might return again to Buenos Ayres, and bring me back at my pleasure. He also said that it I wanted any money during my detention I could have it. I told him I did not want his money, nor did I want a steamer to go to Buenos Ayres, but I did want to go to Paraguay, for it was there my government had ordered me. With this result, unsatisfactory, I believe, on both sides, I left the admiral and returned to the transport steamer on which I was staying.
The second day after this, President Mitre came in with his entire Argentine army, and they all encamped near the river. As soon as I learned of his arrival I made my way to his camp, and gave him my letter from the minister for foreign affairs in Buenos Ayres, Don Rufino de Elizalde, in which he was requested to give me all needful facility for arriving at my post.
President Mitre having read this letter began to talk about the change of circumstances that had occurred since my former interview with him and since the date of the letter. He alluded to the conversation that I had with the Brazilian admiral, and was evidently already informed of what had transpired between us. But the letter from the foreign minister was evidently very embarrassing. No allusion is made in that letter to any change of circumstances, present or prospective. It says that the government being desirous of facilitating my voyage, it has promised to put at my disposition a merchant vessel, by which I may pass within the Paraguay lines, and it expresses the hope that the President and commander-in-chief will give the necessary orders that the promise made by the government may be duly fulfilled.
“Espera el infrascrito que V. E. se servirá dar las ordenes necesarias para que la promesa hecha por el gobierno sea debidamente cumplida.”
After discussing the matter at some length, President Mitre, who evidently felt that both he and his government were already compromised, said he would go and have a conference with Admiral Tamandare, with General Flores, and General Osario, the former commander-in-chief under General Mitre of the Uruguay forces, and the latter of the Brazilians. I told him that though I had had an interview with Admiral Tamandare, I did not consider that he had anything to do with my movements. I was not under the Brazilian jurisdiction, nor did I look for any Brazilian authority to give me protection or safe conduct through Argentine territory; I looked to the Argentine government to protect me in these rights, as by no treaty or alliance could it divest itself of the duty of protecting foreign ministers. President Mitre assented without reserve or hesitation to these views. He said he would have an immediate conference with the general officers and would advise me of the result that day, the 9th of April. I told him I wished to return to Corrientes as soon as I received his answer. In about an hour I received a brief note from him, saying he could not give an explicit answer immediately, but would send it the next day to me at Corrientes.
[Page 569]On the 12th I received the letter from President Mitre. I send herewith a translation; I send also a copy of my reply to it. He reiterates in the letter what he had said verbally in regard to the changed circumstances; that whereas before it had been a simple blockade, it was then a state of active operations. I replied that it was true there were active operations on the Parana, at the “Paso de la Patria,” but that up to that time there had been nothing but a blockade of the “Tres Bocas,” or mouth of the Paraguay, and it was by that river I proposed to go to Asuncion, and the only change of circumstances in regard to the Paraguay consisted in the fact that the blockading squadron was nearer than formerly. In this letter he particularly requested me to take no steps in the matter, but to suspend all proceedings until he could again consult with his government in Buenos Ayres. I replied that I should comply with his request, both from respect and deference to his wishes and for the reason that under the circumstances I could see of no way to help myself.
On the 19th I received another letter from President Mitre. Of this I also send a translation. He expresses great satisfaction at my deference to his wishes, and alludes to recent events that have transpired on the. Paraguay, active operations having already commenced there as well as on the Parana.
In order to comprehend why President Mitre should be so anxious that I should suspend all proceedings and make no complaint or protest, one must understand the internal politics of the Argentine Confederation and the extreme jealousy and dislike that exists between the Brazilians and the Argentines. There is in Buenos Ayres a strong and active party who are all the while engaged in stirring up opposition to President Mitre. They complain that by the alliance he has been kept inactive for many months, waiting for the Brazilians to be ready to move, and that, though he is nominally commander-in-chief of the allied army, every movement is dependent on the will of the Brazilian admiral. Now the Argentine government and President Mitre himself have offered me a safe conduct through the lines to Paraguay, and when they want to carry out their promise Admiral Tamandare assumes dictatorial powers and says they shall not do it. Were these facts known in Buenos Ayres I believe there would be a general expression of indignation at the humiliating position of the Argentine government in thus forfeiting its promise at the command of a Brazilian admiral. I may be mistaken in my conjecture, but on no other theory can I explain President Mitre’s solicitude that I should suspend all proceedings. I have before given my views at length on the questions that would probably arise when once the Paraguay question is disposed of. I have seen no reason to modify them since. That the Brazilian squadron will leave these waters till many other questions are settled besides that of Paraguay I think altogether improbable, and in the act of Admiral Tamandare forbidding the Argentine government fulfilling its promise to me I see but an earnest of strifes, contentions, and wrangles among the allies when once the Paraguayan question no longer serves to unite them against a common enemy.
In the event of hostilities arising between the allies I assume that the sympathies of our government and people would be with the republic rather than the empire. It has been with this idea I have so readily conformed to the washes of President Mitre, believing, as I did, that anything like a protest would have caused great embarrassment and confusion. Besides I have tried to avoid anything like complications with either, and have especially avoided to do any act that might require any intervention or explanation on the part of the government. I have tried every possible way to get to Paraguay, and if I have not succeeded it certainly has not been from lack of zeal; and if I have not received all the facilities from foreign governments for prosecuting my voyage that I had a right to expect, I yet hope I have not involved my government in any question or dispute on my account. It now looks as though [Page 570] the war was near its end. The whole allied army is on Paraguay soil, and it hardly seems possible that Lopez should be able to hold out a month longer. The allies have, it is believed, twice the number of troops that he has, and they are all well armed and have abundant supplies. Lopez’s army, on the other hand, is terribly destitute. The prisoners taken are nearly naked, and they report a great scarcity of provisions.
As I am not permitted to go on in advance of the army I shall follow it up and try and reach Asuncion as soon as possible after it falls into the hands of the allies. I shall press on with the least possible delay, hoping to be able to exert a good influence in saving the lives of such persons as have made themselves peculiarly obnoxious to the allies. One reason why Admiral Tamandare objects to my going to Paraguay now I suspect to be this: He does not mean that Lopez shall escape, and fears that he would seek shelter and protection under the American flag by flying to my house and there relying on its privileged character to save him from his enemies.
This despatch being taken up so entirely with matters personal to myself, I send another of the same date that is devoted entirely to the condition and prospects of the war. I have not been able to give so full an account of the passing events during the last month as I would have done but for the fact that my health has been very poor for the last four weeks; and even now it is such that I write with great difficulty. I trust, however, it is now improving, and that hereafter I shall be able to give you full reports of everything of importance that occurs.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient and humble servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.