Mr. Washburn to Mr. Seward.
Sir: On leaving Washington, the 28th of August, I took passage on the steamer Montana, that was to touch at Rio de Janeiro on her way to California. She left New York on the 6th of September, and arrived at Rio on the 3d of October. I there learned that the La Plata, or rather the Parana river, was closely blockaded by the Brazilian squadron, and that I should find it very difficult if not impossible to reach my post in Paraguay, unless some war vessel of light draught should be detailed by the admiral of the fleet at Brazil for the purpose of carrying me up the river, but no vessel suitable for the trip was then upon the station, though Admiral Godon informed me that he was daily expecting the arrival of his tender to the flag-ship, and that from her light draught she would be well adapted for ascending both the Parana and the Paraguay. This steamer, the Wasp, arrived at Rio on the 20th of October, and on being informed by the admiral that she required so much overhauling and repairs that it would take some twenty days to accomplish them, I took passage on the first passenger steamer that left for this port, reaching here on the 4th instant.
Since my arrival here I have endeavored to inform myself concerning the war now existing between Brazil, the Argentine Confederation, and the forces under the invader of the Ban da Oriental or Uruguay, on the one side, and Paraguay on the other. The accounts from the seat of war are very conflicting, but the general impression is that President Lopez is in a “tight place.” Several months ago he sent a large force down the river and seized several towns of considerable importance, including Corrientes, Bella Vista, and Goya, belonging to the confederation. A large force of some eight thousand men was also sent to capture the Brazilian town of Uruguayana, situated on the Uruguay river. The capture was effected, but the troops were cut off from the base of the Paraguayan army, and after being shut up within the town till they began dying off by starvation, the whole force surrendered to the three potentates, Don Pedro II, Emperor of Brazil, Bartolome Mitre, President of the Argentine Confederation, and Venancio Flores, the Guacho chief and invader of Uruguay.
After this the Paraguayans fell back from Goya and Bella Vista, and made a stand for some time at Corrientes. They have since abandoned that place, and retired within their own territory, and are there awaiting the attack of the allies. It is not supposed any immediate advance will be made against the Paraguayans, as they are strongly posted at Humayta, just above the confluence of the Parana and Paraguay rivers, and the allies are not prepared for any general movement, and it is supposed will not be for several weeks. But of the final result there seems to be very little doubt among the people, both native and foreign, of Buenos Ayres; it is believed that Lopez will either be compelled to surrender or leave the country. That such will be the final issue there can be little doubt if the allies can keep from quarrelling among themselves. Of this, however, there is a very great doubt. Between the Brazilians and the Argentines there is an irrepressible antipathy; they have a mutual contempt for each other, and the fact that they have so long maintained the appearance of [Page 549] harmony, proves only the deep-seated determination of both to destroy the Lopez power or dynasty in South America.
In entering into the alliance against Lopez the three powers solemnly agreed never to treat either separately or collectively with him as the head of the Paraguay government. His government and policy were regarded by all as incompatible with the peace and prosperity of all the neighboring countries.
The retreat of the Paraguayans behind the fortifications of Humayta will give them such an advantage of position that the allies will not venture to attack them without large re-enforcements; and both President Mitre and the Emperor are making great efforts to get a force so strong that there can be no doubt of the result. Brazil has already three or four iron-clads that are to assail the fortifications in front, while a large force is to be sent up the Parana and cross over some distance above the confluence of that river and the Paraguay, and then make an attack in the rear. The allies are all the while increasing their forces, while Lopez is believed to have every man and boy capable of bearing a musket already in his army. Since the war began, he is thought to have lost not less than twenty thousand men, and the report is that provisions are getting to be very scarce there. In the meanwhile the allies are preparing for a long campaign. The special minister of the Emperor, now in this city, who is supposed to direct the general war movements, informs me that he does not suppose the allies will be ready for another movement before February. The government here is also fast recruiting its forces, and unless some division or other turn of affairs favorable to Lopez shall occur, it seems that he must succumb. It is thought by some that his own people may turn against him, but his system of espionage is so thorough that nothing of that kind can take place. Since I left there in January last, several of those most in his confidence, and on whom he most relied to carry out his policy, have fallen into disgrace. The admiral of his fleet was killed in battle, and the general of his army, next to himself in command, is a close and, they say, tortured prisoner at Humayta. He appears to have no confidence in any one, and is particularly jealous of some members of his own family. The prisoners that have been taken by the allies have no wish to return to Paraguay till the power of Lopez is broken. They seem to fear that they would be severely treated for ever having surrendered, as Lopez holds to the idea that it is the duty of every one of his soldiers, under all circumstances, to fight to the death. They must emulate Leonidas and his three hundred, or expect, if they again fall into the hands of Lopez, chains and stripes.
In fact there is no sympathy for Lopez among either natives or foreigners, and so soon as he is disposed of the war will stop. At least so say the members of this government, and so says Señor Octaviana, the Brazilian special minister. They say they have no war with Paraguay; they are only laboring to break up the power of Lopez; and that they say they will do, cost what it will. If they were to succeed in this, the next question of interest is, what is to become of Paraguay as a nation ? That our government would never quietly assent to its dismemberment, or that its more powerful neighbors should divide and annex it, I took for granted, and I have, therefore, endeavored to ascertain what the ultimate intention of these governments was towards Paraguay in the event that Lopez is overcome.
On this point I am assured by Dr. Ramson, the minister for the interior, that there is not the least intention or desire to interfere with the integrity or sovereignty of Paraguay as a nation; that there never has been any such desire, and that the representations to the contrary have done great prejudice and injustice to the government of which he is a member; I may say, the most influential member. Señor Octaviana, is equally explicit to me in saying that the government of Brazil has no intention to interfere with Paraguay as a nation; that the war is only against Lopez, and that so soon as he is driven from power the [Page 550] Paraguay people will be left to such government as they may choose for themselves.
There is now no regular communication between this place and Paraguay. Since the blockade was established, the English, French, and Italian ministers have each sent a gunboat to Ascension, to protect the interests of their respective countrymen. The Italian vessel is expected to return in a few days, and the French about the last of this month. The English boat returned several weeks ago. Under these circumstances, I do not know how soon I shall be able to reach Paraguay. I shall probably leave Mrs. Washburn here, and take passage by a merchant steamer as far as Corrientes, and thence make my way to Humayta as best I can. I shall then try and have an interview with President Lopez, and then, from my knowledge of the purposes and intentions of the two contending parties, I can judge whether any agreement is possible by which the carnage may be staid. Several known friends of Lopez have called upon me here to urge me to proceed to Paraguay with the least possible delay, and saying that he was very desirous to have me return. But as I understand the position of the two parties, I see little chance of effecting anything in the way of peace. If the allies will only treat on the basis that Lopez shall quit the country, it is pretty clear that he will fight to the last. Hence I do not see how, at present, I can be of any service to him in the cause of peace. Still, I shall make every effort to get to his dominions as soon as possible, and be ready to render any service in my power, whenever the time for treating may arrive.
I will not conclude this despatch without mentioning the extremely courteous offer of Señor Octaviana to put at my service any Brazilian steamer now at command, to take me to Paraguay. He says it shall be at my disposition and convenience, if I choose to avail myself of it; but for various reasons I think it best to decline the offer. This liberality is in striking contrast with the distrust and suspicion entertained by the government here towards me, as the latter, I have reason to believe, is more disposed to put obstacles in the way of my going to Paraguay, rather than facilitate my passage. The reason of this I ascribe to the fact that, at the time of the Flores invasion of Uruguay—which was certainly winked at, if not encouraged, by this government—I never spoke approvingly of Flores’s cause or of those governments that, under the pretension of neutrality, really favored it. I also think it is believed, by this government that it was on my representations that you were, to some extent, influenced to intimate to it that the disruption or destruction of the republic of Uruguay would not be viewed with indifference by the government of the United States. This government here I judge to be extremely sensitive to any expressed or implied censure from that of the United States, as it looks to ours as the model republic, and throughout the late rebellion steadily and unequivocally sympathized with and sustained the cause of the Union. Certainly our country has no better friend in the whole world of nations than that of the Argentine Confederation.
I should do injustice to my own sense of right, as well as be disregardful of a faithful public servant, if I did not, in this connection, ascribe very much of the good feeling here existing towards the United States to our faithful, zealous, and popular minister, the Hon. Robert C. Kirk. He is respected alike by the government here, by the members of the diplomatic body, by all of his own countrymen, and by natives and foreigners generally; and though I am aware it is not my duty or business to commend or criticise my colleagues, I trust I may be excused for bearing this testimony in behalf of a friend.
I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State Washington, D. C.