Mr. Peck to Mr. Seward.
Sir: My last despatch to the department, No. 27, was of date April 4th, 1866. I am still without dates from the department later (excepting the one conveying my commission) than October of last year.
[Page 514]The unrest and expectation of new revolutionary movements to which I referred in my last still continue here. Indeed, of late they have been aggravated by a report, the truth of which is fully admitted by the government, that General Salnave has been released from custody by President Biaz, and is in the neighborhood of Puerto Plata, fifty miles east of Cape Haytien, organizing a force for a new revolutionary attempt in this republic. This report is making the spirit of sedition in the country unusually active. Our consul at Cape Haytien reports that violent denunciations of the government are in all mouths there, and that if Salnave should again appear in the town there would not be thirty people to oppose him. It is not very different here. Of course the presence of the President’s household troops curbs both the speech and action of the disaffected; but the revolutionary spirit is very high, and many experienced persons prophecy that the expected uprising will gain its end.
For my own part, however, although I fear that revolt will soon again appear, I doubt whether it will succeed. Several reasons conspire to justify the doubt: 1. The revolutionary feeling has no adequate leader. General Salnave does not enjoy the confidence of those persons who alone could bring revolution to success; and besides him there is no man who seems to be thought of by any considerable number of the discontents as being fit to lead. 2. The revolutionary spirit has no adequate purpose. All who favor revolution agree in hating President Geffrard; otherwise they do not seem to have a common motive or aim. Indeed, it may be doubted whether there is not an absolute contrariety of purposes among them. 3. The country is getting weary of disorder and revolution. 4. The government is measurably well prepared to put down an uprising. The household troops, somewhat over 2,000 strong, are in good condition as to equipments and discipline. The navy has two good steamers, one of which, our Galatea, is ready for efficient service. Leaving the national guard wholly out of view, these means would probably be sufficient to quell any revolt which might arise.
This, however, does not wholly avert danger, nor keep the minds of men who watch events composed. There is on all sides an uneasiness, which exerts a depressing influence on affairs, especially trade.
Next in importance to the political situation in this republic is the rapidly growing ill-will which the government of Hayti and St. Domingo are manifesting towards each other. For some reason President Biaz is, or seems to be, unfriendly towards President Geffrard. In his message to the congress recently (and perhaps now) in session in St. Domingo, he complained of the government of Hayti as being unwilling to enter into the treaty relations which he desired. And now he has released General Salnave from prison and allowed him to occupy himself on the Dominican territory with projects looking to revolution on this side.
Meantime this government has for some time, but especially since the appointment of General Cazneau as United States commissioner in St. Domingo, evinced at first suspicion, and later actual hatred, of President Biaz. Although I must not say, as some persons do, that it has indirectly aided, I can say that it has evidently rejoiced in the insurrection now in progress against him. And on Sunday last President Geffrard made to the troops here a speech, in which (such is the well authenticated report) he said that President Biaz was a bad man; that he was planning to give foreigners a footing on the island, and accordingly that he was an enemy of Hayti; and that as this government regarded him in that light, the frontier would be put in a state of defence against him, by the calling out of the national guard. These things are ominous of a speedy and exhausting quarrel between the two republics.
The prospect has filled me with solicitude, and I have done what I could to avert the impending calamity.
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I then (II) called on Mr. Elie again, and informally said to him about as follows [Page 515] : “I greatly fear that you and St. Domingo will soon be at war.” His excellency replied, as I understood him, “Such an event is not improbable, although Hayti will do what she can to prevent it.” I then proceeded: “From such a war no good can, in my opinion, possibly result to your government. You are already sufficiently weakened by war. A quarrel with St. Domingo would give domestic conspirators new and favorable opportunity for executing their desires against your government. To put General Biaz down would simply enhance the already too great disposition of the people of this island to gratify their political prejudices by an appeal to force. Withal, if my information as to the insurrection against President Biaz is correct, as I think it is, President Geffrard would get no advantage from the success of that movement. Several of the leading men in it are as bitterly opposed to President Geffrard as they are to President Biaz. It seems to me to be the true policy for both governments to recognize, and by all proper means support, each other. There are two reasons why I venture to say anything about this matter: (1.) My interest in the people of the island makes me, for reasons of mere humanity, greatly desire that peace and good-will should be maintained between the two governments. (2.) It is to the interest of my own government that Hayti and St. Domingo should be in accord. War between the two would be the surest means of introducing into the island an European influence which we do not wish to have established here.” Actuated by these motives, I begged to know if “I could not promote an understanding between the parties. I thought I could go to St. Domingo, and with the aid of our representative there might, if I could carry proper assurances from President Geffrard, clear away some of the matters of form which are nominally in the way of a treaty.” I am sorry to say that my plea did not seem to avail much with the minister. I may have misjudged him, but I could not but think that, while partially or wholly convinced of the truth of what I said, he labored under the impression that the President would not be anxious to have the way to peace smoothed. He said, however, that he would speak with his Excellency about the matter and convey to me his answer. I afterwards saw him, but he made no allusion to the President’s views, and I did not press the matter.
In this connection I beg leave to suggest that a letter from yourself to the Presidents of Hayti and St. Domingo, with regard to the matters of which I have written, would be read with respect and be likely to have a wholesome effect on the present unhappy relations of the two republics. And if you should not think it best to write such a letter, a despatch to myself or General Cazneau, or, better still, to both, which should unfold the present policy and wishes of our government with respect to the West Indies, would be opportune and most useful.
I have to report the fact which may presently have important political results, that this government has lately been refused by the Emperor of France a concession as to the debt which it owes to him, which concession circumstances compelled it to ask. The case is this: In 1824, to avoid further annoyance from a French fleet which had long been demanding indemnity for losses sustained by French citizens in the insurrection of 1795, the Haytian government promised to pay to France in the course of fifty years, in constantly decreasing instalments, the sum of 20,000,000 francs. This promise has been sacredly kept by the government down to the present time. This year the expenses caused by the late civil war have so drained the public chest that the government was lately compelled to ask the Emperor to lessen the amounts of the instalments to be paid during this and the next six years, and increase those which are to follow; in fact, to divide the sum still due into equal annual instalments. This request has been refused, and the minister of finance will be put to great difficulty in meeting the payment which is on the eve of maturing. What is regarded as the unreasonableness of the French government in this matter is exciting much [Page 516] feeling here. The question whether the Emperor does not wish to put this government into a dilemma from which he can reap important political advantages is being considerably discussed.
The latest intelligence from St. Domingo is that President Biaz has thoroughly defeated the insurgents in the western part of the country, but that a new and formidable conspiracy has come to light in the eastern part.
Since I came to the last passage of this despatch, the minister of foreign affairs has informed me that he has heard that President Biaz has very much improved his policy, and that now this government will renew its efforts to make a treaty with him.
Regretting the length to which my despatch has extended, I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.