[Extract.]

Mr. Peck to Mr. Seward.

No. 26.]

Sir: I am in receipt of your despatch No. 11, dated January 27, 1866, with my commission enclosed.

I have to ask your attention to the following narrative of important events which have recently occurred, or are now occurring, in this republic:

In the early part of this month the government commenced trying, at Cape Haytien, persons charged with being concerned in the late insurrection. There were but twelve of the indicted at the bar; but, according to the custom of the country, trial proceeded against some fifty others, included in the indictment, who were yet at large. All the indicted were convicted and sentenced to death. Six of the twelve in custody were shot within three hours after receiving sentence.

It was immediately apparent that these executions had excited among the numerous friends of the executed, here and elsewhere, a sullen determination to be avenged, and it was generally feared that a new uprising would occur. This fear was justified by the speedy breaking out in this city of numerous incendiary fires. Still, no open revolt occurred.

But on Monday morning, March 19, a fire, whether kindled accidentally or by design is not known, broke out in the heart of this town. The strong land breeze which was blowing at the time soon drove the flames across acres of valuable buildings to the seashore. This destructive work had hardly been completed when an unusually heavy sea-breeze arose and sent the fire to the extreme landward side of the town. While this was passing, next to nothing was being done to arrest the flames. There was almost no apparatus and no organization. The people, who are taught by the system on which the government is founded to look to the authorities for all instrumentalities required by the public good, were powerless, and the government was both unprepared for and inadequate to the dreadful responsibility. The utter helplessness of the people and the almost total inefficiency of the government were spectacles too sad for contemplation.

The conflagration did not expire until nearly twenty-five squares, covering at least one-third of the territory and occupied by two-thirds of the real and personal properties of the town, had been swept clean. Hardly a single European business house, and but few of the better dwellings, escaped. Thousands of people were at once reduced from comfort to want, and as the losses amounted to five millions of dollars in gold, the commercial interests of the city received a shock from which they can hardly recover in a score of years.

The social and political aspect of affairs during the fire was appalling. The [Page 512] people were panic-stricken, not only because of the havoc they were witnessing, but also because of the fear of a new uprising, which they justly entertained. The inefficiency of the government and its incompetency to meet the crisis were noticed by multitudes, who were in a mood to magnify every fault and undervalue every good act of the authorities. Many persons openly expressed bitter discontent and clamored for a change of rulers. An accession to the already too prevalent dissatisfaction with the government was certainly one of the leading, as it was one of the most unhappy, events of the day. Towards night attempts to fire the town in new places were made, and the knowledge of this fact increased the general alarm.

Since Monday last there have been no new fires, but the fear that the remnant of the town will presently be in ashes widely prevails.

Since these trying events the spirit of the people, so far as the enduring of great and perhaps irreparable pecuniary loss is concerned, has been admirable. The equanimity with which they have borne trial is truly surprising. I wish I could add that their anger towards the government is abating; but I cannot. It is but too clear that the disposition to find fault with the authorities which was exhibited on the day of the fire would still be very glad of an opportunity for an outbreak.

It is to be hoped, and I think it may be expected, that this great disaster will accomplish two good and greatly needed results: 1. It will convince the people that they must rely on themselves, as they have never done before, for the promotion of public interests and preservation against public dangers. 2. It will go far towards abolishing the credit system, which has always been an incubus, not only on trade, but on all the interests of the country.

Meantime bad tidings come to us from the Dominican part of the island. The report is that insurrection has broken out in the west and north. The west has taken arms, it appears, in consequence of an order from President Biaz forbidding the trade which Azua, Neyber, and other arrondissements have for a long time carried on with Port au Prince, to which trade President Biaz objects, on the ground that it deprives the Dominican republic of the custom duties it would receive if the arrondissements named should draw their supplies from St Domingo city. This revolt is represented as being general throughout the west.

And here I may say, parenthetically, that Count Neisseau, French chargé d’affaires near this government, received, by the last packet, a letter from the French consul in St. Domingo, in which it was stated that President Biaz had recently expressed to the consul the conviction that the insurrection in the west was due to the influence of the Haytian government, and that he regarded this interference as poor compensation for the help he had given President Greffrard in capturing Salnave, and that the consul would favor him by conveying to President Geffrard and to Count Neisseau the assurance that Hayti would soon have trouble if she did not acquit herself of complicity in the insurrection.

* * * * * * * * *

The events here and in the Dominican part, which I have thus narrated, have brought the public mind and trade to a seriously disturbed state. This fact has led me to feel that American interests at this point need the protection of a man-of-war, and I have so advised Admiral Palmer at St. Thomas, and asked him to send us one or more vessels. The early arrival of an adequate United States naval force would not only tend to restore business, and to calm the public mind, but would indirectly be a material help to the government, which, to make the best of its case, is in a difficult and perilous place.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. E. PECK.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.