Mr. Portman to Mr. Seward.
Sir: In my despatch No. 66, of the 30th ultimo, I had the honor to inform you of the results of the negotiations in which I have lately been engaged in Osacca hay, in concert with the representatives of Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands; and in my despatch No. 64, covering copy of memorandum, (enclosure No. 1,) I submitted the reasons that induced me to unite with those representatives in carrying out the instructions that had been received from their respective governments. I trust you may have been pleased to approve of those reasons. The temporary transfer of the four legations to Osacca, with the full cognizance of the Tycoon’s chief advisers, was so evidently an act of peace and good will towards this government and people, that I did not hesitate in co-operating in that measure, taking also into consideration that the instructions referred to being based on the convention of the 22d October, 1864, my absence on such occasion might prove embarrassing. Under any circumstances I knew, as stated in my despatch No. 64, of the 30th October, that a golden opportunity to place our political and commercial relations with Japan on an improved basis had presented itself; the opportunity should not be missed, and the results have justified my expectations. The squadron, consisting of nine vessels, did not sail on the 31st October, as intended, but one day later, and arrived at Hiogo early on the 4th November. The anchorage at Hiogo was preferred, not only for its excellence, but principally because it was deemed prudent not to approach nearer to Osacca until the state of affairs in that city, temporarily the seat of government and the headquarters of the Japanese army, could have been accurately ascertained. Officers of the legations proceeded to Osacca on that day, bearing four letters, announcing the arrival of the four legations, and also for the purpose of arranging the preliminaries for the proposed negotiations. It was stipulated that Abe Bungo no Kami, a member of the Gorogio, held in higher estimation than his colleagues, should be charged with the negotiations on behalf of the Tycoon; he was stated to be then at Kioto, in attendance upon the Tycoon, who, on that day, in an audience of great ceremony, received the Mikado’s commands to march against Chorhu and suppress his rebellion. The arrival of the legations at this juncture, as anticipated, was most opportune, as it furnished the Tycoon with sound reasons for delaying his operations against Chorhu with an army imperfectly organized and partly mistrusted—a task of great difficulty, if not impossible of successful accomplishment, particularly in this season. It also enabled him to remain near Kioto to guard his interests, which might have been in jeopardy during his absence, from the intrigues of powerful Daimios, some of whom were strongly suspected of sympathizing with Chorhu, and others of coveting the high office of Tycoon of Japan. It was conjectured that the Tycoon’s departure with his forces would be the signal for a palace revolution at Kioto, leading to serious disturbances, and eventually to civil war. The political condition of Japan at that moment, from all that could be learned, may be described without exaggeration as an imperfect state of civil war. A building for conferences, with [Page 190] limited accommodation for residence, had been selected at Osacca; the preference, however, was given to Hiogo, and all the conferences were accordingly held on board the British flag-ship by the British minister, Netherlands political agent, and myself, at the close of each of which the Japanese ministers proceeded on board the Guerriere, when the same arguments were used by the French minister, who was prevented by indisposition from joining the conferences on board the British flag-ship. This mode of proceeding had the advantage of allowing time, for however brief a space, for considering such proposals as might be made; and also for additional suggestions, it might be desirable to tender during the conferences either on board the British or French flag-ships, between whom, on such occasions, communications were kept up without intermission. Copies of the minutes of two conferences were transmitted with my despatch No. 65, of the 18th ultimo. During the evening of the 11th, Abe Bungo no Kami sent a message to the effect that, in his opinion, there was no necessity for an interview on the following day; he had fully understood, all that had been stated to him, and he would hasten to rejoin the Tycoon, and urge a prompt consideration of the proposals made. I may remark here, that before leaving Yedo I had ascertained that, under any circumstances, this government would prefer the payment of the three million indemnity in full to the opening of Hiogo and the city of Osacca on the 1st January next, as proposed, and hence, that the action of the Senate on the convention of the 22d October, 1864, could in no degree be affected by any subsequent action on the part of the Japanese government.
The second conference was held with Tatshibana Idsumi no Kami, a member of the Second Council, who came in place of Abe Bungo no Kami. From the minutes of that conference (enclosure No. 2 of despatch No. 65) you will have perceived that he made the important admission that the formal sanction of the treaties by the Mikado had become a vital question for the Tycoon, and that he would undoubtedly succeed in obtaining it. He stated that fifteen days were required for considering the proposals and framing the reply; ten days from that date, however, were only granted, as being deemed quite sufficient for that purpose. Communications from subordinate officials, such as the governor of Osacca, and others of that rank, were frequently received in the mean time, but those were considered of minor importance and of doubtful reliability. On the 20th, however, a report was received through the senior naval officer commanding some seven armed vessels at Hiogo, that the Mikado had actually asserted his sovereign rights by dismissing from office the Tycoon’s minister, Abe Bungo no Kami, with whom the first interview had been held, for urging the sanctioning of the treaties. Matmai Josu no Kami, another member of the Gorogio, or Tycoon’s minister, had also been dismissed for the same cause. The next step might be an attempt to dismiss the Tycoon himself. This Japanese commodore evidently believed the statement he had made. His seven vessels got up steam and sailed for other ports in the inland sea; it was thought not improbable that the Mikado might attempt to dismiss foreign intercourse in an equally summary manner, and require him to carry out such a decree with the naval force under his command. The report of the naval officer was corroborated by an official statement early on the next day. It was well known, fortunately, that the material power was in the hands of the Tycoon, and all that was requisite for the removal of complications was the prompt and manly exercise of that power. Six of the ten days granted for a reply to the proposals made had nearly elapsed, and no time should be lost, therefore, if any action on the part of the foreign representatives in this emergency were deemed advisable. It was unanimously determined to address an identical letter to the Tycoon to stimulate him to action, and this was done at once. I herewith transmit (enclosure No. 1) a copy of that letter.
The precise manner in which that letter was made available by the Tycoon [Page 191] could not well be ascertained. It may, however, be taken for granted that when the greatest excitement and confusion prevailed in the Kioto councils, the Tycoon, with a few thousand men, proceeded to Fusimi, near Kioto; a very respectful application was slightly pressed, the Mikado yielded, and his formal sanction to the treaties was obtained. This, of course, implies the formal repeal of those offensive laws against foreigners hitherto in force, according to the views of some native legal authorities, and as such appealed to on the various occasions when foreigners had been assassinated.
On the 24th ultimo the ten days granted for the reply expired, and in the afternoon of that day Matsudaira Hoki no Kami, the senior member of the Gorogio at Osacca, and suite announced their arrival. They produced (as they stated) the original document, the sanction of the Mikado, translation of which (enclosure No. 2) I herewith transmit. This was accompanied by an official letter from the Gorogio, transmitting a copy of the sanction, and containing the reply to the proposals made, in translation, (enclosure No. 3.)
Appended to the copy of the sanction is the translation of the written promise for its promulgation in all parts of Japan. The revision of the tariff on a uniform basis was readily granted. The Mikado’s sanction smoothes the way for reforms, and this was one urgently needed. The indemnity is to be paid in preference to the opening of Hiogo and Osacca on the 1st January, 1866, which is, however, guaranteed on the 1st January, 1868, according to the terms of the extension granted by the United States.
The treaties, as well as all the acts of the Tycoon’s government in pursuance thereof, have now become legalized, and the Tycoon is said to be again the supreme executive authority in this empire. It is deemed quite probable that the Chorhu rebellion will now be satisfactorily disposed of without resort to coercive measures. There is also little doubt that many Daimios desired to open ports in their provinces, with a view of collecting revenue; and that all restrictions hitherto interposed to the dealings of their agents with the foreign merchants, except through the custom-houses at the open ports, will be gradually removed by the Tycoon’s government. If this be successfully accomplished, trade is likely to increase greatly. I hope soon to be able to inform you that the government is moving in the right direction, according to the promises they have made. I have the honor to transmit (No. 4) copy of my letter to the British minister in acknowledgment of the hospitality I enjoyed on board her Britannic Majesty’s ship Pelorus during the entire period of the negotiations in Osacca bay, covering one month. If I had been in command of a squadron, no greater facilities could have been at my disposal than those so cordially extended to me by Vice-Admiral King and Captain William H. Haswell, of her Britannic Majesty’s navy. I believe I am not too sanguine when venturing to submit it as my opinion that the formal sanction of the treaties by the Mikado, recognized by all Japanese as the real sovereign of their country, will prove an important result of the recent negotiations, due in a great measure, no doubt, to the perfect unanimity of views and action of the foreign representatives. The Tycoon is under lasting obligations to the four powers for the action taken by them so opportunely for his interests and the true interests of Japan, and by sanctioning the treaties, the Tycoon is recognized as the de facto chief of the government of this country. Much remains to be done, however. Several Daimios in the Kioto councils reluctantly assented; the relations newly created by this irrevocable act of the Mikado, between himself, the Tycoon, and the more or less sovereign Daimios will have to be adjusted; but a basis for such adjustment appears to have been found at last in the sanction granted, in connection with the various agreements made between the Tycoon and leading Daimios, which are now said to be in course of perfection.
I am inclined to share the hopeful views entertained of the future, and expressed without hesitation by the Yedo officials.
[Page 192]At an early day I hope to receive the official communication that the Mikado’s ratification has been promulgated in all parts of this empire.
I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.