Mr. Campbell to Mr. Seward.
Sir: I had the honor to receive your several despatches, No. 21, of the 27th of November last, No. 22, of the 4th of December, No. 23, of the 12th of December, and No. 24, of the same date.
In the absence of questions in which my government may be considered as directly interested, I propose to introduce a subject in this despatch which England and France regard as of decided moment to them.
The great want of Russia is a port free from ice all the year round, with secure anchorage and abundant space; one that can be amply fortified, and command the waters of the open sea. The deep inlets and land-locked arms of the Varanger Fjord, on the Norwegian coast, between the 68th and 69th degrees of north latitude, and bordering on Sweden, combine all these advantages. This Fjord contains several capacious harbors, capable of affording shelter to large fleets, and could be fortified so as to render approach from the sea very difficult, if not impracticable. The tepid waters of the gulf stream diffuse themselves along this coast, and fleets could put to sea at all seasons of the year. Russia by the treaty of 1809 obtained the tongue of land from Norway which envelopes the greater part of Finmark, and carries the Russian boundary line within some seven miles (English) of the Fjord in question, and she regards the acquisition of its waters and bays as of the first importance. England and France, and more particularly the former, look upon the so-called encroachments of Russia towards the north sea with extreme jealousy; and not without reason, so long as the interests of the powers named may be regarded as autagonistical.
With the possession of secure harbors on the Norwegian coast, Russian armaments might at all seasons deliver blows on French and English ports and shipping, within a few hours, by aid of steam, after leaving their anchorage, or, as necessity might dictate, could find protection behind forts in dangerous proximity to her antagonists. Powerful by land, her rivals in Europe, by the means herein indicated, fear that Russia may become powerful by sea as well.
Recently it was currently reported that the King of Sweden and Norway was negotiating with Russia for the cession of a part of Norway, that would enable Russia to reach the coast, and would adjust the boundary line between the two countries. England and France took the alarm, and despatches were sent to their respective legations at this court to ascertain the truth or falsity of the report.
Count Manderström denied emphatically that any such negotiation was pending, or the probability that Sweden would enter into any such negotiation. Nor can we suppose that Sweden would violate treaty obligations with England on the subject, particularly to give to a powerful and dreaded neighbor marine and other advantages of so much importance.
Conflicts growing out of alleged encroachments on the fisheries of Norway by Russian subjects on the one hand, and on the Russian territory by Swedish subjects on the other, have occurred. Fifteen years ago the Norwegian government drove away the Russien fishermen who occupied the meridianal shores of the Varanger Fjord, in order to fish in Norwegian waters. By way of reprisal, the government of St. Petersburg issued orders forbidding the Swedish Laps to cross or enter the Russian territory while driving their herds of reindeer to the seacoast. These orders were not considered strictly in accordance with the convention of 1809. Yet the cabinets of Christiania and Stockholm, anxious to avoid any controversy with Russia, promised acquiescence, and issued orders accordingly. But a nomadic population, caring little about boundary lines, wandered with their herds where pasture and salt water could be found, and generally by the shortest route from point to point.
[Page 178]In 1863, Russia again addressed complaints to Sweden on the subject, and in consequence fresh instructions were issued by the Swedish government, and an inquiry was instituted, and a commission met at Contekis, at which Swedish, Norwegian, and Finnish Laps were examined.
The result proved that the Russian and Swedish governments had similar causes of complaint, in regard to incursions of their respective subjects on one another’s territory, and the commission were at a loss to know how to get rid of the difficulty, considering very justly that the restrictions placed upon the pastoral movements of the herds and their owners were the cause of all the trouble, and that this cause would continue unless some arrangement could be made.
Thus matters stand at present. No arrangement has been arrived at—no adjustment made. We may safely conclude that Russia will make no terms that shall conduce to exclude the long cherished desire to reach the open sea, nor is it improbable that she will at an opportune moment seek to secure the coveted waters of the Varanger Fjord. There is no point in all Russia’s supposed or actual expansion watched with more jealous care by England and France than her progress towards the sea on the coast of Norway.
I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.