The undersigned, minister plenipotentiary of her Catholic Majesty, has
read in the papers of this country a despatch from Commodore Rodgers,
commanding the United States squadron in the Pacific, on the late events
in Chili. If this document had another character, the undersigned would
not have fixed his attention upon it; but from the moment when an
official document has been published as such, he considers it his duty
to address himself to the Secretary of State to make some remarks upon
it.
This he would have done at the first instant if he had not thought it
proper to await communications he might receive from the Pacific. Those
communications, far from causing him to desist from his purpose, have
confirmed him in it. Annexed in effect, the honorable Secretary of State
will find another despatch, from Brigadier Nunez, commander general of
her Majesty’s squadrons in the Pacific, which, although not in
contradiction of that from Commodore Rodgers, may be considered as its
necessary complement.
It is now beyond all doubt that both Commodore Rodgers and the admiral of
the English squadron in those seas, not content with exceeding, perhaps,
in their negotiations, the limits of all neutrality, used acts of
intimidation, which, if they had been carried further, would have
produced a conflict having the [Page 613]
most serious consequences, because whatever might have been the forces
they could have opposed to him, Brigadier Nunez would not have fallen
back from the fulfilment of his duty. Another fact no less important
follows, notwithstanding also, and this fact is, that Brigadier Nunez
did all that was possible for him to come to an understanding, and that
the said Commodore Rodgers and the said English admiral finished by
acknowledging that not only right, about which there never could have
been any doubt, but also moderation, were on the side of Spain in the
negotiations which preceded the deplorable event of which Valparaiso
ended in being the theatre. This is a point which it imports much to
Spain to place conspicuously before America and before the world, and
Commodore Rodgers, in place of showing his wonder at the terrible mode in which Spain proposes to make war in the other
America, thus forgetting the examples which his own country has
set in the recent war of four years, might very well have given a
testimony of impartiality by confessing that Spain had used equal
moderation after, as during, the negotiations. To blot out the
impression that his despatch may have produced on the mind of the
government at Washington this note is addressed to it, the undersigned,
for the rest, contenting himself by responding to the historico-critical
remarks of Commodore Rodgers on Spain, and chiefly on the tone in which
they are made, that the very decadence of a nation which was more
powerful than any other nation has yet been since then is a lesson to
the most powerful, and that, without calling to mind her past
predominance, Spain is assured of her future.
The undersigned avails of this occasion to reiterate to the honorable
Secretary of State the assurance of his highest consideration.
The Spanish-Chilian War.
We are indebted to the editors of La Cronica, the Spanish paper
published in this city, for the following important official
despatch from the commander of the Spanish squadron off Valparaiso,
giving his version of the events attendant upon the recent
bombardment of that city:
Headquarters of her Catholic
Majesty’s Squadron in the Pacific, On board the Numancia,
in the bay of Valparaiso, the 2d day of April,
1866.
Excellency: In order that your excellency
may form an exact idea of the occurrences of last fortnight, I have
the honor of placing before you a summary of the most recent events,
regretting that want of time should prevent my sending copies of the
despatches I have addressed to her Majesty’s government. On the 17th
of last month I was invited to dine by the American Commodore
Rodgers on board of his flag-ship. During dinner the commodore
expressed ardent wishes for the termination of our difficulty with
Chili, and suggested that, were I clothed with full powers, the
attainment of such an object might, in his opinion, be accomplished.
Upon being informed that I had the necessary powers, he said that he
would immediately communicate with his minister, and see if their
united efforts could not secure peace. A few days after, I received
the visit of the commodore and General Kilpatrick. Both seemed
animated by the best wishes, and invited me to join them in a
conference, which, though of a private and confidential character,
might, perhaps, result in the termination of the war. Upon my
acceptance of the proposal the American minister said to me, that,
although the conference was strictly confidential, the minister of
foreign affairs of the republic had notice of the step that was now
being taken, and that he, (the American minister,) as well as the
commodore, who had taken the initiative in the matter, were very
much interested in arriving at the object they had in view. The
commodore made some remarks to show the inconveniences which he
thought existed for Spain in the prolongation of this war, and
giving me to understand that an unforeseen
obstacle would be met with if the bombardment of Valparaiso
were attempted. He proposed a plan for an arrangement which he
considered equally honorable for both belligerents. In accordance
with this plan there should be a cessation of hostilities, my
credentials presented, and a new investigation made of the different
grievances against Chili. As an earnest of peace there should first
be a reciprocal salute of one and twenty guns in the following
manner: The flags of Spain and Chili, hoisted at the mast-heads of
the English and American flag-ships, should be saluted [Page 614] by the guns of the two
squadrons, and in this salute a Chilian fort and the Spanish
squadron should join in such manner, that, with the noise and smoke,
it should never be known by whom the first gun had been fired. As
your excellency may readily suppose, I rejected this arrangement,
acknowledging, however, the good intention that had suggested it,
and stating that the instructions of my government were so positive,
that notwithstanding any difficulties I might have to overcome, and
should I go to the bottom of the Pacific in the attempt, I must have
from Chili the satisfaction which was due to us. Moved,
nevertheless, by a sincere desire for reconciliation, I would take
upon myself the immense responsibility of not requiring any other
satisfaction than that contained in the arrangement proposed by
England and France, and accepted by Spain, to which I would only
add, the restitution of the Covadonga, with its flags, arms, and
crew, in return for the prizes and prisoners I had in my power. I,
at the same time, gave notice that if, by 8 o’clock on the 27th, I
should not have received an answer, accepting the terms of this
arrangement, I would address a communication to the diplomatic corps
fixing a delay, at the expiration of which I would open fire on
Valparaiso. Both the minister and the commodore found the terms
honorable. General Kilpatrick said he would exert himself to his
utmost to have them accepted by Chili, adding, that however strange
it might appear, it was his predecessor, Mr. Nelson, who had most
strenuously opposed any concession to Spain; so much so, that
unpleasant words had already passed between them. On the following
day General Kilpatrick left for Santiago, not without hope, and the
promise, given of his own accord, that he would let me know the
result of his negotiation. On the 27th, before 8 o’clock in the
morning, General Kilpatrick again came on board of my ship with
Commodore Rodgers. His efforts had been in vain. The reply of the
Chilian government was, that in so short a time it was not possible
to assemble and consult the accredited representatives of the allied
republics. In consequence of this reply, I stated to the United
States, that, as I had previously informed him, I would within an
hour send him the promised communication. The commodore then told me
more clearly what the unforeseen obstacle would be to which he had
alluded in our former interview. He said that, probably, he would
not be able to remain a passive spectator of the destruction of a
defenceless city; that perhaps he might be compelled to oppose it by
force; and he thought the commander of the naval forces of Great
Britain would join him for the same purpose I replied that I should
be extremely sorry to collide with him after the warm interest he
had shown for Spain and her agents, but that such considerations
would not be sufficient to prevent my executing the orders of my
government. The commodore approved my resolution, and said to me, on
taking leave, that whatever might be the consequences of the
conflict, I must ever be assured of his friendship and esteem; the
same words were repeated by General Kilpatrick. One hour after this
interview I sent my communication to the American minister, in order
that through him it might reach the other members of the diplomatic
corps at Santiago. On the 29th of March I received the visit of
Admiral Denman, who told me that he had been informed by the
American commodore of my interviews with the United States minister;
that the laws of war did not authorize the destruction of
defenceless cities, inhabited almost exclusively by foreigners; that
it would be impossible for him to be a passive spectator of such a
deed; that he would have to adopt measures, the extent of which he
could not then define; and that he begged me not to commence
operations until the arrival of the mails from Europe. My answer
was, that, as to the question of right, the decision belonged to my
government; but that, as an officer, I should obey my orders; and
that whatever might be the attitude assumed by the naval forces then
in the bay; however reluctant I might be to come to such ad
extremity; however formidable those forces might be, no earthly
consideration should detain me from the discharge of my duty. The
admiral grasped my hand, and left me with the same assurances of
friendship and esteem as in the case of the American commodore. On
the same day, the 29th, I was once more visited by the American
commodore, accompanied by the secretary of legation, with the
apparent purpose of handing the reply to my communication. On doing
so, he said that he had intended to oppose the bombardment of
Valparaiso by force, because he was at the time convinced that Spain
could not lawfully do so, and that Chili was in the right, but that
subsequently he had arrived at the conclusion that right,
moderation, and dignity were on the side of Spain; wherefore, he not
only should not oppose anything, but that his ships would move out
of the way at 8 o’clock on the morning of the 31st.
He insisted, nevertheless, in proposing another plan, which was that
I should write a manifest, stating that since nothing could prevent
the bombardment, I would desist and spare Valparaiso. The commodore
thought that such an act of generosity would be appreciated by the
government of Chili, which would then declare its readiness to
accede to my demands. My reply was, that although by so doing I
would incur the heaviest responsibility, still, for the sake of
peace, I would accept the proposition, provided a member of the
Chilian government would guarantee to me personally, in the presence
of the American minister, that my proceeding would be appreciated
and reciprocated. The proposal of the commodore was, nevertheless,
rudely rejected by Chili, and another one advanced in its stead so
ridiculous that it has only served as a laughing stock to the
English and American commanders. The idea was, that a sort of
international duel should be enacted; and this in terms indecorous
and even insulting. It being assumed that I dared not seek them at
Chili, they proposed that we should meet with equal forces, the
determination and [Page 615]
equalization of which should be left to Commodore Rodgers. The
result of the duel was to be the termination of the war; and to this
no other declaration whatsoever was added. The proposal, I again say
it, was simply ridiculous, and in this light it has been viewed by
every one, without, perhaps, excepting the very persons who
originated it. I consequently authorized the American commodore who
bore the despatch to say, in my behalf, that such proposals deserved
no answer. It is gratifying to me to be able to state that both the
cominodore and English admiral approved my answer; the latter was so
disgusted that, losing his habitual reserve, he said to me, “The
letter you have Just received is in itself a sufficient
justification for the act you are about to accomplish. Your conduct
has been most dignified and proper; and your generosity has met no
response from the government of this country.” Previously to these
incidents, on the 27th, I had in like manner been called upon by the
representatives of England and France. Instead of presenting
themselves in the guise of friendly negotiators, and strictly
neutral, these gentlemen showed themselves, on the contrary,
altogether partial to Chili. They contended that the brief delay
granted to the government for the acceptance of terms would make any
resolution appear as dictated under the pressure of force; that
sufficient time had not been allowed for consultation with the
allies; that, in fine, a long delay should be conceded. They
concluded by observing that they had strong reasons to fear for the
lives of the Spaniards at present in Santiago, should the
bombardment take place. To all these remarks I answered: That it was
six months since the war had commenced, and that the government of
Chili, who now complained of the short space allowed, had never, up
to the present moment, made any proposal for an arrangement; that
the terms offered by me were precisely those of their own
governments of England and France; and that in the event of so
savage a butchery taking place, it should be visited with new and
terrible rigor. The interview terminated with marks of mutual
coldness. On the 30th I received from the same gentlemen a plan for
an arrangement, in which they proposed the cessation of hostilities,
the withdrawal of my vessels, and the presentation of my
credentials, all of which were, as your excellency perceives,
totally inadmissible.
At 8 o’clock on the morning of the 31st the foreign vessels of war
had withdrawn from my front. At the said hour of eight the two guns
were fired that were to serve as an announcement that one hour later
I would open on the city. At a quarter past 9 the frigate Blanca
commenced firing at the government warehouses and a small fort, and
was immediately followed by the frigate Villa de Madrid. Meanwhile
the schooner Vencedora her guns against the intendencia, and the
frigate Resolucion against the railroad terminus; all of which
buildings were government property. At the end of two hours the
warehouses were reduced to ashes; the fort was considerably damaged,
as were also the intendencia and railroad terminus; and a portion of
the city was set on fire by a grenade ricocheting the intendencia
and exploding in a chemical laboratory. The firing was suspended at
half past eleven. It is as yet impossible to estimate the
damages.
The Chilian government had decided, on making no resistance, and
consequently ordered that not a gun should be fired.
It was confidently expected that the forces of England and the United
States would oppose the bombardment.
The property stored in the government warehouses, and entirely
consumed by the firing, belonged to Frenchmen and Germans.
The government had opposed the removal of goods by the foreign
merchants.
I remain, &c.,
“Her Majesty’s Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary, at
Washington.”