Mr. Bigelow to Mr. Seward
Sir: I enclose a memorandum, received last evening from Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys, in pursuance of a promise which I have already reported to you. I called upon his excellency this afternoon for the purpose of getting clearer ideas upon some of its points, that no time should be lost by the two governments in securing an available basis of negotiation.
I read over to him the memorandum aloud, and as I proceeded, remarked that I presumed my government would not deny to France the sovereign right of making war, which, of course, belonged to all governments; that France would be singularly fortunate if the end for which she went to Mexico should be fully realized, for it always took two parties to make a war, and one must be in the wrong: and history had preserved the record of few wars in which either belligerent attained fully the end for which it took up arms. I asked him if he could give me an idea of the “guarantees” which he hoped to obtain from Mexico. He said they did not, of course, expect to get the money owing them, but they hoped for something which they might regard as an equivalent. That, however, was a matter of negotiation between them and Mexico. But [Page 803] he could not very well talk with me about those guarantees now, for they must depend upon the result of pending negotiations in Mexico, and were liable to be different, from anything they might now be able to suggest. I then asked what form his excellency proposed that the “assurances” he asked from the cabinet at Washington should take. He replied that he had as yet given no thought to that subject.
I remarked that it seemed to me desirable, For obvious reasons, that our governments should appear to act as independently of each other as possible in this matter; that France could hardly enter with dignity into a formal covenant with us to make her retirement from Mexico depend upon our forbearance, neither could we covenant not to intervene without implying a disposition on our part to intervene but for such a covenant. I expressed a doubt, therefore, whether a formal covenant was consistent with the dignity of either nation, but I suggested that it would doubtless be perfectly agreeable to the Secretary of State at Washington to restate in a despatch to me the policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other independent states which we have hithertopursued, and to which it is our purpose to adhere, in terms that would be perfectly satisfactory to the Emperor. A copy of such an opinion in his hands, I said, would possess all of the advantages and none of the disadvantages of a formal treaty.
I also expressed my belief that you would have no objection to make such a communication if it promised to favor an early and friendly solution of the questions pending between us.
Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys thought well of this suggestion; said he saw no need of a treaty; he preferred the separate and independent action of the governments, and he would be prepared, he said, in conformity with that policy, to show me when I could give him the assurance spoken of—the results of negotiations with Maximilian which were already going on quite independently of that assurance. I was glad to hear from his mouth this fact, glanced at in his memorandum, for it satisfied me that notice has already gone forward to Maximilian, probably by Mr. Hidalgo, that he must prepare to dispense with the French flag avant peu.
I then asked whether it would not be possible in some way to arrest the useless and demoralizing warfare that was carried on in Mexico between Maximilian and the Juarists, at least while these negotiations were going on, that is, while the French occupation should last. He said he wished there was; that the atrocities practiced there were really too dreadful to speak of, but he did not know that he could do anything to discourage them, and asked if I had anything to suggest. I said, I supposed that if the Juarists were sure that the French were intending to leave Mexico within a time which seemed reasonable to them, and that they would then have a fair chance of trying conclusions with Maximilian’s party, they would be willing to leave him undisturbed, if undisturbed by him; and that if France or Maximilian had any indirect means of coming to such an understanding with Juarez, it might render the situation less embarrassing to all parties.
His excellency replied that he would he very glad if that were practicable, as it would enable them to leave the country so much the sooner; but they had no means of communicating with Juarez, and he asked me if I could suggest any mode of accomplishing what I proposed. I replied that we had relations, as he was aware, with Señor Romero, and anything that he would authorize me to say we should be most happy to say, of course, that would have a tendency to terminate this brutalizing strife.
His excellency promised to speak of this, and also of the form of the “assurance” which we had been discussing, to the Emperor.
I then asked his excellency if he had heard of Santa Anna’s projects, of which I wrote you in my private note of the 8th instant. He seemed to be fully informed upon the subject.
[Page 804]My object in this conversation with Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys, as I have already stated, was to lose no time in getting our two governments to a point where they can begin to act in concert. How far I have succeeded I can better judge when I shall receive your reply to this account of it.
I remain, sir, with great respect, your very obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.