Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the First Session Thirty-ninth Congress, Part III

[Translation.]

Mr. Romero to Mr. Seward

Mexican Legation in the United States of America, Washington, February, 14, 1866.

Mr. Secretary: I have the honor to transmit to you a copy of a French publication lately made in Paris, entitled “Mexico before the Chambers,” and written by Mr. Georges Jauret. It is undoubtedly the most impartial article ever published in France on the Mexican question.

The importance of this publication is such that I cannot refrain from sending it to the department under your worthy charge, and recommending it to your particular attention.

I avail myself of this occasion to renew to you, Mr. Secretary, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

M. ROMERO.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.

[From La Presse, Paris, January 20, 1866.]

Mexico before the French Chambers.

I.

On the 5th and 6th of January, 1862, the first ships of France, Spain, and England appeared before the harbor of Vera Cruz. Spain had sent a large contingent of 7,000 men. The quota of France was much more modest, being only 2,500 men, and the English detachment amounted to little more than 700 bayonets.

The city was evacuated before any demonstration was made against the fort of San Juan de Ulloa, and the allies immediately took quiet possession.

Now a series of tedious negotiations began, and concluded with the convention of Soledad, on the 19th of February, 1862. But this convention was rejected at Paris, by a formal note in the Moniteur of the 2d of April; full diplomatic power was consigned to Mr. Dubois de Saligny; this disavowal became the pretext of a rupture between the allies, and very soon afterwards General Lorencez, at the head of the French corps, re enforced, was attacking the Monastery of Guadalupe, transformed into a citadel, at Puebla, on the 5th of May.

Thus at each step we took on Mexican territory we found ourselves more deeply involved. The skirt of a garment caught in a cog-wheel drags in the whole body. We begin by wishing to protect the interests of our countrymen; at Puebla it is the honor of the flag that demands vengeance; in Mexico we shall see the exigencies of national self-love determined not to give up a work once begun.

General Forey, taking re-enforcements with him, takes General Lorencez’s place, and embarks at Cherbourg on the 30th of July. He organizes his columns, and on the 15th of February, 1863, nine months after the check at Guadalupe, he determines to take the offensive. He had twenty thousand men with him. The siege of Puebla commenced on the 18th of March, and on the 18th of May the city and its defences were taken. Finally, on the 10th of June, General Forey made his entry into the capital.

We now approach the decisive period. The meeting of notables is held, and on the 3d of October, 1863, a deputation starts for Miramar to offer the imperial crown to the Archduke Maximilian. The candidate for the restored throne of Mexico submitted his acceptance to the will of the people formally expressed, the result of this vote was communicated to him on the 10th of April, and he finally announces his acceptance to the Mexican delegates. On the 14th of April he embarked at Miramar for Vera Cruz. The lot is now cast; from this moment dates the decisive experiment and the commencement for France of the bitter fruits of intervention.

II.

Under this history of military incidents there is another profound one, diversified with confused and imperceptible accidents systematically dissembled by calculated reserves, and by what we are pleased to call diplomatic exigencies. This last is, however, the most interesting to learn; for it alone gives value to facts, in exposing the secret thought that has produced or directed them.

We must say now, as a preface to the work undertaken by our army, that Mexico is a country of a peculiar kind. It gets on, in opposition to its governments, by pronunciamientos, just like Spain, from which it has preserved certain political morals. At the time of our expedition, instability was the normal condition of the different powers that jostled, fought, and replaced each other.

It may be explained in this way: the Mexican people, without being brave, are restive. The wars kept up for independence have given them the habit of arms and the necessity of internal struggles.

In fine, Mexico extends over a vast territory, very poorly joined together in its parts. The absence of roads, the difficulties of communications make it a country very slightly connected federally, and so cut up that a victorious party must always find resistance in some remote quarter of the empire or republic, once headed by Santa Anna, then by Miramon, and now by Juarez.

Such were the difficulties we undertook to overcome when we signed the convention of the 31st of October, 1861.

III.

The idea of a French expedition first appeared in a despatch from Mr. Dubois de Saligny, dated in Mexico the 18th of April, 1861. The despatch was as follows:

“In the state of anarchy, we might say of social decomposition, in which we find this unfortunate country, it is very difficult to foresee the turn events will take. One thing seems certain to me: it is impossible to remain in statu quo. Everything indicates that we are approaching a new revolution. In this situation, it seems to me absolutely necessary for us to keep a material force upon the Mexican coast sufficient to protect our interests under all circumstances.”

It is only a question of a protective demonstration, somewhat negative, as is plainly to be seen, that diverts intervention rather than invites it.

In his despatch of the 12th of June, 1861, Mr. Dubois de Saligny intensifies his thought, making it more decisive. It is no longer a question of simple protection, but one of reclamations by force. This despatch says:

“It remains for me to add, that I have little confidence in the new administration; that the position of this government appears to me so precarious that I believe more than ever in the necessity of taking immediate precautions to put ourselves in a condition to support by force, in case of need, the justice of our claims.”

In his despatch of the 27th of July, Mr. de Saligny announced to Mr. Thouvenel that on the 23d, in accord with Sir Charles Wyke, he had broken his relations with the government of Juarez

As to Mr. Thouvenel, he admits the necessity of demanding satisfaction and indemnities; but he does not yet see, even in the most distant case, the project or thought to overturn the republican government of Juarez. See in what remarkably wise terms our minister of foreign affairs resumes his instructions in a despatch from Paris the 5thof September, 1861, addressed to Mr. Dubois de Saligny:

“The government of the Emperor entirely approves of your conduct, and protests in the most formal manner against that of the government of Juarez. That government must know the impression of the government of the Emperor, and must be instructed in regard to what we require of it. You must therefore declare to it that repudiation of the foreign debt, under any pretext whatever, is very unpleasant to us, and we demand the immediate repeal of the law of the 17th of July last. You will add, that we require the appointment of commissioners in the ports of Vera Cruz and Tampico, to be designated by us, and whose duty shall be to assure the deposit, in the hands of the powers entitled to them, of the funds collected for their benefit, in execution of foreign agreements, from the profits of the maritime custom-houses of Mexico. If the Mexican government refuses to accept these conditions, you will quit Mexico without delay, with all the personnel of his Majesty’s legation.”

At last, on the 30th of October, the day before the signature of the famous convention between France, England, and Spain, Mr. Thouvenel addressed Mr. Saligny another despatch, announcing in a positive manner the expedition, the conditions under which it was to be undertaken, and the object of the three powers in organizing it.

“The Emperor,” said Mr. Thouvenel, “has decided that a naval division, under Rear-Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, shall be sent to the Gulf of Mexico to demand satisfaction, which must be given for insults to our dignity and injuries of all sorts to our citizens. The government of the Emperor will not act alone; the government of her Britannic Majesty and that of her Catholic Majesty propose to join their forces to ours in this expedition.”

To explain clearly the situation, we are now forced to stop and ask Spain, in her turn, to allow a brief history of her projects in regard to Mexico. It will be seen here that French policy has only yielded to solicitations from Madrid. The wrongs to that power date back even further than ours. As early as the month of April, I860, before the final triumph of Juarez, we find the first diplomatic protestations of Mr. Pacheco, the Spanish minister in Mexico. We will soon see what fatal fruit this early germ brought forth.

IV.

Let us proceed with the facts. In the month of April, 1860, as Mr. Calderon Collantes says in his despatch to Mr. Mon, on the 23d of October, 1861, Spain had conceived the project of a joint expedition, which would have terminated, according to the proposed plan, in the establishment of a regular and durable government, in the stereotyped language of diplomacy; but no definite resolution was taken till the end of August, 1861. As early as the month of September the government increases its communications with London and Paris; and on the 10th of December Mr. Isturiz writes from London to his government, “That there is nothing yet agreed upon between England and France about intervention in Mexican affairs.” As I have observed, it was not till the 30th October, in Mr. Thouvenel’s despatch to Mr. Dubois de Saligny, that French diplomacy reveals the existence of negotiations for the conclusion of a convention to be signed the next day, and on the 23d of the same month Mr. Calderon Collantes discusses the plan of it in a despatch to Mr. Mon, Spanish ambassador at Paris.

Let us now leave dates and hasten on to the instructive portion of this history. What matters it whether the expedition originated in Madrid, Paris, or London? This question was definitely settled when the three powers solemnly signed the convention October 31. From that day the responsibilities of the expedition ceased to be successive and personal; there is but one action and one responsibility. At present the situation has quite a different appearance. The convention has been given up, and France remains at Vera Cruz, in front of Mexico. We have nothing to say about the conduct of Spain and England after withdrawing from the convention of Soledad. What good would it do? But our expedition has gained its ends. It remains to be seen whether these ends were desired, sought for, or premeditated. And for the proper solution of the question it is certainly not without interest to discover what has been the French policy since the 31st of October, 1861, to the 10th April, 1864, and whether it has been constantly true to itself and constantly uniform. In our mind there are but two orders of facts in the investigation of this question: apparent and tangible facts and those that escape vulgar comprehensions; there is the letter and the spirit.

V.

Consulting appearances, we easily conclude that France never had the idea, ostensibly at least, of exercising any force in the change of government in Mexico. The convention of the 31st October says, in article 1st:

“The commanders of the allied forces shall be authorized to carry out any other operations deemed necessary to enforce the specific aim stated in the preamble of this convention, and particularly to assure protection to foreign residents.”

Mr. Calderon Collantes goes so far, on this occasion, as to demand, in his despatch of 23d October to Mr. Mon, the suppression of all of the article after the word “preamble.” “Then,” said he, “the intent of the convention cannot be doubtful.”

Let us pass on to article 2d, certainly the most explicit:

“Art. 2. The high contracting parties bind themselves, in the coercive measures provided by the present convention, not to seek to acquire territory, nor take any private advantage, nor to exercise in the internal affairs of Mexico any influence of a nature to disturb the right of the Mexican nation to choose and constitute freely the form of its government.”

This article is very explicit; and it appears much more so when we consider the commentaries made upon it by official declarations and facts. The first of these commentaries is certainly one of the most explicit. We find it in a diplomatic document from Washington, signed by Mr. Seward.

The three European powers in consort, moved by England, wished to have the co-operation of the federal government. The ministers of the three powers knocked at the door of the Washington cabinet, and the Secretary of State for foreign affairs answered in a despatch dated Washington, December 4, 1861; which despatch begins by giving almost the whole of the convention of the 31st October, and expresses the views of the United States upon each article.

What Mr. Seward says of article 2d is particularly interesting:

“The United States,” says Mr. Seward, “take great interest—and they are happy to think that this interest is in common with the high contracting parties and other civilized nations—in believing that the sovereigns that have concluded the convention do not seek to obtain an enlargement of territory, or any other advantage not acquired by the United States, or any other civilized state, and that they do not wish to exercise any influence injurious to the right of the Mexican people to choose and freely establish the form of their government. The undersigned reiterates on this occasion the expression of his satisfaction, based on the declaration of the high contracting parties, that they recognize this interest, and he is authorized by the satisfaction of the President of the United States”

It is evident from these declarations of the American statesman that the three powers ought to have discussed the convention of the 31st October at Washington, in a sense altogether reassuring for the national sovereignty and the security of republican institutions in Mexico.

Mr. Seward adds these characteristic declarations:

“It is true that the United States also have causes of complaint against Mexico, as the high contracting parties suppose. After mature reflection the President is, however, of opinion that it is not proper at this time to demand satisfaction for these wrongs by an act of accession to the convention. Among the reasons for this decision, and which the undersigned is authorized to communicate, he will mention: 1st. That the United states prefer, as far as possible, to maintain that traditional policy recommended by the Father of the country, and confirmed by a happy experience, which forbids them to form alliances with foreign nations. 2d. Mexico being a neighbor of the United States on this continent, and possessing, as to some of its most important institutions, a system of government analogous to ours, the United States profess sentiments of friendship towards that republic and take a lively interest in its safety, its welfare, and its prosperity. Animated by these intentions, the United States are not disposed to have recourse to coercive measures to satisfy their wrongs at a time when the Mexican government is profoundly disturbed by internal dissensions and threatened by an external war. These same sentiments prevent the United States, with greater reason, from participating in an alliance in view of a war against Mexico.”

The Secretary of State in Washington would have answered very differently if the three powers had allowed an afterthought of dynastic restoration to penetrate their communications. These afterthoughts have long existed, as we will soon see; but they are disguised, dimmed, and changed in the mystery of diplomatic conversations, waiting only the complaisance of facts and the attitude of the Mexicans to give them the right of publicity.

Mr. Calderon Collantes sends instructions to the captain general of Cuba. There were but three points to impose on Mexico: 1st, solemn satisfaction for the expulsion of the Spanish ambassador; 2d, execution of the treaty signed at Paris between Mon and Almonte; 3d, indemnity. Nothing yet of the perspective of a monarchical restoration.

On his part, Mr. Thouvenel, on the 11th of November, 1861, sends instructions to Rear-Admiral Jurien de la Gravière. First, he is informed of the motives of the expedition; next, his duties are pointed out to him, and he is told what conditions he is to impose upon the Juarez government, with which the plenipotentiaries are still evidently authorized to treat. It is only later that Mr. Dubois de Saligny and Mr. Jurien de la Gravière will officially learn the irrevocable condemnation that threatens the Mexican republic.

“The combined forces of the three powers,” says Mr. Thouvenel to Mr. Jurien de la Gravière, in his note of the 11th of November, “having arrived at the eastern shores of Mexico, you will, as I have said, claim possession of the ports of that coast. After this step, two alternatives may arise: either you will be resisted, and you will take these ports by force, or the local authorities will make no material opposition, and the Mexican government will refuse to enter into relations with you.”

We here see that Mr. Thouvenel still admits the supposition of an arrangement with Juarez, and of course the maintenance of republican institutions. This does not certainly accord with the diplomatic conversations then taking place between Paris and Madrid, with the view of a monarchical establishment in Mexico; but we will have occasion presently to examine this discreet and mysterious phase of facts; we will continue for the present to look at the avowed aims and to expose appearances.

Mr. Thouvenel continues thus:

“Renewing a tactic used by one of his antecessors in the war with the United States, Juarez would retire to the interior. This expedient would not stop the allied powers. The interest of our dignity, and climacteric considerations, would determine us to act promptly and decisively. The government of the Emperor admits that whether it be to reach the Mexican government, or to render coercion more efficacious, you may be compelled to march into the interior, even as far as the city of Mexico itself.” The march on Mexico is only regarded here as a possibility.

The conclusion of the despatch deserves to be given entire; we quote verbally:

“The allied powers, as I have said, have no other design than is expressed in the convention; they do not intend to interfere with internal affairs, nor to exercise any influence on the will of the people in their choice of a government. There are, however, certain contingencies we must be prepared for, and which we must previously examine. It might happen that the presence of the allied forces on the Mexican territory would induce the sensible portion of the population, weary of anarchy, and longing for order and repose, to try to form a government with the guarantees of strength and stability, that have been wanting ever since the independence of the country. The allied powers have a manifest common interest in ridding Mexico of the anarchy which has so long paralyzed its prosperity and annulled the riches bestowed upon it so bountifully by Providence, forcing it to change unstable and expensive governments for others of no better character. This interest ought to induce them not to discourage these attempts, and you will not refuse them your encouragement and moral support if they undertake to establish a government that will afford protection to strangers as well as to other residents. The government of the Emperor relies upon your prudence and discernment to appreciate, in concert with his Majesty’s commissioner, (whose knowledge of Mexican affairs, from along residence in that country, will be very useful to you,) the events that will come under your observation, and the part you will he called upon to take in them.

“THOUVENEL.”

This is the first public appearance of the intentions of the French government on the restoration of royalty in Mexico. But these intentions are so slightly developed, and so little encouraged, that the French plenipotentiaries, scarcely fixed upon Mexican soil, are authorized to send Juarez an ultimatum, comprehending all the wrongs against France, under the form of imposed conditions, concluding with an article 9, thus conceived:

“Article 9. As a guarantee for the fulfilment of the financial conditions and others, proposed by the present ultimatum, France shall have the right to occupy the ports of Vera Cruz, Tampico, and such other ports of the republic that seem proper, and to establish commissioners to be appointed by the imperial government, whose duty shall be to deliver funds collected in the maritime ports of Mexico, in execution of foreign contracts, into the hands of those powers to whom they are due, and to deliver sums due to France to the French agents.

“The said agents shall also he invested with power to reduce by half or in less proportion, us they please, the duties now collected in the ports of the republic.

“It is expressly understood that goods upon which importation dues have been paid shall be subjected in no case whatever to an additional tax of more than fifteen per cent. on import duties as internal tax or any other, neither by the supreme government nor by the state authorities.”

This article shows that the French commissioners reject all projects of a nature hostile to the government, and are disposed to treat with Juarez.

VI.

The opening of the session of 1862 was impatiently expected. The imperial discourse would necessarily cast some light on this Mexican expedition, around which rumors from every quarter had cast so many shadows. At the opening of the session on the 27th January, 1862, the Emperor expressed himself thus on the Mexican question:

“We would be at peace with the world if the proceedings of an unscrupulous government in Mexico did not force us to join Spain and England in protecting our countrymen, and suppressing crimes against humanity and the laws of nations.”

From the data of this imperial speech, then, it is only a question of one of those conflicts so frequent during the first half of the century across the sea. Citizens to protect, crimes to be suppressed—such is the wise, modest, and easy programme announced and avowed solemnly by imperial policy.

Next come discussions of the address. Strange rumors about Mexico circulate, and they find an echo in the centre of the legislature. Vague talks of monarchy in Mexico are heard; officious offers to a prince of the house of Hapsburg are hinted; the band of five bestirs itself, and presents this significant amendment:

“We see the beginning of the Mexican expedition with regret. Its aim seems to be to meddle with the interior affairs of a people. We advise the government to attend only to the reparation of wrongs.”

Mr. Jules Favre gets up this amendment. He admits the reparation of wrongs; but he is alarmed when the name of Maximilian is pronounced, particularly in diplomatic circles. On the 24th of January, 1862, Lord Cowley wrote to Lord John Russell thus:

“I have heard it said so often that the officers going to Mexico with re-enforcements say they are going there to place Archduke Maximilian on the throne of that country, that I have thought it necessary to question Mr. Thouvenel on that subject.

“I asked him if negotiations were pending between France and Austria on the subject of the Archduke Maximilian. His excellency said no, hut that negotiations had been commenced by Mexicans alone, who had gone to Vienna for that purpose.”

We must confess that this affair, lately so much of a secret, was very suddenly developed; for only three days after Lord Cowley’s despatch, Lord John Russell wrote, on the 27th of January, 1862, to the English minister in Mexico as follows:

“Sir: I have received your despatches of the 18th and 28th of November, and have placed them before the Queen. Since I last wrote to you the Emperor of the French has determined to send 3,000 more men to Vera Cruz.

“It is supposed these troops will march to the capital with the French and Spanish troops already in the country. It is said that the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian will he invited by a number of Mexicans to ascend the throne of Mexico, and that the Mexican people will be rejoiced at this change in the form of their government.

“I have little to add to my instructions upon the subject. If the Mexican people, by a simultaneous movement, place the Austrian archduke upon the throne of Mexico, we have nothing to do with it; that is not in our convention.

“But we cannot forcibly interfere in this affair. Mexicans must consult their own interests. And this was written in Europe, and talked of in diplomatic circles, two months before our plenipotentiaries tried to treat with Juarez and sent him the ultimatum. This is a mystery to be solved only by a contradictory study. Mr. Billault at this time undertook to quell the alarms of the opposition. The official orator is very plain, precise, and affirmative. Mr. Jules Favre dreaded the project of monarchical restoration. Mr. Billault answered him thus:

“England and Spain have joined us. The same offers have been made to the United States; but the United States, in regard to Mexico, do not seem to concentrate their views upon a simple reparation of damages suffered. Their policy views things differently, and we have decided to act without them. [Very well!]

“Does not this union of three powers fully satisfy you as to the private suppositions upon which your speech is founded? You persist in seeing certain secret machinations of France, for the benefit of foreign interests, beyond open and avowed facts. When such suppositions are affirmed, you ought at least to have some proof of them, and you have none!”

Mr. Jules Favre is afraid the convention of the 31st of October covers some ambiguity, and cannot give full faith to complaisant interpretations. Mr. Billault replies to him:

“The convention agreed upon by the three powers is plain and precise. The aim is to exact from Mexico:

“1. A more effectual protection of the persons and property of their subjects.

“2. The execution of obligations contracted towards them by that republic; and article 2 of the convention adds:

“‘The three contracting parties bind themselves to seek for themselves, in the use of coercive measures provided by the present convention, no acquisition of territory, nor any private advantage; and to exercise in the internal affairs of Mexico no influence of a nature to trespass upon the right of the Mexican nation to choose and freely constitute the form of its government.’

“All that is plain and precise. It clearly explains what the three powers intend to do in common, and what they forbid each other to do. Against such solemn declarations what proofs have you to adduce?”

Mr. Jules Favre anxiously inquires why we should go as far as the city of Mexico. Mr. Billault answers:

“You ask why go as far as the capital? Gentlemen, the topographic and hygienic situation of the country commands it as much as political necessity. To take possession of the coast, and remain there, would be sacrificing our troops to the yellow fever. [That’s so! that’s so!] It would be destroying ourselves; anarchy would reign in the interior, and laugh at France and its futile efforts.

“The decisive blow must be struck at the heart of the power, and, leaving the yellow fever behind us, we must assault a less terrible enemy.

“There, and there only, can we force our rights to be respected, and command respect for our subjects, and the execution of obligations to our country too long delayed. [Good!] That is why our troops must go to the city of Mexico; and as they left on the 20th of February, they ought to be there now.”

Mr. Billault does not stop at these declarations. Urged on by the current of his eloquence and applause of his hearers, he becomes more explicit:

“This principle which we proclaim, this principle, the base of our public right—independence of the popular vote and national sovereignty—we will not violate it in the city of Mexico. We will leave these unfortunates perfectly free; miserable people, oppressed by governments yon praise, that never gave them the securities and blessings which are the rights of civilized societies. If they desire to continue that miserable existence, we will not force a better lot upon them; but if they will accept a better condition, most certainly we will encourage them with all our sympathies, with all our counsel, with all our moral support.”

It is still a question of moral support.

And, finally, to dispel all ridiculous rumors about the throne of Mexico and the Archduke Maximilian, to banish all fancies of idle imaginations, the minister makes this decisive argument to the Chamber:

“Such, gentlemen, is the situation, briefly explained; and as to the rumors that gave umbrage to the ambassador of her Britannic Majesty, permit me to pass them by. Officers said they were going to put a foreign prince upon the throne of Mexico. What! do you suppose a great diplomatic secret would be intrusted to the first army officer that might he sent to Mexico? Surely he was not serious!”

In the debate on the address of 1863, Mr. Saligny was accused of having instigated the French government to a monarchical restoration in Mexico. We will not undertake to defend our plenipotentiary against these imputations; but we must defend truth against conjectures. Did not Mr. Saligny put his name, with that of Mr. Jurien de la Gravière, to the famous convention of Soledad, and thus give his support to the following articles:

“Art. 1. The constitutional government now in power in the Mexican republic having informed the commissioners of the allied powers that it has no need of the assistance so generously offered to the Mexican people, because it has the strength to preserve itself from internal revolt, the allies will resort to treaties to present the reclamations they are charged to make in the name of their respective nations.

“Art. 2. With this intent, the representatives of the allied powers protest that they have no intention to injure the sovereignty and integrity of the Mexican republic. Negotiations will be opened at Orizaba.”

This was written on the 19th of February, 1862, over the signatures of the representatives of the allied powers. These principles were subsequently denied; but the fact is not less serious, inasmuch as it reveals the nature of the instructions given to our plenipotentiaries. The preliminary convention of Soledad is the authorized and official commentary of the convention of the 31st of October.

VII.

The situation is now clearly established. It comes out as evidence, that until the official rejection of the Soledad convention, the French government did not acknowledge as an avowed object and aim the repression of the Mexican republic. The expedition is confined, ostensibly at least, to the prudent limits of a simple revindication. How, then, has it been brought to abandon that policy? By what intrigue has it been impelled to a monarchical crusade? By what association of ideas or facts has it been led to dream of a resurrection of an imperial crown for the benefit of the Archduke Maximilian?

Here we fancy that French policy has left its old initiation, yielded to the solicitations of the court of Spain, and suffered itself to be caught in a net of intrigues, woven for it by its refugees; but it is yet only an apprehension, and we leave it to facts that we are going to produce to contradict or affirm it.

Let us go back some years. As early as the 16th of March, 1860, the Spanish government began to propose its claims against a country “the situation of which could not be worse.” Miramon then ruled the republic; but we must go back to the 24th November, 1858, to discover the first thought of a joint intervention in the affairs of Mexico. At that date Mr. Mon began to confer with Mr. Walewski on the necessity of establishing a government and a firm power in those countries.

On the 3d of January, 1859, Mr. Mon again wrote to Mr. Calderon Collantes in these terms: “The thought that I have not been able to make your excellency comprehend is to find out if it is not possible to aid in forming a government in Mexico, which, supported at first by the three powers, might afterwards exist without any assistance.”

Would not any one say that this despatch was written the day before the convention of the 31st of October?

Mr. Mon continues: “Will your excellency inform me, if possible, what form is best, and what means most available, to attain this end? Count Walewski and myself have left this question here, in order to resume it at a more convenient season.”

Mr. Calderon Collantes, minister of state, writes to Mr. Mon, on the 10th of January, that it is of the utmost importance to establish a strong and durable power in Mexico; but that to persuade Mexico to this, moral suasion and purely diplomatic discussions are sufficient.

As to the initiative taken in this grave question by Spain, it is indisputably affirmed in these few lines, borrowed from a despatch of Mr. Calderon Collantes, on the 18th April, 1860:

“Your excellency knows of the attempts made several times by the government of her Majesty to induce England and France to join in the adoption of measures to put an end to the anarchy now exhausting the Mexican republic.”

The minister of state in Madrid continued in these terms: “I had a consultation some time ago, on this grave affair, with Mr. Barrot, the French ambassador. Mr. Barrot transmitted my remarks to the department of foreign affairs of the Emperor, and recently he read me an extract from one of his despatches, which says that the governments of France and England are now disposed to combine their efforts to establish a government in Mexico, to be recognized by the whole nation, and put an end to the painful condition of that unfortunate country.

“Mr. Thouvenel thinks the best way would be to propose a constituent assembly to fix a permanent form of government, and settle all existing difficulties, whatever their nature or importance.

“Her Majesty’s wish is that your excellency have an interview with Mr. Thouvenel, to try and contrive some way for the three powers to intervene in the disorders of the Mexican republic. Her Majesty’s government thinks that the simple news of this resolution, and the first steps taken, will be enough to encourage the honest people of Mexico, and dispose them to act in favor of the establishment of a government which, without limiting the exercise of legitimate rights and guarantees enjoyed in other civilized countries, may suppress that spirit of rebellion that has caused so much harm to that unhappy country.”

See the gentle approach. At first it is only a strong and durable power; nothing is said of a republican form. On the 18th of April, 1860, a republic was considered; two months after, Spain favored a monarchy; and lastly, when everything was ready, as she supposed, a Bourbon was proposed. And thus our policy has been insensibly seduced into the Mexican expedition.

Things were in this condition when Spain took the trouble to draw up a constitution for the reorganization of Mexico, and sent it simultaneously to London and Paris, on the 24th of May, 1860. What caused these plans of intervention, so actively caressed by Spain, so pleasantly received by France, to fail? It was their cool reception by England.

On the 27th of April, 1860, Mr. Isturitz wrote from London to Mr. Calderon Collantes: “In fact, on the 27th of April, 1860, Lord John Russell replied briefly to Mr. Isturitz, in regard to English co-operation, that he would not reject it, if it was ‘understood that no force was to be used in the execution’ of the projects. In a second interview, Mr. Isturitz insists on a more explicit answer from Lord John Russell. The secretary of state replies, that ‘England will require protection to Protestant worship;’ to ‘which I replied,’ adds Mr. Isturitz, ‘in that case England cannot rely upon the co-operation of Spain.’”

After this reserved attitude of England, Mr. Thouvenel seems inclined to back out. On the 18th of May, 1860, he declared to Mr. Mon, “that as to force and coercive measures, he is by no means inclined to use them.”

This is not all; on the 2d of June, 1860, Mr. Barrot, our representative at Madrid, handed a despatch to the minister of state, in which the question of mediation is considered by data and instructions from Mr. Thouvenel.

“Moreover, it is understood,” says that despatch, “that the steps to be taken must be of a friendly nature, to the exclusion of all forcible coercion.”

This period of projected intervention may be considered as concluded, after the solemn declaration of Mr. Thouvenel.

Henceforth Spain hurries her military preparations, and sends reserved instructions to the captain general of Cuba.

Here the diplomatic history of the Mexican question has a large void; for a year passes before a Spanish despatch, of the 6th of September, 1861, revives diplomatic negotiations upon the Mexican question. A few days previous, Mr. Mon, alluding to the troubles in the United States, wrote to his government: “The government ought to know that this is a good opportunity to awaken old memories, and place upon the throne of Mexico a prince of the Bourbon blood, or intimately connected with that house.”

We must pay strict attention to this despatch, because it will subsequently explain the sudden defection of the Spanish government.

On the 6th of September, 1861, the Spanish government instructs Mr. Mon to inform the French government that a Spanish expedition is fitting out against Mexico, and that special orders have already been sent to the captain general of Cuba. It was a sort of demurrer in the case, and Mr. Thouvenel, forgetting what he had said about coercive measures, is attracted within the orbit of Spanish policy. And it is not alone in regard to the expedition that this policy prevails, but also to its aim; and, in spite of the convention of 31st of October, in spite of instructions to Mr. Dubois de Saligny and Jurien de la Gravière, in spite of Mr. Billault’s declarations in the legislature, the Mexican republic is definitely condemned, and Spain’s dream of monarchy is debated, not as a possible event, but as a project irrevocably determined on. On the 11th of October, 1861, Mr. Thouvenel wrote to our ambassador in London:

“I have told the English ambassador that I agreed perfectly with his government on one point. I agreed with Lord John Russell that our coercion of Mexico should be caused by our complaints against that government, and that the prevention of their repetition was the only ostensible excuse for a convention.”

Is the word ostensible intentional? The minister continues:

“But it seems to me useless to object to legal participation in the events caused by our operations. * * * It is lawful to suppose that if the result of the American crisis should be a separation of the north and south, the two new confederations would seek compensations on Mexican territory, offered by anarchy to their rivalry. England would not remain indifferent to such an event, and the only thing, in my opinion, that could prevent it, would be the establishment of a new government in Mexico, strong enough to prevent its internal derangement.”

It is evident from these declarations of Mr. Thouvenel, uttered twenty days before the convention, and five months previous to the solemn protestations of Mr. Billault, that it was no longer only to avenge our countrymen; and when we compare this declaration of Mr. Thouvenel with that of Mr. Mon on the crisis in the United States, which we have just quoted, we readily perceive the connecting link of the two kindred policies.

VIII.

We remember the clear, precise, and affirmative declarations of Mr. Billault. In 1864 the times and ministers have changed, and policy must change. The entire disinterested nature of the expedition must now he explained. As events have been hurried to the contradiction of Mr. Billault’s declarations, Mr. Rouher must explain the unfailing unity of our policy in the Mexican question. Thus he is led, in contradiction to his eloquent predecessor, to prove that present facts were not unexpected, and that France foresaw them, if it did not will them, from the beginning of the expedition.

On the 12th of May, 1864, Mr. Rouher, in reply to Mr. Jules Favre, takes a retrospective observation, and lets a confession escape, in strong contrast to the previous declarations of Mr. Billault. He says:

“We did not stop at vain recriminations; we did not accept insignificant satisfaction, but we resolved from the first to march to Mexico, if our honor and the protection of our countrymen required it, in spite of temporary checks, of rude blame, and mean calumny; for after the situation was changed, despite the counsel of glory, we did not abandon the way we had traced out. We have neither been exalted nor discouraged. We came to Mexico to demand satisfaction of our honor, and overthrow a man who had dared to outrage France. We undertook to make peace in the country; we have reorganized the finances, the administration, and the army of that long unhappy nation, and we have invited it to choose its own government.”

The expedition, then, according to Mr. Rouher, had started with the determination to overthrow Juarez, and substitute another government.

But that is not all.

Mr. Rouher expressed himself thus, in the house, on the 28th of January, 1864:

“We told the truth at first; it was satisfaction for our wrongs, protection to our countrymen, with the probable necessity of going on to the city of Mexico. If we go to Mexico, the Juarez government cannot be sustained; there must be a new one.

“The form and conditions of this government must be planned by prudent cabinets, determined to engage in a distant expedition.”

Strange inconsistency!

The existence of a government with which our plenipotentiaries were to treat was doubted. There must have been a previous determination to transform the expedition into a crusade for monarchy, exclusive of outside machinations. In discussing the preliminaries of the expedition, Mr. Rouher quotes a despatch of Thouvenel to Count Flahault, on the 11th of October, 1861. Here it is:

“But the interest we have,” says Mr. Thouvenel, “in the regeneration of this country does not allow us to neglect anything to insure its success. As to a form of government, any that would offer proper guarantees would suit us; and I believe England has no preference, and has come to no conclusion. But if the Mexicans themselves, weary of their former miserable governments, should retura to the instincts of their race, and form a monarchy, I think we ought to aid them, yet leave them free to select whatever form of government they may think most conducive to their happiness.

“Continuing these ideas in the form of a confidential conversation, I added that in case of such an event, the government of the Emperor, entirely disinterested, did not propose a prince of the imperial family, but, willing to satisfy all parties, would be pleased to see the Mexicans select a prince of the house of Austria.”

The proposal of the Archduke Maximilian for the restored Mexican throne is thus frankly made. Then, we ask, how could Mr. Billault, five months later, call the reports from America, about Maximilian’s accession, ridiculous stories of silly officers?

Mr. Rouher next read a despatch from Mr. Thouvenel to Mr. Barrot, on the 15th of October, 1864, concerning the projects of monarchical restoration:

“In my despatch to Mr. Flahault, you will find the observations I made to Lord Cowley on this point, by which I have attempted to prove that though we assumed no direct responsibility in internal Mexican affairs, we would not discourage their efforts to form a regular and substantial government, and that the three powers ought to aid in this work of regeneration. In this way I was led to mention to Lord Cowley the possibility of a monarchy in Mexico, as you will see in my despatch to Mr. Flahault.”

Mr. Rouher adds these characteristic details:

“Mr. Thouvenel continues. He relates his conversation with Mr. Mon, the Spanish ambassador in Paris; he acknowledges, in case of a monarchy in Mexico, France will accept the Austrian archduke, thus rejecting Spain’s proposal to put a Bourbon upon that throne.”

From that moment the zeal of Spain became less warm; her troops are already on the way to Vera Cruz; she is obliged to sign the convention then negotiating; but since she cannot slip a Bourbon prince upon the Mexican throne, she will withdraw from the business as soon as she can; and France, pushed forward and then abandoned by her two allies, will be left alone to pursue her solitary way to the city of Mexico with a crown in her knapsack.

Such is history!

IX.

There was an unfortunate concurrence of circumstances to hasten the resolutions of our government. While Mr. Saligny was writing from Mexico, about the necessity of establishing a firm government there, a band of Mexican refugees, one of whom had served Miramon, began their monarchical campaign in Europe. Their part, even before the October convention, had assumed an official character. Almonte was the evil genius of our policy in this circumstance.

Mr. Billault was wrong to treat this band of refugees, on their way to Miramar or Vienna, so contemptuously in his speech in 1862, for not long afterwards, Almonte, their chief, appeared at Vera Cruz with a letter from Napoleon III, and made this celebrated declaration to the Mexicans:

“I have reason to know the desires of the allies, particularly of the French, to establish a firm government based upon peace and good morals in our unhappy country, and through our own instrumentality alone.”

The refugees act with extreme prudence, but official documents contradict them. On the 9th of April, 1862, Mr. Saligny and Mr. Jurien de la Gravière addressed this note to General Doblado:

“When General Almonte left France, the government of his Majesty the Emperor of the French knew that hostilities had commenced in Mexico. General Almonte offered to conciliate his countrymen, and make them understand the benevolent intention of European intervention. His offer was accepted by the government of his Majesty, and the general was not only authorized but invited to repair to Mexico.”

There is, then, no doubt about the official character of his mission.

On the 23d of March, 1862, General Prim wrote from Orizaba to Admiral Jurien de la Gravière about the refugees as follows:

“The act of introducing political refugees into the interior of the country, to plan a conspiracy that may destroy the existing government as well as its political system, while you pretend to be friendly and are waiting for a conference, is unexampled, and I am heartily astonished at it.

“If you have orders from your government, I must say I do not see the wisdom, justice, and grandeur of imperial policy; nor do I see any conciliation of the Emperor towards England and Spain in such a proceeding. I am sorry to say this, but your Mexican policy forces me to it, and I must also say it will cool the friendly relations of England and Spain towards France. I regret to say this, because nobody has more respect for the Emperor than I, and nobody loves France and Frenchmen more than I do.”

General Prim writes to his government the 17th March in the same tone. General Lorencez had arrived with re-enforcements; there was a mutiny, and General Prim wrote:

“Articles in French papers announcing that the object of the imperial troops is to put Maximilian on the throne of Mexico, will not only cause a difficulty between France and Mexico, hut a coolness between Spain and England and the imperial government. Almonte, Haro, Ramarez, and other monarch-makers arrived in Vera Cruzat the same time with General Lorencez. The Mexican government, knowing this, has sent me a note announcing its intention to prosecute these exiled enemies of the nation, who have returned to Mexico for criminal purposes.”

The part played by these Mexican refugees in Europe, and their influence on French diplomacy, inducing a monarchical crusade beyond the ocean, are candidly expressed in a despatch of the Spanish minister to General Prim. We find the following lines in that despatch, dated Madrid, 22d of January, 1862:

“The Emperor of the French has informed the government of the Queen, by her ambassador, that he intends to increase the Mexican expedition by 3,000 men. The object of this seems to be to get enough men to march to the capital if necessary, to shorten operations and abridge the delay of troops in that country.

“As your instructions are clear and formal, I have no additions to make to them. But your excellency must know that the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico is daily increasing.

“Some of the natives of that country—and this deserves particular notice—now residing in Europe are engaged in that business.”

All this while Mr. Saligny enters into the full spirit of the expedition in the part he has to play, and gets up a kind of side game with General Serrano against England. In a letter of the 24th of November, 1861, he speaks of the “incredible candor of perfidious Albion.” The word candor is underlined. In a letter of the 39th of November he promises “proofs of the duplicity and stupidity of the British minister.” He announces “curious revelations of a chimerical alliance between Mexico, England, and the United States against France and Spain;” and on the 23d he had already sent detailed accounts of the regular forces in Mexico. Alas! the 5th of May shows the result of all this; the blood of our soldiers who fell at Guadalupe will cry out against the advocates of Mexican emigration; and that order of General Lorencez, the betrayed and conquered general, will accuse the folly of ambition and the credulity of our policy.

On the 27th May General Lorencez said to his soldiers: “Your march on Mexico has been stopped by unforeseen obstacles, which we did not expect from what had been told us; they said Puebla invited you within its walls, and that its inhabitants would welcome you with flowers.

“With the confidence inspired by these assurances we appeared before Puebla; we found it bristling with barricades and commanded by a fortress armed with every means of defence.”

This is the answer to the advocates of immigration; these sad lines dissipate the illugiomand increase the bitterness of defeat.

We will now draw this first part of our labor to a close; we have pointed out the two currents that carried our policy into the dangers of the Mexican question; we have seen Mr. Billault reduce the expedition to a simple revindication of injured interests, and the secret conferences of diplomacy opening the doors to the projects of monarchical restoration. We have seen France first oppose the application of force in the restoration, and afterwards yield to the solicitations of Spain and the active manoeuvres of Mexican immigration. Is that all? Alas! no. On the 9th of April, 1862, the alliance is broken at Orizaba. It is broken on account of the presence of the refugees who have already constituted a secret government; it is broken because Mr. Saligny wants to march on Mexico, when the Spanish plenipotentiary and the English minister declare that no deed “is of a nature to justify this resolution.” (See report of conference held at Orizaba on the 9th of April.) It is broken, in fine, “because the three plenipotentiaries cannot agree upon the interpretation to be given to the convention of the 31st of October, 1861.” (See note addressed by the plenipotentiaries to General Doblado on the 9th of April, 1862.)

X.

England never wanted the establishment of a monarchy, and Spain, after tugging France in by a Bourbon, was ready to quit on the first pretext.

Spain had long been preparing for a retreat, and General Brim was let into the secret. Saligny accuses him of wanting the crown for himself, and would not play Don Quixote for another’s benefit. This was at the Orizaba conference on the 9th of April. General Prim, who must have known the Emperor’s views in regard to Mexico when he met him at Vichy, wrote to Napoleon, from Orizaba, the 17th of March, the following letter:

“Orizaba, March 17, 1862.

“Sire: Your Imperial Majesty has deigned to write me an autograph letter, which, on account of the benevolent words it contains for my person, will be a title of honor for my posterity.* * * * * * * * *

“As to just reclamations, there can be no difference of opinions among the commissioners of the allied powers, and there will be less among the commanders of your forces and those of her Catholic Majesty. But the arrival of General Almonte, of the former minister, Haro, of Father Miranda and other Mexican refugees at Yera Cruz, with the idea of creating a monarchy in favor of Prince Maximilian of Austria, to be supported by the forces of your Imperial Majesty, tends to create a position difficult for all, and particularly hard for the general-in-chief of the Spanish troops, who, according to instructions from his government, will see himself obliged to refrain from contributing to the realization of the views of your Imperial Majesty if they are really to raise an Austrian archduke to the throne of Mexico.

“I have, moreover, the profound conviction that the partisans of monarchy are very few in this country, and it is reasonable, because this country has never known monarchy in the person of the Spanish monarchs, only in the viceroys, who ruled as they pleased in those distant times.

“Monarchy has not left here the immense interests of nobility, such as exist in Europe; it has not left moral interests nor anything to make the present generation wish for the re-establishment of monarchy, which it has not known. The vicinity of the United States, and their severe reprobation of monarchy, has contributed to create a hate for it here. In spite of constant disorder and agitation, the republic, which has existed more than forty years, has created habits, customs, and even a certain republican language hard to destroy.

“For these reasons and others that cannot escape the attention of your Imperial Majesty, you will understand that the general opinion of this country is against monarchy. If logic does not demonstrate it, facts prove it; for during the two months that the flags of the allied forces floated over Yera Cruz, and now that we occupy Cordoba, Orizaba and Tehuacan, important towns where there is no Mexican force, the partisans of monarchy have made no demonstrations to tell of their existence.

“Far be it from me to suppose that your Imperial Majesty has not the power to erect a throne in Mexico for the house of Austria. Your Majesty directs the destinies of a great nation, rich in brave and intelligent men, rich in resources, and that manifests its enthusiasm to second the views of your Imperial Majesty. You can easily carry Maximilian to Mexico and crown him King; but the King will find no adherents in the country but conservative chiefs, who had no thought of establishing monarchy when they were in power, but wish it now, when they are conquered, scattered and exiled.

“A few rich men are willing to receive a foreign monarch who comes supported by your Majesty’s soldiers, but the monarch will have nothing to sustain him when the time shall come for your soldiers to withdraw, and he will fall from the throne, as others will fall, when the mantle of your Imperial Majesty shall cease to protect and defend them. I know that your Imperial Majesty, moved by a high sentiment of justice, will not force this country to change its institutions in such a radical manner unless the country desires it and requests it. But the chiefs of the conservative party, who landed at Vera Cruz, say it will only be necessary to consult the high classes of society and not mind the others; but that inspires a fear that violence may be offered to the national will.

“The English troops that were to come to Orizaba re-embarked as soon as they heard that a greater number of French troops were coming than had been agreed upon in the convention. Your Majesty will appreciate the importance of this withdrawal.

“I ask a thousand pardons of your Imperial Majesty for having dared to write such a long letter, but I thought the only true reply to your Majesty’s kindness to me would be to tell the truth, and the whole truth, upon the political state of the country as I understand it. In doing this I have not only done my duty, but I have obeyed the great, noble, and respectful attachment I feel for the person of your Imperial Majesty.

“General PRIM, Count Reuss.”

The real design of the expedition, at first carefully concealed, afterwards timidly confessed, and now openly announced, comes out in relief. One remark, however, must be made before entering on the era begun by the accession of the Mexican Emperor. We did not go to Mexico only to put up a throne for an archduke; he is only the instrument of a theory, of a preconceived plan.

XI.

Mr. Billault was then near the truth when he insisted on reducing the expedition to mean proportions; when, in 1863, he mentioned the monarchy as an unexpected event, caused by a concourse of circumstances; and Mr. Larabure was true in his report of 1864, on supplementary credits, when he expressed himself thus:

“We must not conceal that these frequent expeditions disturb the nation. To be just, let us say at once, that the Mexican expedition now pressing most heavily upon our exchequer and public opinion grew to its present importance by a concatenation of unfortunate incidents which the government could neither foresee nor prevent.”

When the Emperor himself said, in his discourse from the throne in 1863, “Distant expeditions, now so much criticised, have not been the results of premeditated plans; force of circumstances have brought them about, but they are not to be regretted; “he only half revealed his thought, for he destroyed his argument, the force of circumstances, in his famous letter to General Forey on the 3d of July, 1862:

“Fontainebleau, July 3, 1862.

“My Dear General: There will be people to ask you why we are going to waste so many men, and spend so much money, in establishing a regular government in Mexico.

“In the present state of the civilized world, the prosperity of America is not indifferent to Europe, for America supports our manufactories and keeps alive our commerce. We are interested in keeping the United States a powerful and prosperous republic; but it will not be interesting to us if it takes possession of the whole of the Gulf of Mexico, and governs the West Indies and South America, thus controlling the entire produce of the New World. We now see by sad experience how precarious an industry is that which is compelled to seek its raw material in a single market, the changes of which so seriously affect it.

“Now if Mexico preserves its independence and maintains the integrity of its territory; if a firm government be established there by the aid of France, we shall give to the Datin race beyond the ocean its ancient strength and power; we shall have guaranteed the security of our own and the Spanish colonies in the West Indies; we shall have extended our benevolent influence to the centre of America, and that influence, while it makes a market for our fabrics, secures us the material indispensable to our manufactures.

“Mexico, thus regenerated, will ever be favorable to us, not only from gratitude, but also because its interests will coincide with ours, and because it will find a support in its relations with European powers.

“NAPOLEON.”

After examining attentively a file of the Moniteur, after having collated the documents and studied the evidence, we have come to the conclusion that the above letter contains the true secret of the Mexican expedition. The continued expansion of the United States towards South America has frightened Europe. We had to build a dike against it out of a restored throne in Mexico; and our wrongs furnished ample excuse for the expedition. The merit of the Emperor’s letter to General Forey is the acknowledgment of a political theory, and the elevation of the expedition into a system.

XII.

The question becomes grand in this light. It is no longer a question of contest with the refractory population of Mexico; it is a rivalry, a contest perhaps, between the Old World and the New; so Mr. Berryer proclaimed prophetically in his speech on the supplementary credits of 1864:

“Nothing afflicts me more than the present strife in the United States. I desire peace with the least possible injury to each party in that great country. But in whatever way the civil war may terminate, we must not forget that the United States will be the ruling power in North America, and that we have offended her by our Mexican expedition. Those who deny this have not studied the documents under their eyes, and the historic facts of the last three years. I do not allude to that profound sentiment, the vital nerve of political existence in the United States, called the Monroe doctrine; a sentiment opposed to European intervention in American affairs. I do not speak of that. But how did you begin the Mexican expedition ? With the convention of the 31st of October. And what did you say in that convention? Yielding to the wish of England, the United States are invited to join the convention. And in a letter of the 25th of July, 1862, I read that it was necessary to form a new government in Mexico, just to diminish the influence of the States of the north, and prevent them from trespassing upon South America. Thus the Mexican expedition was got up to oppose the United States.

“I exaggerate nothing; I simply tell the truth. Bead the letter of July, 1862, and you will see that the development of the United States is to be arrested.

“Well, suppose you succeeded; when the civil wars in the United States are over, and that government saw a new nation by her side, sustained at an immense expense and sacrifice by a foreign power, hostilities would certainly break out. The northern republic would not tolerate an imperial monarchy in Mexico, and war would certainly be the consequence. This is the dangerous, impracticable situation to which you invite Prince Maximilian, and which will be ruinous to France if she persists in the enterprise. [Applause.]”

Thus the question is put upon new ground by the imperial letter and Mr. Berryer’s eloquent commentary. These are the true conditions of the problem as France has propounded them by going to Yera Cruz, and as Mr. Seward has accepted them, when he wrote to the Spanish minister, at Washington, on the 14th of October, 1861, “That he acknowledged the right of Spain to make war on Mexico to defend her rights, and obtain satisfaction for injuries; but that, as it was a question in the eventualities of which entered the possibilities of a conflict with the United States and European powers, he had carefully endeavored to avoid that possibility.”

The manner in which the Mexican question has been officially laid down since General Forey’s departure for Mexico, and Maximilian’s accession, places France and the United States in new relations to each other. We must speak without circumlocution. The continuance of occupation is a political danger; is it a diplomatic duty ?

XIII.

What are our obligations to the new empire ? That is the interesting question now to French policy.

On the 10th of April, 1864, Archduke Maximilian received the Mexican deputation at his castle of Miramar, and announced his acceptance in these terms:

“Thanks to the magnanimity of the Emperor of the French, the necessary guarantees to fix the independence and prosperity of the country upon a solid basis are now given.”

But, properly speaking, this is not an engagement; if we are bound, it is less by these vague effusions of a happy candidate, than by the precise terms of the diplomatic convention of the 10th of April, 1864. Now what does that convention say ?

“The government of his Majesty the Emperor of the French, and of his majesty the emperor of Mexico, animated by a like desire to assure the re-establishment of order in Mexico, and to consolidate the new empire, have determined to settle by a convention:

“Art. 1. The French troops now in Mexico shall be reduced to 25,000 men, as soon as possible, including the foreign legion.

“That body shall remain temporarily in Mexico, to protect the interests for which intervention was instituted, under the conditions regulated by the following articles:

“Art. 2. The French troops shall evacuate Mexico in proportion as his majesty the emperor of Mexico can organize the troops necessary to replace them.

“Art. 3. The foreign legion in the service of France, composed of 8,000 men. Shall remain in Mexico six years after all the other French forces are recalled, according to article 3. From that time the said legion shall go into the service and pay of the Mexican government. The Mexican government reserves the right of shortening the term of service of the foreign legion in Mexico.

“Art. 10. The indemnity to be paid to France by the Mexican government, for supporting the troops of the army corps from the 1st of July, 1864, is fixed at 1,000 francs per annum for each man.”

At the time of the debate on the supplementary credits, 27th January, Mr. Berryer said:

“Has the government bound itself to furnish money or soldiers to that country ? Are we bound, or are we not ?”

Mr. Rouher answered: “If you had read, Mr. Larrabure’s report you would have known.’’

Now here is the report:

“The government of the Emperor declares at this time that it is under no obligation to leave a body of troops in Mexico, nor to guarantee any loan. It declares he has no reason to think it may be necessary to increase the French forces now on Mexican soil.”

In the session of the 27th of January Mr. Rouher again said:

“In treating with the sovereign, the government contracts no permanent and indefinite responsibility for the maintenance of an empire in Mexico.”

The convention of Miramar, the most important articles of which we have quoted, appeared officially in the papers of the 16th of April, 1864. It was quite natural for it to become the subject of an interesting debate in the discussion of appropriations. So on the 11th of May Mr. Berryer busies himself with the obligations and charges imposed by the convention in respect to the finances and military affairs of our army. Mr. Rouher answers him, but instead of sticking to the convention, he gives a brilliant picture of the condition of Mexico.

Let us listen to him a while.

Mr. Rouher, minister of state, continues:

Mr. Berryer has discussed the whole Mexican question in his speech on the general appropriation. That question has caused many unfavorable apprehensions in this house.

When we debated it last year they said: Your San Louis Potosi expedition is madness. You are going to scatter the French army over four hundred square leagues. The Mexican army, under Juarez, Uragua, Doblado, will whip our scattered battalions.

M. Thiers, (interrupting.) They did not say that.

M. Rouher. The honorable gentleman has only to refer to Mr. Jules Favre’s speech, and he will see what has been said.

Mr. Favre. I have never doubted our military success.

Mr. Rouher, They represented the expedition as marching contrary to the wishes of the Mexican people.

A voice, (interrupting.) And they were right.

M. Rouher. You say they were right ? Have you forgotten the triumphal march of General Bazaine over those four hundred leagues; our arrival at Guanahuato, Quere taro, and San Louis Potosi; the shouts of welcome wherever the French flag was seen ? Some blind people can see no, truth in historical facts. [Good, good.]

The San Louis Potosi expedition, that you blame, was a ‘triumphal march. [Renewed applause.]

A little further on the minister exclaimed:

“Here is a new empire just beginning, a sovereign not yet seated on his throne, a government not yet organized, and capitalists have given it nine millions per annum, when old governments cannot negotiate their loans. Is not this a token of foreign confidence ? There is no doubt that when Maximilian goes from Yera Cruz to Mexico, amid the enthusiastic demonstrations of the people” ‐‐ [Disturbance on some seats.]

Mr. Picard. Then recall the army.

Recall the army! That was evidently the logical conclusion for peace.

Yet the convention existed; it was known; the government must explain its meaning officially. On the 12th of May Mr. Jules Favre grew urgent, irresistible:

“You know, gentlemen,” said he, “what arrangement has been made. A new plan has been discovered to pay the expenses of the war; they must be paid by the victorious power, for France issues sixty-six millions in bonds, that are only notes of accommodation, over its signature. [Exclamations.]

“The convention of the 16th April, in the Moniteur, has regulated the stay of the French troops in Mexico. We are very far from the declarations of Mr. Larrabure’s report: how long will our troops remain in Mexico ? until the new empire shall be firmly established; that, in reality, is the business of France. Maximilian’s empire must be consolidated. France is deceived when they tell her the expedition is over; it has hardly commenced. [Confused noises.] We leave 25,000 men in Mexico for an indefinite time; political circumstances alone can fix the day for the recall of our troops. It is said they will be paid by the Mexican government—a deplorable thing for France. [Noise.] Our troops are thus put in the pay of a foreign prince; they will obey a foreign policy; they may be used in enterprises, in adventures, in perils.”

Here Mr. Rouher takes the floor and gives the convention, and the interpretations it may provoke, their right place:

“We must once more consider the Mexican question. The honorable gentleman (Mr. Jules Favre) has told you that the treaty concluded with the emperor Maximilian violated engagements we had with you; he has spoken to you of the threats of American intervention, suspended, like the sword of Damocles, over the new Mexican empire.

“While I listened to the ironical eulogies given to the eloquence of the government orators, as they painted gay pictures of promised prosperity to Mexico, little moved by them, I was patiently reading the Mexican Courrier that I had just received; and here is what I read:

“‘The general condition of Mexico is daily improving, as the masses comprehend and appreciate the generous views of the Emperor towards them. Resistance, now only local, has entirely lost its nationality. The bandits fly at the approach of our troops; and whenever they are caught they are cut to pieces. It has, in fact, relapsed into brigandage, very annoying to the inoffensive people who are the chief sufferers; hut this will soon be suppressed by a well-organized police system.

“Confidence has greatly increased in the last month or two. People of all classes and all opinions come to the capital from every part of the country, meet and pass, forgetting their former hostility, and mingling in similar sentiments, with oblivion of the past and faith in the future. Under such circumstances, with the support of the government of the Emperor and the aid of European capital, Mexico cannot fail soon to enter into a way of national prosperity, by which Europe will be the first to profit.’”

Several voices: Who wrote it ?

Mr. Rouher. It is signed by Mr. Montholon.

We will not spoil this brilliant picture by untimely reflections. He then continues:

“But they say the treaty contains promises contrary to our declarations. What does the treaty say? First, that the army shall be reduced to 25,000 men. The expedition is over, and 10,000 of our men will return by the 1st of January, 1865. As to the other 15,000 men, we declare they are to remain temporarily in Mexico to protect the interests of France, and the interests that induced the intervention.”

Mr. Gueroult. Please read the treaty.

Mr. Rouher. I have not got it; but if the honorable gentleman will give it to me, I will read it to the house.

Mr. Gueroult. I have not got it either; but I think the time for the return of our troops was left to the emperor Maximilian.

Mr. Rouher. The honorable gentleman is mistaken; I will give the sense of the treaty from memory:

Article 1st says the army shall he reduced to 25,000 men, who will remain in Mexico to protect our interests there. So 25,000 men remain for no fixed time—till France chooses to recall them. Now, do you call this indefinite? No. The emperor of Mexico reserves the right to demand the return of our troops, in proportion as the Mexican army shall he organized.

Mr. Gueroult. But we can’t stay so long.

A voice. No interruption!

Mr. Rouher. Does Mr. Gueroult know the facts? Does he know that there is already a national army of 25,000 men in Mexico, and does he not see that it is for the general, interest to withdraw these troops, so expensive to the emperor of Mexico ? A Mexican army is organizing. Mr. Berryer declared yesterday it would cost the Mexican government thirty-seven millions this year. A national army then exists. Our soldiers will return as soon as our interests no longer require their presence there. Each day brings this period nearer, and it will he equally welcome to both nations.

The treaty contains nothing contrary to the declarations of the legislature; and if some are pained at our stay in Mexico, I care little about them, for they are revolutionists, who would like to see the country again as it was in the time of Juarez. [Very good, very good.] The treaty is above criticism. It contains nothing but what conforms to the thoughts expressed by the legislative body in the address. [Good, good ]

Thus, in 1864, Mr. Rouher was sorry to see opposition to the prolongation of our stay in Mexico, because all who opposed it were revolutionists, eager to deliver the country over to the agitations of the Juarez times, which means that the prompt return of our army was impossible, in spite of the allay of passion and increasing prosperity of the Mexican empire; in spite of the brilliant picture he himself had drawn.

XIV.

The dark apprehensions of 1864 were fortunately dispelled by the bright prospects in the beginning of 1865. We find ourselves in presence of wishes, hopes, and promises. The good wishes are thus expressed in the address of 1865:

“The legislative body believes with you, sire, that the most wisely governed nations cannot always avoid external complications; and when they do come, they must be met firmly and without illusion. The distant expeditions to China, Cochin-China, and Mexico, succeeding each other, have disturbed many people in France on account of their expense and sacrifice. We acknowledge that they are calculated to inspire respect for our subjects and our flag abroad, and tend to develop our commerce; and we shall be happy to see the good results realized that your Majesty has induced us to hope for.”

This hope is explained in the exposé of the condition of the empire of that year, where we find the following lines:

“The emperor Maximilian has assumed the crown offered to him by the national will, and his arrival has happily put an end to the provisional situation of Mexico. The emperor’s reception in the capital, and all through the country, by all classes of people, and the support of influential men of all parties, leave no doubt about the wishes of an immense majority of the Mexican people.

“The new sovereign will gain strength and confidence by these manifestations, which will enable him to complete the great and generous mission he has so resolutely accepted. The pacification of an extensive country, where robbery was sheltered by the banner of a political party, could not be accomplished in a single day; yet, thanks to the soldiers of our expeditions who have penetrated every part of the country, this is being rapidly accomplished, and so the return of our forces from that country has already begun, and will continue, as the object of intervention permits. Functionaries from the different branches of our administration have been placed at the disposal of the Mexican government, at its request, to assist in the interior organization of affairs.”

The promise offered is found in this solemn declaration of the imperial discourse for the session of 1865:

“Thus all of our expeditions are drawing to a close; our land troops have evacuated China; the navy can protect our settlements in Cochin-China; our army in Africa is going to be reduced; that in Mexico is now returning; the Roman garrison will soon return; and when we close the temple of war, we can proudly inscribe these words upon a new triumphal arch:

“A la gloire des armées Francaises pour les victoires remportées en Europe, en Asie, en Afrique, et en Amérique.

(“To the glory of the French armies for victories gained in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America.)

“Let us devote ourselves quietly to peaceful labors.

“The new throne is gaining strength in Mexico; the country is becoming quiet; its immense resources are being developed. This is the happy result of the bravery of our soldiers, of the good sense of the Mexican people, and of the intelligence and energy of the sovereign!”

GEORGES JAURET.