Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the First Session Thirty-ninth Congress
Mr. Romero to Mr. Seward
Mr. Secretary: I have the honor of transmitting to you, for the information of the government of the United States, the copy of a letter dated Berne, September 17, 1865, addressed by a Mexican citizen to a German baron, who is in the confidence of the ex-archduke of Austria, Ferdinand Maximilian, now called the emperor of Mexico.
This review of present affairs in Mexico is impartial, if not rather inclined to judge with too much kindness French intervention and its instrument, and plainly shows that the French Emperor’s project to substitute an Austrian monarchy for a Mexican republic is entirely impracticable, and that, should it be insisted upon, it will only bring France into much trouble and expense, causing countless ills to Mexico.
As the monarchy, in fact, has no national support, it is impossible to conceive how it can be established or consolidated.
I am pleased with this occasion of repeating to you, Mr. Secretary, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.
Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c., Washington City, D. C.
[Translation.]
Sir: I regret that I did not, at the time they took place, write down the conversations I had with the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian and yourself when his highness first entered Mexico; and, for fear I may forget those between you and myself in the imperial palace of that court, I will note them in this letter.
I am not moved to this by the vanity of proving that my predictions have been fulfilled, or will be, but by the desire of recalling some important events to your mind, and enlarging upon others I barely mentioned in the course of our conversation.
It is now too late to discuss past, events in Mexico, and the erroneous opinions formed of them in Europe. They belong to history; and, as to more recent deplorable events and grievous deceptions, they are attempted to be justified by saying that the present condition of Mexico is very different from what it was a year ago.
You are a friend of the archduke, and I am a friend of Mexico; so it is our duty to consider things as they are, and find the best remedy for them we can. In the first place, we must consider the very critical condition—more critical than is believed—not only of Mexico, but of the archduke, and examine the moral and physical support of the new empire, and the elements that are conspiring to destroy it.
The two principal parties in Mexico, the conservative and liberal, are subdivided into radical (or purist, as called there) and moderate.
The radical portion of the conservative party is composed of the higher clergy and a portion of the laical people, who, by education, prejudice, or perhaps by conviction, are forced to belong to it.
The moderate party is composed of persons of wealth, who, though partial to conservative principles, are always busy with the management of their own affairs, have, in reality, no political principles, and accept any form of government and liberal reform, provided the new government will let them enjoy their wealth in peace.
The radical fraction of the liberal party, purely republican, is composed of those who think it absolutely necessary to establish liberal principles (they made the reform) immediately, and at every cost, and the moderate fraction of those who are slow and measured in their steps towards the same end, for fear of convulsions and revolutions, and even social commotions.
When liberal principles are settled the moderate liberal party will cease to exist, as there will be no further cause for its existence, and its scattered members will have to be numbered with the conservatives.
In nationalizing church property and confirming other reforms made in the time of Juarez the archduke has made bitter enemies of the high clergy, and has alienated the lower priests, who were never hostile to Juarez, by depriving them of their old fees, and assigning them salaries which they will certainly never get. As to the persons in comfortable circumstances, that formed a portion of the moderate conservative party, and joined the imperialists for the sake of peace and quiet, they left it as soon as they found themselves in a more sanguinary and disastrous war than they had ever before seen. They found the empire more expensive than the republic, for it must be supported by enormous and continued foreign loans, that increase domestic taxes to pay them, and they find it does not protect them from guerillas; therefore, they desire a change, and want to try some other way to gain the security and peace their interests and inclinations require.
In regard to the liberal party, its moderate fraction no longer exists, as I have already said, and the pure radical party is the one that now keeps up the war against the empire. All the archduke has done by his personal influence is to persuade six or eight members of the moderate party to accept places in his cabinet; but this is very different from having the support of a political party.
We must conclude, then, that the empire has not the least moral support. As to physical support, all he has to depend upon are a few Mexican troops and the French army, with the Austrian and Belgian divisions. The archduke can place no confidence in the first, for many have already passed over to the republican side, and proposals from some of his generals are no secrets. As regards the foreign army, its insufficiency to subjugate the country is already proved: first, by the fact that it has fought four years in vain; second, that re-enforcements are now being sent to them; and third, in the opinion of their chief, who is the best judge, in a letter lately published, it is impossible to whip the guerillas, because they run off and disperse whenever attacked.
The elements that militate against the empire are also physical and moral. Among the latter, and in the first place, we may name the dislike to the archduke on account of his extravagance and immense and unnecessary debts with which he began to burden the country before he knew it; and for his inability to protect the Mexicans, as is seen by the [Page 659] shooting of General Romero; for the preference he shows to foreigners, putting them in office instead of the natives of the land; and finally, because he has established no good administration. A philosopher might excuse the archduke for these errors; but the people are not philosophers; they feel rather than reason, and they lack patience. A nation that has suffered so much from revolutions requires a long time to recover, and must have patience to suffer and wait. No Mexican has ever doubted but the country would be restored to peace in proper time without foreign intervention; and if a few decided for intervention, it was only because they thought it would restore peace at amore early day. As soon as they were undeceived they abjured their error.
In the second place we may mention the want of present and future means. The imperial expenses amount to forty millions of dollars annually; and every Mexican knows that the country, even in times of peace, could not produce the half of that sum. Let the French financiers who were sent to make their imaginary estimates say what they please: this is certain death to the empire. It cannot curtail its expenses, because a large army must be supported to defend it from the Mexicans; nor can the revenues be increased, because the situation of the country will not allow it. No resources are left then except temporary loans, and they will soon be exhausted.
To these opposing elements may be added that of the unpopularity of the Mexican war in France, because it embarrasses the French government. And we may include another reason why the empire in Mexico must end. The civil war in the United States is ended. This has discouraged the monarchists, while it has revived the hopes of the republicans.
Now for the physical elements that are hostile to the empire. I will only mention two: first, the constitutional forces, chiefly composed of guerillas; and second, expected aid from the United States. Guerilla warfare is not known in Europe, nor have they any idea how useful it is. The events in Spain at the beginning of this century have been forgotten, and they can only judge from recent events in Poland, a level and densely populated country, where the few guerillas formed were rather gangs of fugitives than organized guerillas, trying to escape from the immense armies that surrounded them. In countries like Mexico, mountainous and dry, with a mild climate, where horses abound, and inclemency of weather never prevents out-door movements; where food is found everywhere to supply the necessaries of life, guerillas always exercise a deciding influence. The chief difficulty is in a proper organization; but, this once acquired, they can defy the strongest powers in the world. This system is the stronger as its power is latent and deceptive; it gains time by sudden action, and you never know when it is defeated.
Mexico gained its independence of Spain by a series of sudden victories by guerillas, in eleven years. The reform was effected by the same means, in three years; and so must the second independence be achieved. The French army may triumph everywhere, just as the royalists did in the war of independence, and the clergy did in the reform; but, as the victories of all these parties were more expensive to themselves than destructive to the enemy, the latter finally triumphed.
For this very reason the national government need not be concerned about the rout of their guerillas—only a temporary dispersion, in fact—but may rejoice, because those defeats are only so many steps towards final victory. But to avoid the shedding of blood, danger, and expense, orders have been given to all the guerillas to annoy the enemy without offering battle, as that would cause the French to make fatiguing marches, at a great expense, without the least advantage, except a distant sight of their foes. Every late event in Mexico promises a repetition of the scene in San Domingo, where two hundred thousand inhabitants, with only six or eight thousand soldiers, have whipped Spain, and compelled her to a very mortifying retreat from that island.
I came from America in company with General Espinar, a gentleman of good judgment, who had served in San Domingo, and was then on his way to Spain to ask the evacuation of that island, for reasons very applicable to the French in Mexico. His proposal was shamefully received in Madrid, and, so far from listening to him, additional forces were sent to reduce the handful of opposing rebels in the colony.
Like the French leaders in Mexico, the Spanish generals in San Domingo continued to send despatches announcing victories, from day to day, until they declared the whole island subdued. The simple final result is just what General Espinar proposed, an abandonment of the island, under the most deplorable circumstances, after a great sacrifice of men and money. How much blood Spain would have spared, how much money she would have saved, and how great a shame to her reputation she would have avoided, if her government had done in time what she was compelled to do at last!
I see the French newspapers insist that the United States will remain neutral on the Mexican question, founding this argument on their conduct up to this time, and portions of public documents collected here and there; but they need put no trust in what a government says and does under certain political circumstances. What a government will do [Page 660] depends upon the natural inclinations of its inhabitants and the national interest of that government at the time.
If an American army were to dethrone Leopold of Belgium, and establish a democratic republic in that country, to exist under its immediate direction, would the Emperor Napoleon remain in quiet indifference? We guess he would try to save his throne in some way, even if he had to change political opinions in France. Well, the United States will act in exactly the same manner, and with greater reason, because the establishment of an empire in Mexico was a consequence of the southern rebellion; and did not the French Emperor declare publicly in a speech that his Mexican expedition was in defiance of the United States?
The present silence of that republic is a prudent consideration, as it must settle with England before it offends another great power. But if the British question is amicably settled by diplomacy, as is generally believed it will be, then we shall see the United States turn its attention to the empire. And even supposing it were prudent for the United States to keep at peace with France, it would still assist the constitutional government of Mexico in many ways without getting into war with other nations. It might not prevent private emigration to Mexico to aid Juarez, and arms, the great need, might be smuggled in from every quarter. Money they do not want; they can live upon the country, and they have always had enough men. Everybody knows the guns at Puebla were made of old muskets rejected, and unarmed bodies of men waited to use the guns of those who were slain. And even if the United States government refused to supply them with arms, individual interest would elude all prohibition and furnish them in any quantity, as was done in the late civil war. But we must not think that the exportation of arms will be prohibited, because the United States has adopted as a principle in neutrality that articles of war may be allowed in trade. If the exportation of arms was prohibited by the United States during the civil war, it was only because they were needed in the country—just as they prohibit the exit of corn in years of scarcity. So President Johnson, faithful to these principles, has revoked the prohibition to export arms and munitions of war. This recent act is a great benefit to Juarez—more beneficial, in fact, than if he had been aided by troops; and the fact of the United States constantly refusing to recognize the empire ought to convince Maximilian of the disposition and probable intention of the United States.
It is the policy now of the authors and aiders of intervention to say the republic of the United States will remain neutral; but they cannot believe it, for they would be the first victims of the error. In a nation where public opinion is all-powerful, and where it has been so often expressed against Mexican intervention, the President would run a great risk to proclaim neutrality in an affair of vital importance to his country. Without debating this point to a greater extent, I will merely assure you that the United States will not remain neutral in the question of Mexico. And in giving you this assurance, do not believe, for an instant, that I am blinded by party zeal, for I consider it a disgrace to my country to ask for foreign assistance. I know how it lessens the sovereignty and independence of a nation. I think Mexico possesses all the necessary elements to regain her independence without foreign aid. I have faith in her future, and want her to act alone, that she may be indebted to no one for her success. One of the reasons (aside from duties and natural sentiments) why I have opposed European intervention so violently is precisely because it would compel us to call on the northern Americans for help. I believe, my dear Baron, that, as a sequel to what I have said, the time has come when the archduke will reflect seriously upon the precariousness of his position, and will take himself out of Mexico before the force of circumstances compels him to evacuate the capital. If he thinks his situation secure, I have nothing more to say; but if he doubts it, and should hereafter change his mind, and should need my assistance with Juarez and his cabinet, I will do all I can to get him out of trouble, and at the same time save my country from further misfortunes. I will try to induce Juarez to enter into a treaty honorable to both parties, showing the evils consequent upon foreign protection. He, as a true patriot, desires to see Mexico free from obligations to any foreign power, and I do not doubt but he can free it yet. But, I repeat, Maximilian must be quick in his determination, for if Juarez once appeals to the United States it will be too late to make treaties of any kind. In my opinion Maximilian already views affairs in Mexico in their proper light. The pleasant visions that beguiled his fancy at Miramar are gone, and he will now believe what I told him, when I assured him that the history of intervention in Mexico would be like that in France after the first revolution. The conquered party in both countries, filled with anger and thirsting for revenge, sought foreign aid by deceiving strange governments, exaggerating their sufferings and anarchy, declaring that the call for intervention was unanimous and very easy to be effected. When the people have made a reform—that is, when they have extirpated the cause of their displeasure—they are more proud and elated with hope than at any other time, and cannot bear the idea of a foreign yoke, and their patriotism is bold and exhibits its full strength on the least provocation. The prodigies of French patriots against [Page 661] combined Europe are well known. Mexico, feeble Mexico, will be satisfied with struggling within its own frontiers for its independence.
According to late news from Mexico a deep hatred to the French army is spreading throughout the country on account of its cruelty as conquerors; a dislike to Maximilian increases because he does not prevent these barbarities; he is blamed for not giving protection to persons and property; and the general want of confidence in the stability of the empire is increasing and becoming more general. The day is not far distant when this disaffection will pervade the whole nation, and a second of May, as in Madrid, will be the consequence—one of those sudden, spontaneous, and unanimous movements, of which we have seen several examples in Mexico to end Santa Anna’s dictatorship. The French army is too small to resist such a movement; and if it cannot, what is to become of the archduke and his little band, unless France submits to new sacrifices? And supposing that Maximilian sustains himself for the present, what will support him in future? The French army cannot always remain in Mexico! Another army, composed of adventurers and volunteers from other countries, will not be sufficient to sustain him. What, then, must he expect? Just what I must repeat—sooner or later a defeat, or sudden expulsion. To retire quietly and decorously would certainly be far preferable, and he ought to know it better than we.
I will tell you how he could do it honorably, so as to raise himself much in the eyes of Mexicans and foreigners. Did Maximilian come to Mexico to secure the felicity of its people, or to sacrifice them and keep himself upon a throne? We must suppose the former case. Well, since he has not succeeded in this, he is in honor and duty bound to withdraw. Will any one blame him for doing his duty? Any other course of conduct would lessen him in the estimation of his peers, and ruin his former reputation. His grandfather, the Emperor Francis, declaring the German Confederation dissolved, on a similar occasion, thus gaining a great name in history, left him an example of abnegation and magnanimity he ought never to forget. If I were in his place, I would agree upon an armistice with the constitutional government; then I would conclude a treaty as advantageous as possible to myself, and send off the French army, in accordance with the treaty of Miramar; and lastly, I would publish a manifest explaining the object of my journey to Mexico, what I had done there, and finally withdraw from the country, agreeable to my promise to retire as soon as I found out that my presence was not pleasant to the people.
Such frank and loyal language would undoubtedly be more worthy of Maximilian than to involve his party in an unequal contest, turn the whole of Mexico into a battle-field, and drag France into a useless and expensive war to sustain him on a throne he could never hold. If a treaty could not be formed with the government, it would be honorable in Maximilian to withdraw at any rate, preferring peace in Mexico to personal interest, and saving France much trouble and expense. Maybe Maximilian might object to this manner of quitting Mexico! As unpleasant as it might seem to him, (but I see no reason why it should be,) he ought to remember that it is the best, and he cannot have choice. Later he might consider himself lucky to get off in a way he rejects at present. He now has a good chance to get away, and he will find danger in delay.
I have the honor to repeat, &c.,