Mr. Bigelow to Mr. Seward
Sir: I fear our government will not succeed in giving entire satisfaction to the ruling classes on this side of the Atlantic, whatever we may do. They seemed very much dissatisfied, at the commencement of the war, that our armies were not more destructive; when they became more destructive, the same parties censured us for bloodthirstiness and insensibility to the blessings of peace. Now that peace has come, and we have reason to count upon a general jubilee in Europe, there appears to be more discontent than ever. The great grievances at present are, first, President Johnson’s proclamation offering a reward for the delivery of Davis to the officers of justice; second, the reported emigration of discharged soldiers to Mexico; third, the trial of Booth’s accomplices with closed doors.
The readiness with which all these prestiges are seized to weaken the impression which our unexpected triumph over what were deemed insurmountable embarrassments has a tendency to produce, shows how great is the importance attached here to our example.
The proclamation putting a price on Davis’s head will be generally condemned by the Latin race, who are so accustomed to see a price put upon the heads of their most meritorious citizens that they feel an instinctive sympathy for any one who wears that flattering penalty. I think nothing that has happened during our war has produced so unpleasant an effect upon our friends here, though their impressions always yield to proper explanations when there is an opportunity of making them.
In regard to Mexico, the impression produced by the recent news from the United States has amounted to a panic. Some military successes of the liberals in Mexico are associated in the public mind with the emigration schemes advertised in the New York and Washington papers, which are supposed to respond to a public sentiment beyond the control of the government. The absence of the Emperor at the moment aggravates the alarm, and leaves the community a prey to rumors of the most disturbing character.
I dined with Mr. Fould on Tuesday evening. He sought several opportunities to talk with me of Mexican affairs. I assured him that he had nothing to fear from the United States; that the formidable enemies of the Archduke Maximilian were “those of his own household”—the Mexicans. He expressed a doubt whether our government and its friends would be strong enough to maintain our neutrality. I told him that so far as I could judge, there were not, nor were there likely to be, two considerable parties on our Mexican policy; that whatever the government decided to do would be pretty universally accepted by the people, because it would be likely to reflect their deliberate wishes, one of which I felt sure was to preserve friendly relations with France. He said he thought that the best way to remove all difficulty between the three countries, and to resolve all embarrassing questions, was for us to recognize the new government. This view he enforced with a few obvious remarks. I heard him through, and then remarked that he had opened a question which would require [Page 392] me, for its discussion, to go further back in the history of our respective countries than was possible on such a festive occasion, but I felt prepared to say to him that but for the unfriendly tone of the official press, and the abounding evidence of a willingness, if not a desire, on the part of influential classes in France to see our republic weakened by a permanent disunion, the Emperor would probably have experienced no difficulty in coming early to a satisfactory understanding with our government about Mexico. Unhappily, the impression had got abroad among our people that the Emperor had undertaken to build up an empire in Mexico upon the ruins of our republic, and it would take yet some time and some substantial proofs of good feeling on his part to remove this impression. His excellency arose from his seat at this remark, which I was preparing to elaborate a little, and said that was a subject that would take us too far to discuss on that occasion; and after a few more words our interview ended. It ended rather abruptly, because Mr. Fould is entirely of my opinion; he has been opposed from the outset to this expedition. He feels that he is gradually sinking, officially, under the weight of its burdens; and having no response to make to the view I presented, he did not wish to be betrayed into admissions unbecoming his position; at least such was my impression.
He introduced me, in the course of the evening, to Baron Dussin the elder, who is a very important arm of the government, though now eighty-five years of age, and whose sympathies have been rather with the insurgents than with the government during the late rebellion. He also showed great solicitude about Mexico, and seemed greatly relieved by my assurance that, regardless of the example set by other nations, and faithful to all our traditions, we should make our people, if any were otherwise disposed, respect our neutral obligations.
I mention these facts to show that the anxiety which is reflected by the press here and in England is not exaggerated, and as the foundation for a suggestion which I think it my duty to make to you. It is that, as far as possible, we avoid giving any pretext to this government upon which public opinion can be rallied against us. It is in a critical situation, and, I think, on the eve of a very important if not desperate step in reference to Mexico. Something must be done, and speedily. It is important that we neither do nor permit anything that will relieve the situation at our expense, for we now need all the good feeling in Europe that we can possibly inspire to repair the waste of our war. If we alienate France, or even establish an unfriendly feeling here, it will poison all the official journalism of Europe towards us, notwithstanding the universally acknowledged folly of the Mexican expedition. They all have less affection for the Monroe doctrine than they have for France or Mexico. I hope, therefore, that our government will protect itself by all dignified means from any suspicion of conniving at the military schemes, if there are any maturing in the United States, against Mexico, and show the old countries of Europe to how much better use we can put them than by fighting them. I would hardly trouble you with a suggestion apparently so superfluous as this, if I did not feel that, where men are in desperate circumstances, they may do desperate things, and sovereigns are but men.
I am, sir, with great respect, your very obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.