Mr. Perry to Mr. Seward.
Sir:Tunis has been profoundly agitated since my last despatch. It was whispered, about two weeks since, that some startling and decisive event was at hand. French troops were stationed near the Algerine confines, and had accumulated in the harbor of the Goletta, to the number of nearly 2,000, and the arrival of several iron clad war-ships from France and Italy gave rise afresh to the report that the combined forces of these two nations were to land. Other reports, compromising the character of England and Turkey, were equally calculated to enlist attention and terrify. Robberies were committed between Tunis and the Goletta. Some of the Bey’s bravest troops, the zouaves, were disorderly in the streets, manifesting hostility to Europeans. The news from the coast and the interior was unfavorable to peace and order. All business was suspended, and horrid stories were told of Moslem hatred, and of massacres that were likely to attend the disembarcation of troops. The result was a general panic, and thousands of Jews and Christians of the better classes hurried out of the country for personal security. The Spanish consul general left two weeks since, and this week the Swedish and Dutch consuls, who have passed their whole lives here, have departed. The poor and laboring classes, finding no employment and threatened with starvation, if not with massacre, have been helped off by their respective consuls in large numbers, so that now comparatively few European families remain here.
At the present time fears of immediate danger are not so general. The landing of troops and other warlike demonstrations which were confidently predicted are not witnessed, and the news from the interior is of an encouraging character. And as the war cloud appears less portentous, the question is raised Who [Page 450] has caused this agitation and panic; to whose indiscretion is this general ruin to be attributed? The French and the Anglo-Turkish parties are unsparing in their criticisms upon each other.
Among the natives animosity against the French is intense, and it would require but little indiscretion on the part of the Tunisian and French officials to light up a war that would arouse the most bitter Moslem hatred against the infidels. The Anglo-Turkish party is popular among the Moors, but can do nothing, watched and constrained by the overpowering forces of the French. There are here substantially three parties. One party opposes all intervention, maintaining that the Bey, left to himself, will be able in due time to overcome all opposition in his dominions, and to settle his difficulties in the best manner. This party opposes equally the officious claims and pretensions of the French and of the Ottoman party, and is composed of Tunisian officials and of individuals of various nationalities, whose sole object is quietness and order. Most of the consuls are classed at the present time with the non-intervention party, maintaining that it will be in season to provide for a European congress when the necessity shall be satisfactorily demonstrated.
The other two parties appear agreed in regard to the necessity of foreign intervention, but differ in regard to the nation that shall take upon itself the responsibility of intervening. One of these parties maintains that the Emperor of France is the natural and legal protector of the Bey. Tunis is near Algeria, and French troops and the French navy can readily render all needed assistance. And further it is added, that France has maintained the character of a protector to the Bey for a third of a century, having, on one occasion, marched her troops into the interior to quell an insurrection and punish disturbers of the public peace, and having prevented, at the request of the then reigning Bey, the disembarcation of Ottoman troops and the interference of the Sultan in the affairs of the regency. As the neighbor and de facto protector of the Bey, France is pronounced the rightful power to stretch forth her strong arm to restore tranquillity and order, and to extend the benign influence of civilization in this regency. And further it is urged, as a matter of honor, that since France does not interfere with the controlling influence of England in Morocco, England ought not to interfere with the controlling influence of France in Tunis.
In opposition to this stands forth the Turkish claim supported by England. For centuries the Grand Sultan has exercised the right of suzerainty over this regency, investing the Beys of Tunis with the rights and responsibilities of their office; and his right so to act has not been disputed He has never given to any Bey the right to diminish his territory, or to call French arms to his support; and, consequently, if any Bey has exercised such right, he has acted without authority, and contrary to the law and custom; and if France has interfered in Tunisian affairs, she has done so against law and custom, and against the suzerainty of the Sublime Porte. Questions of convenience, neighborhood, and civilization are aside and independent of the main question of the right of suzerainty, and therefore need not be here considered. If the Sultan is divested of the right of suzerainty, when was it done? And why does he continue to exercise the right of investiture? Why does all the money in the regency continue to be coined in his name? And why are prayers offered in his behalf every Friday in all the mosques?
Again, it is argued, on the ground of the independence of the Bey as maintained by the French, that Turkey, if any power, should interfere in Tunisian affairs, since Turkey is the natural ally and protector of the Bey, both on the ground of affinity in religious concerns and of actual preference, as shown by the demands of the people in the cities along the coast. This point is specially argued by the British consul, while the French consul shows no favor for his application of the Napoleonic doctrine of popular sovereignty. Many Christians [Page 451] and Jews of various nations favor Ottoman rather than French intervention as a means of obviating the horrors of a religious war.
While studiously avoiding the spirit and attitude of a partisan, I deem it my duty to give my cordial support to the Bey in his efforts to prevent all foreign intervention. A revolt sprang up against the French in Algeria before any demonstration was made against the Bey in Tunisia; and I see no more reason for interfering at present with the latter government than with the former. The Bey is feeble, but his feebleness is, I believe, due in some degree to impositions practiced upon him by his powerful neighbors through jealousy of each other’s influence.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward. Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.