Mr. Seward to Mr. Harvey.
Your despatches of January 15, No. 250, January 20, No. 251, January 22, No. 252, January 25, No. 254, January 27, No. 255, January 30, No. 256, and February 1, No. 257, have been received.
From these papers I learn that about the 14th of January last you received information, deemed reliable, that the British brig Aggression, laden with military supplies, was on her way to a rendezvous at the Azores, there to meet and transfer these supplies to piratical cruisers which are engaged in devastating the commerce of the United States on the high seas. That you represented this fact to the Duke de Soule, who thereupon promptly procured from his Majesty, the King of Portugal, the necessary directions, and caused them to be conveyed at once to the magistracy and other officers of his Majesty in the Azores, enjoining them to prevent and defeat the iniquitous design of the pirates. I learn, further, that the Portuguese government not only caused duplicates of those directions to be placed in the hands of the commander of the United States ship-of-war St. Louis, to be conveyed by him to their destination, but that the government also despatched a public armed vessel to intercept the pirates and prevent the intended violation of the neutrality of Portugal in her island possessions. I learn, further, that you gave instructions to the commander of the St. Louis to proceed to the Azores, and also gave to our consuls there the advice and directions which the exigency apprehended seemed to render necessary. These facts have been submitted to the President, and I have now the [Page 269] pleasure of making known to you his approval and commendation of all that you have thus done. I am especially directed to sanction the terms in which you have expressed to the Duke de Soule your convictions of the satisfaction with which his proceedings would he regarded by the President.
You are well aware that the government and people of the United States have never ceased to regard the concession made by the European powers to the insurgents of a belligerent maritime character as a proceeding not less unfriendly and invidious than it was exceptional and unwarranted by the treaties existing between this country and those powers.
It has, as we believe, protracted what was merely ephemeral sedition, and invested it with the severe features of a deadly civil war. Although we think that we have shown to the world sufficient proofs that the attempted revolution is not only causeless, but criminal, and also that we have the ability to suppress it and save the integrity of the country, yet the maritime powers still adhere pertinaciously to the attitude they originally assumed, and thus persevere in derogating us from our position as a sovereign power to one of mere equality with citizens standing in armed rebellion against the government. The remembrance of this injustice may be expected to survive the contest itself, and to modify for a long time the sentiments of the United States towards the maritime powers. Every state must see that, if the United States survive this crisis, all the maritime powers must at some period, sooner or later, recede from the attitude of which we complain. It is equally manifest that some one of the states must take the lead in the path of reconsideration, and that the states which earliest return to their former relations with us will be esteemed hereafter as more just and generous than those who shall defer that return until a period when even their hostility would be harmless.
It is a matter of history that the United States have faithfully cherished through more than three-fourths of a century the memory of the favor and friendship they received from France, Spain, and Holland in the struggle which separated them from Great Britain. This insurrection is to them a trial quite as severe as that revolutionary contest was. It may well be expected that they will cherish the recollection of any just and generous conduct towards them on the part of foreign nations as faithfully and as gratefully as they have heretofore remembered the friendship of their first allies. Would such relations be worthless to Portugal? Has she anything to fear in now laying the foundation for them? If she should say that she is a small power, and her proceedings, whatever they may be, are unimportant, you may answer that the state which is first to correct the error which has been committed to our injury will by that very procedure increase its moral influence and importance in the family of nations, provided that it assume that stand before we shall by our own efforts, without foreign favor, have regained our accustomed and rightful position in the council of nations.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
James E. Harvey, Esq., &c., &c., &c., Lisbon.