Mr. Motley to Mr. Seward.
Sir: I transmit in this despatch a translation of Count Rechberg’s statement in the Reichsrath, on the 4th of this month, in regard to the Schleswig-Holstein matter. You will perceive that the imperial government takes the [Page 135] ground that it is bound by the London protocol of 1852, which it signed as a European power. In this course it is acting in harmony with the Prussian government, whose position has already been announced.
The Austrian government maintains, however, that the stipulations entered into by Denmark in regard to the government of the duchies, which preceded and formed the base of the London treaty, are with the protocol itself parts of an indivisible whole. As these stipulations have been violated on the part of Denmark, by the 30th March decree, and by the new constitution in which the provisions of that decree have been subsequently embodied, the Austrian government, in common with Prussia, has decided to urge upon the Bund the necessity of sending a force into Holstein to execute the laws of the Bund; to fulfil, in short, the execution voted by the Diet before the death of Frederick VII.
In this position, as you are doubtless aware, Prussia and Austria are far behind the desires of the rest of the German states. They are also behind the aspirations of the great majority of the public of Prussia and Austria, so far as those sentiments can be ascertained by the tone of the press and of popular assemblies.
The Prussian Chamber of Deputies has just adopted resolutions, by a majority of 231 to 63, that the Duke of Augustenburg has an unquestionable claim to the government of the duchies; that not the German Bund, nor the estates of Schleswig-Holstein, nor the male heirs of the house of Oldenburg, have ever acceded to the decision of the London treaty of 1852, that no ruler can be imposed by foreign powers upon a German race against its own will and against constitutional laws; that Denmark, by violation of its own engagements, and by oppression of the German population in Schleswig, has forfeited all claim to the protection of the London treaty, and released the German powers from all obligations to sustain it; and that, therefore, the continued presence of the Danish troops in Holstein is a foreign invasion of German territory; that the honor and interest of Germany require that all German states should protect the rights of the duchies, recognize the Duke of Augustenburg as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, and give him requisite assistance in enforcing these rights. These resolutions embody, I should think, the sentiments of a large majority of the population of Germany as at present manifested, and the governments of nearly all the other states of the Bund would be ready to urge upon the Diet immediate action upon this basis.
In short, the Austrian and Prussian governments have declared simply for execution, or an enforcement by Bund troops of the violated laws of the Bund and of treaty stipulations; while the rest of Germany, including a majority of Austrian and Prussian subjects, are believed to be in favor of the occupation and sequestration of the duchies, until the competent Bund tribunal shall decide the question of succession.
Execution is recognition of Christian IX as legal sovereign of the duchies, whether the point be technically reserved or not, say the opponents of this policy. Sequestration, with possible dismemberment of the Danish monarchy, is breach of faith, say the Austrian and Prussian governments.
The German Bund is bound by no faith nor treaty to sustain the integrity of Denmark, is the reply; and foreign powers have no right to exercise authority over German territory.
Austria and Prussia as European powers signed the treaty of 1852; but as members of the Bund they are bound to submit to the decisions of the majority of the Bund. That majority may possibly decide in favor of sequestration.
The debate which followed upon Count Rechberg’s exposition of his policy lasted four hours, and was a far more excited one than ever before occurred in the Reichsrath. The minister was obliged to contend single-handed against the assaults of many of the ablest members of the house; and the position of government [Page 136] was vehemently assailed, not only by its ancient foes, but by others who were formerly its staunch supporters.
I send journals containing reports of the debate, in case you may desire to examine it. It would have been impossible for me to send a translation in time, and, moreover, the packet would have been too bulky. The tone and general bearing of the argument you may gather from my despatches; but I regret not being able to give you the text of the speeches, which were often excellent specimens of forensic eloquence. Had a vote been taken, which in the manner in which the case came up was not possible, it is supposed that at least as large a majority would have been obtained as in the Prussian chamber in favor of sequestration, and consequently against the measures of the government. All the speakers were in opposition, and each was disposed to outvie the other in giving expression to the most intense Germanism.
What is most interesting to a spectator, and especially to an American, in the whole affair, is its bearing on the question of Germanic union. The great mass of the German people, and all its rulers except the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, are disposed to make use of this occasion to wrest forever from the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign these integral portions of German territory, and to denounce by something stronger than words the pretension of the great European powers to exercise authority or enact statutes in regard to German soil. It is the Pentarchy against United Germany; and it is now for the Austrian and Prussian governments to decide whether their position as members of the Pentarchy or of the German Bund is most valuable to them.
As to the Prussian government, its choice has not been doubtful. It hardly affects much veneration for the Bund, and treats with hardly disguised scorn the idea that the petty princes of Germany or a majority of its people should outweigh in the Diet the decisions of a great European monarchy.
But the Austrian government, which so lately was obtaining great popularity by its striking attempt to draw closer the bonds which unite the sovereigns and the peoples of Germany, is likely to cause a general and bitter disappointment, should its course, on what the national party considers a crucial matter, seem as anti-German as that of the Prussian monarchy.
As to the practical issue, it is not possible to predict it until the vote of the Diet shall be taken, which, however, cannot be delayed much longer. Austria and Prussia will naturally do their utmost to obtain a vote for execution, and not for sequestration. Should the Diet by a majority insist on sequestration, there are no indications that Austria and Prussia will submit to that majority. Should they refuse, is it not a proof that the Bund is a sham, that it is without vitality, and that it is quite time to bury it decently? Will it not be an additional proof, if any were wanting by Americans, that the theory of State rights, of independent sovereignties forming part of a common whole, is an impossible one? The wisdom of our fathers changed our Confederacy into a Union. Our States are fortunately not sovereign, and have no claim to be recognized as such in the general family of nations. That useful position is reserved to the United Republic alone. But here is a great kingdom and a mighty empire signing, as world powers, a treaty which, as members of a confederacy, they may be called upon to repudiate. Naturally they feel bound in honor to maintain their plighted faith. Yet if the confederacy cannot compel its members to obey its decrees, it proclaims its impotence to the world. Will the great object at which the imperial government is aiming, to avert war on the Schleswig-Holstein question, be attained?
The impression seems to be as general just now that war may be avoided, as it was a few days ago, that war was inevitable. Yet I do not see what has happened to make a pacific result very probable.
If execution takes place, precisely the same state of things will exist which, [Page 137] before the death of the late king, seemed about to bring on a war. But in face of the graver question which the popular excitement in Germany has now raised—before the new king has been recognized by the Bund—it is believed that the course of Austria and Prussia is really protective and conciliatory to Denmark. Not only these powers but the others who signed the protocol are supposed to be putting great pressure upon the Danish government in order to induce it to submit peaceably to the execution, and to make the necessary concessions. But although politicians are often illogical, events are never so; and it is difficult to understand how the king can withdraw a constitution which he has just signed and promulgated, and which he signed under the pressure of an impending revolt in his own capital. Will not the Danish excitement be increased rather than awed by the presence of German troops in Holstein, and by the passionate denunciations of Denmark with which all Germany is ringing? Will not the king, obliged to choose between an insurrection in his kingdom and a war with all Germany, draw the sword, however outmatched he may be at the outset? And if blows are once struck, will not the same European necessity for the integrity of Denmark, which was the basis of the protocol of 1852, compel England, notwithstanding her pacific counsels to Denmark, to come to the rescue of that monarchy at last, which otherwise would not only be dismembered but annihilated? I confess that the way does not seem to me very clear to a pacific adjustment, even although hostilities may for a time be deferred.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.
P. S.—Since the above was written, the telegraph brings information that the 30th March decree has been proclaimed by the King of Denmark to be no longer in force, and there is even a report that a proposal to suspend the constitution until January 1, 1865, will be made to the Chambers. On the other hand, we are informed from Frankfort that the Diet, by a small majority, has voted for execution under reserve of the succession question, and that the order to march has been given to the Bund troops.
Whether the first-named concession on the part of Denmark is enough to avert war; whether the reported design as to the second be really entertained; and whether the diplomatic victory obtained by Austria and Prussia at Frank-fort will calm or increase the agitation in Germany, time will soon show. The crisis must occur ere long.