Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session Thirty-eighth Congress, Part III

Mr. Pruyn to Mr. Seward

No. 62.]

Legation of the United States in Japan, Kanagawa, October 12, 1864.

Sir: I had the honor, in my despatch No. 61, of the 1st instant, to inform you of the return of the fleet and the results of its operations at the straits.

The government immediately despatched officers to confer with the ministers. The gratification of the government was quite apparent, though shaded by a slight tinge of mortification that so little valor and capability of resistance had been displayed. On the return of the fleet, it was determined at once to ask for an interview with the Gorogio, to confer on subjects which we had indicated through its agents, in order that they might not be unprepared for instant decision.

The Jamestown being in quarantine, in consequence of the prevalence of several cases of small-pox, the British minister and admiral kindly placed at my disposal her British Majesty’s steamer Argus, in which I proceeded to Yedo, and remained during my stay there, as the legation was not in a condition for occupation, being still unfinished. I have not failed to acknowledge this courtesy.

The first conference was formal and inconclusive, in consequence of the large number of governors and other high officials in attendance, in whose presence the Gorogio did not wish to discuss the delicate questions proposed. It was, therefore, arranged that the British minister and myself should have a confidential meeting with the Gorogio the ensuing day at twelve o’clock, and that the French and Netherland ministers should join us at two o’clock, bringing with them the officers of the fleet for presentation.

This interview was closed with the presentation of letters to the Tycoon, which myself and my colleagues of Great Britain and France had prepared in consequence of the disturbed aspect of affairs, and which the Gorogio said they would immediately bring to the notice of the Tycoon.

The memoranda of these conferences and of the preparatory meetings with the agents of the Gorogio are so full as to render it unnecessary for me to enter into any detailed statement.

On the second day we were received by three ministers, two vice-ministers, and several governors for foreign affairs, with very great cordiality. Indeed, I have never seen the Gorogio so animated and friendly, nor been present at any interview where so much interest was shown, and at which all the ministers participated in the discussion. The result was, that a promise was given that all the restrictions, which they admitted they had imposed on trade, should be removed; that the Tycoon’s government would assume and pay all indemnities for outrages committed by Choshu, and the expenses of the expedition against him, if our governments preferred to receive the same, rather than to have another port opened in the vicinity of the straits. We were careful to say that our governments did not desire to impose pecuniary fines; it was not money, but their friendship and trade, that we wanted. The Gorogio replied that they would prefer to assume the payment of the indemnities; that it was impossible for them to agree to open another port at the time one of their number was on his way to the Mikado to induce him to withdraw his order to close those already opened.

We then urged the necessity of procuring the Mikado’s ratification of the treaties, and we were assured every effort would be made by the Tycoon, and without delay, to procure such ratification.

You will remember that as early as the 27th June, 1863, (despatch No. 45,) I had the honor to invite your attention to the necessity of this, and to declare my conviction that peace and quiet could not prevail until the Mikado was thus in accord with the Tycoon; and it is exceedingly gratifying to me that my colleagues have so fully and heartily concurred in those views. You will perceive, in my letter to the Tycoon, I was careful to say that this was desired for the sake of the internal peace and quiet of Japan, and not to acquire any rights. Our treaties with the Tycoon were sufficient for every purpose, except that of preventing intrigues and opposition to his government by combinations of Daimios.

The Gorogio gave each of the ministers a letter, agreeing to pay indemnities, and promised, within eight days, to send commissioners with full powers to agree upon the sums to be paid to each power, and to arrange all undecided questions as to further facilities of trade at the open ports.

It is not possible to believe that the government of the Tycoon would have dared to agree to any such proposition, had it not felt that their power was strengthened by the prostration of the prince who stood forward as the representative of Japanese isolation and intolerance.

The ministers of the treaty powers, when they decided on the expedition to the straits of Simonoseki, with instructions to commence hostilities against Choshu, the prince of the provinces of Suwo and Nagato, without further notice or negotiation, assumed a grave responsibility which they would gladly have transferred to their respective governments had delay been compatible with a proper regard to the interest or even the safety of the citizens and subjects of these governments in Japan. From their own observation, and the conclusion arrived at after interview with the high officers of government, they could not fail to be impressed with a feeling of insecurity created by the increasing strength of the hostile party, which was, moreover, acquiring solidity, and even governmental sanction, through the influence it had over the Mikado, who sympathized with and adopted their views.

Though the treaties are to some extent the cause of trouble in Japan, they are, to a much greater extent, the pretext eagerly embraced by intriguing and ambitious Daimios, some of whom are known to aspire to the Tycoonship, each hoping that, with the fall of the Tycoon, and the favor of the Mikado secured, that high position would not be beyond his reach. The fear that the Tycoon would not be able to retain his power was by no means unreasonable, and could not be overlooked in ascertaining our true position and danger. He was confessedly too weak faithfully to observe the treaties. Trade was paralyzed and threatened with entire destruction because he declared it necessary to temporize; and while assuring us of his good faith, promised the hostile and now dominant party that he only waited for the opportune moment to terminate those treaties; meanwhile, throwing every obstacle in the way of trade, the safety of the foreign powers was involved in the stability of the Tycoon’s government, with which our relations exist, from which we derived whatever rights we possessed, and which, if prostrated, would leave us without a friend, and liable to be involved in the struggle which would ensue. The best place to defend the open ports was, therefore, manifestly at the straits of Simonoseki, where the strength of the hostile party might be broken before it was ready to be precipitated on these ports.

While the conferences with the government were in progress, and the expedition had been decided upon, the Prince of Nagato, (fortunately for the government of the Tycoon,) taking the alarm, made a rash but ineffectual attempt to secure the person of the Mikado. A large portion of the capital city of Kioto was destroyed by fire, but the assailants were utterly routed by the Daimios, charged by the Tycoon with its defence. The Mikado, filled with apprehension for his safety, appealed to the Tycoon, and Choshu was declared an outlaw by both these sovereigns.

The allies, therefore, not only sustained the Tycoon’s government in the most effectual but in the only possible way, and, at the same time, had the good fortune to act in the interests of the Mikado.

It may be asked, why, then, was not the expedition undertaken in concert with the forces of the Tycoon?

While the Tycoon could not give any valuable or needful aid, other than that which might be derived from his avowed sanction, he would have excited the jealousy and aroused the pride of the Daimios by an open co-operation with foreigners. It would have been a violation of the procedure required by usage and ancient law against a Daimio who had subjected himself to punishment.

The treaty powers dared not wait this slow process, already prolonged a year because of the differences between the Mikado and Tycoon; and the government of the Tycoon was forced, while yielding a secret assent to the measure through its confidential agents, formally to ask its postponement, and to offer to summon the refractory prince to Yedo; and, in default of his appearance, to array against him the power of the empire. Under these circumstances the expedition sailed.

That the representatives judged wisely is demonstrated by the papers herewith enclosed, which will show that the government, far from considering the expedition as an act of war, regard it as having relieved them from the pressure of alarm and danger, and as having imparted a degree of confidence and strength which will enable it to act with vigor not only, but for the first time with singleness of purpose and without duplicity.

The President will perceive, from these brief remarks, that I regard my course and that of my colleagues as entirely consistent with the views (enclosure No. 2, of my despatch No. 38) which I made known to the British minister, and which he did me the honor to communicate to his government.

I have been kindly permitted to read Earl Russell’s very flattering reply to Sir Rutherford Alcock’s despatch enclosing a copy of my letter, and have been favored with the following extract:

“There is another course of policy which appears preferable either to precipitating hostilities, or to the abandonment of the rights we have acquired by our treaties. This course of policy appears to be in conformity with the views so moderately and carefully expressed by the minister of the United States.

“This policy consists in—

“1st. Giving every encouragement and support to such of the Tycoon’s ministers, and to such of the Daimios as are favorable to foreign trade, and thus lead to the ultimate weakening of the feudal system and of the protectionist theory of Japan.

“2d. To make arrangements with the Japanese government for the protection of the foreign settlement at Yokohama.

“3d. To keep for the present a strong squadron in the Japanese sea.

“4th. To endeavor to establish an understanding with the government of France, the Netherlands, and the United States, with a view to our common interests in Japan.”

Earl Russell, in a subsequent despatch, shown me in confidence by the British minister, fortunately received after the sailing of the expedition, directed Sir Rutherford Alcock to refrain from using the forces of her Majesty against either the government of the Tycoon or any Daimio. I learn from the consul-general of the Netherlands that his government was consulted by the British government as to the propriety of adopting a more pacific policy in Japan, and I presume the government of the United States and that of Great Britain have had the same question under consideration.

It is my belief that the result of the expedition to the straits of Simonoseki has greatly contributed to, if it has not secured altogether, our safety in Japan. It has broken and scattered the opposition to the Tycoon, relieved him of the apprehension of dethronement, and enabled him to compel, once more, the residence of the Daimios and their families at Yedo. The abolition of this ancient usage was wrung from his weakness. While its restoration must be regarded as a retrograde movement, it is, probably, necessary at present to the preservation of the crumbling power of the Tycoon. At the same time an order, in the nature of an excommunication, has been issued by the Mikado, depriving the Prince of Choshu of the names and titles conferred on him by his ancestors and those of the Tycoon, virtually absolving his subjects from their allegiance, and making him landless and nameless. This edict is to be enforced by twenty-one Daimios, summoned to the standard of the Tycoon. Whether Choshu will be able to defy this decree, and resist, successfully, the force which may be sent against him, will depend upon his own ability and the loyalty and valor of his retainers, as well as upon the fact whether his peers wish his downfall. The Gorogio informed us that the Tycoon would deprive him of his territories and assign portions to different Daimios, reserving the district commanding the entrance to the Inland sea as imperial territory. It was for this reason the government so willingly assumed the payment of the indemnities. It is probable the struggle will be protracted, as Choshu will have the advantage of a defensive position, and Japanese warfare is necessarily dilatory. But it is manifest that the operations of the allies have deprived him of his chief means of defence, and that the government takes advantage of this to assume the attitude of open hostilities. The palaces of Choshu at Yedo have been levelled to the ground. The land, being a gift from the Tycoon, can be resumed, but the buildings, according to usage, must be removed. We passed the site of his chief yaski, or palace, en route to our interview with the Gorogio; but it was not till long after the expedition had sailed, and until the news of its success could have reached the Tycoon overland, that his summary measure was adopted.

I, therefore, am perfectly satisfied my course will meet the approval of the President. While I am not able positively to say, and with entire confidence, that peaceful relations are fully assured, I am able to state that our position in Japan would not have been tenable if a more pacific policy had prevailed, and that what has been done will prove our best guarantee against matured hostilities, which would involve a greater expenditure of blood and treasure, and possibly a war with the entire country.

I thank the President most heartily for the confidence he has bestowed on me, and for leaving me unfettered by any instructions other than the expression of his wish that peaceful relations might continue; and the more so, that it enables me to say, without the appearance of preferring a complaint, that it is my deliberate conviction that no other course can be adopted with safety or honor, and that the minister accredited to this government should be clothed with full powers and free from specific instructions, which, though wise when given, may become, even while in transitu, entirely inapplicable, in consequence of the changed aspect of affairs, and that the incumbent, if undeserving of this confidence, should be superseded as soon as possible by a minister who, by his prudence, wisdom, and experience, shall be entitled to receive the entire confidence of the President.

The three ships-of-war which had been temporarily left by the admiral at the straits returned to this port on the 10th instant, bringing envoys to the foreign ministers from the Prince of Choshu.

I must confess this prince has my sympathy; an open foe is much to be preferred to a deceitful and doubtful friend. He has acted with consistency, vigor, and boldness. He now desires peace, and his past history will probably prove a guarantee for his future sincerity. If, as I think is highly probable, he shall escape the destruction now threatened, perhaps, on payment of a large fine, little damage need be apprehended from his open hostility, and probably as little from his secret opposition.

The mission sent by him is a very significant proof of the thoroughness with which the work of repression was carried out, and will, without doubt, have a salutary influence on all the Daimios, as well as the government itself.

I have the honor to enclose—

No. 1. The Prince of Choshu to United States admiral.

No. 2. Mr. Pruyn to Sir Rutherford Alcock, acknowledgment of courtesy in placing her Britannic Majesty’s ship Argus at my disposal.

No. 3. Mr. Pruyn to his Majesty the Tycoon.

No. 4. Sir Rutherford Alcock to same.

No. 5. Monsieur Leon Rocher to same.

No. 6. Memorandum of conference with confidential agent, Takemoto, September 18, 1864.

No. 7. Memorandum of conference with the same, September 23, 1864.

No. 8. Memoranda of conference with the Gorogio, at Yedo, on the 6th and 7th of October, 1864.

No. 9. Letter from the Gorogio members on duty, agreeing to pay indemnities.

No. 10. The Prince of Choshu to Mr. Pruyn.

No. 11. Memorandum of conference with his karo, or secretary, at Yokohama, October 10, 1864.

No. 12. Circular to Daimios and sentence of the Prince of Choshu.

No. 13. The Prince of Choshu to Mr. Pruyn.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

No. 1.

An humble petition to the United States Admiral.

The instructions of the Emperor of Japan and those of the Tycoon are different. Because, in obedience to the Emperor’s commands, I, at Simonoseki, fired upon foreign vessels, I have received the name of rebel.

When I appeared to be acting in opposition to the imperial orders, a messenger came from the foreign nations to make it known to me and demand its discontinuance. This being the case, Nagato-no-kami (son and heir) went on horseback to Kioto to learn the Emperor’s will. Before arriving there, an insurrection having arisen in Kioto, there was no alternative but to return without having accomplished the mission. Three days ago I heard your illustrious country’s ships had come to Ituna Sima. I sent a messenger, Mr. Ama, to you by boat, to say that I did not care whether you passed through the straits or not. Whilst on his way you left the island and the boat returned, thinking to reach you from Simonoseki. Much time having elapsed, in the interval war broke out.

For this inability to prevent its breaking out I am exceedingly sorry. I have not, from the first, hated foreigners. I consider this war a great affliction to thousands of people. I desire nothing but amity. Please consider the subject well. Further particulars Mowou Idsumo, my minister and his associates, will make known to you.

First year of Genji, eighth month, ninth day, (September 9, 1864.)

MATWDAEIA DAIZEN-NO-DAIBOO.

No. 2.

[Untitled]

No. 93.]

Legation of the United States in Japan, Kanagawa, October 10, 1864.

Sir: I beg to present to you, and through you to Vice-Admiral Kuper, my thanks for placing at my disposal her Britannic Majesty’s steamer Argus for my accommodation, (the United States ship Jamestown being in quarantine,) on our recent visit to Yedo, and to Commander Moresby for his courteous and kind attention while on said vessel.

It will give me great pleasure to inform my government of this act of considerate courtesy.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the United States in Japan.

Sir Rutherford Alcock, K. C. B., Her Britannic Majesty’s Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Japan.

No. 3.

[Untitled]

No. 90.]

Legation of the United States in Japan, Kanagawa, October 4, 1864.

Sire: The President of the United States is unable, by reason of the great distance which separates our country from Japan, to address to your Majesty considerations, and to offer advice such as, in great emergencies, those invested with supreme power frequently offer to the presidents and sovereigns with which they are in alliance.

Believing that I shall thereby most acceptably discharge my duty, I have, in concert with my colleagues, come to the grave resolution to address to your Majesty direct such observations in reference to the present attitude of Japan as may serve to show the imminence of the danger which, in our judgment, threatens it, and the only course which can be taken to avert it. I am confident your Majesty will not only excuse the liberty, but will give those observations that candid and mature consideration which is due to them, as coming from the representative of a nation animated by sincere friendship for your Majesty personally, and a disinterested desire for the prosperity of your empire.

The governments with which your Majesty has made treaties regard those treaties as clothed with every sanction necessary to their validity and force. Nor can your Majesty, without a sacrifice of honor and sovereignty, allow any of your subjects to deny your perfect right to make such treaties. Your Majesty will, therefore, understand what I say as neither intimating nor admitting that any public act is necessary to confer rights on the treaty powers not already acquired.

Their representatives cannot, however, shut their eyes to the fact that several turbulent and hostile Daimios, in order to promote their own selfish purposes, have endeavored to bring into collision the authority of your Majesty and the Mikado—to interrupt your cordial relations, and to render antagonistic powers which, for more than two centuries, have been exercised in entire harmony.

They have, unfortunately, been successful in making the Mikado believe that the treaties were injurious to Japan, and that they could be annulled. This he has called on your Majesty to do, leaving no option between opposition to his wishes and a violation of the treaties, which would eventuate in war.

Not, therefore, for the purpose of acquiring any rights or privileges for themselves, but for the preservation of the ancient polity and laws of Japan, and the continuance of the exercise of powers by your Majesty and the Mikado, which have been so long in harmonious action, the treaty powers, through their representatives, would urge the immediate necessity of inducing the Mikado to give those treaties his high sanction, and thus removing every cause of opposition and existing inducements for hostile combinations.

Your Majesty has endeavored to reconcile the obligations thus imposed by the Mikado with those assumed with the treaty powers. Their representatives, appreciating the difficulties of your position, have been disposed to exercise great moderation and forbearance. But your Majesty must now be satisfied that the time has arrived when it is necessary for you to declare that the treaties must and shall be faithfully observed, and to abandon all half-way measures.

I should not discharge my duty if I failed to declare that the treaty powers cannot abandon the rights acquired under these treaties, and that continued violations of them by the subjects of your Majesty may subject the whole empire to measures of repression and reprisal, which have hitherto, fortunately, been confined to comparatively small districts.

Peace, both at home and abroad, can be best secured by a fair and open policy, which shall avoid holding out expectations to the hostile party which can never be realized, and encouraging combinations which will be made stronger by concession.

The United States earnestly hope that your Majesty will be guided by such wise counsels as shall enable you to preserve friendly relations with the treaty powers by observing the treaties with perfect fidelity, and by disarming all opposition to your rightful authority.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your Majesty’s most obedient, humble servant,

ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the United States in Japan.

His Majesty the Tycoon of Japan, &c., &c., &c.

No. 4.

[Untitled]

Yedo, October 5, 1864.

Sire: At the present moment, when a grave resolution is about to be taken, of a nature to influence the relations of your country with foreign powers, I conceive it my duty, as the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary accredited by my sovereign to your Majesty, to submit for your appreciation the following observations bearing upon the actual situation, in order to define with precision the real questions at issue, which it is becoming each day more urgently necessary to solve in a satisfactory manner.

The experience of the last few years has abundantly manifested that there exists a want of accord on the subject of foreign relations between the Mikado and Tycoon. Public proclamations and official declarations of the members of the Gorogio to the foreign representatives have otherwise placed the fact beyond all doubt.

The Mikado requiring the abrogation of treaties, has reduced the Tycoon to the alternative of either disobeying his legitimate sovereign, or bringing on his country all the calamities of a war against four of the greatest powers in the west; for to annul treaties, entered into with them without their consent, is to declare war.

The Tycoon, desiring to avoid both of these fatal contingencies, has hitherto sought a solution of the difficulty by half measures, equally distasteful to the Mikado and to foreign powers.

Hence the formal demand for the abandonment of Yokohama, and the hostile act of Daimios forming a Sako party. The treaty powers have replied by the despatch of military and naval forces adequate to the protection of this port and the destruction of the batteries and defences of the Prince of Nagato.

The Mikado can no longer be under any illusion, therefore. If he continue to secure the abrogation of treaties, he must also desire war.

It is for the Tycoon, who knows all the danger of the situation, to anticipate and prevent the fatal consequences. The time for half measures has passed irrevocably. The four great powers, having material interests in Japan, can no longer suffer their own dignity and the interests of their subjects to be called in question.

A solution of the difficulty has become indispensable, and the only one that promises either peace or security is the ratification of the treaties by the Mikado.

This act, which offers the only guarantee which the treaty powers can accept, will put an end to a situation becoming each hour more pregnant with danger. This basis once laid, it would be easy to come to a mutual understanding as to the reconstruction of the rest of the edifice and the maintenance of good relations.

It is with the view of indicating this solution, sire, and, above all, to lead you to comprehend that it ought to be immediate, that I have determined, after communication with my colleagues, to address this letter personally to your Majesty, persuaded that the frankness and loyalty of its language, if listened to, will prevent calamities which must result from a continuation of the policy hitherto followed in regard to foreigners by the government of your Majesty.

With the highest respect,

RUTHERFORD ALCOOK.

[Untitled]

Memorandum of a conference held at Yokohama, September 18, 1864.

Present: Sir Rutherford Alcock, K. C. B., her Majesty’s envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary; Monsieur Leon Rocher, minister plenipotentiary of his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of the French; Robert H. Pruyn, esq., minister resident of the United States; Monsieur de Graeff Van Polsbrock, his Netherland Majesty’s consul general and political agent; Takemoto Kai-no-kami, principal governor of foreign affairs and confidential agent of the Tycoon; Shibata Hinga-no-kami, governor of foreign affairs; Kolimoto Kai-no-kami, Ometske of the first class.

The British envoy informed the Japanese officials that her Majesty’s ship Perseus arrived, as he had anticipated, only a few hours after Takemoto had taken his leave yesterday. By this vessel despatches had been received from the senior naval officers by his colleagues and himself, acquainting them that in two days the whole of the batteries of the Prince Nagato had been silenced, and the force collected for their defence defeated and entirely dispersed. All the magazines had been destroyed the day following and the guns taken on board the fleet. On the day after the fleet commenced the attack the prince sent on board to sue for peace, but his agent having no plenipotentiary powers was sent back, and the next day a minister of the prince, with proper credentials, went on board the flag-ship of Admiral Kuper, and, in his master’s name, again sued for peace. At that interview it was proposed that the prince himself should come to Simonoseki, if he desired peace, and hold a conference with the senior naval officers to arrange the terms for a cessation of hostilities, with guarantees for the permanent maintenance of a free passage through the straits. In the mean time no hostilities on either side should be continued. It was then arranged that this conference should take place on shore on the 14th instant. The admirals afterwards steamed through the straits, visiting the several points where batteries had been erected, and which already had been dismantled by the allied forces.

From all which the British envoy observed there was this conclusion to be drawn: That the Prince of Choshu, notwithstanding all his vaunted power and long preparation in a position of great natural strength, had been utterly unable to defend his batteries against the allied forces, and in three days, all his troops having been defeated and dispersed, not a gun was left in any of his forts, and he himself had found it necessary to sue for peace. But there was another conclusion brought out by that which followed these events. The prince declared that hitherto he had only acted under the orders of the Mikado and the Tycoon; that he had no enmity against foreigners, but was perfectly willing to enter into friendly relations.

Such being the substance of the news brought by the Perseus, and the result of the operations against the Prince of Choshu, who had held the straits closed by batteries for fifteen months, it was now necessary to advert more especially to the prince’s alleged justification of this long violation of treaties. The prince not only declared that, as a Daimio of Japan, he had acted under the orders both of the Mikado and of the Tycoon in all that he had done, but he further produced certified copies in Japanese of these orders. The foreign representatives, under these circumstances, desired to know what answer the Tycoon’s government had to make to this direct charge of complicity.

Takemoto Kai-no-kami replied that he would shortly have something to say on this subject, but would be glad first to hear anything which the representatives might further have to communicate.

The French minister said he was of opinion, in concert with all his colleagues, that the present was a very critical moment in the relations between foreign countries and Japan, and that the time had arrived for a total change in those relations. Hitherto the foreign representatives had suspected that the Tycoon, under the pressure of many difficulties, had been led to play a double part, which, however calculated in one point of view to secure his safety, was on the other full of peril to the foreigners in Japan, and, as they conceived, not without some danger to himself. He had often seemed to be playing into the hands of the Daimios, most hostile to the maintenance of foreign relations, and to be seriously preparing to put a stop to these, while at the same time he professed to the several treaty powers a very earnest desire to maintain intact all the rights conferred by existing treaties. But now it was no longer a matter of suspicion, but of certainty; and the documents placed in the admiral’s hands prove that the whole of these outrages and flagrant violations of treaties by the Prince of Nagato were really the acts of the Mikado and Tycoon, since done under orders, which might easily be interpreted to sanction, if not to prescribe, the exact order of proceedings adopted by the prince. The time, therefore, had come for dropping all mask and adopting a totally different policy; and unless the Tycoon, strengthened and materially aided as he must be by this complete victory over the Prince of Nagato and by such support as the foreign representatives were in a position to render him, would undertake, without further temporizing, to put himself in accord with the superior authority of the Mikado in this matter of the treaties, obtain his sanction, and give entire execution to all their stipulations, an opportunity not likely to occur again would be lost in the Tycoon’s interest, not less than theirs.

Takemoto Kai-no-kami, in reply, stated that he fully agreed with the opinions just expressed; that this was a very critical moment, and it behooved the Tycoon’s government to take advantage of it in the way indicated. In regard to the charge made by the Prince of Choshu, and the written orders he produced in justification, he, Takemoto Kai-no-kami, had to remark—

1st. That the order, such as it was, had been transmitted, not by the Tycoon, but by an act of treachery on the part of persons, about the Mikado, and without competent authority.

2d. That it did not order the prince to fire upon foreign ships, and the proof that such was not its proper meaning might be found in the fact that although a similar order was communicated to all the other Daimios, he alone had put that interpretation upon it because it suited his own designs.

To this the American minister replied, that although it was true the order was not in express terms to fire, yet as it declared the intention of the Tycoon to cease all intercourse with foreigners on the 20th June, 1863, the prince might naturally draw the inference that he was expected to treat them as enemies.

Takemoto replied, that such acts were contrary to the Tycoon’s wish was further established by his sending down an aide-de-camp at once to cause the prince to stop firing, and this emissary was murdered in the territories of Choshu.

As to the appearance of double dealing on the part of the Tycoon’s government on the one side, concerting measures for the closing of the port of Yokohama, and, on the other, for maintaining the treaties in their integrity, the Tycoon had hitherto been, as the representatives well know, in a position to make something of this kind unavoidable, in the interest of foreigners as well as for his own sake; since, had he openly refused to carry out the orders received from the Mikado for the expulsion of foreigners, he was liable to be deposed, and his dynasty might be destroyed. Now, however, that the Prince of Nagato had been defeated by the allied expedition, there was certainly a great opportunity for putting an end to whatever was ambiguous in the position of the Tycoon as regarded the foreign powers; but, in furtherance of such end, it was essential that the allied squadron should be recalled to prevent all chance of collision with other Daimios and new complications arising.

The American minister then observed, that it was evident from the tenor and urgency of this demand, which Takemoto had been no doubt instructed to make, that the Tycoon was still inclined to pursue the policy of conciliating the hostile party, whereas he now occupied a vantage ground, secured to him by the action of the treaty powers, which relieved him from such subservience. He was no longer under the necessity, which it was pleaded had hitherto controlled his free action, of presenting one face to the treaty powers, and another to his own subjects. The power of the hostile party was now broken, and the Tycoon was now able to act with security. He would accordingly be expected to prove his good faith, by strictly observing the engagement entered into by treaties, and no longer holding out expectations of their modification. The Tycoon must know, by this time, that such modifications as the hostile party contemplated would never be acceded to. So far as the Tycoon was concerned, the representatives present had indeed the assurance that they were only asked for the purpose of gaining time, and not with any hope of ultimate concession. The temporizing policy hitherto followed, however, had greatly aggravated the evils which the Tycoon professed to be desirous of remedying; and the safest course, as well as the wisest, would now be found in a faithful observance of treaties, without pretence at negotiation for their modification or apparent concessions to those who only sought their entire nullification.

Takemoto said, that believing, with the foreign representatives, the present time very favorable for efforts at Kioto to place the relations of Japan with foreign countries on a better footing, he was all the more anxious that the fleet should immediately return, and especially that no troops should be left to occupy any post in the Inland sea, lest new complications or collisions should arise which might seriously interfere with the success of efforts now to be made.

The British minister replied, that it had been determined by common consent to keep an effective hold upon the straits until satisfactory arrangements were entered into by the Tycoon’s government, both as to the navigation of the Inland sea and the better maintenance of treaty rights generally. Either the Tycoon must find the means of bringing the Mikado and hostile party of Daimios in accord with him for the maintenance of treaties, or the western powers might find themselves compelled to go beyond the Tycoon, and enter into relations with the Mikado. It has been already suggested that a new order of things might at once be established, if the Tycoon would take advantage of the recent blow dealt at the Sako party in the person of Choshu. Advantage might also be taken of the intimation now conveyed, that unless some agreement could be come to on the subject of treaties between the various conflicting powers in Japan, foreign states might, however reluctantly, find themselves compelled, in self-defence, to take steps which would bring them in more or less direct relation with the Mikado, and those Daimios who had hitherto supported him in a hostile course of action. Hitherto the Tycoon had always been considered as the treaty-making power in Japan, and the sole representative of government in relation with foreign states; but it is continued to be demonstrated that the Tycoon has not the necessary authority, and was so completely overruled by a superior power in the state as to be unable to prevent or resist orders for the rupture of treaties, however well disposed he might be to maintain them. Foreign powers would sooner or later have no alternative hut to seek the superior power in the state and make their own terms.

Takemoto Kai-no-kami observed that, agreeing in much that had been suggested, he was nevertheless not in a position to make any definite answer in so grave a matter. He would, therefore, at once proceed to Yedo, to report all that had been said. In the mean time he must still urge the importance of immediately recalling the fleet to prevent all chance of new collisions.

The French minister wished to ask Takemoto two or three question’s: First, if the Tycoon could now obtain the full concurrence and support of the Mikado in the maintenance of foreign relations and existing treaties, would the Tycoon then find it possible to give them full effect, and to deal with any recalcitrant or rebellious Baimios, now especially that Satsuma and Choshu, two of the most powerful having tried their strength against foreign powers and failed, were no longer hostile.

Takemoto answered without hesitation, Yes, certainly.

The French minister then asked whether it would not be very inconvenient to the Mikado to receive the foreign representatives in Kioto.

Takemoto smiled and said, Undoubtedly it would be very inconvenient.

Then, continued the French minister, would it not be much better for the Tycoon to profit by this opportunity so happily afforded by the recent defeat of the Prince of Nagato, and the great discouragement it must be to the Sako party, and prevent any necessity arising for such a step?

To which Takemoto replied also in the affirmative; observing that such, indeed, would be the desire of the Tycoon, and he, Takemoto, would immediately hasten to Yedo that the Gorogio and Tycoon might be informed, without delay, of all that had passed, and of the whole bearing of the important events which had taken place in the straits.

The British minister summed up by saying it was desirable the high officers now present should return to Yedo impressed with two leading facts: First, that the time had arrived for a total and radical changer of policy on the part of the Tycoon in respect to the Sako party and the foreign powers; abandoning all attempts to temporize with and conciliate the former by seeming to consent to measures for the expulsion of foreigners one day, or by the stoppage of the trade another.

This, it was observed incidentally by the representative of the Netherlands, had been done in regard to the silk coming to this port quite recently, and it ought to be allowed to come forward at once as a first indication of this change of policy.

Takemoto replied affirmatively, and that steps were taken to that end.

And secondly, the British envoy then continued, he trusted they would leave the conference with the conviction that it was impossible for foreign powers any longer to let their rights and national interests in the country be perpetually damaged and sacrificed between the two conflicting authorities of the Mikado and Tycoon. It followed, therefore, that either the Tycoon must find means to reconcile the two, and successfully assert his power to execute the treaties fully, or measures must be taken into the consideration of foreign governments for arriving at a satisfactory result by other means than representations to the Tycoon, courteously listened to always, but wholly inoperative.

In the mean while, anxious to give every support to the Tycoon in his efforts tending to this end; desirous of avoiding any cause of embarrassment that might interfere with his action in this direction; willing, even, to strengthen Takemoto’s hands in the arduous work on which he had now been employed, he might go back to the Tycoon with the assurance that the admirals would speedily return with the greater part of the force; and no permanent position would at present be taken on shore to command the straits. On the other hand, having at no slight cost obtained such important results, as the removal of all the impediments to the free navigation and the submission of the Prince of Nagato, it was out of the question their immediately relinquishing these material and political results, or exposing them to any jeopardy. A certain number of ships, therefore, would remain in the vicinity of Simonoseki to secure the free passage and strict maintenance of the terms on which peace would be granted to the prince.

The American minister observed, further, that it would be a question now whether, after the past experience, it was not essential to prevent the liability of the straits being closed at the caprice of any single Daimio.

To do this effectually, it might be necessary that so much of the territories of the prince as should be required to secure foreign trade henceforth from any such contingency should be imperialized and made over to the Tycoon’s keeping. Whether, also, Simonoseki or some other port in its vicinity should not be made a port for foreign trade was matter now for deliberation.

As some indemnity for the sacrifices made by the four treaty powers to secure the removal of long existing obstructions and the injury done to foreign trade during the past fifteen months, the four treaty powers might reasonably require it from the Tycoon, and the Tycoon might be disposed to make this arrangement of his own accord, and the more willingly that there was reason to believe the concession, if now insisted upon by the admirals, could be at once obtained from the Prince of Choshu, as Daimio of the province.

The British minister observed, in conclusion, that it would be necessary for the representatives then present to confer in person with the Gorogio on this and other important matters connected with the present aspect of affairs. These subjects were distinctly mentioned now, therefore, that when the meeting took place the members of the Gorogio might not be taken by surprise and require time for deliberation, but be prepared at once to enter into the discussion of the proper measures to be taken.

Takemoto Kai-no-kami said he perfectly under stood all that had been said, and, with his colleagues, would hasten back to Yedo to render an account of his mission.

The conference was then closed.

RUTHERFORD ALCOCK, H. B. M. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Japan.

LEON ROCHES.

ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the United States.

D. DE GRAEFF VAN POLSBROEK, H. N. M. Consul General and Political Agent.

No. 6.

[Confidential.]

Memorandum of a conference with Takemoto Kai-no-kami, principal governor for foreign affairs and confidential agent of the Tycoon; Shibata Hinga-no-kami, governor for foreign affairs, and Idsuri Shinzabaro Ometske, at the British legation, September 23, 1864.

It was announced, on the part of the Tycoon and Gorogio, that it had been finally resolved to abandon the temporizing and double-faced policy hitherto adopted, and from henceforth to cease making any pretence even of closing the port of Yokohama, and a member of the Gorogio would at once proceed to Kioto to make this known to the Mikado, and obtain his sanction to the public renunciation of such a policy, and, if possible, his acceptance and ratification of the treaties.

In accordance with this resolution, it was further stated, and as a material proof of good faith, that all restriction on the trade of this port should at once cease. A large quantity of silk was already on its way, and to be expected in a day or two. These two resolutions, they were directed to state, are the first results arrived at in consequence of the representations made by the four representatives in the conference of the 18th instant, when the news of the defeat of Choshu was communicated. But as the determination to take no further steps In the closing of this port cannot be made public until it has been formally communicated to the Mikado, a vice-minister will be Bent to Yokohama to acquaint the foreign ministers privately.

In the mean time it was the anxious desire of the Gorogio that all the foreign ships should be withdrawn from the straits, as their presence interfered with the operations of the Daimios and Tycoon against Choshu.

In reference to which, the convention of Choshu and the question of indemnities was spoken of; Takemoto was informed that these, if pressed, would no doubt amount to a very considerable sum. It was not the desire of her Majesty’s government, however, to extort money from either the Tycoon or the Daimios. Their earnest wish was rather to establish good relations for the advantage of both nations, and it was believed that the other treaty powers entertained similar views. As to the withdrawal of the ships from the straits at this moment, therefore, if the Tycoon chose to enter upon negotiation on the following basis, the objection at present existing to the withdrawal of the last ship might possibly be removed:

The Tycoon to take upon himself the satisfactory arrangement of the whole of the indemnities claimed, or to be claimed, for the past by the four powers from Choshu, and to engage either to pay the amount, or make arrangements for the opening of the port of Simonoseki (or some other port more convenient in the vicinity) in lieu of such payment, at the option of the treaty powers.

The same high officers having proceeded to the French legation, a conference on the subject took place with the French minister, who had the above minute before him.

In the first instance, Takemoto Kai-no-kami repeated the desire of the Gorogio that all the ships should be withdrawn from the straits, insisting much upon the obstruction their presence would be to the operations then contemplated against Choshu on the part of the Tycoon and Daimios summoned to his aid.

The French minister replied that if hostilities had not been pushed further against Choshu, it was because the Tycoon especially requested it, undertaking himself to complete the work to the satisfaction of the representatives. They ought to be well assured, therefore, of the sincerity of the Tycoon’s promises, for there was reparation due, indemnities to be recovered, and, secondly, guarantees for the future yet wanting. But, beyond these, there was something vastly more important to be secured, and that was the ratification of existing treaties by the Mikado, and this with the least possible delay. The non-ratification of the treaties had been a perpetual cause of difficulties, since the Tycoon’s government unceasingly made it the plea for their non-execution. Now there could never be a more propitious movement, or a more favorable opportunity for obtaining their immediate ratification. The means of communication with Kioto existed; the time required was short, and assuredly without this being obtained it was idle to talk of the recall of the ships.

To this Takemoto observed that their presence in the straits interfering with the Mikado’s orders for the punishment of Choshu might prove an obstacle in the way of the ratification.

The minister of France replied it was difficult to conceive this. It appeared to him, on the contrary, that the Mikado, being almost within hearing of the foreign artillery, would be disposed all the more readily to listen to the demands of the Tycoon, who could very well use the presence of the fleet as an argument, showing that the ratification had at last become a matter of necessity, supposing that the Tycoon should still hesitate boldly to avow the policy of maintaining the treaties as the only course consistent with good faith or policy, and the engagements entered into with foreign powers, engagements which even at this moment had been renewed with their representatives.

Takemoto observed that this might be a very dangerous part for the Tycoon to play, as likely to arouse the hostility of the Daimios against foreign nations by an appearance of intimidation.

The minister remarked that a similar argument had been used to deter the representatives from sending the allied squadrons against Choshu, and no such result had followed. But apart from this, was it not evidently and urgently in the interest of the Tycoon himself that the ships of the treaty powers should keep careful watch of the movements of Choshu, and prevent his re-arming his batteries, which it had not been thought worth while to destroy? Once rearmed, all the junks of the Daimios, north or south, would be certain to be sunk by his guns, and their attack might fail.

Takemoto and his colleagues appeared much impressed with this observation, and admitted it was one of great weight, and deserving serious consideration, but that in so grave a matter they could only promise to report to the government at Yedo.

The minister remarked, besides, that his experience of military matters satisfied him that such an expedition as was announced on the part of the Tycoon and Daimios could not possibly be ready under two months, and one month should suffice to obtain the Mikado’s ratification of the treaties. It would then be time enough to discuss whether the ships were an obstacle to theiroperations or not.

Takemoto replied that, as far as his own opinion went, he was satisfied of the expediency of leaving them for the present, but he must, of course, refer the whole question to the Gorogio.

The minister assented, observing that it must be evident there was between the British minister and himself, in all this matter, a perfect identity of opinion, and that their resolutions had been definitively taken. And in conclusion, he wished to know when the promised silk would arrive.

Takemoto replied: To-morrow, if the weather was fine. It was already at Kanagawa, in quantity.

Apprové dans tout son contenu. Yokohama, September 28, 1864.

LEON ROCHES.

R. A.

R. H. P.

Memorandum of two successive conferences held at Yedo, the 6th and 7th of October, 1864, at the residence of Makino Bidzen-no-kami, minister for foreign affairs, between the undersigned representatives of the treaty powers and the Gorogio, representing the government of the Tycoon.

Present: Sir Rutherford Alcock, K. C. B., her Britannic Majesty’s envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary; Monsieur Leon Roches, minister plenipotentiary of his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of the French; Robert H. Pruyn, minister resident of the United States; D. de Graeff Van Polsbroek, consul-general and political agent of the Netherlands; and the following members of the Gorogio: Midsumo Idsumi-no-kami, Makino Bidzen-no-kami, Suwa Inaba-no-kami; and the members of the second council: Sakai Hida-no-kami, Tachibana Idsumo-no-kami; also, the governors for foreign affairs, and Takemoto Awadji-no-kami, confidential agent of the Tycoon, and principal governor for foreign affairs.

The British minister informed the Gorogio that in all the observations he had to offer for their consideration upon the occasion, he should speak not in his own name only, but as conveying the opinion of his three colleagues also. It was the more essential this should be understood, for they were now assembled under no ordinary circumstances. The critical situation of affairs in Japan, and the important interests at stake, make it imperative that a decision should be taken without delay as to the foreign policy of the country, and upon that decision must very much depend the possibility of maintaining good and friendly relations with the treaty powers.

The first minister for foreign affairs, Midsumo Idsumi-no-kami, replied, that the members of the Gorogio were fully impressed with the gravity of the situation. They hoped, however, that it would be possible to arrive at a peaceful solution of all the questions on which they had hitherto been at issue.

The British minister, adverting to the recent destruction of all Choshu’s defences, and his total defeat, observed that it must now be manifest no hostile Daimio was strong enough to resist such forces as the treaty powers could command, and from this conviction the four representatives hoped much good would result. At Kagosima and Simonoseki proof had now been given that the treaty powers both could and would vindicate their rights by the sword, when either the lives or the trade of their subjects were attacked. Neither hostile Daimios of the Sako party, the Mikado himself, nor the Tycoon, could any longer be under the illusion that a hostile policy towards foreign powers might be carried out with impunity, or, indeed, without entailing all the calamities of a general war and a conflict with western powers, in which Japan could not hope to be victor. In the mean time, they had first to consider the position of affairs in respect to the Prince of Nagato. This Daimio, after a series of unprovoked aggressions on foreign ships, and continuous interruption of trade by every kind of violence, had been punished, his batteries dismantled, and the guns employed in such outrages taken away from him. Finding his utter powerlessness in face of such a force as had been sent against him, he had promptly sued for a cessation of hostilities, and entered into a convention with the admiral commanding-in-chief, to pay all the expenses of the expedition, together with any indemnities to be claimed for his aggressions on foreign flags since the beginning. The first thing to be ascertained was whether the Tycoon would undertake to meet these claims, and liquidate them, as agreed upon by the Prince of Nagato.

The Japanese minister replied, that Choshu was going to be punished for his offences against his own sovereign. His territories would be confiscated, and out of his estate the expenses of the expedition would be defrayed.

The British minister replied, that this did not meet his question. Would the Tycoon take upon himself the responsibility of carrying out the convention in regard to the payment of all indemnities? If so, the engagement must be wholly irrespective of the result of any operations of the Tycoon against Choshu, which might be long delayed or incomplete in their results. Choshu had also expressed his willingness to allow trade to be carried on at Simonoseki; and it seemed, therefore, only to rest with the Tycoon whether this port might not at once be opened. Without, however, insisting upon this point at present, the representatives must have a formal and unconditional engagement from the government of the Tycoon to meet all the claims for indemnities against Choshu, or they must of necessity look to him to meet his own obligations.

The Japanese ministers, after some consultation among themselves, replied that the Tycoon’s government would unconditionally undertake the engagements of Choshu, as to the payment of all indemnities. As to the opening of the port of Simonoseki, it would be impossible for them to return any answer until they knew the result of a mission with which Abe Bungo-no-kami, the absent member of the Gorogio, had been charged, and who was then at Kioto.

The British minister observed, that the root of all evil in respect to foreign relations was the want of accord between the Mikado and the Tycoon; and that the time had now arrived when the ratification of existing treaties by the Mikado could no longer be deferred. He trusted this was the object of Abe Bungo-no-kami’s mission.

The Japanese minister replied, We cannot give you any promises on this point, but every effort will, be made on our part to obtain the Mikado’s ratification. We perfectly agree with you that it should now take place.

The British minister, after communication with his colleagues, stated, as their united opinion, that something more definite, within a fixed period, should be promised.

The members of the Gorogio were evidently under some embarrassment, and showed hesitation in entering further into the matter in presence of all the Japanese officials present.

The British minister then observed, that as there was much of a very grave and confidential character which he and his colleagues wished to communicate freely to the Gorogio, and to them alone, in the first instance, it might be better if the conference were adjourned to the following day, when the British and American ministers would come alone, two hours before their colleagues, who would be accompanied by the naval officers of the squadrons, as previously agreed upon.

This was agreed to by the Japanese ministers, after assuring themselves that, although there would be only two of the foreign representatives present, they would speak in the name of all, with full power to act for and on behalf of their absent colleagues.

The Gorogio was then informed, that in view of the gravity of the situation, and the absolute necessity for some immediate resolution in regard to the foreign policy of Japan, each of the foreign ministers had felt it his duty to address a letter to the Tycoon, which they requested might be at once delivered. The Gorogio would find that the foreign representatives had submitted certain suggestions and opinions similar to those already known to the members of the council; and they hoped, therefore, that before the conference of the morrow it would be possible for the Gorogio to take the Tycoon’s instructions, and enter fully into the whole matter.

The Japanese ministers replied, that the letters which were now placed in their hands should be at once delivered, and by to-morrow, at noon, they hoped to have received the Tycoon’s instructions.

The conference then broke up, with an adjournment to the following day, at 12 o’clock.

A. R.

L. R.

R. H. P

D. de G. V. P.

Minutes of a conference on the 7th August, at the same place.

Present: The British and American ministers; the following members of the Gorogio: Midsumo Idsumi-no-kami, Makino Bidzen-no-kami, Suwa Inaba-no-kami; and the members of the second council: Sakai Hida-no-kami, Tachibano Idsumo-no-kami; also, governor for foreign affairs, and Takemoto Awadji-no-kami, Shibazu-no-kami.

The British minister opened the conference by referring to the understanding come to on the previous day in respect to the Tycoon formally engaging to liquidate all claims for indemnities against the Prince of Nagato.

After some conversation, it was agreed that a letter to that effect, to be signed by the ministers, should at once be written and delivered; and for the assessments of the amounts, time, and mode of payment, and other details, commissioners with plenipotentiary powers should be sent to Yokohama, within eight days, to treat with the foreign representatives, and settle the whole matter.

The British minister, then referring to the numerous confidential conferences which had taken place between Takemoto Awadji-no-kami and himself, as well as with his colleagues, sometimes separately and at others collectively, said that he had much desired an occasion like the present, of pressing upon the attention of the Gorogio viva voce the many important considerations which he conceived should at this moment determine the foreign policy of the Tycoon’s government.

The ministers, with every manifestation of interest, expressed their willingness to hear whatever it was desired to communicate to them.

The British minister said the foreign representatives had three principal objects in view when they determined in concert to demand a conference with the whole Gorogio, and to proceed to Yedo collectively for the purpose.

The first had reference to a long series of outrages and aggressions on the part of the Prince of Nagato. He had now paid the penalty of his temerity, and been defeated in the field. The ulterior question of indemnities might now also be considered as satisfactorily settled, by the written engagement of the Tycoon’s government to take upon themselves the final adjustment and liquidation. The letter to this effect was delivered during the conference, with the seal of Makino Bidzen-no-kami, in whose house the conference took place, and the only one, consequently, who was prepared with it, but with the assurance, personally given, that it was the act of the whole Gorogio.

The second had reference to a subject on which the representatives had barely touched yesterday, because they saw it was productive of embarrassment; indeed, they knew that its discussion in public could not be satisfactorily conducted. This subject was the disaccord between the Mikado and Tycoon on the question of a foreign policy, and between the Tycoon and a powerful party of Daimios perpetually urging the closing of the port as the condition of peace in the realm.

The head of this party had now been dealt a paralyzing blow by the foreign squadrons, by which his power and his prestige both must have been greatly diminished. The whole party even must have suffered great damage and been discouraged. Simultaneously they must have lost influence with the Mikado by the treasonable attack of Choshu upon his castle, and the destruction of half his capital. There could not be a more favorable conjuncture, therefore, for the successful prosecution of a negotiation with the Mikado for the ratification of the treaties and the recovery of an ascendancy by the Tycoon over the Daimios hitherto so hostile to his policy and to all foreign relations.

The Gorogio knew what was the general outline of a policy indicated to Takemoto, by which the foreign representatives conceived all parties might be conciliated, and a foreign policy established calculated to maintain good relations with the treaty powers, and put an end to all hostile combinations against them and the Tycoon on the part of the Daimios. This policy, it was explained, consisted in giving both the Mikado and the Daimios a personal interest in the maintenance of these relations and the development of trade, and in removing some of the causes of hostility where their prejudices were most hurt by particular treaty stipulations.

The ministers, while this was being very fluently interpreted by Mr. Von Seibold, manifested in various ways the deepest interest in the views submitted, and begged to hear further by what means it was conceived these great ends could be attained.

The British minister continued: The Mikado might easily be given a personal interest in the maintenance of treaties and prosperity of trade by assigning to him, as a portion of the revenue paid to him by the Tycoon, a royalty constituted by a percentage on the gross receipts of the custom-houses at the open ports. The Daimios might in like manner be conciliated by withdrawing all vexatious restrictions and exactions prohibitory of their produce being sold at the Tycoon’s ports. These restrictions were not only in violation of distinct treaty stipulations, but wholly opposed to the Tycoon’s true interests; for, as the event proved, this system had raised him up such powerful enemies that they placed his life and throne in danger, and were clamoring for the closing of ports and cessation of a trade in the advantages of which they were not allowed to participate, while in various ways they had been made to feel the inconveniences attaching to all great and sudden innovations in the policy of a country.

The ministers, after much interchange of opinion among themselves, and a more animated conference with individual expressions of thought and evidence of lively interest than had ever been witnessed by any foreign representatives in Japan, replied that they had been much impressed with the line of policy traced out, and that, as regarded the hostilities of the Daimios, it was already in contemplation to move in this direction. But as regarded the Mikado it was a delicate subject, and they could hardly say yet how far such a policy would be feasible.

The American minister here observed that by no other means could the Mikado’s interest in trade be more effectually secured, and, in consequence, his interest in putting down the hostility of any of the Sako party, since it would be open to the Tycoon at any time, if they made themselves, troublesome, to represent to the Mikado that in so far as they might succeed in the interruption they diminished the amount of duties received, and of necessity diminished the revenue which he had to pay over to the Mikado, this being formed by a percentage on the whole.

The members of the two councils seized on this point with much interest, and evidently saw how valuable such an argument might become.

The British minister added, that among the means to be used both with the Mikado and Daimios to bring them in accord with the Tycoon, and to lead them to accept an enlightened policy, it must not be forgotten that there were some arguments which appealed to their patriotism, and others to their interests in a different way.

To the Mikado it might very truly be represented that not only were all the perils and calamities to the country inseparable from a war with western powers to be averted by his prompt ratification of the treaties at a moment when longer delay would be fraught with danger, but if even this by any more temporizing measures could be avoided, it was very certain the treaty powers, seeing all the conditions unfulfilled upon which alone they made the large concession of deferring the opening of two cities and three ports, Hiogo and Osacca, among others, would, at no long interval, if the present negotiations failed, insist, as was their undoubted right, upon the full execution of the original treaties, and the opening of these ports without further delay. If, on the other hand, the Mikado, moved by these and other weighty considerations, should determine on at once ratifying the treaties, the foreign powers would not only be more inclined to take patience, but their represenatives on the spot would see in this the sure promise of peace and future improved relations. The British minister would at once, for his own part, on hearing of such an act of ratification begin to send away the British troops now collected at Yokohama, solely there to meet the danger created by the hostile action of the Mikado and Daimios, and thus material evidence would be given of a sense of security, which would do more to restore confidence and allay disturbance throughout the country than any number of decrees and proclamations.

The Japanese ministers seemed fully to understand and to appreciate the bearing and force of these remarks, and said that they would spare no effort to obtain the Mikado’s acceptance of the treaties, and to this end were about to despatch another envoy, whom they then begged to present to the British and American ministers.

It was here suggested that if the Gorogio, while one of their number, or the Tycoon himself, was engaged with the Mikado, at Kioto, in this negotiation, were to remove to Osacca, and the foreign representatives also, with a portion of the squadron, were to be in the bay of Hioga, so that they could have easy access to each other and frequent intercourse, not only much advantage and more rapid progress in the negotiation would be attained, from the proximity of Osacca to Kioto, but the mere presence of both ministers and ships in that vicinity might have a good effect, as showing the urgency of the occasion, and thus strengthen the hands of the Tycoon’s government.

The ministers objected to this, that it would look like a menace—would certainly be liable to be so construed both by the Mikado and the Daimios, and it would expose the Tycoon to the charge of attempting, with foreign powers, to coerce and force the Mikado, thus raising an insuperable obstacle to the success of the negotiations.

The British minister said it would not be the wish of the foreign representatives to insist, if such was the deliberate opinion of the members of both councils. Nevertheless, some definite period, say thirty days, must be fixed, within which an answer from Kioto or some result should be obtained; because, if the negotiation now going on there should not be successful, it would, undoubtedly, be the duty of the foreign representatives to lay before their respective governments such a statement of the untenable nature of the actual situation as would be calculated to lead them to adopt some decisive and serious resolution.

The Japanese ministers expressed their acquiescence in this view. They hoped the end would be attained long before thirty days, in which case they would hasten to communicate it. One means of success they had yet to obtain from the foreign representatives, and that was the withdrawal of the ships-of-war from the straits of Simonoseki. If their envoy, now proceeding to Kioto, could convey this intelligence, it would, they thought, go far to insure a sucessful issue.

The British minister replied, that before the conference terminated an answer should be given; but, in the mean time, of the three main objects which had led to this conference, he had only as yet touched upon two, namely, the termination of the affair of Choshu, and the necessity of accord between the Mikado and Tycoon on the subject of treaties and foreign relations. The third was not less important than the first and second; indeed, it was much more important than the first. The restrictions in trade and the vexatious obstructions and exactions to which foreign trade was subject at all the ports, and latterly the total stoppage of silk—a main staple of the trade of Yokohama—had reached such a pitch that it was imperative there should be a prompt and radical change. The government of the Tycoon had already been informed last year that the closing of a treaty port would be considered as constituting an act of war, but the stoppage of the trade of a port, or any considerable portion of it, was virtually the closing of the port; it was only a question of degree and method. The wrong was the same; the injury inflicted and the violation of treaty rights no less flagrant. This wrong and injury had now been suffered at the hands of the Tycoon’s government by the merchants of Yokohama for more than three months in the great staple of silk, and it was the duty of the representatives to represent to the Gorogio that it mattered not what was the plea, there could be no justification; and if all restrictions were not forthwith removed, they would, however reluctantly, be compelled to conclude there was no faith or trust to be placed in the Tycoon’s government. Takemoto, in the name of the Gorogio, had distinctly promised all obstructions should cease more than fifteen days back, and still they were maintained.

The ministers entered into rather a vague disclaimer, seeking to throw the blame on competing native dealers, but in the end they admitted that the government was not without some direct action in the matter. They repeatedly and emphatically assured the representatives, however, that the restrictions had been already removed and should not again be imposed.

The British minister replied that he would trust to their good faith, and that they would scarcely venture to continue the same dubious course after their solemn assurances. And in that trust the force at Simonoseki should be immediately removed. But in giving them this material evidence of good will and trust the representatives expected, and would insist on having like material evidence in the free and unrestricted supply of silk; failing this, the Gorogio must know, the same power that withdrew the ships could send them back again.

The minister gave renewed assurances that the silk was already going into Yokohama—that the representatives would find this to be so when they returned.

The British minister then observed that there was much to be done before the trade at these ports could be placed on a satisfactory footing, and in accord with the treaties. These had been hitherto very persistently violated in every essential, to the great injury of foreign residents at all the ports, and of trade generally. A radical change of system and of policy was required; but, as any step in this direction would require a discussion of details as to particular abuses, it was proposed that the commission about to be sent to Yokohama with plenipotentiary powers to arrange the settlement of indemnities, should also have instruction to confer with the foreign representatives, and take decisive action for the correction of all abuses. This as regarded all the ports, and the improvement of local conditions imperatively required at the present moment—more particularly, perhaps, at Yokohama, but in all more or less—and not only as regarded trade but land and sanitary arrangements, such as had been considered and assented to in conference with the commissioner Sibata Hinga-no-kami, now present, sent down for this purpose on the 8th of September last.

The ministers agreed that the commissioners about to be sent should be so instructed, and duly empowered to carry into effect whatever arrangements should be decided upon.

The British minister observed that, although a whole month had elapsed since Sibata, together with the governor of Kanagawa, had conferred with the American minister and himself, and agreed upon certain measures as both reasonable and necessary for the enlargement of the settlement in several directions—the buildings of the abattives, the construction of a road away from the Tokaida, for recreation and exercise, &c.—not a single step had been taken towards carrying them into execution. It was necessary, therefore, to impress upon the Gorogio that any further delay or inaction in all these matters should be looked upon by the foreign representatives as a breach of faith on the part of the Gorogio, and would only lead to complications which they must feel it was very desirable, in the interest of both parties, to avoid.

The ministers replied, that all necessary instructions would be given, and the requisitions of the foreign representatives should be promptly attended to.

The British minister observed that, in order to insure this result, it was thought very desirable that some one or more of the high officers most familiar with the subject, and who had already discussed it with the foreign representatives, should be sent to Yokohama with plenipotentiary powers. Sakai Hida-no-kami, for instance, had been employed on a similar commission, now three years ago, and although they had to regret that many of the engagements then entered into, and the material improvements determined upon, remained yet to be carried out, they thought, for that very reason, indeed, as well as from previous knowledge, Sakai would be a very fit person to be appointed. The same might be said of Takemoto, and of Sibata Hinga-no-kami, as employed on the last occasion—the latter, especially, as having already understood and generally acquiesced in the necessity and expediency of the amelioration and improvements contemplated.

The ministers, after a good-humored disclaimer on the part of Sakai of his being a fit person, agreed that the suggestion should be borne in mind when the commission was named.

The British minister said it was impossible to enter into long details at such a conference as to the manifest obstructions to trade; nevertheless, one instance was worthy of special mention because of its great importance. There had been a disease among the silkworms over large districts in Europe, and a consequent deficiency in the production of silk. It was all-important to get fresh seed from this country, and yet every possible impediment had been thrown in the way of those employed in obtaining them by the Japanese officials. Now, as each silkworm lays thousands of eggs, it is impossible that Japan could suffer by allowing of the export of any quantity that could be required to replenish the seed in Europe. Moreover, since the Japanese authorities rather objected to the excessive demand for silk, there was no better means of diminishing the demand from Europe than by taking care to keep up the European stock of worms on which the home supply of silk depended.

The ministers replied, that silkworm eggs not being an article of trade, no provision had been made for a foreign demand; but now that it was known they were required, orders had been given to provide for this unforeseen demand, and next year a plentiful supply might be relied upon.

The British minister replied that he was glad to hear they had made provision for the future; but even as regarded the present season, the want in Europe was urgent, and he could not conceive any just reason could exist for obstacles being raised in the expectation of such small quantities as had actually been purchased.

The ministers replied that if the consuls applied for authority to ship eggs already obtained, it should be granted.

The subject of a residence at Yedo was then discussed. The Gorogio was informed that by treaty the residence of foreign representatives should be at Yedo, and nowhere else. This was a right which the treaty powers would certainly not relinquish, and, therefore, it was true that the Tycoon’s government took some steps to enable the representatives to resume their residence.

The ministers made some observations as to the difficulties from the troubled state of the country, without, however, in any way calling in question the right insisted upon.

The British minister remarked, in reply, that the choice of a site was the first step, and there was no reason why that should not be taken at once. As regards the already chosen Gotten Yama, it appearing that strong objections existed on the part of the Daimios to its occupation by the foreign ministers, they were not disposed to insist upon that site being preserved, provided some others equally eligible were placed at their disposal. As to the present time, being one of trouble and unfavorable for the resumption by the foreign representatives of their residence in Yedo, no legation could be built under twelve months, and, therefore, even when a site had been found, there would be a long interval, in which time, it was to be hoped, a new policy would be finally established and all hostile feelings at an end on the part of the Daimios.

The ministers agreed that it was necessary to set about choosing an eligible site in lieu of Goten Yama, and promised to lose no time in doing so.

The British minister said the understanding now come to, on the main points discussed, was satisfactory, and as the officers of the squadron were at hand, the confidential part of the conference might be considered at an end; and, in proof of the trust he and his colleagues were willing to place in the assurance now received, he had to announce their departure, with their respective ships, the following day. The Dutch consul general alone, and for his private convenience it was believed, proposed remaining some time longer at his residence, but his ships would all leave.

The ministers expressed their great satisfaction at the manner in which all the grave and important matters under consideration had been discussed and arranged, and renewed their assurances that everything now agreed upon should be effectually carried out.

The French minister and the representative of the Netherlands shortly after arrived with the commanders of the several ships of the allied squadron, who were duly presented to the ministers; and, after some conversation and a refection, the whole party took leave.

RUTHERFORD ALCOCK, H. B. M.’s Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Japan.

LEWIS ROCHES, Ministre Plenipotentiaire de I. M. l’Empereur des Français in Japan.

ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the United States in Japan.

D. DE GRAEFF VON POLSBROEK, H. N. M.’s Consul General and Political Agent in Japan.

[Enclosure No. 9.]

Having met in conference the several ministers, and having well understood the nature of their communication, our government has agreed to take upon itself the settlement of the indemnity which should have been paid by Mowosi Daizen, consequent upon the war which has taken place with your ships in Choshu.

For your information we address you this communication in writing.

With respect and esteem,

MAKINO BIDZEN-NO-KAMI.

His Excellency Robert H. Pruyn, Minister Resident of the United States in Japan, &c., &c., &c.

Ninth months 7th day of the 1st year of Grenji, (7th October, 1864.)

[Enclosure No. 10.]

I beg to communicate, in writing, as follows:

Peace having now been established between your country’s admiral and myself at Simonoseki, I have despatched envoys to you to pay my respects; and I have to request that you will receive them and give them a hearing.

With respect,

MATSUDAIRA DAISEN-NO-DAIBO.

YOSITSE KA.

[l. s.]

Nineteenth day, 8th month, 1st year of Genji, (19th August, 1864.)

The Minister of the United States of America.

Memorandum.

Ibara Kazuye, a Karo of the Prince of Nagato, accompanied by the three officers, having applied for a passage on one of her Majesty’s ships returning from the straits of Simonoseki, in order to communicate with the representatives of the treaty powers at Yokohama, the above officers arrived on board H. M. S. Barrossa, on the 10th October, 1864; and the same day the First Karo and his councillor, Sunji Tokuske-san-lei, were received at the British legation at a private interview by H. M. envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary. The minister resident of the United States joined shortly after the interview began.

The Karo presented his credentials, in the form of a letter, signed by the Prince of Nagato, (a copy annexed,) stating that peace having now been established in the waters of Simonoseki, he had despatched envoys to H. M.’s minister to pay his respects; and he requested that they might be received and given a hearing.

The chief envoy, Ibara Kazuye, stated that the prince, his master, had desired him to express his regret that hostilities had taken place between his people and the foreign powers. In the course he had taken, however, he had only been obeying orders—the orders of the Mikado and Tycoon both; but now that peace had been established, the prince was anxious it should be maintained, and it was his firm resolve to do his best to prevent any interruption of existing relations. In the mean time the Karo had it in command to represent the impoverishment of the prince by reason of the enormous expenditure incurred throughout his provinces by warlike munitions, defences, and other preparations for war, which the order of the Mikado and Tycoon had entailed. In reference, therefore, to the indemnities claimed for the expense of the expedition, and for the ransom of Simonoseki to the prince, he trusted the foreign representatives would take into consideration the extreme difficulty he would find in raising any large sums.

The envoy was informed, in reply, that as regarded the excuse offered for a long-continued series of hostile acts on the part of the prince, namely, that he had the orders of both the Mikado and Tycoon, the prince must know very well that this was decreed by the Tycoon, and it was believed by the Mikado also.

The envoy observed that textual copies of the orders had been given to the admirals.

This, it was replied, did not materially alter the case, for those orders, although they communicated a decision of the Mikado and Tycoon to interrupt relations and cease all intercourse with foreigners from a given date, (June 20, 1863,) did not explicitly order any Daimio to fire upon foreign ships without notice or warning; and the proof that such was not the necessary reading of the order was to be found in the fact that no other Daimio had so interpreted it or commenced hostilities.

The envoy stated, on the other hand, the fact that the Mikado, ten days after the hostilities had commenced, sent an envoy to the prince entirely approving of his conduct.

The Tycoon, at all events, it was remarked, had taken steps to stop hostilities, and had sent an envoy to tell the prince he had misinterpreted his order, but the envoy was killed in Choshu’s territories, and the hostile action continued. If the prince had in the beginning purely mistaken his instructions by over-zeal and willingness to carry out the will of the Tycoon, why did he persevere?

The envoy replied, his. master had no wish to impute blame to the Tycoon, but the fact was the Mikado had never revoked his orders, and the Tycoon in the beginning had approved. When the foreign representatives sent down two of the prince’s people by the queen’s ships, in August, with written communications, the prince immediately despatched his son to Kioto to induce the Mikado to revoke his order. Unfortunately some disturbances arose there, excited by Lronins, in which the Karo and people of the prince got mixed up, and so no access could be gained to the Mikado, and thus the prince’s good intentions in respect to foreigners had been frustrated. Thus the prince had been sacrificed. And when the fleet came, he fought, as was his duty, but knowing very well he could not single-handed cope with the foreign powers.

It was observed, in reply, that a different version of the whole affair had reached the representatives; and if the Karo’s was the correct one, it must be admitted the prince was a very unfortunate man. But as regarded the indemnities, the representatives had taken steps which left no further question on that head between the prince and them. As representatives of treaty powers they were accredited to the Tycoon, and treated only with his government in all ordinary circumstances. That they had taken action with the prince himself arose entirely from the exceptional condition in which they were placed. He had attacked their ships and obstructed their passage through the inland sea—and not only their ships, but all produce going to Nagasaki, to the great detriment of foreign trade and in direct violation of treaties. It was the Tycoon’s business and his duty to put an end to such hostilities at once and afford full redress. The Tycoon’s inaction, from whatever cause proceeding, having lasted over fifteen months, without any reasonable hope of change or improvement, the treaty powers had been compelled to do themselves justice and open the straits with their own forces. That once done, and the prince having sued for a cessation of hostilities, and entered into engagements to keep the peace and give no further cause of complaint, the relations of the foreign powers reverted to their usual course. The representatives had accordingly informed the Tycoon’s government of what had taken place and the engagements entered into by the prince, demanding to be informed if the Tycoon was prepared to take upon himself those engagements and pay the indemnities and expenses to be recovered. The answer having been in the affirmative, there was, as has been stated, no further question or ground of negotiation between the prince and the foreign representatives in respect to money indemnities.

The envoys appeared satisfied with the explanation of the actual position of affairs, and begged that as their presence on shore involved some danger, and might give rise to new complications with the government of the Tycoon, the representatives present would be pleased to transmit the several letters of credence addressed to each, and communicate, in their name, what they had been directed to state to each in person could they have had the opportunity.

After some conversation as to the means for returning them to their homes by one of her Majesty’s ships, they took their leave.

RUTHERFORD ALCOCK, H. B. M. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Japan.

ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident of the United States in Japan.

[Enclosure No. 12.]

Circular to Daimios above ten thousand koku of yearly revenue, by the Phometskes, by order of the Gorogio or Council of State.

The order of the year before last, (1862,) which was to the effect that Daimios, tenants or owners of territories, having a yearly revenue of more than 10,000 koku, could return to their castles or residences with their families at their pleasure, is hereby cancelled by the Tycoon, and he has been pleased to direct that the old customs shall be observed in future; therefore, you shall come as before with your families to the capital.

Given by the member of the first council on duty.

MAKINO BIDZEN-NO-KAMI.

September 30, 1864.

Note.—It is reported that in consequence of this the Daimio of Kanga has declared himself ready to return to Yedo, and his residence is under repairs.

Sentence of the Prince of Choshu remitted to his chief adherent, Mori Awadzi-no-kami.

Mori Daizen (father and son) had sent Tukuhara Etrigo and two more officers of standing and rank to Kioto, where they attempted violence, but did not succeed. They have, however, alarmed the Emperor and brought miseries upon the citizens and country people. This is a series of crimes which cannot be overlooked, and he must be punished accordingly.

Therefore, of his titles and the name given to him by the Tycoon’s ancestors he shall be deprived; and the country belonging to him, the provinces Suwo and Nagato, shallboth be taken from him. He is now at liberty to go where he likes; but if he does not obey this order, our forces shall advance from their positions.

Given by the member of the first council on monthly duty.

MIDSUNO IDSUMI-NO-KAMI.

September, 1864.

Handed to Mowori Awadzi-no-kami.

[Enclosure No. 13.]

From the Prince of Suwo and Nagato to the Minister of the United States.

Having fired upon foreign ships in the straits of Simonoseki last year, in obedience to the order of the Mikado and Tycoon, I cannot understand why I was censured by the Tycoon’s government as having done wrong in firing. This made it appear as if I had disobeyed the orders of the Mikado; and my two retainers having returned a short time ago with communications, (from the foreign ministers,) I became desirous to refer again to the Mikado in order to obtain his decision. Nagato-no-kami (son and heir to the Prince of Choshu) set out for Kioto, but before he had arrived disturbances arose in the capital which, I regret very much to say, obliged him to return without having accomplished the end in view. I have sent Matsu Shimakoso and Ito Shunske to explain to you, and I hope you will understand that henceforth I will offer no opposition to the free passage of the straits of Simonoseki.

Sovereign Prince of Suwo and Nagato, in Japan.

Eighth month, third day, of the first year of Genji, (3d September, 1864.)