Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward

No. 64.]

Sir: I have great pleasure in acknowledging the missing despatches referred to in my despatch No. 63. I have received yours to No. 44, inclusive; I have also received No. 46, but No. 45 has not yet come to hand. Your despatch No. 40, informing me of the approval of the policy adopted by me, has given me great satisfaction. The winter is broken and the mail facilities are now open, so that I shall be able at once to communicate the results of my more recent actions. I can say in this that my relations with my colleagues and the government are of the most friendly nature. I send with this, marked A, the letter of Mr. Walsh, giving the result of my action in the case of the Scotland. I send it chiefly for the valuable suggestions of Mr. Walsh about Japan.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

A.

Mr. Walsh to Mr. Burlingame

My Dear Sir: Your kind letter of 15th December reached me at Shanghai, whither I had gone to meet it. Not finding anything from you on my arrival [Page 372] on the 12th, my fears got the better of my hopes, and I gave up all expectation of a favorable decision on my case. You may imagine, then, the pleasure it gave me to receive next day your despatches.

In hurrying off with them to this, I had not time to acknowledge them fitly, and thought you might, perhaps, be better pleased to hear from me at this point, that the Scotland business had terminated. I did not neglect, however, to arrange with Messrs. Russell & Co. for the payment of the courier.

I beg now to thank you most cordially, both for your friendly interference in my favor, and for the promptitude with which you acted. I shall hope one day to enjoy the pleasure you promise, and from hearing from your lips all the details of your proceedings. You may rest assured I shall not soon forget the great service you have done me, nor the kind manner in which you undertook and speak of it.

The ship was released on the 25th ultimo, and sailed for Nagasaki on the 1st instant. Seven of the guns had been lost by the act of the customs officers, and for these Mr. Perry has reclaimed on the hoppo; but I do not suppose he will pay, and I would not detain the ship for them. The customs people were all surprised at the release, and some of them, who had reckoned on getting rich out of my misfortune, showed much disappointment. What has reached me from that quarter indicates that the confiscation was a foregone conclusion from the first, and that the authorities had resolved to override whatever we should urge in our defence. The words of the hoppo, “I have seized the ship; how can I let her go?” were thus full of meaning; and they show not only how hopeless it is even to expect any officials of his class to decide against their own interest, but how essential it is to the maintenance of justice that our property as well as our persons should be protected by our own national courts, and not left at the mercy of the corrupt provincial tribunals of China. The whole case also demonstrates the advantage of our having a national representative at Peking.

The editor of the Daily Press has gone quite wild about the release, as you will see by his paper herewith. But excepting among persons of his class, I believe it has given pleasure to men of all nations, and I have been as warmly congratulated by Englishmen as by our own American friends. Mr. Perry was, of course, very glad. He had taken a hearty interest in the matter, and the decision in his favor will augment his already weighty influence at Canton.

The expenses of the ship have been heavy, but if she now escapes the Alabama the business will still result prosperously, the Japanese having been patient and faithful to their engagement despite their disappointment as to time. I trust the guns will now do good service, not in war with any foreigners, but in maintaining peace among themselves, and by that means increasing the ability of the government to fulfil its obligations to us.

I have read, with the attention it deserves, Sir Frederick Brace’s admirable letter to you, and recognize in his remarks a largeness of view and a liberality of sentiment which command my sincere respect. His treatment of the Scotland case was what I ought to have expected from these qualities of his character, and if I gave him less credit for them than he was entitled to, I hope my present acknowledgment will procure me pardon.

It is most agreeable to me to find that Sir Frederick has not been misled by the untruthful and malicious statements which have been published here respecting my acts and opinions, statements which it would have been beneath me to notice further than I did, but which I, nevertheless, feared might prejudice those who knew little or nothing of me. I need not tell you that I have no such anti-English sentiments as have been imputed to me. I have enjoyed friendly, and often intimate, relations with too many British officers and civilians in China to admit of my entertaining such feelings; and while I never hesitate to defend my own country to the best of my ability, I am unaware of [Page 373] having ever so acted or expressed myself as to give reasonable cause of offence to the patriotism of others.

But it may gratify you and Sir F. Bruce, and. justify the generosity which he has shown in this case, to know that before 1 undertook to obtain for the Japanese the guns on board the Scotland, I ascertained that the prince of Satsuma meant to come to an amicable settlement with the English, and that these guns, if they went into his hands, were not likely to be used against them. For prior to any discussion of the order, and after the result of the British attack on Kagosima was known, my brother, at Nagasaki, was invited by Satsuma’s representative there to go to Kanagawa to mediate with the admiral for peace. My brother declined, because he and I thought another method, which we suggested, might be adopted with better change of success, and, so far as we can judge by subsequent events (the peculiar, reticence of the Japanese leaving us no other means of judging,) it was in sequence of these suggestions that the settlement finally made at Yokahama was proposed—this very steamer Scotland having conveyed to that port the envoys sent for that purpose.

Thus you will see that what influence we had in Japan was exercised in favor of peace; and I can conscientiously say that such has always been our disposition and our practice, for we recognize the truth which Sir F. Bruce so clearly points out, that the real interests of all foreigners are identical in these oriental countries, and not only identical with each other, but identical also with the dictates of abstract justice and international equity; and every one who knows my brother’s conduct, as United States consul at Nagasaki, during the last five years, can testify that he has acted in accordance with this conviction.

You and Sir F. Bruce will not expect merchants to refuse, on the Quixotic ground that they may, possibly, at some future time, be used against foreigners, a profitable order in times of peace for so legitimate an article of commerce as munitions of war. As well might one refuse to sell ships, or lead, or iron, or even books, lest they might assist the Japanese some day to defend themselves against foreigners. The most that a practical man could do in such cases would be to decline to furnish anything intended for immediate hostile uses, and by his conduct and counsel to discourage hostile feelings. This is what we have endeavored to do always, and the case which has been before you makes no exception to the statement.

We do not know precisely where these guns per Scotland will be mounted, but we believe they are intended not for hostilities against foreigners, but to strengthen the Tycoon and his friends, of the party of progress, in dealing with such men as the Prince of Nagata and the party of reaction. Satsuma appears to have enrolled himself with the former, and has proved his adherence by assisting to subdue the revolt which Nagata had raised in his territory. Indeed, it is believed by many, as it is asserted by Satsuma’s people, that his only serious question with the Tycoon’s government has been respecting the monopoly of the foreign trade to the “imperial’’ ports; his demand being that he shall be allowed to open one of his own ports to foreigners; and since he is a large producer of the articles demanded by foreigners, which he has now to send to Nagasaki and Yokahama for sale, paying heavy duties there, it is altogether likely that such is the case.

As to the lamentable murder of Mr. Richardson, no one who can examine the matter impartially will fail to see that it was not a deliberate thing, but the result of the heat of the moment, under a sense of the gross affront which the party attacked had, doubtless, without intention, given to an old dignitary who had been accustomed to the most servile respect, and who had not learned to adapt himself to the extraordinary liberty granted to foreigners. This view is supported by the facts that Satsuma’s officers had previously rather distinguished themselves by their civilities to and intercourse with foreigners, and that in no other case had any of his people been identified with attacks upon them.

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Looking from this point of view, I cannot join in the cry which has of late been raised against this prince, but believe that he remains on the liberal side, notwithstanding the provocations to a different policy recently given him. The guns per Scotland can only go to him with the assent of the Tycoon. If he gets them, therefore, the circumstance would attest the correctness of the views above expressed, for I think it cannot be reasonably doubted that the Tycoon and his party are desirous to deal liberally and faithfully with foreign nations. They are embarrassed by a strong reactionary party, whose arguments foreigners themselves have done too much to strengthen, and to whom the liberals are now, and may be for a good while yet, compelled to yield something in order to avoid overthrow. For it is certain that the foreign trade has increased the expenses of living so much that many who had fixed incomes have been almost beggared; and as they are not enlightened enough in political economy to look for compensation to the future, they regard the opening of the country as a disastrous experiment.

Our only dependence, then, is upon the steadiness and success of the liberal party, and it appears to me but wise and prudent in foreigners to give them every advantage which a legitimate commerce will afford, and every indulgence not inconsistent with national honor. The choice of foreigners is between such a policy and the enterprise of subverting the political organization and crushing down the spirit of the Japanese people in order to force them into an unnecessary commerce.

I do not believe that England or any other civilized power will deliberately undertake so unjust, so unwise, and so impracticable an enterprise. If I am right in this belief, then it can do no one any harm to furnish arms to the Japanese, if the treaty stipulations regarding trade in arms be duly observed, for the Japanese government cannot be reasonably suspected of a wish to make war upon foreign nations; no doubt it desires to withdraw some of the concessions it has made to them; but this is because its life is imperilled by the unforeseen effects of these concessions. But how timidly it proceeds to effect its purpose, soliciting, as a favor from the western powers, liberties which the smallest European nation would not hesitate to demand as a right. Surely such a people are not very dangerous to the peace of the world.

I do not defend their duplicities, their evasions, the alternate coaxings and threatenings they employ towards foreigners, least of all the horrible system of assassination by which some among them try to frighten us out of the country. But these are the resorts of a weak people. They are not unexampled, and they are not to be prevented by keeping the nation weak. Frankness, liberality, and honor are the virtues of the strong; and if we wish these virtues to appear among the Japanese, we must promote the national power instead of destroying it, recollecting that no government can be strong towards its own subjects which exhibits timidity towards foreigners.

It is, I know, commonly supposed that the government of Japan is strong internally. As respects the common people, who have no arms, and are without political influence, this may be true, for a good police suffices to govern them. But as regards the nobles and their armed followers, it is otherwise. Towards them the government is weak, its existence depending on its keeping the majority of them satisfied with it.

When the treaties were made the party in favor of liberal measures was in the ascendant; but since then, partly because the poorer princes suffered by the unexpected rise in prices, partly because some saw in the arrogant air and encroaching disposition of the foreigners a real danger for the liberties of the nation, and partly, also, because the Tycoon’s government sought, by limiting the foreign trade to its own ports, to monopolize its benefits, many of the princes who supported the government have fallen away. Until lately it was doubted if the Tycoon could maintain his throne.

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I should not despair on this point, however, if foreigners would act considerately, for besides the fact that the government is of old standing, and is showing considerable energy, the common people, who are naturally on its side, are steadily rising in wealth and power through the foreign trade, and will ultimately counterpoise the nobles. Moreover, some of the latter have begun to see that the increased productiveness of the land will enable them to repair their deficient revenues. A few of the more liberal have taken a still broader view, and one of the arguments of the Prince of Kanga, in the pamphlet he is reported to have published in favor of liberal measures, is, that the extra demand for laborers created by the foreign trade will absorb many of the rovers, and other idlers, who now prey upon the country, and thus tend to relieve Japan of its two greatest evils, its hosts of two-sworded men and its haunts of debauchery.

That in a nation organized as this is, and isolated as it has been, any noble can be found liberal and intelligent enough to advance such views, is itself a sign that if we will have patience with the Japanese, and give their intellectual pioneers a fair chance, they will progress as remarkably in political science as they have already done in mechanics, medicine, and languages.

This very tempting subject has made me ramble somewhat away from my text; but, perhaps what I said may have some interest for you, and satisfy you and Sir F. Bruce that in sending the “Scotland’s” cargo on to Japan I do not act recklessly, or solely on pecuniary considerations, but upon a conviction, fortified by reason as well as by facts, that the guns are more likely to be used for the advantage of mankind in general than for their injury; and that I do no honestly-intending nation any wrong in supplying them to the Japanese.

You will have received ere this the good news of Bragg’s discomfiture in Georgia, and of Longstreet’s in Tennessee. It its evident that the war will soon be over now, the seceders being nearly exhausted. I anticipate, however, that they will make another rally or two, and shall not be surprised to hear that Lee has combined their forces and gained some great battle. They will surely not give up without some vantage ground of this kind for negotiations, and their military power is probably still strong enough to obtain it. This done, they will not let another planting season go by without arranging a peace. At the most they cannot hold out beyond the November elections; and if the war shall end even then, we shall have cheaply purchased two things—the extinction of the blight of slavery, and the evidence that our system of government is equal to the severest test that can be applied to any system.

Trusting that peace will find you still able and willing to do the nation good service, and wishing you health and happiness meantime, I remain, my dear sir, yours truly,

THOMAS WALSH.

Hon. Anson Burlingame, &c., &c., &c., Peking.