Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward
Sir: I have the honor to inform you of the settlement of the most difficul question that has arisen since my arrival in China. You have doubtless heard much of the building in England of war steamers for the Emperor of China, and finally of the sailing of the “Osborn Flotilla.” But unless you were more fortunate than I was, you did not learn the exact terms on which this fleet was to be made available, or on what precise service it was to be employed. When I entered into the co-operative policy with my colleagues, as recounted in my despatch No. 42, it was understood that the steamers were to put down piracy, and aid in maintaining the revenue laws. On the condition that the force was to act in this sense, and that the service was to be cosmopolitan, no special objection was made to it by the ministers of France, Russia, and the United States. I disclosed a little suspicion, in my despatch, it is true, but immediately qualified it by the confidence I expressed in the wisdom and fairness of the British minister, Sir Frederick Bruce. When I saw, in the English newspapers, strange accounts of the number of war steamers which were said to be building for China, I felt it to be my duty to make inquiries of the Chinese government in relation to them. I did so, and gave you the result in my brief despatch, No. 51, but I could not then learn the names of the vessels, nor of their armament, for the Chinese had not been informed upon these subjects. About five months since Mr. Lay, inspector general of customs, came to Peking to secure a ratification of certain agreements he had made in relation to the steamers. He did not, as far as I know, make known his purposes to the ministers. We only gathered them from two cleverly written papers in “Blackwood,” of February, 1863, in which Mr. Lay’s merits are fully set forth, as by one intimately acquainted with them, and expectations were raised of what might result from his rare qualities, in the way of civilizing China. These papers were so full of hope and good intentions, that, though we, at Peking, felt that the author was under a misapprehension as to affairs in China, still we could but wish Mr. Lay success. His discussions with the Chinese ran through the greater part of four months without any realization of his hopes. In the mean time Captain Sherard Osborn arrived with his fleet, ready for service. We soon learned that there was a “hitch,” owing, it was said, to the “stupidity arid bad faith of the Chinese.” Not knowing then all the questions involved, I believe I may say, with truth, that there was a general feeling against the Chinese. * * *
The Chinese government refused to ratify the agreements, and the papers were then placed in the hands of Sir Frederick Bruce, and the nature of the agreements, for the first time, came fully to his knowledge, and to the knowledge of his colleagues; and that you may better understand them, I will give briefly their history. For a long time past the ministers have suggested to the government, that for police purposes, and in aid of the revenue laws, a few small steamers [Page 344] would be serviceable. These views were also held by the European employés in the customs. With some vague understanding in relation to steamers, Mr. Lay, inspector of customs, who went to England, primarily for his health, undertook to get them, but finding that he could do little without authority, he prepared a letter of instructions, which he sent out, to be adopted by Prince Kung. Mr. Hart, a very able man, who was acting in the place of Mr. Lay, had been permitted, at the request of Sir Frederick Bruce, to come to Peking to consult about regulations for trade in the Yang-tsze-kiang. While here, the letter arrived from Mr. Lay. Mr. Hart, by his intelligence and modest manners, had won, and deservedly so, the entire confidence of the Chinese, and, favoring the steamer project, he had no difficulty in securing their assent to the general letter of instructions which Prince Kung sent to Mr. Lay, coupled with the suggestions of Mr. Hart, which might serve to indicate the number of the steamers and the nature of their service, when they should arrive. Mr. Lay says he never received the letter. This letter was simply a general letter of instructions to buy, equip, and man certain steamers and bring them to Shanghai, and to make such agreements as were necessary to this end. Under this letter he entered into articles of agreement with Captain Sherard Osborn, and a large number of officers and men of her Majesty’s navy, by which the captain, officers, and men were to serve four years; that the captain was not only to command the ships purchased, but all others manned by Europeans in China; that all moneys for the payment of the force should go through the hands of Mr. Lay; that all orders were to pass through him, and if he thought any order unreasonable, he could veto it. Such is the substance of the material articles. When they were communicated to the Chinese government, it indignantly refused to ratify them, on the ground that it would be a practical abdication of the sovereignty of the empire. At this point, as I have before stated, the papers were placed in the hands of Sir Frederick Bruce, and the question arose as to what was to be done with the ships. Three dangers menaced them, upon the dissolution and departure of the force: the Daimios in Japan, seeking war steamers; the lawless men on the coast, into whose hands they might fall, to be used for piracy; and the confederates, who have agents in China. I earnestly protested against their being left in that situation. Sir Frederick Bruce, in a spirit of that large amity which he has never failed to recognize, at once relieved my apprehensions by stating that the ships should be sent with the men to England, and that the whole question would be submitted to his government. He gave this information to the Chinese government. It was all that was left for him to do. At this stage in the history of the affair the Chinese came to me, in a great state of alarm, and earnestly asked my advice. I said my advice would be predicated upon their answer to one question: Would they, under any circumstances, ratify the agreements between Lay and Osborn? They replied that under no circumstances would they assent to the agreements. I then advised them, 1st, to give their reasons fully for not ratifying the offensive articles of agreement; 2d, to thank the British government and Captain Osborn for what they had done for them; and 3d, that inasmuch as there was a misunderstanding between them and their agent, which could not be reconciled, they should request the British minister to have the flotilla returned to England, under the direction of Captain Osborn, the ships sold, the men paid off and discharged, and the proceeds remitted to them. They followed this advice to the letter, and addressed a handsome letter to Sir Frederick Bruce to this effect, and, without suggestion from any one, added, as a compliment to Captain Osborn, that they would be pleased if he would accept ten thousand taels. Thus was settled, after weeks of anxious discussion, continued for the last three days at the United States legation, almost without intermission, this question involving so many interests. The virtue of the plan is, that it settles the question here, safely, to the satisfaction of all parties, and relieves everybody from all fear of future complications on [Page 345] account of the flotilla. The truth is the fleet was out of proportion to the needs of the Chinese, and quite beyond anything over dreamed of by us in Peking. One of the vessels, I am told, is the fastest war vessel in the world; and all the ships are equipped in a manner, it is claimed, superior to anything of equal size afloat. But the flotilla had fair play, and the failure cannot be charged to the jealousy of anybody. When. the several articles of agreement became known to me, I confess that I was surprised; and if the Chinese had not rejected them at once, without suggestions from any one, I should have been constrained, by a sense of justice to the Chinese, and in the interests of my own country, to have opposed them. To the credit of the British government, I learn from Mr. Lay that it was not aware of the articles of agreement between Captain Osborn and himself. The British government may also rejoice that it had at Peking, a representative so enlightened and just that he would not, by menace, undertake to force an arrangement which no one could defend, and which would have at once shaken our confidence in that co-operative policy which he had done so much to establish. He, by his prudence, relieved his government from a complication that no man could see the end of. Captain Osborn, as soon as he saw the real situation, to his honor be it said, determined at once not to involve himself or his government. He saw that the Chinese could not meet the only conditions upon which a British officer could with honor serve in China. By the constitution of the government, one must hold his commission at the will of a local governor, and must be subject to his orders. It is not in the power of the imperial government to depart from this rule; and this was the real difficulty. Had Captain Osborn thought more of his pecuniary interests, and less of his own and his country’s honor, he would have taken the command on the Chinese conditions—have made an attack upon Nanking, won a temporary notoriety, and left his country involved in a mortal struggle with the rebels, and subject to the taunts of the civilized world. For his noble course I do hope he may be appreciated at home, as he is here, not only by the representatives of foreign governments, but by the Chinese themselves. They had come to believe that every foreigner could be had for money, upon any terms. One man has illustrated the higher quality of western civilization, and that man is Captain Sherard Osborn. For the humble part I have taken in this affair, in which I have assailed no one, but tried to do right, I am pleased to inform you that I have received the thanks of the British, French, and Russian representatives, and the kind letter from Prince Kung, which I enclose, marked A. Hoping that my conduct may receive the approval of my own government, I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c., &c.