Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session Thirty-eighth Congress, Part III

Mr. Clay to Mr. Seward

No. 30.]

Legation of the United States, St. Petersburg, Russia, November 15, 1863.

Sir: The French seem to have confined their criticism of their late trial of ships altogether to the supposed superiority of two over one-deckers, in which I dissented from them. Since then other questions have arisen.

1st. Is it better to plate the whole ship, or leaving the ends unclad, thus to make it more seaworthy?

2d. Is wooden or iron framing or hacking best?

3d. How can the ship be best prevented from fouling?

The French frigates, which were entirely iron-clad, suffered more in the gale than the ships-of-the-line, which had the bows and sterns unplated, The River Consort, in a late storm, with wooden backing, and entirely iron-clad, nearly sunk with leakage, whilst the Warrior, with iron backing, rode out the same storm with perfect safety. The Royal Oak, in consequence of the galvanic action of the copper and iron, in three years nearly rusted out near the junction, and still “fouled.” 1. In response to these facts I would say that as sea worthiness is an essential requisite, if the ship won’t bear full armor it must be left off at the ends. In fact, whilst ordnance seems to be superior to the defence, wooden ships already built might be very effectually armed against even ironclads. 2. Iron backing I urged long ago upon the department upon the very fact which is now established by experience. Every bolt and all the metal put upon the iron frame, with proper mechanical arrangement, strengthens the ship against storm and shot, whilst every pound of iron put upon wooden backing weakens the ship in stress of weather. Iron is also preferable because it is more durable than wood, and can be more largely and readily supplied in case of war than wood. 3. The experiments upon copper and iron bottoms need to be further tried. The copper might be insulated from the iron near the water line by gutta-percha, or some other material, and thus the galvanic action might be avoided.

To return to iron-framing, it allows false bottoms, double skins, and water-tight bulkheads. The Warrior has a double skin protecting the machinery, and is also divided by eighteen bulkheads into as many water-tight compartments, thus being greatly secured against shot, rocks, icebergs, and stress of weather, and other casualties, and especially fire, for stores in one compartment on fire might be submerged at once by water without injury to other things and other parts of the ship.

I have herein enclosed a slip from the London Times of November 6 instant, being an article marked “Modern Artillery.” It is a summary of two reports from a committee of the House of Commons, 1862 and 1863, and gives a condensed review of late improvements in English gunnery. I have put it upon a separate sheet, marked “A,” so that if it has not met the eyes of our ordnance department it may be sent them, if deemed worthy of notice.

I will only remark that the shells of Sir William Armstrong are worthy of note. I think his method of coiled iron welded would not be so strong as H. Ames’s method of welded rings. Mr. Ames has a foundry at Falls Village, Connecticut, and our government ought at once to give his guns a fair trial. I am, your obedient servant,

C. M. CLAY.

Hon. William H. Seward. Secretary of State, Washington, D. C., United States of America.

Addendum A.—“Modern Artillery”

The three novel points in Armstrong’s system are, his method of rifling and welding coiled iron, and his shells. His breech-loading I regard as a failure.

“Similar ammunition“, is good.

C. M. CLAY.

Modern artillery.^*

The art of war, like every other art, has been gradually developed, and has had its periods of stagnation and progression. It has recently made extraordinary advances, especially in the department of artillery, and this was a necessary result of the great improvement in small-arms in range as well as precision. Brown Bess was a capital weapon, and did excellent service in her day. She was a great favorite of the Duke of Wellington, and it was not without reluctance that she was abandoned in favor of the rifle. As soon, however, as this weapon was generally introduced into the service rifled ordnance became a necessity, for it is obvious that if the small-arm exceed artillery in range, the latter must be comparatively useless, as riflemen might then take deliberate aim at the gunners and shoot them down at their posts, while they could make no effectual reply. At the siege of Sebastapol the value of the rifle in this respect was fully exemplified in the ranks of the enemy, as well as in those of the allies. Expedients of various kinds were resorted to with a view to protect the gunner from the deadly aim of the invisible rifleman, but only with very partial success.

In obedience to the general law of demand and supply, the want of guns of precision and long range was no sooner felt and expressed than the inventive faculty of the nation was immediately stimulated to the production of ordnance possessing those qualities. Mr. Lancaster was the first to come forward, when in 1853 he proposed his oval-bore system of rifling, which was approved and accepted by the authorities of that day. Machinery was erected at the royal arsenal for rifling large cast-iron guns on this system, and for making the projectiles, but the manufactory did not long continue in operation. According to Colonel Lefroy, the total amount expended on the remuneration of the inventor and buildings, and machinery connected with this invention, did not exceed £25,000. (First report, p. 147.)

In the year following appeared Sir William Armstrong, who had previously acquired a solid reputation as a man of science, and had distinguished himself as the author of mechanical inventions of the highest practical value. In December, 1854, Sir William had an interview with the Duke of Newcastle, then secretary of state for war, and proposed the system of artillery which is now designated by his name. The result was “an order for a number of his guns, not exceeding six, for trial.” (First report, p. 156.) The first gun, a 3-pounder, was completed in March, 1855, and after having been subjected to a series of experiments was delivered in July of the same year. This gun was not tested by the ordnance select committee of that day until November, when they presented a report which was in the main favorable, and requested to be allowed to submit it to further experiments. The gun was rebored up to a 5-pounder, and in December, 1856, Colonel Eardley Wilmot reported that “at 1,500 and 2,000 yards it had made remarkably good practice.” (Ibid., p. 156.) There-upon an 18-pounder was ordered, which was completed July 1, 1857, and tried by the ordnance select committee January 26 and 27, 1858. Concerning the results of this trial, Colonel Mitchell, then superintendent of the school of gunnery at Shoeburyness, reported, February 9, as follows:

“The very extraordinary powers of range and precision of fire exhibited at Shoeburyness on the 26th and 27th ultimo from a breech-loading gun of Mr. Armstrong’s invention appear to me to afford a reasonable expectation that artillery will not only regain that influence in the field which, to a certain extent, the recent introduction of improved small-arms has deprived it, but that that influence will be most materially increased.” (First report, p. 165.)

On the 30th of August, 1858, General Peel, then secretary of state for war, appointed the rifled cannon committee, with instructions to ascertain as speedily as possible the best form of rifled guns for field service then known to the war department. In his evidenee before the committee of the House of Commons General Peel assigns the following as the reasons which led him to take this course, and which are so relevant that we cannot refrain from presenting them nearly in extenso:

“2,308. Was it not during your administration that the breech-loading Armstrong gun was adopted into her Majesty’s service?

“It was during my administration that that gun was adopted into the service. Shortly after my appointment to the office referred to my attention was naturally directed to the circumstance that we were behind other countries in not having any rifled ordnance in our service, and notwithstanding the very favorable opinion expressed by my predecessor with respect to the results of the trials made with the Armstrong gun, it had not been adopted. I called upon Colonel Lefroy, whom I found occupying in the service the position of scientific adviser to the secretary of state for war, to furnish a report of all the experiments which had been made in rifled ordnance.

“2,309. That report is now before the committee, is it not?

“That report is now before the committee, but before that report was laid before me I had received what I must say, under the circumstances, appeared an exaggerated account of the results of the trials made at Woolwich with reference to this gun. The Indian government, not waiting for the report of the committee, but in consequence of a report which Lord Stanley had received direct from a very distinguished officer of the Indian artillery, Colonel Willoughby, had applied to the government for a battery of guns. A very distinguished officer, General Brereton, who was then on a committee appointed to decide about shrapnell shells, came to me and stated that from the circumstance of his being at an adjacent butt he had seen the practice with the gun in question, and I think he told me there was nothing in the Arabian Nights half so wonderful as this new gun. The commander in chief came back with an account of the gun almost equally strong, and I believe the words of his royal highness were, that it could do anything but speak. On receiving the report of Colonel Lefroy I adopted the recommendation in that report, and appointed a special committee, in order that they might report to me what was the best rifled gun.” (First report, p. 111.).

General Peel’s rifled cannon committee reported November 16, 1858, and recommended “the immediate introduction of guns rifled on Mr. Armstrong’s principle for special service in the field.” (First report, p. 167.) This committee has been charged before the ordnance committee of the House of Commons with unfairness, and with undue haste in arriving at its decision; but, after the most searching investigation, these serious charges have been completely rebutted, as appears from the following passage in the committee’s report, 1863:

“The range and precision of the gun were so vastly superior to all field ordnance known at that time that, after careful and repeated trials, the committee appointed to investigate the question recommended its adoption as the field gun of the service. Your committee are of opinion that the adoption of the Armstrong gun by the secretary of state for war for special service in the field was fully justified.” (Report, p. iv.)

The Armstrong system of artillery having been introduced and greatly extended both in the land and sea service, and having encountered strong opposition from various quarters, a committee of the House of Commons, termed the select committee on ordnance, was appointed, June 20, 1862, “to inquire into the expenditure incurred since the beginning of 1858 on various natures of improved ordnance, whether obtained by contract or manufactured in the public departments, and into the results obtained by such expenditure.” This committee, having been reappointed February 20, 1863, and having sat through two sessions, concluded its labors July 23, 1863. An immense mass of evidence has been collected and published in their two reports, of which the last appeared only a few weeks ago.

The country has great reason for satisfaction that such a committee should have been appointed, for it is certain that through its instrumentality the Armstrong system has been subjected to the severest conceivable ordeal. Every possible objection has been urged against it, and that before a tribunal of which the majority was assuredly not prepossessed in its favor. While all the avowed enemies of the system were called upon to give evidence, it is somewhat surprising, however, that artillery officers who have had the largest experience of the working of this gun both at Shoeburyness and in actual service in China should not have been invited to attend. Thus, Colonel Taylor, commandant and superintendent of the school of gunnery at Shoeburyness, and his able assistant, Captain Alderson, might have given most valuable and, to the public, most acceptable testimony, for at Shoeburyness alone 37,000 rounds have been fired from Armstrong guns. (Second report, p. 161.) The same may be also remarked of the artillery officers who served in China, not one of whom was summoned as a witness.

We shall now proceed to examine and digest the evidence contained in the reports of the committee, commencing with that relating to the Armstrong system. In the first place we shall adduce the evidence in favor of the system, and in the second place the evidence against it. But it will be necessary to consider apart the subjects of field artillery and large ordnance.

The Armstrong field gun—the term “field gun” being applied to guns not exceeding a 12-pounder—is a rifled breech-loader made of wrought-iron, and essentially differs from all guns previously invented, both in the nature of the rifling and in general construction. The rifling consists of a series of shallow spiral grooves extending over the whole internal surface of the barrel in front of the shot chamber; and the projectile is a cylinder of hard metal coated with lead, about twice the length of its diameter, flat-ended posteriorly and rounded off anteriorly. The shot enters easily at the breech, but cannot proceed beyond the commencement of the rifling, except by the yielding of the coat of lead, under the propelling force of the powder. The lead thus readily adapts itself to the grooves, and, as these are spiral, rotary motion is necessarily communicated to the shot. By this simple expedient the shot is, as it were, surrounded with a tight packing, which effectually prevents windage, and therefore tends to render available the whole explosive force of the powder. The breech is closed with a movable vent-piece, which is firmly secured by a powerful and easily adjusted screw. The gun is constructed on what is termed the coil system, and is formed of a series of coiled tubes shrunk over each other. But let us hear Sir William Armstrong’s own description of his original gun, as he communicated it to the ordnance committee:

“It was a gun with a steel tube, surrounded with coiled cylinders, similar in every respect to the tubes of gun-barrels. Now, the peculiarity of that gun was not its being merely a built-up gun, because built-up guns are of very ancient date. In fact, I have no doubt that the original construction of all guns was by building up. It was not merely a hooped gun—that is to say, a gun strengthened by rings, because rings give only circumferential strength, and no longitudinal strength; but that gun was peculiar in being mainly composed of tubes, or pipes, or cylinders, formed by coiling spirally long bars of iron into tubes, and welding them upon the edges, as is done in gun-barrels. Now, whether any one had conceived that idea before is beyond my power to say, but I feel assured that no gun up to that time had been actually made upon that principle. The whole difficulty lay in the making. It is very easy now, with all our knowledge and experience, to define how such coils are to be made; but at that period it was a very difficult matter to accomplish, and it was not until I had made very many unsuccessful attempts that I succeeded in satisfactorily carrying it out.” (Second report, p. 133.)

It is important not to confound hoops with coiled tubes. The ancient wrought-iron guns were composed of longitudinal bars of iron firmly bound together by hoops, not by coiled tubes, which are a modern invention. Sir William Armstrong lays no claim to originality with regard to the principle of construction of these tubes, but candidly acknowledges that he has simply done on a large scale what had been previously done on a small scale in the case of the barrels of fowling-pieces. It should, however, be borne in mind that the difficulty of manufacture is often directly proportionate to the size of the object; and of this the large coiled tubes furnish a striking example. Those who are practically acquainted with the welding and forging of iron will readily admit that the production of a sound tube of large dimensions on the coil principle is by no means easy, and that the skill necessary to insure success was not likely to be attained except through numerous failures.

The general mode of construction of the Armstrong gun is applicable to all guns, whether rifled or smooth-bore, breech-loaders or muzzle-loaders; and, accordingly, in several guns differing much from each other, this mode of construction has been adopted. Hence, no small confusion has arisen in the public mind with respect to the meaning of the term Armstrong gun; and it is therefore necessary to distinguish carefully between general construction and special modifications.

What Sir W. Armstrong claims as essential and peculiar to his system of artillery will be learnt from the following part of his evidence before the committee:

“3,487. (Major O’Reilly.) You mentioned on the last day of your examination that one of the results which had been obtained by the country had been a system of construction of guns; will you kindly say whether you mean by that the system of strengthening the guns by hoops of wrought-iron, or whether you include the system of constructing the barrel]

“I referred to the coil system.

“3,488. You referred both to the barrel and the external hoops?

“It is applicable to the barrel and to the hoops.

“3,489. Then what do you mean by the coil system as applicable to the barrels and the hoops?

“The gun with the barrel of steel as exemplified in my first gun, or with the barrel of coil, as in my subsequent guns.

“3,490. What is the system of construction which you say the country has gained?

“The coil system; but I have made the internal tubes of the gun of both steel and coils. I use the coil as an alternative when steel is not to be obtained.

“3,495. * * * * Would you kindly define that further as to its essential part; it consists of polygroove rifling, but the breech-loading is not essential, you say?

“The essential part is the construction; I think the mode of rifling is subordinate; the most prominent feature is the construction.

“3,496. Then am I right in concluding that the question of the breech-loader or muzzle-loader is not essential in your system?

“Yes; neither mode is peculiar to my system. I think that the relative merits of the breech-loader and the muzzle-loader is a very difficult question.

“3,497. Is the question of using soft-coated shot an essential part of the system?

“Yes; not the coating, but using a soft material for giving rotation; it may be in the form of a continuous coating, or in the form of studs.

“3,498. (Sir John Hay.) A soft bearing?

“Yes, that I do certainly pledge myself to.

“3,499. (Major O’Reilly.) Those are the only points which you consider essential?

“The essential points are the mode of construction, and, so far as the principle of rifling is concerned, the using of a soft material.” (Second report, p. 161.)

It has been alleged that Sir William Armstrong has no claim to the merit of originality in the construction of guns of coiled tubes, and the allegation was carefully investigated by the ordnance committee. Mr. Whitworth, in a letter in the Times of November 8, 1862, asserted that “guns built up of welded coiled hoops were well known in this country before he (Sir W. Armstrong) introduced his rifled ordnance.” This letter was subsequently read by the author to the committee, and the following question was put to Mr. Whitworth by Sir John Hay:

“1,446. Can you refer the committee to any guns built up of welded coiled hoops before Sir William Armstrong introduced his rifled ordnance?”

No answer was given. It should be particularly noticed that the question referred to guns built up of welded coiled hoops, which is the identical expression used by Mr. Whitworth in his letter to the Times. Now a single hoop may be described as coiled, inasmuch as it is a bar bent in the form of a circle; and the barrel of a gun surrounded with a series of hoops might, in that sense, be said to be constructed on a coiled system. But such a system is essentially different from that of the coiled system of Sir W. Armstrong.

Captain Blakely claims to have invented and patented a gun identical in mode of construction with Sir W. Armstrong’s, and he has, moreover, expressed his concurrence with Mr. Whitworth that the coiled system of which he has availed himself “was a well-known method of making guns.” (Second report, p. 223.) The captain maintained, before the committee, that “there was no doubt about the identity.” (Ibid., p. 223.) He, indeed, commenced an action against the Elswick ordnance committee “for infringement of patent,” and at the same time addressed a letter to the secretary of state for war, notifying the existence of his patent, and suggesting either that the government should purchase the patent right or issue a “command to Sir William Armstrong not to defend an action in which his cause is so manifestly unjust.” (Ibid., p. 599.) In a letter, dated January 22, 1861, addressed to the under-secretary of state for war, (the late Sir Benjamin Hawes,) the captain demanded the moderate sum of £500,000 for the assignment of his patent. (lbid., p. 550.) The charge of infringement was denied, under the advice of the law officers of the crown. The captain desisted from further legal proceedings, having been informed by Mr. Montague Smith, Q. C, “that an action would not hold against her Majesty’s ministers; that the guns were being made for the Queen, and a subject would have no remedy.” (Ibid., p. 226.) It is to be regretted that other patentees, who have caused so much annoyance to the government, should not have had the benefit of similar advice.

The projectile peculiar to the Armstrong gun, and designated the segment shell, is confessedly one of the most ingenious and important elements of the Armstrong system of artillery. It consists essentially of a large number of segmental pieces of cast-iron, arranged like bricks m a well, and solidly compacted together by means of lead, a central cavity: being left to receive the bursting charge of powder. The charge is ignited by means of fuzes, which are made to explode on striking an object, or, if desired, before impact. There are thus two kinds of fuzes, termed the percussion fuze and the time fuze, and particular varieties of each. It is not possible to render their construction intelligible by mere verbal description, and we shall, therefore, refrain from an attempt to do so. The observations which Sir W. Armstrong made to the committee respecting his projectiles and fuzes deserve careful perusal. But they are too lengthy for quotation in extenso, and we therefore insert the following extract, which seems to embody the most important:

“I will take this opportunity of explaining to the committee the principle of construction of this segment shell. The spaces between the segments are entirely closed with lead, which renders the whole interior perfectly compact and solid, so that the interior segments contribute to strengthen the shell, and are like the structure of an arch. In consequence of that I am enabled to have the external case extremely thin, and by that means to get a much larger capacity for those pieces and for the bursting charge than if I were forced to use a thick shell. Now I can only use this very thin shell by such a mode of rifling as mine, and for this reason, that whenever the gun is fired, this soft-coated shell is forced into the tightly fitting bore, and the compression of the bore holds it tight and prevents its breaking; without that lateral support I should want a much greater thickness in the external case. I only mention this to show how the projectile may be related to the mode of rifling, so that you cannot alter one part of the system without affecting the other parts. Thus it is with regard to those fuzes. I have found, in my attempts to apply the shunt system of rifling to shells, that even that variation in the mode of rifling (although it embraces the principle of soft metal and compression) necessitated my making certain alterations in the fuzes. These (producing specimens) are fuzes for shunt guns, which are slightly different from the others, the alterations being such as are necessitated by the mode of rifling. You cannot ascertain the best mode of rifling unless you take into calculation what sort of projectile and what kind of fuze is compatible with that mode of rifling.” (Second report, p. 146.)

The advantages claimed for the Armstrong field-gun are lightness combined with strength and durability, great precision and extent of range, and for the projectile uniformity and remarkable destructiveness. The disadvantages, on the other hand, ascribed to the gun are founded on the nature of the gun, and the nature of the ammunition. Under the first head are stated breech-loading, deficient strength, and the liability to breakage of the vent-pieces, loss of ricochet, multiplicity of parts, and that, on the whole, the gun is too delicately constructed for the rough usages of war. Under the second head, or that of ammunition, are stated stripping off of the lead coating during flight, liability of the projectiles to become unserviceable in store in consequence of corrosion due to chemical action, excited by contact of lead with iron, and untrustworthiness of the fuzes. The advantages and disadvantages we shall now consider seriatim.

Lightness.—We all remember the memorable effect at Inkermann of the two 18-pounder cast-iron guns, weighing forty-two hundred weight each. It was this incident which directed Sir W. Armstrong’s attention to the construction of a field-gun capable of performing the work of heavy guns of this kind, and yet so light as to admit of being moved with facility. On this point, relating to the history of his gun, Sir W. Armstrong communicated the following information in his report to the war office, July 14, 1855:

“I may be permitted to observe that the incident which chiefly contributed to direct my attention to this subject still appears to furnish a forcible illustration of its importance. I allude to the memorable service rendered at Inkermann by means of two 18-pounders, laboriously dragged from the batteries, and ultimately directed with great gallantry and success against the Russian artillery, at a distance from which the numerous but lighter guns of the enemy could not effectually reply. Now, these two battery guns were but a clumsy substitute for light long-range field-guns, which would have rendered the same important service with more promptitude and ease, and could have operated at a greater distance from the enemy’s fire.”

Our field batteries in the Crimea were armed with 9-pounder and our horse artillery with 6-pounder brass guns, the former weighing thirteen and a half hundred weight, and the latter six hundred weight each. The 6-pounder guns were, however, exchanged for 9-pounders. The 9-pounder gun is now replaced by the Armstrong 12-pounder of eight and a half hundred weight, and the 6-pounder by the Armstrong 9-pounder of six hundred weight. By this alteration the service has, therefore, obtained the advantage of possessing guns which not only project heavier missiles with greater precision and to a greater distance, but are also considerably lighter than those previously in use.

Strength.—On this point was adduced before the committee a war office memorandum, dated March 6, 1862, from which we insert the following extract:

“An endeavor has also been made to test a gun of this [12-pounder] nature to destruction; one hundred rounds were fired in quick succession with service charges, and thirty rounds with double charges and cylinders (in lieu of projectiles) progressing in weight up to a hundred and twenty pounds, and the result of this trial was considered as proving that it was practically impossible to burst a gun in ordinary service.” (First report, p. 218.)

Durability.—Sir W. Armstrong gave the following evidence before the committee in proof of the durability of the 12-pounder gun:

“I have also a statement of the number of rounds fired from certain unlined guns of an early state of manufacture. I find here No. 7 has been fired 3,263 rounds, and is perfectly good and serviceable. I have here another 12-pounder, No. 6, which has been fired 1,953 rounds, another which has been fired 1,515 rounds, another which has been fired 1,911 rounds, and another which has been fired 1,146 rounds, giving an average of nearly 2,000 rounds, without injury to the gun.” (Second report, p. 149.)

“The number of 12-pounders issued for the land service is 392, and for the sea service 178; to them I have to add the sixty-six 9-pounders, which make altogether 636. Out of those six hundred and thirty-six 12-pounders issued, and in use, only thirteen have been returned to Woolwich for repair, and out of those thirteen two were repaired at a cost of 11s. 6d.; of the remaining eleven we had seven guns that were returned as defective in consequence of being lined, so that if we had not unfortunately adopted this mistake of lining defective guns we should only have had, out of six hundred and thirty-six guns, four guns returned to Woolwich for repair. * * * Now, the number of rounds fired from those guns cannot, I believe, be much short of fifty thousand rounds; in fact it would be more. At Shoeburyness alone we had twenty-two thousand, [the actual number was twenty-two thousand seven hundred sixty-five—see second report, p. 159,] while we had in China about four thousand, making twenty-six thousand. We had, again, in the experimental [rapid] firing with entire batteries upwards of four thousand rounds; that brings up the number to thirty thousand; and then we had all the ammunition issued for experimental practice with the batteries, which is fifty rounds per gun per year, some of those guns having been upwards of two years in the service, so that fifty rounds each upon the six hundred and thirty-six guns would be thirty thousand rounds. The result is, in all, sixty thousand; but I will call it fifty thousand. So that those casualties to which I have been referring occurred in the history of fifty thousand rounds fired from six hundred and thirty-six guns.” (Second report, p. 184.)

With reference to the evidence advanced concerning durability the committee report that—

“On careful investigation your committee find that out of five hundred and seventy 12-pounders issued and in use thirteen only have been returned to the royal gun factories for repair, three of which have proved unserviceable, and the remainder repairable at an inconsiderable expense.”

Precision and range.—All the witnesses examined before the committee as to the existence of these qualities in the gun are unanimous. (Report, p. vii.) We subjoin the answers to some of the questions put by the committee on this subject.

Question 327, (second report:)

“At the practice at Shorncliffe there were twelve guns used, and they fired in that way their one hundred rounds as rapidly as they could, and with wonderful precision, for the whole of the targets were carried away except those at three thousand yards, and they were hit several times; there was not an accident of any kind to screw, bolt, or gun that could be visible to any one.” (Colonel Bingham, deputy adjutant general of artillery.)

Question 3,622, (Ibid.:)

“As to the 12-pounder and 40-pounder, when the range was accurately known, their precision of fire up to two thousand three hundred yards was certain at an object about fifteen feet square, and at smaller objects within that range from the shore, and exceedingly good from a gunboat when under way.” (Captain Jerningham, R. N., during five years captain of her Majesty’s gunneryship Cambridge, at Plymouth.)

Question 3,272, (Ibid.:)

“I have had considerable practice with all natures of Armstrong guns, 12-pounders, 20-pounders, 40-pounders, and 110-pounders, firing many thousand of rounds at different times. I have a very high opinion of them with respect to range, accuracy, and perfect safety, with common care. They are subject to little defects, and liable to derangements and accidents, but not if proper care is taken with them.” Question 3,280: “The accuracy is very great.” (Captain Hewlett, R. N., C. B., during six years Captain of her Majesty’s gunnery-ship Excellent, at Portsmouth.)

Major Hay, R. A., in his report concerning the action of the 12-pounder guns to Brigadier General Crofton, commanding the royal artillery in the Chinese war, says:

“Their precision of fire and the actual results obtained by them cannot for a moment be doubted; they were the admiration of all.” (First report, app., p. 216.)

Uniformity of projectiles.—This is regarded as one of the most important improvements effected by Sir W. Armstrong in field artillery. In his evidence before the committee Sir William stated:

“I found that at that time the service projectiles for field artillery consisted of three different forms: first, the solid shot; secondly, the shrapnell shell; third, common case or canister. Now, the disadvantages of having three different projectiles was this—that batteries were liable to expend for any particular service the form of ammunition which was particularly adapted for that service, and were consequently compelled to resort quickly to a form of ammunition which was not adapted for that service. The idea, therefore, occurred to me of adopting a form of projectile which should be convertible, so as to be used either as solid shot, shrapnell shell, or canister, and this was the origin of the segment shell, in which the arrangement of the segment is made to contribute to the strength of the shell. In so doing I Was enabled to use a shell of a very small thickness, so as to obtain an amount of room which I could not otherwise have obtained for the stowage of the contents of the shell. In this way I produced a shell which for all practical purposes had the solidity of a solid shot, and when used without a burster or a fuze produced the effect of a solid shot. When used with a percussion fuze it produced a percussion shell bursting upon impact; when used with a time fuze it represented the ordinary shrapnell shell; and when used with a special adjustment of either the time or the percussion fuze it could be caused to burst at the muzzle of the gun, in which case it answered the purpose of common case or canister.” (Second report, p. 135.)

Major Milward, R. A., who commanded a battery of Armstrong guns in China, has given in his report to General Crofton the following testimony to the correctness of the foregoing remarks of Sir W. Armstrong:

“An enormous advantage of the gun is the great facility of replacing the ammunition; the old difficulty of being out of one description of ammunition while there may be plenty of another is entirely obviated; a few seconds refills a limber-box, and the wagons can retire out of fibre, only one at a time being required up with the battery.” (First report, app., p. 213.)

“On the subject of ammunition Major Milward has stated that ‘they were only supplied with one kind of projectile, but that they found a great benefit in having only one kind of ammunition in the battery, because they found that in replenishing the ammunition in the field they had simply to bring up any limber or any wagon and empty it into the one they were using, and whenever they put their hands into the limber-box whatever they wanted was at hand.’” (Second report, p. 144.)

Destructiveness of the projectiles.—Of all the instruments of warfare yet invented the Armstrong segment shell is admitted to be the most destructive, even by the stoutest opponents of the Armstrong system, and the credit of originality in this respect was not questioned before the committee. The shell of a 12-pounder is composed of forty-nine segments of cast-iron, which on explosion are scattered far and wide, and its terriffic effect, therefore, may well be conceived. In the late Chinese war the value of this shell was strikingly demonstrated, as will be seen from the following evidence presented by Sir W. Armstrong to the committee:

“In the first place I would observe that destructiveness is the cardinal virtue of a gun, and the first thing that we have to inquire into, in judging of a gun, is its power of destruction. I will first speak of the destructive effect of the gun when used in the open field as a field-gun. In an action near Pekin a body of about five hundred Tartar cavalry halted at a distance of about fifteen hundred yards from some of our guns, where they imagined themselves to be safe. Sir Hope Grant proposed to try the effect of one shot at them, and he accordingly ordered one gun to be fired. The projectile, which was the ordinary segment shell, containing the usual concussion fuze, touched the ground a few yards in front of the Tartars, and burst in the usual manner. The Tartars immediately fled, and left on the ground thirteen dead men and three disabled horses, all destroyed by that one shell, which was the only one fired. I state this on the authority of Captain Richard Harrison, of the royal engineers, who was standing close by when the shot was fired. I further state, on the authority of Major Milward, who commanded a battery of those guns in China, that he used the guns with very great effect in the open field at ranges varying from four hundred and fifty yards to two thousand yards. He states that the damaging effect of the shells was very great, that the Tartar horses are very thick horses, and that at one thousand two hundred yards he found that the segments had gone completely through them, and left a mark on the off-side of the horse just as if cut out with a knife, as clean as on the near side. The shells and concussion fuzes, he asserts, acted admirably; nothing could be better than the bursting of the shells. He found great benefit in the concussion fuzes from the circumstance that he could pick up the range with great facility, because the place where the shell burst was distinctly seen. Next, as to the effect of the guns against Tartar gunners protected by earthworks, Captain Harrison has stated that at a large fortified village called Tangku there were sixteen or eighteen gunners of the Tartars killed at one gum. He says that the shells were very destructive against the men behind the parapet. He saw where the shells struck the parapet, and the men behind were all killed by the Armstrong shell. He says the Armstrong guns were considered terribly effective, and that at the taking of the Taku forts they saved a great deal of loss on our side, and that there were an immense number killed by the Armstrong guns. Captain Harrison, who says this, states that he saw every shot fired by the Armstrong guns against forts in China. I further state, on the authority of Major Milward, that his battery fired into the Taku forts at the distance of two thousand yards, and that it was afterwards ascertained that the shell had produced very great effect. All these effects were produced by ammunition of the oldest patterns, which, as may easily be supposed, were very far from perfect. The bursting charges of the shells proved insufficient to break them thoroughly up; and both fuzes and bursters had suffered great deterioration by exposure to damp, The time fuzes, in fact, had been completely spoiled. There cannot, therefore, be a doubt that the effects obtained in that war would fall greatly short of what would now be realized by the ammunition in its improved form. No such effects as those have ever been claimed for the French artillery, and, in fact, it is quite impossible to suppose that ammunition such as they used, even if their guns had been equally powerful, was capable of producing comparable effects.”

Dr. Muir, C. B., inspector general, principal medical officer of the expeditionary army in China, states that—

“The severity of the wounds made by Armstrong shell was remarked upon by every medical officer. They were positively frightful. The effects of this destructive weapon had evidently produced a panic, as several dead Chinese soldiers were found tied to their guns by their plaited tails of hair, as a punishment, doubtless, for attempting to escape.” (Army Medical Department Report, 1860, p. 382.)

The committee sum up the evidence which they procured on this subject in the following decisive language:

“The testimony as to the Armstrong shell has been universally favorable; it is described as the most destructive weapon ever used against wooden ships, and most formidable in its effects and range. (Report, viii.)

In our next article we shall proceed to examine the objections urged before the committee against the Armstrong field artillery.

1. Report from the select committee on ordnance, together with the proceedings of the com mittee, minutes of evidence, appendix, and index. Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed July 25, 1862: pp. 335.

   Report from the select committee on ordnance, together with the proceedings of the committee, minutes of evidence, appendix, and index. Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed July 23, 1863: pp. 728.