Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session Thirty-eighth Congress, Part III
Mr. Clay to Mr. Seward
Sir: * * * * * * * *
When I reached Europe, finding the navy, so potent at home, would prove our greatest defence against, foreign intervention, I devoted most of my [Page 256] correspondence with the department, during my first mission to this court, to its development. It is now admitted on all sides that our success in iron-clads and big guns, has, so far, saved us from European assault. I flatter myself that my labors were not all fruitless in aid of such results, and I am encouraged to pursue the subject further. I enclose you an article from the London Times of October 26, 1863, styled “Mr. John Laird, M. P., upon National Defences,” which I make a part of this despatch. It is a speech of that notorious ship-builder and “canny Scot,” delivered at Birkenhead. Its avowals may be of service both to yourself and to the Navy Department. Some of these admissions, coming from so competent a ship-builder, are worthy of notice. He says,
“We have only two ships, that I can find on looking over the navy list, that could possibly be considered suitable for coast defences; and those two vessels are constructed upon Mr. Reed’s plan. Why they are not brought forward I cannot pretend to say—but I do believe this, that the money wasted in the naval administration of this country is something fearful. We have spent £30,000,000 sterling to £33,000,000 in the last three years, and got a number of large ships afloat, some of which you saw in the river the other day, and others are building but not ready, and none of which will be of any use to us to carry on a war, in the circumstances in which we shall be most probably placed. I have stated these facts distinctly, [hear, hear.] I have stated them in my place in the House of Commons, [hear, hear,] and I have no fear of their being heard by anybody in any place, because I can prove them to be correct.” These are strong admissions, from which you will draw your own conclusions. I call your attention to the expression, “a number of large ships,” in this extract, because, from the beginning, I have protested against wasting time and money in building large ships. That ever has, I believe, been avoided by the Navy Department. Our small ships, armed with a few heavy guns, as proved in the case of the “Monitor” and “Merrimac,” and in the late victory of the “Weehawken” over the “Atlanta,” are a match for these leviathans of France and England, which have cost so much in time and money. Whilst we must, no doubt, increase our sea-going ships in size, over those which have been designed for harbor and coast service, I still maintain that, having regard to speed, to capacity for fuel, to impenetrable armor, and a few heaviest guns, which science shall develop, extra size is to be avoided: because it takes more time and money to build large ships; because they can be used only at sea, and are unfit for coast service, in offence or defence; because they are more difficult to manage, and more liable to get out of order; because they are subject to greater loss in capture and shipwreck; because, in the search after the enemy, a few small ships are more likely to find him than one large one; and lastly, because the rapid advance in gunnery and iron-mailing warn us not to make large outlays to-day in vessels which may prove worthless to-morrow. I admit the time may come when projectiles will have reached their maximum in force, and the powers of offence and defence will have been perhaps equalized, and when the aggregate metal in the single discharge of a broadside may determine success, as is now the case with wooden ships. Then size will become an important element; but until that time does come, if ever, I think the rules I have laid down are based on reason and the laws of nature.
I have given this subject much reflection, and have studiously watched all the experiments in ship-building and armors which were accessible. I may be often in error, yet I trust I have sometimes hit upon truths, which will be of use to the government in building our navy, which is destined to play an important part in the history of the nations.
I am, truly, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C., U. S. A.
P. S.—In the late trial of the ships-of-the-line the “Magenta” and “Solferino,” and the frigates “Normandie,” “Invincible,” and “Couronne,” all iron-clad steamers, the port-holes of the “Normandie” were closed against the waves, and the ship, in consequence, rendered defenceless. Hereupon the “Solferino” and “Magenta” were subjects of congratulation because of their double tiers of guns, the upper one being used when the rough sea rendered the lower one useless. Now, to my mind, tin’s experiment is all in favor of low hulls, and ball-proof towers, which can be used at all times. What further do we see? The immense extent of plating on these two-deckers made it necessary to leave the stems and sterns unclad. I should say, leave off the upper tier, reduce the number of guns, and put their weight in entire mailing, and heavier metal. I have no data of the size of the guns, but it is stated that the “Normandie “and “Invincible” are armed with rifle guns of 30 pounds calibre. What would such shot do against our better clad and heavier armed monitors? The “Solferino “and “Magenta “carry 50 guns each, size not named. They are armed with “iron spurs,” 4 feet under water, and weighing 15 tons each. I believe the “Weehawken “will sink either of them with ease.
C. M. CLAY.
N. B.—In 1861 I called your attention to the two screw system of propulsion of ships. I cut from the Times of the 29th October, ultimo a most successful experiment made by the English government.
C. M. C.
Mr. John Laird, M. P., upon national defences.
On Friday last the prizes for rifle and artillery shooting, competed for on the 17th ultimo by the volunteers of Birkenhead and district, were distributed by Mr. John Laird, M. P., who presided.
The chairman, after some remarks upon the constitution of the volunteer force, addressed the meeting as follows: Having said this much, I may, perhaps, be now allowed to go into the question of the defences of the country. The army and navy, everybody admits, so far as the personnel goes, is kept in the highest possible state of efficiency. In proof of that I need only call your attention to the character, conduct, and known abilities of the officers of the channel fleet, which lately visited this river. [Cheers.] I have had opportunities for years—nay, all my life, in fact—to meet naval men; but I must say I never met a set of men better adapted to fill the position they were placed in than the men who were here with the channel fleet; and I feel convinced that, if provided with proper means, they will fulfil their duty to the country. [Cheers.] Gentlemen, in the last session of Parliament, and in the session before that, great attention was paid, not only to the army and navy, but also to the way in which that army and navy should be armed—the sort of rifles and the sort of guns that they should use. A great deal of discussion took place about the Armstrong gun; and so much was said about the millions it had cost, and about the wasteful expenditure upon it, that I really thought the gentlemen who made those remarks in the House of Commons were giving expression to mere figures of speech rather than to anything else. But the statements were made again and again. They were repeated day after day, and week after week, until a committee was appointed to inquire into the merits of the Armstrong gun, its cost and its efficiency. I was appointed to act on that committee, and rather hard work it was, sitting for two or three hours a day for two or three days a [Page 258] week through two sessions of Parliament. And I am bound to say, having sat on that committee during the session of 1862 and 1863, I was satisfied that practically 62,500,000 had been spent on that gun, and that we had not got value for our money. [Hear.] And why did we not get value? Because I believe the appointment of Sir William Armstrong an injudicious appointment. He was appointed engineer-in-chief of rifled ordnance, and, of course, thought his own guns were the best that could be constructed; and, therefore, as an honorable man, he was bound to endeavor to carry out his own principle; but he did it with a bad result to the country, because, by being placed in that position, I believe men like Whitworth, and Blakeley, and others, who have invented guns and have done much for the scientific development of the gunnery question, were kept back. I don’t mean to impute anything to Sir William Armstrong, but I say his was an unfortunate appointment on the part of the government, [hear, hear,] and my opinion is that such a post should be opened up to the country generally—to the men of scientific knowledge in the country generally; and that in scientific matters of this kind you should endeavour to bring to bear all the best” and most perfect knowledge in the empire. If you do that, it strikes me as a self-evident proposition that you are more likely to get the best invention than you would do if you confined yourself to the invention of merely one man. [Applause.] Sir William Armstrong started the Elswick Ordnance Company. When he was appointed the engineer-in-chief of ordnance he retired, but his partners carried on the business, and they had a large amount of work, amounting to one million of money, in three or four years to do for government, the government spending the other million and a half. Many statements were made in the committee, and very much evidence was taken. Mr. Whiffin, the accountant general, was called, and proved that, had the work done by the Elswick Ordnance Company been done in the gun factory at Woolwich, the country would have saved, on an expenditure of £600,000, no less a sum than £240,000; so that we may calculate what a saving would have been effected if you reflect for a moment that the amount spent was £1,000,000, and the work might have been done at Woolwich. I will candidly admit that there was a difference of opinion upon that point, but my argument in the committee was that Mr. Whiffin was called, as the accountant general, to verify the accounts presented to the committee. And who is Mr. Whiffin? it may be asked. Well, he is a man appointed by the government to go to India and put the accounts of the army and the departments in India on a proper and sound basis. If he was an unfit or improper man to be put in that position, we must take it for granted that his evidence before the select committee on ordnance was incorrect; and if he gave evidence that was incorrect, then the government should not have sent him on that mission to India. I believe there has been a large expenditure on these Armstrong guns which might have been avoided. But I will not give you merely my own opinion; I will give you that of his grace the Duke of Somerset, who was himself examined upon this committee, as to the efficiency of the Armstrong gun after all this enormous expenditure had been incurred. The Duke of Somerset, in reply to question 5,012, said: “We had a report that the Armstrong gun had the greatest range and the greatest power of penetration of any gun tried; when we came to try it ourselves that was not confirmed by the facts. The Armstrong gun, at a great distance, may have had greater power of penetration, but for naval purposes, at 200 yards, it certainly had not the greatest power. Our old 68-pounder is a more powerful gun than the 100-pounder Armstrong gun.” This was evidence given after they had been at work for five years, and spent two and a half millions of money. Then, again, the noble duke goes on to say, that a 68-pounder gun, of the old style, struck a harder blow at short range than the 100-pounder Armstrong gun. His grace said, in reply to question 5, 108: “I thought it so much an advantage to have a 70-pounder gun that could throw a 100lb. shot that I considered it probable [Page 259] that the armament of the Warrior would have been all 100-pounders; and it was not until we tried a 100-pounder and a 68-pounder against Captain Cole’s cupola that I became aware that the 68-pounder struck a harder blow than the 100-pounder at short range.” Other statements were made by the noble duke and other parties, with which I need not trouble you; but I have thought it right to go briefly into this question, because at this moment it excites considerable interest. America has guns of very great power, and of very great size; and every naval officer with whom I have conversed has told me that in naval wars battles will be fought at close quarters; that the ship that can deliver the hardest blows at 200 yards will be the most efficient ship; and the Duke of Somerset, as you have already heard, has stated that at short ranges the old 68-pounder is more efficient than the 100-pounder Armstrong gun. I do not say that the 68-pounder is the most efficient gun that we can get; but public attention has very properly been drawn to this subject, and the next thing that we must do is to see how, in regard to naval guns of increased size and power, we can work them on board ship. Perhaps it may be said that I should apologize for going into these matters, but I, for one, believe that the volunteer movement is an essential part of the defences of the country; and that unless the army, the navy, and volunteers are properly armed and equipped we cannot expect adequately to defend the country, and, as we ought to do, carry the war into the enemy’s camp, which is the proper way of punishing intruders. [Hear, hear.] If we are to go into this question of large guns which has been talked of so much, and which has been looked after, not only with great interest in this country, but with more than usual interest in America—if we are to adopt those guns, we can only do so by resorting to the cupola plan of Captain Coles to work them. I believe that by that plan we can work the largest and the heaviest guns. I know we can work guns of from 15 to 20 tons with the greatest possible ease. We cannot do that on board a broadside ship, and if our battles are to be fought and won by ships with the heaviest armament, the sooner we consider the question of the ships best calculated to carry those heavy guns the better it will be for the country. What have we done on this subject? The cupola, I should tell you, if you do not already know it, stands in the middle of the ship, and you can strengthen a vessel to carry a cupola of any weight. You can armor-plate a cupola to any thickness—12 or 15 inches, and you can make it perfectly impenetrable to shot; and, as it is a very small portion of a very large ship, you won’t depress the ship much in the water, but the battery will be well protected and impervious to shot. That, you will see, is a very great point. But what has our government done with regard to this plan? There are two plans now before the public. One is that of Captain Coles; the other is the plan of Mr. Reed. Now, it is quite clear to naval men that, if either of these plans is to supersede the old broadside system of gunnery, the sooner either one or the other, or both, are tried, the better. But again, I ask, what has our government done? In April or May, 1862, they stated in the House of Commons, after various remonstances, that the Royal Sovereign had been ordered to be cut down to be fitted with Coles’s cupola, and that another was to be converted on Mr. Reed’s plan. I venture to say that if proper exertions had been used those two ships might have been ready in six months from April last, [hear, hear,] and I don’t believe they will either of them be ready for six months to come. In the mean time a large amount of money has been expended in other ways; and if these plans of Reed and Coles should prove to be the best, we shall have wasted some millions of money on ships of another construction. If we were to go to war to-morrow our navy is not—I say it advisedly—in such a state as that we could go to war with a certainty of suceess. How do we stand with regard to iron-plated ships? If we were to go to war with America, they have a number of iron-clad turret ships perfectly fitted in every respect for coast defence, while we have no ships at all that are suited for [Page 260] the purpose. It will not do to say, as we did during the Russian war, that we can build 150 or 200 gunboats, by means of private yards, in twelve months. Armor-plated ships require a length of time in their construction, and I say most emphatically, that it would be the best policy of this country if the legislature would turn its attention to this question; because, although the fleet that we saw in the Mersey the other day was composed of most magnificent ships— most of them drawing from 25 to 28 feet of water—I need scarcely tell you who know anything of the port of Liverpool that they are perfectly unfit for war on the coasts of France or America. [Hear, hear.] If we went to war to-morrow, we should go into that war for the first year or two under most disadvantageous circumstances, and then we should have to turn our dock-yards and our private yards to some account—in fact, to do something to get us out of the scrape in which we should find ourselves, as we had to do during the Russian war, because, if in that war we had had a sufficient number of efficient gunboats, which we had not until the second year of the war, we would have put an end to that conflict much more rapidly than we did, and at a far less cost to this country. I think it right to impress this point particularly upon the meeting. We have only two ships that I can find on looking over the navy list that could possibly be considered suitable for coast defences, and those are two vessels constructed on Mr. Reed’s plan. Why they are not brought forward I cannot pretend to say; but I do believe this, that the money wasted in the naval administration of this country is something fearful. We have spent from £30,000,000 to £33,000,000 sterling in the last three years, and got a number of large ships afloat, some of which you saw in the river the other day, and others are building, but not ready, and none of which will be of any use to us to carry on a war in the circumstances in which we shall most probably be placed. I state these facts distinctly. [Hear, hear.] I have stated them in my place in the House of Commons, [hear, hear,] and I have no fear of their being heard by anybody in any place, because I can prove them to be correct. I assert, then, that there are only two ships capable of application to coast and harbor defences; and that the two ships on Captain Coles’s plan draw so much water that they are utterly useless for the purposes they are intended for—namely, the defences of our coasts and harbors; and, moreover, that they are neither masted nor rigged, nor are they fit to be sent across the Atlantic. It is in vain that Captain Coles has protested to our government against this state of things. He has urged them to make those ships serviceable, not only for the defences of our own coasts, but for foreign service. I need not tell any of the many commercial men I see here to-night the difficulties that attend ships of very great draught of water getting into and out of Liverpool. How, then, can ships of that class cruise about our banks? [Hear, hear.] What we want is a number of ships of a certain description of from 8 to 10 or 15 feet draught of water; and, unless the government come to do something of that sort before very long, we shall have to spend a large sum of money without being in a position when the time really comes to meet the emergency; and we shall in the end spend considerably more money than would be the case if we considered the question well at the present time. [Hear, hear.] Mr. Cobden has been pleased within the last day or two to make some complimentary remarks about my late firm at Birkenhead. I don’t agree with Mr. Cobden in his conclusions. I don’t think it would do to abandon entirely our government dock-yards; but I do believe it would be desirable to maintain them to a certain extent, while at the same time they should have throughout the country a portion of their work done in private establishments, so that in case of war we would not only have the resources of the national dock-yards to rely upon, but the extensive resources of the private yards, the proprietors of which would understand how to do government work. [Hear, hear.] But we stop progress in this country; and the naval development of this country has come to this, that it is supposed that when a gentleman is [Page 261] appointed controller of the navy, whatever his antecedents may have been— however respectable he may be, however good a sailor he is—yet he must needs carry all the ship-building brains of the country in his head. What I want is simply this—that the government shall bring to bear, for the interest of the country, all the talent that exists in the country. That is done already by the government in respect of engineering for the navy; and I need not tell you who have turned your attention to the subject that the engineering talent of this country, as exemplified by Penn, by Maudslay, and others of considerable eminence, has been the means of bringing a vast amount of talent and ingenuity to bear in the construction of the most perfect machinery which science could devise for propelling our ships-of-war; and this would not, and could not, have been the case if one man only had been placed at the head of the naval engineering department, and everything left to him. Competition is desirable in all things, but in this case it is desirable extremely for the true interests of the country. I do not want to be personal at all, because I will take the testimony of a certain vessel’s operations. I will take two ships built in this neighborhood— the Alabama and the Florida. [Loud and protracted cheering.] I am not at all ashamed, ladies and gentlemen, to own that my sons designed and built the Alabama. [Renewed cheering.] Nor, I am sure, is the builder of the Florida ashamed to say that he designed and built that ship; but the testimony borne to those vessels is not the testimony of Birkenhead or of Liverpool, or, indeed, of this country; but the testimony comes from America. They are two vessels that have been afloat for some considerable length of time, and they have defied the power of 400 ships. [Cheering.] They have never been caught. [Renewed cheering.] They were designed and built by private individuals; but in this country it is the misfortune of the managers of our marine to imagine that one man, and one man only, is to carry in his head the brains of all the designing talent of the country for building ships. If they had got a little life in the admiralty, then they might have improved on the Alabama and the Florida, and perhaps on other ships. [Laughter.] We have been accustomed to hear of the Americans boasting about their ship-building, and that they built ships to run twenty miles an hour. Ladies and gentlemen, the Alabama goes thirteen, but the Americans have never been able to touch her. I certainly do not agree with Mr. Cobden that we should rely on private interests alone. I think the government should do in respect to ship-building as they have done with regard to engineering. As I have told you, I was a member of the committee for two sessions on the Armstrong gun, and that committee recommended, and carried their recommendation, that the inventions of all able men should be properly considered. That was a great step in the right direction, [“hear, hear,” and applause;] and, no doubt, our gunnery will be very much advanced in the future in consequence. [Hear, hear.] I may, perhaps, be tiring the audience, [cries of “No, no,” and cheers;] but when I was asked to come here I did not come here merely to talk about the volunteers. My intention was to speak on the general defences of the country; and, therefore, I now want to state, as shortly as I can, my views on some points connected with that matter. [Cheers.] You have had this point repeatedly stated in the House of Commons, and it is one which is of lasting importance, and that is the question of dock accommodation for ships of the royal navy. [Hear, hear.] Many gentlemen here, no doubt, are connected with the trade of Liverpool; and I will just tell you now what is the position of the royal dock-yards as compared with Liverpool, and then make a few remarks on that point. Liverpool and Birkenhead have 400 acres of dock space, and 28 graving docks. The whole of her Majesty’s dock-yards, including Chatham, Sheerness, Portsmouth, Plymouth, and other places, have only 41 acres of dock space, and the number of graving docks is 33, but only four or five of them are capable of takkig in shipe like the Warrior. In the Mersey, the other day, that fleet looked nothing at all; but we have seen tha [Page 262] at the time they got back to the south one part was obliged to go to Plymouth, and another to Portsmouth, and Portsmouth harbor would not take them all in. Why, the admiral told me himself that he was alarmed at the very idea of coming up the Mersey; but he got into the Mersey, and he got out of it again, as safely as we could do, and as we did do every day in the year, with very large merchant ships. [Hear, hear.] Now, every householder in Birkenhead pays taxes; and therefore, being taxpayers, they are all interested in where the money goes. I’ll explain to you where some of it goes. Supposing, instead of 400 acres of dock space on the Mersey, we had only 40 acres, and that we had to do the greater portion of our business on the Mersey; supposing we had to take cargoes out of ships into flats, take them ashore, take goods on board again from the shore and carry them on board the ships in flats, and that every single piece of work on board the ship in the river would have to be done by workmen going from the shore, doing the work in the river, and coming back again on shore; why, need I tell any commercial man who knows anything of the trade of Liverpool that with such a system as this, Liverpool would never have gone on at all? Bristol, or London, or some other port would inevitably have taken the trade; because the working of ships here would have been so dreadfully expensive and so ruinous that the port would have been shut up as a port and its trade destroyed entirely. Now, just look for a moment at the position of the royal dock-yards. The ships there cannot fit out in the docks, but they fit out in the harbor as far as they can. They go to Spithead, and their stores are taken off to them. A carpenter is sent off. If it is blowing hard he does not get there at all. If he does not get there he loses half a day; and that is just how the money is spent in the dock-yards. [Hear.] I say this to the government and the House of Commons: “We want two or three millions to make perfect accommodation, and if you give us this money now we will save that expenditure in two or three years.” That is what they should do. They ought to have done it before; but they took a contrary step, and in ten years they have spent a million and a half on mere peddling, stupid alterations, without deriving any benefit from them. The first thing is, they increase the length of a dock by ten feet. Then they widen it two or three feet, and next they deepen it a foot or eighteen inches. That is another way in which the money is wasted. Is there any commercial man who has ever had a ship in this river, and has had to discharge, and load, and refit in the river, who does not know that if he had had proper means for discharging his cargo, refitting his ship, and loading his outward cargo in dock, he would not have beaten another man who was compelled to do all these things in the stream? The man who can do all this in dock would beat the man who has to do it in the river in a very short time. [“Hear, hear,” and applause.] Possibly, it may be considered that the country is too great to look into these matters and the expenditure of money; but I say that the true manner in which to manage public business is to manage it as a man manages his own private affairs; and until the government in this country is forced to do something of that kind they may talk about what they will do, but they will never be able to reduce the expenditure which is going on. [“Hear, hear,” and loud applause.] I do not know that I ought to occupy your time any longer, but various statements have been made about a vessel that has attained to some degree of fame. I refer to a vessel well known throughout this country as the Alabama. [Loud and repeated cheering.] I am not ashamed to acknowledge that some of my family have had to do with that ship. Still, some statements have been made about her which should be controverted. I should not have made any remark now, but for the fact that the government of this country have made certain statements and have given certain legal opinions about her, and they have talked about the vessel having escaped. I see my friend Mr. Hind and other gentlemen who are somewhat of sporting men, and well they know what I mean when I say—when the hounds approach a fox [Page 263] cover the fox scents the hounds; and when the huntsman comes up to the cover the fox is gone. It is nonsense to talk about the fox escaping or about the Alabama escaping. The Alabama was in dock when she was inspected by very many curious people; and in dock she took on board her coals and her stores. There was no secrecy whatever observed about the ship. She went out of dock at night; and if she wanted to escape, surely the night was a time when she could have escaped. But what was the fact? They were so vainglorious about their litttle craft that they anchored her off the landing-stage, and there she remained until half past ten or eleven the following morning, when she left for her destination. They admit that she was not fitted out as a man-of-war, and that they had no legal authority to detain that ship until a man was engaged to serve on board her as a sailor. Does any ship-owner present believe, or any man connected with shipping, that the captain of a vessel supposed to be going upon any extraordinary voyage would go and tell a man, who appears to have been a hired agent or spy of certain gentlemen in London? Would the captain of a ship on such an expedition go and tell a common sailor, at the Sailors’ Home, all the ins and outs of his intentions regarding that ship? (“Hear, hear,” and applause.] Certainly not. Now, I know it is not true that that man was told anything of the sort by the captain. I have been so informed, and I believe the information to be on the best authority. But let me tell you it is not necessary, in engaging men to go to any part of the world, to tell those men where they are going; because, you know, I am an old hand myself in fitting out secret expeditions. [Laughter and applause.] A few years ago it was thought desirable by the government of this country to send vessels to China and to various parts of India secretly. A Chinese war was anticipated; the Russians were expected to come down the head of the Indus and the Euphrates; and it was desirable to place faith in somebody. Her Majesty’s government were pleased to place faith in me, and I built for the British government about a dozen vessels; but the government said to me, “What we want you to do, Mr. Laird, is this: we want you to build, and to arm, and equip these vessels, and to send them out; they must be yours, and nobody must know anything about it.” Well, being a prudent sort of a ship-builder, I said, “I will take your order on those conditions.” I built the ships; they were armed; I engaged men; I did everything. [“Hear, hear,” cheers, and laughter.] I had to engage, not only sailors, but engineers and boiler-makers, ship-carpenters, and men of a variety of trades; I had to send them to various parts of the world, and I can assure you that a few shillings per month extra did all the business. They did not care where they went so long as they got a little extra pay [laughter;] and, therefore, the statement regarding the captain of the Alabama having told a sailor all about the ship—whose she was, and where she was for— bears the impress of falsehood upon the very face of it. I never saw the captain of the Alabama but once, and that was after having taken the ship out, and I don’t think he was the man to make such a statement as that upon which the ship might have been stopped. Let me read you a few words from a speech of the solicitor general, who made another great speech the other day at Richmond. He said some months ago: “It was not till the Alabama reached the Azores that she received her stores, her captain, or her papers, and that she hoisted the confederate flag. It is not true that she departed from the shores of this country as a ship armed for war.” [“Hear, hear,” and great applause.] And then went on to say: “But I wish the House to understand that in those depositions there was a great mass of hearsay evidence, which, taken by itself, could not form the basis of any action. Of the six depositions transmitted on the 22d of July, only one was good for anything at all—viz., the evidence of a person named Passmore, which was sufficient to prove the material facts. Two more were sent, corroborating Passmore, on the 24th, and were received by Earl Russell on the 26th.” [Hear.] Passmore was the man who made the affidavit [Page 264] that he was told by the captain where the ship was to go. I don’t believe him, and he must have got up the evidence for the occasion. Lord Palmerston, whom we all respect, [applause,] said, on the 27th of March last: “I have myself great doubts whether, if we had seized the Alabama, we should not have been liable to considerable damages. It is generally known that she sailed from this country unarmed, and not properly fitted out for war, and that she received her armament, equipment, and crew in a foreign port. Therefore, whatever suspicions we may have had—and they were well founded, as it afterwards turned out—as to the intended destination of the vessel, her condition at that time would not have justified a seizure.” [Cheers.] Now, here is Lord Palmerston, an old and experienced man, who says, in his opinion, the government would have been liable to considerable damages had they stopped that ship. I think, after what has been said—considering my connexion with this place, and after the noise this vessel has made in the world [laughter and applause]—the meeting will excuse my having brought forward these questions. [Applause.] But the whole question of the defences of this country may be, I think, very safely brought before this meeting, because they are all intimately connected with the volunteer movement; and I therefore feel that I have been justified in going somewhat at length into the various questions as to the character of our ships-of-war, the quality of guns that they are to carry, and other incidental matters. Other speeches have been made by a noble lord who does not seem to agree with Lord Palmerston. I mean Earl Russell. [Hisses.] He made a speech the other day which has caused a great sensation all over the world, and which the Americans say is only due to the coercion they have put upon him. Earl Russell is a man who is well known and respected throughout the country by his own followers; but he is a man of whom Sydney Smith said that he had such confidence in himself that he would take command of the channel fleet, if necessary. Well, I think Earl Russell has undertaken something that he will not be able to carry through quite so easily as, perhaps, he might command the channel fleet. He has undertaken to say in this country that he can do certain things, and that if he finds the law is not sufficient he can go to Parliament for an indemnity. [Hear, hear.] I don’t believe myself that Parliament will ever indemnify any man in the country, however powerful and however great he may be, if he is trying to transgress the law. [Loud and protracted cheering.] At any rate, up to the time that the act of indemnity is passed, there are laws in the land which all of us are bound to obey. [Hear, hear.] Laws are not made for administrations, but for the people of this country, and the people are only bound to obey the law as it stands, and not to obey laws which may possibly come to be passed hereafter. [Renewed cheers.] Another eminent gentleman, Sir Roundell Palmer, has made another speech at Richmond; and I must say, having read that speech, that it is all very well for an eminent lawyer, one of the first legal authorities of the day, to make a speech in the month of March, and say that those were the views of the country, and then to make a speech in support of another client in October of opposite views; but I say it is not the duty of a man who holds the position of a statesman in this country to be placing one interpretation upon certain facts in March and another in October. [Loud cheers.]
Trial of her Majesty’s screw launch Experiment.
The official trial of this little craft, which has been fitted by the steam factory department of Portsmouth dock-yard expressly, by order of the admiralty, in order to obtain certain data relative to the merits of the double or turnscrew [Page 265] system, took place on Monday, in Stake’s bay, near Portsmouth, under the supervision of Mr. John Ward, chief assistant to Mr. Andrew Murray, engineer of Portsmouth yard, and was attended with the most satisfactory results on every point, whether in relation to the speed obtained, powers of turning and manœuvring the vessel with one or both screws, or of steering by the screws alone, without the aid of the rudder. These results have been obtained before to a great extent in the trials of private steamers on the Thames lately fitted on the “twin” screw principle; but the trial of the Experiment at Portsmouth on Monday was the first trial of any vessel fitted on this principle by the admiralty, was their official acknowledgment of the value of a most important discovery in marine propulsion, and was, therefore, attended with a degree of interest beyond what usually attends an ordinary screw trial.
The Experiment is a first-class line-of-battle ship’s launch, 42 feet in length, and of proportionate breadth and depth. Her engines and boilers have been made for her according to the designs of Mr. Andrew Murray, the engineer of Portsmouth dock-yard, and are models of workmanship and compactness of form. Boiler and engines occupy a space in the centre of the boat of only 6 feet 11 inches by 4 feet 4 inches, the nominal horse-power of the engines being 3, the length of the stroke of piston 6 inches, and the diameter of cylinder 4 inches. The total weight of engines and boilers, with platform, coal-boxes, &c., and with boilers fitted, is 2½ tons. The cylinders are brought on to each side of the boiler and drive their independent shafting through each quarter with screws attached to the latter of four blades, each screw having a diameter of 2 feet, and a pitch of 3 feet 4½ inches. The draught of water of the launch, at the commencement of the trial, was 2 feet 6 inches aft, and 1 foot 9 inches forward. The launch steamed out of harbor at 10 a. m. against a strong flood tide, and excited considerable surprise in the minds of those on board by the manner in which she ran over the strong adverse tide. The measured mile was reached, and the little vessel was at once placed upon her speed trials, which she accomplished as follows:
| Time. | Pressure of steam. | Rev. of engines. | |||
| m. | s. | Knots. | lbs. | ||
| First run | 8 | 3 | 7·453 | 55 to 50 | 290 |
| Second run | 10 | 5 | 5·479 | 55 to 50 | 280 |
| Third run | 7 | 15 | 8·275 | 60 to 55 | 200 |
| Fourth run | 11 | 28 | 5·232 | 60 to 55 | 280 |
| Fifth run | 7 | 19 | 8·200 | 60 to 58 | 290 |
| Sixth run | 11 | 10 | 5·373 | 59 to 55 | 280 |
Mean speed of the six runs, 6·742 knots.
The revolutions of the engines averaged 290 at 60lb. pressure of steam, and with that pressure the Experiment will realize a good seven knots. On Monday, from a cause which can be easily remedied in future, the steam, as will be seen by the foregoing figures, could not be kept at 60lb., and consequently the vessel lost in speed, although it was almost impossible for anything to be more satisfactory than the speed she actually attained. Indeed, it has become a question worth noticing, while referring to speed alone, whether by thus dividing the propelling power of a vessel in the substitution of two for a single screw, an additional speed of the ship through the water is not gained. The advocates of the principle, such men as Commanders Symonds and Selwyn, R. N., say that full 20 per cent. is gained. Reverting, however, to the actual results obtained by the trial of the Experiment, on the conclusion of the speed trials the vessel was next tested in making circles as follows: With both engines going ahead at full speed, with the rudder acting, a complete circle was made to starboard in 1 minute 9 seconds, and to port in 1 minute 13 seconds. The circle was next made with one engine shut off, and with the port engine standing (the helm still [Page 266] being brought into use) a circle was made in 1 minute 31 seconds, and with the starboard engine shut off in 1 minute 27 seconds. Reversing the motion of the respective engines, and with the starboard engine going ahead and the port astern, the circle was made in 2 minutes 9 seconds. Repeating this experiment, but with the starboard engine astern and port ahead, the circle was made in 1 minute 43 seconds. The diameter of the circles made, as near as could be ascertained without actual measurement, was, with both engines going ahead and rudder acting, rather under three times the length of the launch; with one engine shut off rather over that distance; with engines reversed, and screws, therefore, working opposite ways, the launch turned on a pivot just abaft her centre, and within her own length, gradually working spirally and astern. The foregoing results confirm in a remarkable degree the trials made during the past twelve months on the Thames by Messrs. Dudgeon, of Limehouse, which have attracted so much attention in the naval and scientific world, and which have been attended and officially reported upon for the information of the admiralty by their inspecting engineer afloat, Mr. John Dinnen. The double or twin screw system of propelling ships-of-war has an importance in relation to the future construction of the British navy of which the general public are but little aware. We are now clothing our iron-clads with 5½-inch armor, but if a gun should be, or has been already, adopted by foreign nations that can to a certainty destroy this armor within point-blank range, then we certainly must give our ships an increasing ratio in their means of defence. It is indeed said that we must clothe all ships designed from the present time with 12 in lieu of 5 inches of armor, in order to meet the advantage that has already been gained by guns over our now orthodox 5½ inches. If we must do this we can only do it by the adoption of the double-screw system, which, it is asserted, will carry any given weight at one-third less draught of water than can be done by any vessel driven by a single screw. If we can thus really carry a given weight in our ships-of-war, by simply dividing their propelling power, at one-third a less draught of water, the sooner such a principle is adopted the better, for every one now seems agreed. that our Minotaurs, Agincourts, and Northumberlands will require some eight or nine feet too great a draught of water to be available for any ordinary work on any line of coast. The obvious superiority of the double over the single screw for turning and manœuvring in shallow or narrow waters is already too obvious, after what has already been said, to need any further comment here. In concluding this notice of the Experiment’s official trial, it is, perhaps, necessary to state that the double screw was first employed by the late Sir John Rennie, C. E., in building steam vessels for the Indian rivers. They were 70 feet in length, 7 feet 6 inches in breadth, 3 feet 6 inches in depth, and drew 2 feet of water. They were driven by two screws, each of 2 feet 2 inches diameter and 4 feet pitch, by direct-acting disk engines, but their screws were driven by “collective” and not independent engine power. Something of the same kind was followed in three of our iron-cased floating batteries constructed for the Russian war, but it was reserved in this country for Messrs. Dudgeon, of Limehouse, to practically demonstrate the true value of the double-screw system, each screw driven by its own independent engine, for purposes of war as well as of commerce.