Mr. Pruyn to Mr. Seward
Sir: I have the honor to inform you, that after a protracted negotiation, and the extension several times of the period noted for the acceptance or rejection of the British ultimatum, the Japanese government have signed an obligation to pay the sum of $440,000, demanded for the murders at To-den-ji in June, 1862, and of Mr. Richardson in September last.
Of this amount, $140,000 is to be paid on the 18th instant, and the balance is to be paid in weekly instalments of $50,000 each.
Negotiations are still pending in reference to the demand made of £25,000 from Satsuma, and for the arrest and punishment of the murderers of Mr. Richardson. The British minister informs me there would be no hesitation on the part of the government to assume and discharge this additional sum claimed, but that, thus far, he has not separated the demands. He further states, that these negotiations will probably be somewhat protracted, and that there are difficulties on both sides. The government informs me that the murderers made their escape immediately after the commission of the crime, and that Satsuma has made repeated attempts to discover them, but without success.
You will perceive by reference to my despatch No. 50, of 1862, that I urged their immediate arrest, and predicted this very result, unless prompt measures were at once taken for that purpose.
I presume this part of the claim will be abandoned, which I should regret, as I think it will cause the Japanese to depreciate our character.
In my despatch No. 15, I informed you that I thought the money would be paid. I arrived at this conclusion because I had strongly urged the payment, as a measure of prudence and of real economy, to avoid heavy demands for mercantile damages, and for expenses of the fleet, which would inevitably follow; and because Takemoto Hayato-no-kami, with whom I had several conferences on the subject, and who is high in the confidence of the Gorogio, had informed me that he had advised it, though he said, if it were known his life would not be safe till he reached the castle.
You will perceive by the enclosures I send, that a decision had been arrived, at, adverse to any concession whatever.
As I have already informed you, the Tycoon left on the eve of the demands for Kioto, accompanied by all the members of the Gorogio connected with the administration of foreign affairs. He still remains at the Kioto with two of these ministers, one having returned a few days since.
It is the general belief that the Tycoon will never be permitted to leave Kioto, while many affirm he will be deposed.
The families from which the Tycoon is elected are Kshii, Owari, and Mito. [Page 1105] The present Prince Mito was a candidate for election against the present Tycoon, who is of the family of Kshii.
It is certain that Mito, who has been opposed to foreign intercourse, is now acting as vice-Tycoon at Yedo. The enclosures show that he was clothed by the Mikado with supreme power, for the purpose of carrying out the policy determined upon at Kioto, to exclude foreigners. The work which appeared easy of execution at that distance, and while he was surrounded by proud and hostile daimios, and an arrogant heaven-born Mikado, assumed such formidable proportions when he arrived at Yedo, as to deter him from his purpose; and he has been obliged to yield, as every Tycoon must eventually do. There will always be a formidable minority, however, or, I should rather say, majority, who will struggle, ineffectually, to bring back what they call the “ancient custom.” The government, while compelled to act otherwise, will, for many years, represent a small minority of the daimios, who are the sole governing class.
It is not yet known whether Mito, before abandoning his hostile policy, obtained the consent of the Mikado and council at Kioto, or whether he has acted on his own responsibility, relying on their acquiescence.
I think the presence of ships-of-war representing the United States, France and Holland, in the bay during the pendency of these negotiations, though exerting a silent influence, has greatly aided in producing this favorable result.
I have not been anxious till recently for the presence of any of our naval force here. But my opinions have undergone a great change, and I now content myself with the simple proposition. It must be obvious to the President that the presence of Commodore Perry’s powerful fleet first opened Japan, and it is both natural and undeniable that the same means must be relied on, for some time at least, to preserve to the world what was thus gained.
It was the presence of the British fleet and of other vessels-of-war in these waters, which has brought about a peaceful solution of the late complications. My advice, and that of every representative of all the treaty powers, and of all powers combined, would have been powerless without such force. I hope my influence was not unfelt. I am gratified both at the result and apparent gratitude of the government for my friendly services in procuring an extension of time fixed for its decision, and my readiness at all times to advise with them.
The great distance of all the treaty powers from this empire makes it desirable that a powerful fleet should for some time to come remain permanently in these seas; and I submit to your better judgment the propriety of the treaty powers combining for that purpose.
When the British demand was made, impressed with the idea that the citizens and subjects of the other powers would receive protection, and that discrimination would be possible, and a measure desired by this government, I made every effort to procure a promise to that effect, suggesting, among other expedients, a joint declaration of the open ports as neutral territory. While such proposition was received with favor, it was invariably accompanied by the declaration that it was feared that such discrimination would be practically impossible. At that time I was under the impression that the government was acting in good faith, as I also now presume it was.
Other counsels, however, unquestionably prevailed at Kioto, and expulsion was decreed. The fear of being involved with the other treaty powers, as well as the threats of Great Britain, have doubtless had their effect in producing an abandonment, or at least suspension of that decision; or, perhaps, the necessary means and forces have not yet been collected.
Our relations continue as friendly as ever. But there never has been and never will be a time when the friendship of this country for the United States will cause it to change its policy.
It is idle to say that their friendship for any government is so great as to cause them to desire foreign intercourse. Our presence is only tolerated from [Page 1106] necessity. The governing classes are not so blind as not to see the danger to which the presence of foreigners exposes them. A Japanese merchant cannot ride, cannot bear arms, and is in every respect, except wealth possibly, beneath even the two-sworded retainer of a daimio. The presence of merchants from abroad, possessing and exercising rights denied to their native merchants, is a danger felt and acknowledged; and repeated attempts have been made to induce the foreign representatives to require their countrymen to forego the exercise of these rights.
All foreigners, without distinction, you will perceive, have had a narrow escape. If Mito’s change of views has been approved and adopted by the Mikado and the hostile party, we may reasonably hope for peace. But a like threatening storm may overwhelm us should the naval force be withdrawn, and the hostile daimios re-establish their influence over the Mikado, whose shadowy power they are attempting to resuscitate, in order to confirm their own; or it may break out at an earlier period if it shall be found that Mito has not acted up to his final instructions, and is, therefore, denounced as vacillating and weak, and another daimio clothed with power to direct the “exterminating war.”
I enclose No. 1, copy of the orders of the Mikado to Mito; and No. 2, orders of the Tycoon and Gorogio; and No. 3, the Tycoon’s order to the thirty-six principal daimios, to the same effect; for which valuable papers I am indebted to the kindness of the British minister, who informs me that he had referred to them during his negotiations, and their authenticity was not denied by the envoys of this government.
I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.