Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward

No. 42.]

Sir: In despatch No. 18 of June 2, 1862, I had the honor to write, “if the treaty powers could agree among themselves to the neutrality of China, and together secure order in the treaty ports, and give their moral support to that party in China, in favor of order, the interests of humanity would be subserved.”

Upon my arrival at Peking, I at once elaborated my views, and found, upon comparing them with those held by the representatives of England and Russia, that they were in accord with theirs. After mature deliberation, we determined to consult and co-operate upon all questions. The first practical question arose when the regulations for trade on the Yangtzekiang were to be considered; to these we agreed.

The 2d in relation to General Burgevine, (of which I shall write in a separate despatch.)

The 3d had reference to the doctrine of concessions in the treaty ports; the 4th relates to municipal regulations for Shanghai; of the 3d and 4th I have already written. The 5th to demand of the French government in Kweichan.

Since our agreement thus to act together, the French minister, Mr. Berthemy, has arrived, and enters most heartily into the policy of co-operation.

Preliminary to entering into thorough co-operation, I held it to be my duty to ascertain the ulterior purposes of the treaty powers, having, by position and trade, a leading place in China.

I found Mr. Balluzeck, the Russian minister, prompt to answer, in the spirit of the Russian treaty, that his government did not desire to menace, at any time, the territorial integrity of China, but, on the contrary, wished to bring it more and more into the family of nations, subject, in its relation with foreign powers, to the obligations of international law. That he was but too happy to co-operate in a policy that would engraft western upon eastern civilization, without a disruption of the Chinese Empire.

With Sir Frederick Bruce, the British minister, my conversations were elaborate and exhaustive.

I said to him, frankly, that we represented the first trading powers here, and [Page 938] that our interests were identical, and I was ready, not only from individual desire, but because of the wishes of my government, to co-operate with him.

He met me in a large and generous spirit, and said that he had ever desired to co-operate with the other treaty powers, and pointed out in his despatches to his government the evidences of such desires, and expressed his delight that the representative of the United States should hold views so co-incident with his own. I said to him, that while I paid full homage to the energy of his government in opening China, and for affording protection to the citizens of the United States, still I felt, looking to British antecedents, a little distrust about the future; that our trade by the way of California was increasing, and I felt anxious about its future condition.

I illustrated my views of distrust by reference to the controlling influence of the British in the custom-house, and in the pretensions set up by his countrymen in the treaty ports in favor of territorial concessions.

He agreed with me that the sensitiveness was natural, and replied that he would be pleased to remove every ground for it. He said that circumstances, more than design, had given the English the seeming control of affairs at the treaty ports; that, in the first place, the English trade was very large; and besides, from long connexion with the East, many of his countrymen had acquired knowledge of the Chinese language, and when persons were wanted it was natural that those most qualified in that respect should be selected. He pointed out that long ago he had recommended that the custom-house should be put upon a cosmopolitan footing, and that Mr. Lay, who was at the head of it, had endeavored to carry out his views. I must admit that in this he was right.

I was applied to by the Chinese, through their employé, Mr. Hart, then at the head of the customs, for Americans to fill places, but I could not find any who had studied Chinese.

One of the first places in the Chinese service was tendered to our consul, Mr. Seward, but he could not, he thought, with justice to his own government, accept it. If we had had a school for interpreters, our proper influence would have been far greater than it is now. Besides, the English have been compelled to defend the treaty ports without any assistance from us, and we have enjoyed the fruits of that protection. But, in the face of these obvious facts, Sir Frederick admitted that it was not in the interest of England to hold a position which gave her no special privileges, and subjected her needlessly to the criticisms of the other treaty powers, and therefore he was willing to have any arrangements made by which she would not be put in a false position.

He did not wish, as far as he was concerned, that English officers should lead against the Taipings. He prefers that the Chinese should employ, for purposes of drill and discipline, men from the smaller states of Europe, and that I might rely upon it that he would do all he could to relieve England from the charge of being the “great bully” of the East; to relieve her “from the dilemma of being forced by local clamor to commit acts of violence, which, though in accordance with past usage, and perhaps justified by our (their) former situation, do not fail to jar unpleasantly on the conscience of England and of the civilized world.” The force policy was wrong, and he was certain that his government had had enough of wars brought about through hasty action of men in the East not under the sway of large ideas. He was for a change of policy. To show me that he did not wish to have an English officer at the head of the Ward force, he showed me that he himself had urged the appointment of General Burgevine, an American—a fact I did not know when I wrote my despatch No. —, or I should have given him the credit which was his due; and when Governor Li and Tackee conspired to put Burgevine out of the force, (of which I shall write fully,) I must say that the most determined man for his restoration was Sir Frederick, on the broad ground that it was not good policy to have an Englishman at the head of that force. When I raised an objection to the [Page 939] so-called concessions, and presented my argument against them, he fully concurred with me, and scouted the whole doctrine as dangerous; and to stop all pretensions on the part of his people, he wrote those very able letters to his consul at Shanghai which I sent in despatch No. —.

In all our conversations he, with great force, urged the adoption of a co-operative policy in China, and as the representative of the largest trading power here, said that he was willing to lead in a liberal direction. Indeed, so striking were his views, and so in contrast to what had hitherto been the English policy, and so in accordance were they with the policy strongly urged by me before I came to Peking, that I expressed a warm desire that he would present them to his government, that they might become the basis of our future co-operation. He accordingly wrote the powerful despatch marked A, which he communicated to me for my private use, and which, with his permission, I send to you confidentially, with the most positive request that it is not to appear until it is first published in England.

Upon this frank avowal of the policy of England, it would be impossible to refuse co-operation. The Russian minister and myself both concurred in the view that the position of Sir Frederick was just what we desired, and we hailed with delight its avowal. The French minister, Mr. Berthemy, agrees with us. Being a broad and experienced statesman, he at once saw the advantages that would flow from the casting down of all jealousies, and by a co-operation on every material question in China. Indeed he has realized largely the advantages of such action. The French chargé d’affaires before him, acting upon the old-school policy of antagonizing everybody, thus causing the Chinese to believe that we were divided among ourselves, for one year failed to get justice from the Chinese government, where it was due, in a case in which we were all interested.

The case was briefly this: A French priest with a passport was put to death with circumstances of unusual cruelty, by a high Chinese official in the province of Kweichan. Satisfaction was demanded, but no result obtained.

The moment Mr. Berthemy came he frankly communicated the facts to his colleagues, who made common cause with him, and in a few weeks this question, menacing war under other arrangements, was settled, to the credit of Mr. Berthemy, and in the interests of all the treaty powers.

The policy upon which we are agreed is briefly this: that while we claim our treaty right to buy and sell, and hire, in the treaty ports, subject, in respect to our rights of property and person, to the jurisdiction of our own governments, we will not ask for, nor take concessions of, territory in the treaty ports, or in any way interfere with the jurisdiction of the Chinese government over its own people, nor ever menace the territorial integrity of the Chinese empire. That we will not take part in the internal struggles in China, beyond what is necessary to maintain our treaty rights. That the latter we will unitedly sustain against all who may violate them. To this end we are now clear in the policy of defending the treaty ports against the Taipings, or rebels; but in such a way as not to make war upon that considerable body of the Chinese people, by following them into the interior of their country. In this connexion, while we feel desirous, from what we know of it, to have the rebellion put down, still we have become to question the policy of lending government officers to lead the Chinese in the field, for fear of complications among ourselves, growing out of the relative number to be employed, &c. That while we wish to give our moral support to the government, at the present time the power in the country, which seems disposed to maintain order and our treaty rights, we should prefer that it would organize its own people, as far as possible, for its own defence, taking only foreigners for instruction in the arts of peace and war, and these, as far as possible, from the smaller treaty powers.

To maintain the revenue laws of the government, to relieve the treaty powers [Page 940] from the burdens attending the suppression of piracy along the coast, the Chinese government has been persuaded to purchase several small war steamers, and to man them temporarily with foreigners. This fleet is coming out under the command of Thervard Osburne, and is manned chiefly by English sailors, with the understanding that it is a temporary arrangement; and that it, too, is to become cosmopolitan, and on the idea that we are to co-operate upon all questions in China; no special objection is made to the force by the other treaty powers. I confess that I should be pleased, were it more cosmopolitan now, but it was arranged before I came out, and before the above policy was developed and agreed upon.

While Sir Frederick Bruce shall remain, or while the policy now agreed upon shall be maintained, no harm can come from it,

That the indemnity may be collected and accounted for, and that the Chinese government may have a fund to maintain a national force, organized upon European principles; that the local authorities may be checked in their corrupt practices, and a uniform system for the collection of the revenue maintained, it is agreed on all hands that the present foreign custom-house system is the best as yet devised, and, as it has been administered by Mr. Lay, entitled to our support. Indeed it is alone through such instrumentalities that we can hope to advance the cause of civilization in China. As Sir Frederick states, there can be nothing more unmeaning than antagonism between the United States and Great Britain in China. I need not attempt to prove the advantages which must flow from co-operation; that we should do so, all must admit. By the favored-nation clause in the treaties, no nation can gain, by any sharp act of diplomacy, any privilege not secured to all.

The circumstances conspire to make this a fortunate movement in which to inaugurate the co-operative policy.

The treaty powers are represented here by men of modern ideas; by men who, in this land, where everything is to be done, do not choose to embarrass each other by sowing distrust in the Chinese mind, but who, with an open policy and common action, deepen each other’s confidence and win the respect of the Chinese. That the too sanguine hopes in relation to China of our more advanced civilizations may be fully realized by any action we may take, ought not to be expected. The peculiar people we are among must be remembered; how hoary is their civilization, and how proud they are, and how ignorant of us they have always been, and how little their knowledge of some of us, has tended to create in their minds a desire for a change. Their government is good in theory, but not now well administered. The people are free to license, and, as in our own country, we find a portion of them in rebellion, because they have felt too little the influence of the central government.

The trouble here now is, that we are dealing with a regency which, in a few years, must hand over its doings to the Emperor and those he may call around him. The regency dare not depart in the smallest particular from the old traditions, and yet these will not do for these times. They are distrustful of us, and are afraid of their censors and distant local authorities. Besides, there is a large anti-foreign party here. There are members of the foreign board who, if left to themselves, would at once place China in perfect international relations with us; but sitting with them are spies, who paralyze them in their action with us, to fall, as they frequently do, far short of their promises. In their weakness they resort to tergiversations to such an extent as to invite menace, and to cause us, in our passionate modes, almost to despair of holding, with dignity, any relations at all with them. Our only hope is in forbearance and perfect union [Page 941] among ourselves; if these are maintained, and our government sustains us in the policy we have adopted, I cannot but be hopeful of the future, and feel that a great step has been taken in the right direction in China. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant.

ANSON BURLINGAME.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.