Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward.
Sir: I am now to report the result of my conference with Lord Russell at three o’clock yesterday.
I began by expressing my regret that circumstances seemed to be once more conspiring to embarrass the friendly relations between the two governments. It had been my constant effort ever since I came, so far as I could, to defeat the [Page 181] machinations of those ill-disposed people whose object had been from the first to sow strife. But late events led me to fear that at last they might gain their point. Of the nature of the present danger I did not know that I could give his lordship a better idea than by laying before him a copy of a letter which had been transmitted to me by one of many active friends of peace in this country as having been lately received by him from a responsible person in London. This would serve to show the nature of the means upon which these desperate rebel conspirators counted to inflame animosities between us.
I then read the letter, a copy of which I send you with this despatch.
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The object of asking the interview I then explained to be an earnest desire to obtain the active co-operation of her Majesty’s government to prevent the danger growing out of these machinations. Without such action I very much feared they might succeed; for I was now charged with the duty of laying before his lordship a frank statement of the difficulties under which my government labored in consequence of the increasing irritation of the people by reason of the successive accounts of the depredations committed by the two gunboats fitted out from here. My best course, I thought, would be to read to him for his information the despatch on the subject which I had just received, though I was not instructed to do so, nor to leave a copy of it. I then, with his assent, read your No. 505. After I had finished it, I added an expression of my own strong conviction that the measure of issuing letters of marque therein referred to was one very distasteful to the government. I had myself great doubt of its efficacy, not less than of its expediency. In my view it Would rather be like playing into the hands of the common enemy of both countries. But still it was not to be denied that the people in America felt as if they were now suffering from all the effects of war waged from this side of the water whilst their own hands were tied behind them. They very naturally argued that if such operations were to be carried on without any effectual labor to prevent them on the part of the government here, it was about as well to let the game be opened to both sides. I did not give this as conveying my own opinions, but simply to put his lordship in possession of the views held at home. And unless the government and those of us who were disposed to preserve amicable relations were furnished with some evidence of action to prove the determination of her Majesty’s government to exert its power to protect us from the effects of this misconduct of a portion of her own subjects, it seemed impossible to resist the force of this popular reasoning.
His lordship then went over much of the same ground heretofore taken by him on the nature of the contest and the desire of Great Britain to remain perfectly neutral. He adverted to the action of certain people at Liverpool as of a kind which he had always disapproved, to convince me of which he referred to his letter of last year, which had, he said, excited much dissatisfaction among them. I replied by reminding his lordship of the fact, as shown in the published diplomatic correspondence, that I had endeavored to give full credit at home to that letter. But the difficulty now was that we needed something more like evidence of efforts to prevent threatened evils.
His lordship said that the government was sincerely desirous to do all it could. Any attempt to go beyond the law would only end in disappointment. They had carefully consulted on the matter, had examined their powers, and were ready to exert them to the utmost. He had made some explanation of his. views in the speech he had made on Monday evening. He had since received a note from Lord Palmerston expressing his approbation of every word of that speech.
I said that I also had been much gratified in reading that speech. It would be regarded in America as altogether the most friendly which emanated from his lordship since the beginning of the troubles. Had the same sentiments been [Page 182] expressed then we should not have been where we now are. I must also add that I should be highly gratified in writing home the substance of what he had said of Lord Palmerston.
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What was much needed in America was not solely evidence of action to prevent these armaments. It was the moral power that might be extended by the ministry in signifying its utter disapproval of all the machinations of the conspirators against the public peace. Hitherto the impression was quite general, as well in America as in this country, that the ministry held no common sentiment, and were quite disposed to be tolerant of all the labors of these people, if not indifferent to them. Here they were absolutely sustaining the rebels in the prosecution of the war, by the advance of money, of ships, and of all the necessaries with which to carry it on as well by sea as on the land; and upon such notorious offences ministers had never yet given out any other than an uncertain sound. The effect of this must be obvious. It encouraged the operations of British instigators of the trouble on this side, who believed that they were connived at, and so believing carried on their schemes with new vigor; whilst, on the other, it confirmed the popular impression in America that the government policy was really at heart hostile, and therefore should be met in a corresponding spirit. These were the views commonly held as they appeared to me from the calmest consideration I could give to the whole subject. I regretted them the more that I believed they were founded in a mistake, which might lead to very bad consequences. I should do what I could in deprecating any present resort to so doubtful a remedy as that of issuing letters of marque.
There was a strong and a growing popular sentiment throughout the kingdom which might be relied upon partially to counteract the dangers which I feared. But I could not too earnestly beg his lordship at this crisis to think of the value that would in this sense attach to any unequivocal expression by persons in high authority of their condemnation of all enterprises in violation of the neutrality of this kingdom, now projected or in process of execution, within it limits.
His lordship’s tone throughout this conversation was unequivocally friendly, and I thought him not unimpressed by the earnestness of my representations. He went so far at one time as to express regret at the failure to prevent the departure of the two privateers. But he evidently considered it as a misfortune rather than a fault, which should be now repaired by us through the application of our “vast resources” to the capture of the offenders, He wondered that we had not done so. I replied that it was not for want of effort. But it should be remembered that this was a somewhat novel kind of warfare on the ocean. It consisted of depredation on the innocent and the unarmed, and running away from the strong and those prepared for defence.
The gunboats were known to be very fast vessels. The great improvement made in steam navigation had given facilities for this kind of piracy never before known, especially in favor of those who had nothing to lose, and against those who had commerce spread over every sea. I then gently reminded him that no nation would take more chances against itself by tolerating such a practice than Great Britain. A concentrated effort made to surprise its navigation in remote portions of the globe might sweep half of it away before it had time to turn round and lay its hand on the right instruments to use for prevention, and then it would have the task before it of a wide and long chase after an offender swift to escape his punishment.
Having disposed of this matter, I next turned to the subject of the joint resolutions of Congress on foreign intervention, and agreeably to your instructions, contained in the printed circular of the 9th March. I offered to read them to his lordship, or to leave a copy, as he might prefer. He said that Lord Lyons had already sent a copy of them, which he had read. His opinion on that subject was sufficiently known. He would, therefore, take a copy, which I accordingly [Page 183] put into his hands. Lastly, I alluded to a letter which had been sent to me from a respectable person at Liverpool, an earnest friend of peace and good will, urging me to suggest the propriety of prosecuting the parties known to have been connected with the outfit of the gunboats in Liverpool.
I said that I should not be unwilling to recommend my government to initiate any suitable form of proceedings if necessary, and if with the slightest hope of success in procuring conviction. I thought it no more than proper to present the subject to his lordship’s consideration. He said he would think of it, and take advice. Should it appear that anything effectual could be done he would let me know.
I have by no means reported the whole of this conversation, which lasted more than an hour. The conclusion which I draw from it is, that the government is really better disposed to exertion, and feels itself better sustained for action by the popular sentiment than ever before. * * * *
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.