Message of the President of the United States to the Two Houses of Congress, at the Commencement of the Second Session of the Thirty-seventh Congress
Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward.
[Extracts.]
London, September 7, 1861.
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the reception of despatches from the department, numbered from 61 to 67, both inclusive.
Since the date of your No. 61, of the 17th of August, you will have learned ere this that the enigmatical extract from Lord Russell’s note to me, of which you instructed me to ask an explanation, has taken a very distinct and unequivocal shape, superseding all necessity for further inquiry. I may take occasion to remark upon the similarity of some of the reasoning in your despatch with that which you will find already made use of in my letter to his lordship, of the 23d August, declining to conclude the negotiation. On the whole, it seems to me that it is perhaps as well to let it stay for the present in the situation in which her Majesty’s ministers have placed it. But in this I remain to be directed at the pleasure of the President.
In this connexion I have the honor to transmit a copy of Lord Russell’s note of the 28th of August, in reply to mine of the 23d of that month to him, already referred to in the preceding paragraph. I likewise send a copy of his instructions to Lord Lyons, which he seems to have furnished to me as an evidence of his good faith in the representation he made of them to me at the conference.
* * * * * * * * *
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.
[Untitled]
The undersigned, her Majesty’s principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, has had the honor to receive the note, of the 23d instant, of Mr. Adams, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States.
Mr. Adams has accounted satisfactorily for the delay in answering the note of the undersigned of the 19th instant. Her Majesty’s government in all these transactions has acted in concert with the government of the [Page 145] Emperor of the French, and the undersigned cannot be surprised that Mr. Adams should wish to communicate with Mr. Dayton, at Paris, before replying to his note.
The undersigned is quite prepared, following Mr. Adams to recapitulate the particulars of this negotiation, and he is happy to think that in matters of fact there is no ground for any controversy between them. He need only supply omissions.
Mr. Adams, at his first interview with the undersigned, on the 18th of May last, mentioned the subject of the declaration of Paris as one on which he had power to negotiate, and the undersigned then told him that the matter had been already committed to the care of Lord Lyons, at Washington, with authority to agree with the government of the United States on the basis of the adoption of three of the articles and the omission of the first, being that relating to privateering. So far, the statement of Mr. Adams agrees substantially with that which is here made. But the representation of the undersigned was strictly accurate, and in faith of it he subjoins the despatch by which Lord Lyons was authorized to negotiate on the basis of the three latter articles of the declaration of Paris. Lord Lyons, however, was not empowered to sign a convention, because that form had not been adopted by the powers who originally signed the declaration, nor by any of the numerous states which afterwards gave their adherence to its articles.
At a later period, when Mr. Adams brought a copy of his full powers to the foreign office, the undersigned asked why the adherence of the United States should not be given in the same form as that of other powers, and he was told, in reply, that as the Constitution of the United States required the consent of the Senate to any agreement with foreign powers, that agreement must necessarily, or at least would most conveniently, be made in the shape of a convention.
The undersigned yielded to this argument, and proposed to the government of the Emperor of the French, with which her Majesty’s government have been acting throughout in complete agreement, to concur likewise in this departure from the form in which the declaration of Paris had been adopted by the maritime powers of Europe.
But the British government could not sign the convention proposed by the United States as an act of Great Britain singly and alone, and they found to their surprise that in case of France and of some of the other European powers the addition of Mr. Marcy relating to private property at sea had been proposed by the ministers of the United States at the courts of those powers.
The undersigned concurs in the statement made by Mr. Adams respecting the transactions which followed. Her Majesty’s government, like Mr. Adams, wished to establish a doctrine for all time, with a view to lessen the horrors of war all over the globe. The instructions sent to Lord Lyons prove the sincerity of their wish to give permanence and fixity of principles to this part of the law of nations.
The undersigned has now arrived at that part of the subject upon which the negotiation is interrupted.
The undersigned has notified Mr. Adams his intention to accompany his signature of the proposed convention with a declaration to the effect that her Majesty “does not intend thereby to undertake any engagement which shall have any bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal differences now prevailing in the United States.”
The reasons for this course can be easily explained. On some recent occasions, as on the fulfilment of the treaty of 1846, respecting the boundary, and with respect to the treaty called by the name of the “Clayton-Bulwer treaty,” [Page 146] serious differences have arisen with regard to the precise meaning of words, and the intention of those who framed them.
It was most desirable in framing a new agreement not to give rise to a fresh dispute.
But the different attitude of Great Britain and of the United States in regard to the internal dissensions now unhappily prevailing in the United States gave warning that such a dispute might arise out of the proposed convention.
Her Majesty’s government, upon receiving intelligence that the President had declared by proclamation his intention to blockade the ports of nine of the States of the Union, and that Mr. Davis, speaking in the name of those nine States, had declared his intention to issue letters of marque and reprisals; and having also received certain information of the design of both sides to arm, had come to the conclusion that civil war existed in America, and her Majesty had thereupon proclaimed her neutrality in the approaching contest.
The government of the United States, on the other hand, spoke only of unlawful combinations, and designated those concerned in them as rebels and pirates. It would follow logically and consistently, from the attitude taken by her Majesty’s government, that the so-called Confederate States, being acknowledged as a belligerent, might, by the law of nations, arm privateers, and that their privateers must be regarded as the armed vessels of a belligerent.
With equal logic and consistency it would follow, from the position taken by the United States, that the privateers of the southern States might be decreed to be pirates, and it might be further argued by the government of the United States that a European power signing a convention with the United States, declaring that privateering was and remains abolished, would be bound to treat the privateers of the so-called Confederate States as pirates.
Hence, instead of an agreement, charges of bad faith and violation of a convention might be brought in the United States against the power signing such a convention, and treating the privateers of the so-called Confederate States as those of a belligerent power.
The undersigned had at first intended to make verbally the declaration proposed. But he considered it would be more clear, more open, more fair to Mr. Adams to put the declaration in writing, and give notice of it to Mr. Adams before signing the convention.
The undersigned will not now reply to the reasons given by Mr. Adams for not signing the convention if accompanied by the proposed declaration. Her Majesty’s government wish the question to be fairly weighed by the United States government. The undersigned, like Mr. Adams, wishes to maintain and perpetuate the most friendly relations between her Majesty’s kingdom and the United States. It is in this spirit that her Majesty’s government decline to bind themselves without a clear explanation on their part to a convention, which, seemingly confined to an adoption of the declaration of Paris of 1856, might be construed as an engagement to interfere in the unhappy dissensions now prevailing in the United States—an interference which would be contrary to her Majesty’s public declarations, and would be a reversal of the policy which her Majesty has deliberately sanctioned.
The undersigned requests Mr. Adams to accept the assurance of his highest consideration.
C. F. Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.
[Untitled]
My Lord: Her Majesty’s government deeply lament the outbreak of hostilities in North America, and they would gladly lend their aid to the restoration of peace.
You are instructed, therefore, in case you should be asked to employ your good offices either singly or in conjunction with the representatives of other powers, to give your assistance in promoting the work of reconciliation. But as it is most probable, especially after a recent letter of Mr. Seward, that foreign advice is not likely to be accepted, you will refrain from offering it unasked. Such being the case, and supposing the contest not to be at once ended by signal success on one side or by the return of friendly feeling between the two contending parties, her Majesty’s government have to consider what will be the position of Great Britain as a neutral between the two belligerents.
So far as the position of Great Britain in this respect toward the European powers is concerned, that position has been greatly modified by the declaration of Paris of April 16, 1856. That declaration was signed by the ministers of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey.
The motives for making that declaration, and for agreeing to the articles of maratime law which it proposes to introduce with a view to the establishment of a “uniform doctrine” and “fixed principles,” are thus shortly enumerated in the declaration:
“Considering that maritime law in time of war has long been the subject of deplorable disputes;
“That the uncertainty of the law and of the duties in such a matter gives rise to differences of opinion between neutrals and belligerents which may occasion serious difficulties and even conflicts;
“That it is consequently advantageous to establish a uniform doctrine on so important a point;
“That the plenipotentiaries assembled in congress at Paris cannot better respond to the intentions by which their governments are animated than by seeking to introduce into international relations fixed principles in this respect—
“The above-mentioned plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized, resolved to concert among themselves as to the means of attaining this object, and having come to an agreement have adopted the following solemn declaration:”
- 1st. Privateering is and remains abolished.
- 2d. The neutral flag covers enemy’s goods, with the exception of contraband of war.
- 3d. Neutral’s goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy’s flag.
- 4th. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective—that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.
The powers signing the declaration engaged to bring it to the knowledge of the states which had not taken part in the congress of Paris, and to invite those states to accede to it. They finally agreed that “the present declaration is not and shall not be binding, except between those powers who have acceded or shall accede to it.”
The powers which acceded to the declaration are Baden, Bavaria, Belgium, Bremen, Brazil, Duchy of Brunswick, Chili, the Argentine Confederation, the Germanic Confederation, Denmark, the Two Sicilies, the Republic of the Equator, the Roman States, Greece, Guatemala, Hayti, Hamburg, Hanover, the Two Hesses, Lubeck, Mecklenburg Strelifcz, Mecklenburg Schwerin, Nassau, [Page 148] Oldenburg, Parma, Holland, Peru, Portugal, Saxony, Saxe Attenburg, Saxe Coburg Gotha, Saxe Meiningen, Saxe Weimer, Sweden, Switzerland, Tuscany, Wurtemburg, Anhalt Dessau, Modena, New Grenada, and Maguay.
Mr. Secretary Marcy, in acknowledging, on the 28th of July, 1856, the communication of the declaration of Paris made to the government of the United States by the Count de Sartiges, proposed to add to the first article thereof the following words: “and that the private property of the subjects or citizens of a belligerent on the high seas shall be exempted from seizure by public armed vessels of the other belligerents, except it be contraband;” and Mr. Marcy expressed the willingness of the government of the United States to adopt the clause so amended, together with the other three principles contained in the declaration.
Mr. Marcy also stated that he was directed to communicate the approval of the President of the second, third, and fourth propositions, independently of the first, should the proposed amendment of the first article be unacceptable.
The United States minister in London, on the 24th of February, 1857, renewed the proposal in regard to the first article, and submitted a draft of convention, in which the article so amended would be embodied with the other three articles. But, before any decision was taken on this proposal, a change took place in the American government by the election of a new President of the United States, and Mr. Dallas announced, on the 25th of April, 1857, that he was directed to suspend negotiations on the subject; up to the present time those negotiations have not been renewed.
The consequence is, that the United States remaining outside the provisions of the declaration of Paris, the uncertainty of the law and of international duties with regard to such matters may give rise to differences of opinion between neutrals and belligerents which may occasion serious difficulties and even conflicts.
It is with a view to remove beforehand such “difficulties,” and to prevent such “conflicts,” that I now address you.
For this purpose I proceed to remark on the four articles, beginning, not with the first, but with the last.
In a letter to the Earl of Clarenden of the 24th of February, 1857, Mr. Dallas, the minister of the United States, while submitting the draft of a new convention, explains the views of the government of the United States on the four articles.
In reference to the last article, he says: “The fourth of those principles, respecting blockades, had, it is believed, long since become a fixed rule of the law of war.”
There can be no difference of opinion, therefore, with regard to the fourth article.
With respect to the third article, the principle laid down in it has long been recognized as law, both in Great Britain and in the United States. Indeed this part of the law is stated by Chancellor Kent to be uniform in the two countries.
With respect to the second article, Mr. Dallas says, in the letter before quoted: “About two years prior to the meeting of congress at Paris, negotiations had been originated and were in train with the maritime nations for the adoption of the second and third propositions substantially as enumerated in the declaration.”
The United States have therefore no objection in principle to the second proposition.
Indeed her Majesty’s government have to remark that this principle is adopted in the treaties between the United States and Russia of the 22d of July, 1854, and was sanctioned by the United States in the earliest period [Page 149] of the history of their independence by their accession to the armed neutrality.
With Great Britain the case has been different. She formerly contended for the opposite principles as the established rule of the law of nations.
But having, in 1856, upon full consideration, determined to depart from that rule, she means to adhere to the principle she then adopted. The United States, who have always desired this change, can, it may be presumed, have no difficulty in assenting to the principle set forth in the second article of the declaration of Paris.
There remains only to be considered the first article, namely, that relating to privateering, from which the government of the United States withhold their assent. Under these circumstances it is expedient to consider what is required on this subject by the general law of nations. Now, it must be borne in mind that privateers bearing the flag of one or other of the belligerents may be manned by lawless and abandoned men, who may commit, for the sake of plunder, the most destructive and sanguinary outrages.
There can be no question but that the commander and crew of the ship bearing a letter of marque must, by law of nations, carry on their hostilities according to the established laws of war. Her Majesty’s government must, therefore, hold any government issuing such letters of marque responsible for, and liable to make good, any losses sustained by her Majesty’s subjects in consequence of wrongful proceeding of vessels sailing under such letters of marque.
In this way the object of the declaration of Paris may, to a certain extent, be attained without the adoption of any new principle.
You will urge these views upon Mr. Seward.
The proposals of her Majesty’s government are made with a view to limit and restrain that destruction of property and that interruption of trade which must, in a greater or less degree, be the inevitable consequence of the present hostilities. Her Majesty’s government expect that these proposals will be received by the United States government in a friendly spirit. If such shall be the case, you will endeavor (in concert with M. Mercier) to come to an agreement on the subject binding France, Great Britain, and the United States.
If these proposals should, however, be rejected, her Majesty’s government will consider what other steps should be taken with a view to protect from wrong and injury the trade and the property and persons of British subjects.
I am, &c., &c., &c.,
The Lord Lyons.