From a review of the whole course of these proceedings I am led to infer
the existence of some influence in the cabinet here adverse to the
success of this negotiation. At the time of my last conference with Lord
Russell I had every reason, from his manner, to believe that he
considered the offer of the project as perfectly satisfactory. The
suggestion of a qualification did not make its appearance until after
the consultation with his colleagues, when it showed itself first in the
enigmatical sentence of his note to me of the 31st of July, of which, in
my despatch No. 22 to the department, I confessed my inability to
comprehend the meaning, and afterwards in the formal announcement
contained in his note of the 19th of August. That the failure of the
measure, by reason of it, could not have been altogether unexpected I
[Page 136]
infer from Mr. Dayton’s
report to me of M. Thouvenel’s language to him, to the effect that his
government would prefer to lose the negotiation rather than to omit
making the exception.
Although the matter is not altogether germane to the preceding, I will
not close this despatch without calling your attention, to the copy of a
letter of Lord John Russell to Mr. Edwardes, which I transmit as cut
from a London newspaper, The Globe. It purports to have been taken from
parliamentary papers just published, although I have not seen them, nor
have I found it printed in any other newspaper. You will notice the
date, the 14th of May, being the very day of my first, visit to his
lordship in company with Mr. Dallas, when he did not see us, as well as
of the publication of the Queen’s proclamation. I have reason to believe
that the original form of that proclamation described the parties in
America in much the same terms used by his Lordship, and that they were
only qualified at a very late moment, and after earnest remonstrance.
The tone of the letter corresponds very much with that used to me, a
report of which was transmitted in my despatch No. 8.
[Untitled]
Legation of
the United States,
London,
August 23, 1861.
The undersigned, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of
the United States, has the honor to acknowledge the reception of the
note of the 19th instant, of Lord Russell, her Majesty’s principal
secretary of state for foreign affairs, covering the copy of a
declaration which his lordship proposes to make upon signing the
convention which has been agreed upon between her Majesty the Queen
of Great Britain and Ireland, and the United States of America,
embodying the articles of the declaration of Paris, and at the same
time requesting him to name a day in the course of this week for the
signature of the convention, in conjunction with a similar
proceeding, to be arranged to take place at Paris, between Mr.
Dayton and the minister of foreign affairs on the part of the French
government.
The first step rendered necessary by this proposal was that the
undersigned should communicate with Mr. Dayton in order to know
whether a similar declaration was contemplated on the part of the
Emperor of the French, and in case it was, whether Mr. Dayton was
still prepared to proceed. Mr. Dayton’s letter containing that
information was received only yesterday, which fact, in conjunction
with a brief absence of the undersigned, will account for the
apparent delay in answering his lordship’s note.
In order perfectly to understand the position of the undersigned, it
will be necessary briefly to recapitulate the particulars of this
negotiation. But a few weeks after the accession of the President of
the United States to office, his attention was turned to the state
in which the negotiation on the subject of the four articles of the
declaration of Paris had been left by his predecessor; and his
disposition manifested itself to remove so far as he could the
obstacles which had been interposed in the way of completing it. To
that end, among the duties with which the undersigned was charged
immediately upon his arrival at his post, was an instruction at once
to make overtures to her Majesty’s government for a revival of the
negotiation here. And, in case of the manifestation of a favorable
disposition, he was further directed to
[Page 137]
offer a project of a convention, which he was
properly empowered to sign, after satisfying himself that the
incorporation of the amendment which had been proposed by Mr. Marcy
for the government of the United States, at a former stage of the
proceedings, was not attainable.
On the eighteenth of May last, being the day of the first interview
had with his lordship, the subject was only opened by the
undersigned as one on which he had power to negotiate, and the
disposition of her Majesty’s government to proceed here was tested.
It was then that he received a distinct impression from his lordship
that the matter had been already committed to the care of Lord Lyons
at Washington, with authority to agree with the government of the
United States on the basis of the adoption of three of the articles,
and the omission of the fourth altogether. Considering this to be
equivalent to declining a negotiation here, and at the same time
relieving him from a duty which would be better performed by his own
government, the undersigned cheerfully acquiesced in this
suggestion, and accordingly wrote home signifying his intention not
to renew the subject unless again specifically instructed so to
do.
One month passed away, when the Secretary of State of the United
States, after a conference with Lord Lyons, learning that his
lordship did not confirm the representation of the powers with which
the undersigned had understood him to be clothed, and, so far from
it, that he did not feel authorized to enter into any convention at
all at Washington, directed the undersigned to inform the government
in London of this fact, and to propose once more to enter into
convention, if agreeable, here.
Immediately upon the receipt of these instructions, the undersigned
wrote a letter on the 11th of July, as his lordship may remember,
reciting these facts and renewing the question whether a proposal of
negotiation at this place would be acceptable to her Majesty’s
government. To this letter a favorable reply was received on the
13th, and an interview took place the same day, at which, after
ascertaining that the amendment desired by his government would not
be successful, the undersigned had the honor to present to his
lordship the project in the same form in which it had been, nearly
two months before, placed in his hands, and in which it has been
since accepted, and to offer a copy of his powers to negotiate. His
lordship, after examining the former, remarked that he would take it
for consultation with his colleagues, and in the meantime that there
was no necessity for a copy of the powers.
The next step in the negotiation was the receipt, by the undersigned,
of a letter from his lordship, dated the 18th of July, calling his
attention to the fact that the declaration of Paris contemplated a
concurrence of various powers, and not an insulated engagement of
two powers only, and requiring an assurance that the United States
were ready to enter into a similar engagement with France and with
other maritime powers, parties to the declaration, and not with
Great Britain alone. But, inasmuch as this process itself might
involve the loss of much time, that her Majesty’s government would
deem themselves authorized to advise the Queen to conclude a
convention with the President of the United States so soon as they
should have been informed that a similar convention has been agreed
upon between the President and the Emperor of the French.
Upon receiving this reply the undersigned, not unwilling to do
everything within his power to forward an object considered by him
of the greatest value, immediately opened a correspondence with Mr.
Dayton, the representative of the United States at Paris, to learn
from him whether such an arrangement as that contemplated in his
lordship’s note could not be at once carried out by him. With some
reluctance Mr. Dayton consented to promote it, but only upon the
production of evidence satisfactory to his own mind
[Page 138]
that the amendment originally proposed
by Mr. Marcy was not attainable. The undersigned then addressed
himself to his lordship, and with entire success. The evidence was
obtained, Mr. Dayton acted with success, and no further difficulties
then seemed to be in the way of a speedy and simultaneous
affirmation of concurrence in the principles of the declaration of
Paris by the United States, in conjunction with the other
powers.
The public law thus declared to be established, embraced four general
propositions, to wit:
- 1.
- Privateering is abolished.
- 2.
- The neutral flag covers enemy’s goods, except contraband
of war.
- 3.
- Neutral goods safe under an enemy’s flag, with the same
exception.
- 4.
- Blockades, to be binding, must be effective.
The government of the United States, in proposing to join in the
establishment of these principles, are believed by the undersigned
to be acting with the single purpose of aiding to establish a
permanent doctrine for all time. Convinced of the value of it in
ameliorating the horrors of warfare all over the globe, they have,
perhaps against their notions of their immediate interest, consented
to waive temporary considerations of expediency for the attainment
of a great ultimate good. They are at last prepared to sign and seal
an engagement pure and simple, and by so doing to sacrifice the hope
of attaining, at least for the present, an improvement of it to
which they have always attached great value. But just at the moment
when their concurrence with the views of the other maritime powers
of the world would seem to be certain, they are met with a
proposition from one, if not more, of the parties, to accompany the
act with a proceeding somewhat novel and anomalous in this case,
being the presentation of a written declaration, not making a part
of the convention itself, but intended to follow the signature, to
the effect that “her Majesty does not intend thereby to undertake
any engagement which shall have any bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal differences now
prevailing in the United States.”
Obviously a consent to accept a particular exception, susceptible of
so wide a construction of a joint instrument, made by one of the
parties to it in its own favor at the time of signing, would justify
the idea that some advantage is, or may be suspected to be, intended
to be taken by the other. The natural effect of such an
accompaniment would seem to be to imply that the goverment of the
United States might be desirous, at this time, to take a part in the
declaration, not from any high purpose or durable policy, but with
the view of securing some small temporary object in the unhappy
struggle which is going on at home. Such an inference would spoil
all the value that might be attached to the act itself. The mere
toleration of it would seem to be equivalent to a confession of
their own weakness. Rather than that such a record should be made,
it were a thousand times better that the declaration remain unsigned
forever. If the parties to the instrument are not to sign it upon
terms of perfect reciprocity, with all their duties and obligations
under it perfectly equal, and without equivocation or reservation of
any kind, on any side, then is it plain that the proper season for
such an engagement has not yet arrived. It were much wiser to put it
off until nations can understand each other better.
There is another reason why the undersigned cannot at this moment
consent to proceed under the powers conferred on him to complete
this negotiation when clogged with such a declaration, which is
drawn from the peculiar construction of the government of his own
country. By the terms of the Constitution, every treaty negotiated
by the President of the United States must, before it is ratified,
be submitted to the consideration of the Senate of the United
States. The question immediately arises in this case, what is to be
done with a declaration like that which his lordship proposes to
make.
[Page 139]
Is it a part of the
treaty, or is it not? If it be, then is the undersigned exceeding
his instructions in signing it, for the paper made no part of the
project which he was directed to propose; and in case he should
sign, the addition must be submitted to the Senate for its advice
and consent, together with the paper itself. If it be not, what
advantage can the party making the declaration expect from it in
modifying the construction of the project, when the Senate have
never had it before them for their approval? It either changes the
treaty or it does not. If it does, then the question arises, why did
not the undersigned procure it to be incorporated into it? On the
other hand, if it do not, why did he connive at the appearance of a
desire to do it without effecting the object?
The undersigned has ever been desirous of maintaining and
perpetuating the most friendly relations between her Majesty’s
kingdom and the United States, and he continues to act in the same
spirit when he deprecates the submission of any project clogged with
a similar exception to the consideration of the Senate of the United
States. He has reason to believe that already a strong
disinclination exists in that body to the acceptance of the first of
the four propositions embraced in the declaration itself, and that
mainly because it is esteemed to be too much of a concession to the
great maritime powers. Were he now to consent, without further
instructions, to accept a qualification which would scarcely fail to
be regarded by many unfavorably disposed persons as more or less
directly an insult to the nation in its present distress, he should
deem himself as incurring the hazard of bringing on difficulties
which he professes an earnest wish to avoid.
For the reasons thus given the undersigned has reluctantly come to
the conclusion to decline to fix a day for proceeding in the
negotiation under its present aspect, at least until he shall have
been able to submit the whole question once more to the judgment of
the authorities under which he has the honor to act.
A copy of this letter will also be forwarded to Mr. Dayton for his
information.
The undersigned prays Lord Russell to receive the assurances of the
most distinguished consideration with which he is his obedient
servant.
Right Hon. Earl Russell, &c., &c., &c.
Lord Russell to
Mr. Edwards.
Foreign
Office, May 14,
1861.
It is for the Spanish government to weigh in the balance of their
judgment the advantages and inconveniences which may arise from the
annexation of the territory of the Dominican state to the dominions
of Spain; and any opinion which her Majesty’s government may form on
the subject can be founded on no other consideration than a regard
for what they may look upon as the real and permanent interests of
Spain.
Her Majesty’s government would, no doubt, have felt a strong and
decided dissatisfaction at the proposed annexation if it had been
likely to lead to the introduction of slavery into a community which
is free from the taint of that pernicious institution; but the
formal and repeated declarations of Marshal O’Donnell, that under no
circumstances will slavery be introduced into the Dominican
territory, have removed the main cause which would have led her
[Page 140]
Majesty’s government to
view the proposed annexation with dislike and repugnance.
Her Majesty’s government certainly apprehended, when first this
projected annexation was talked of, that it might, if carried into
execution, involve Spain in unfriendly discussions, if not in
conflict, either with France or with the United States, or with
both. With regard to France, her Majesty’s government have not
learned that the French government has expressed any positive
objection to the proposed arrangement, although she may not think it
advantageous to Spain. It appears, also, from what has been stated
to you, that there is no probability at present of any positive
resistance to the measure, either by the northern or the southern
confederation of North America. But the Spanish government should
not too confidently rely on the permanent continuance of this
indifference or acquiescence on the part of the North Americans; and
it is not impossible that when the civil war which is now breaking
out shall have been brought to an end, an event which may happen
sooner than at present appears likely, both the north and the south
might combine to make the occupation of the Dominican territory by
Spain the cause of serious difference between the North American
governments and that of Spain.
Her Majesty’s government do not deny that Great Britain, as a power
naturally inclined to peace, and systematically addicted to
commerce, must always view a war between any two powers as an event
not only at variance with her principles, but to a certain degree
injurious to her interests. But with respect to Spain, the motives
of the British government spring from far higher sources. Great
Britain and Spain have for long periods of time, and in
circumstances of high moment to each, been faithful and active
allies; their alliance has been greatly useful and eminently
honorable to both. It is a fundamental maxim of British policy to
wish well to Spain, and earnestly to desire her welfare and
prosperity; and therefore any combination of events which might at
any time involve the possibility of Spain being engaged in a
conflict which, from local circumstances and disadvantages, might be
in the end seriously injurious to her rule over her ancient
possessions, would be viewed by her Majesty’s government with lively
apprehension and sincere regret.
