Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams.
Washington, July 1, 1861.
Sir: Your despatch No. 8 (dated June 14) has been received.
My despatch, No. 21, of 19th ultimo, has anticipated the matter you have discussed in the paper before me. It remains only to say that while we would prefer to add Mr. Marcy’s amendment, exempting private property of non-belligerents from confiscation in maritime war, and desire you to stipulate to that effect if you can, yet we are, nevertheless, ready and willing to accede to the declaration of the congress of Paris, if the amendment cannot be obtained. In other words, we stand on the instructions contained in my aforesaid despatch.
We, as you are well aware, have every desire for a good understanding with the British government. It causes us no concern that the government sends a naval force into the Gulf and a military force into Canada. We can have no designs hostile to Great Britain so long as she does not, officially or unofficially, recognize the insurgents or render them aid or sympathy. We regard the measures of precaution on her part, to which I have alluded, as consequences of the misunderstanding of our rights and her own real relation towards us that she seemed precipitately to adopt, before she heard the communication with which you were charged on our behalf. These consequences may be inconvenient to herself, but are not all occasion of irritation to the United States. Under present circumstances, the more effectually Great Britain guards her possessions and her commerce in this quarter the better we shall be satisfied. If she should change her course and do us any injury, which we have not the least idea now that she [Page 112] purposes to do, we should not be deterred from vindicating our rights and our unbroken sovereignty against all the armies and navies that she could send here.
Before the Queen’s proclamation was issued, and at the moment when privateers were invited and a naval force announced as being organized by the insurrectionists, it was reported to this government that the iron steamer Peerless, lying at Toronto, had been sold to insurgents to be used as a privateer to prey upon our commerce, and that she was, nevertheless, to pass under British papers and the British flag down the St. Lawrence to be delivered over to a pirate commander in the open sea. It was said that the governor general declined to interfere. I asked Lord Lyons to request the governor general of Canada to look into the facts, and prevent the departure of the vessel if he should find the report to be true. Lord Lyons answered that he had no authority to do so. I then said that I should direct our naval forces to seize and detain the vessel if they should have good reason to believe the facts reported to be true, and to refer the parties interested to this government. I did this at once, and his lordship protested. Afterwards, as we understand, the governor general did interfere, and the Peerless was prevented from sailing until the danger of her being converted into a pirate was prevented. Here the matter ended. Certainly the British government could not expect us to permit the St. Lawrence to become a harbor for buccaneers. Had the vessel been seized or detained we should at once have avowed the act and tendered any satisfaction to the British government if it should appear that the character of the vessel had been misunderstood.
Mr. Ashmun went to Canada to watch and prevent just such transactions as the sale or fitting out of the Peerless for a pirate would have been. It was not supposed that his visit there would be thought objectionable, or could give any uneasiness to the British government. Lord. Lyons here viewed the subject in a different light and complained of it. I instantly recalled Mr. Ashmun.
These are the two grievances presented to you by Lord John Russell. I trust that the British government will be satisfied that in both cases we were only taking care that the peace of the two countries should not be disturbed through the unlawful action of covetous and ill-disposed persons on the border which separates them.
I conclude with the remark that the British government can never expect to induce the United States to acquiesce in her assumed position of this government as divided in any degree into two powers for war more than for peace. At the same time, if her Majesty’s government shall continue to practice absolute forbearance from any interference in our domestic affairs, we shall not be captious enough to inquire what name it gives to that forbearance, or in what character it presents itself before the British nation in doing so. We hold ourselves entitled to regard the forbearance as an act of a friendly power, acting unconsciously of a domestic disturbance among us, of which friendly States can take no cognizance. On this point our views are not likely to undergo any change. In maintaining this position we are sure we do nothing derogating from the dignity of the British government, while we inflexibly maintain and preserve the just rights and the honor of the United States.
I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,
Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.