493. Memorandum of Conversation1 2
PARTICIPANTS:
- Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, Owner-Editor La Prensa
- James N. Briggs, Political Officer, Amembassy MANAGUA
In a two-hour tour d’horizon with the reporting officer, Chamorro said that he continues to believe that President Somoza will try to prolong his term in office beyond 1972. Chamorro continued that be has nothing concrete on which to base his prediction but feels that Somoza’s ego and the urging of close advisers who could not survive a change in administrations would in final analysis lead Somoza to seek to remain in power. According to Chamorro, Somoza faces an extremely difficult job in defusing the continuismo issue if he opts for re-election and will probably use a phased approach giving the appearance at each stage of the way that he is considering stepping down from the presidency. Chamorro said that he thinks Somoza’s best tactic would be a call for a constituent assembly sometime next year. In Chamorro’s view, Somoza could then spin out the period of campaigning for the assembly elections, with the elections finally taking place on or near February 6—the date on which the 1972 presidential elections would ordinarily take place. The assembly would then name Somoza as head of state for one or two years, after which there would be regular elections—presumably to elect Somoza for another full term.
Chamorro also discussed his views on what might transpire if Somoza decides to let another Liberal replace him as president, either through the regularly scheduled 1972 elections or by action of a constituent assembly. Chamorro emphasized that in such an eventuality he does not believe Somoza will be willing to give up effective power, but will instead remain on as Jefe Director of the Guardia and run [Page 2] the country from that position. Chamorro said that speaking in general terms both he and Conservative Party President Fernando Aguero, who engineered Chamorro’s ouster from the Party in 1968, would go along with a national transitional government composed of Liberals and Conservatives if Somoza names someone acceptable as President. However, Chamorro commented, neither Somoza nor Aguero will deal with him in reaching an agreement beforehand as to the desired outcome of a constituent assembly, and what might well happen, Chamorro said, is a secret Somoza-Aguero deal which neither will ever acknowledge. Chamorro said that if Somoza and Aguero come up with an arrangement whereby only the Conservative and Liberal Parties appear on the ballot for assembly delegates, there will be “a storm of reaction against them”—from himself, the Social Christians, and other opposition elements. Chamorro opined that Nicaragua desperately needs a symbolic change which will attract the nation’s youth into the political system. A Conservative-Liberal pact excluding the participation of other oppositionists, he said, will not produce the needed change and would in fact drive out of the present system many promising young leaders, especially among the Social Christians. Chamorro also said that if the country goes to elections for a constituent assembly he would insist on a zonal vote whereby independents (presumably he had in mind the ANC) could get on the ballot in their respective zones without the necessity of being members of a national party which had obtained legal status.
Turning to his anti-reelection strategy in the months to come, Chamorro said that he and other leaders of the ANC have held several meetings recently with the Social Christians and the Partido Liberal Independiente (PLI) to discuss coordination of their opposition to any bid by Somoza to stay in office beyond 1972. He anticipated that these groups will now work much closer together than in the past although there will probably be no formal machinery linking them. Chamorro said that he is fully aware that the PLI is now communist-controlled and that the communist and pro-communist elements within that party would try to use the coalition for their own purposes; however, he expressed confidence that he can handle this problem. (Note: The latest edition of the PLI’s newspaper contains an editorial discussing the need for a “national front” against Somoza.) Chamorro added that he has also met recently with representatives of Liberal Party leader Ramiro Sacasa (who is trying to organize Liberal Party elements to oppose Somoza’s re-election); unfortunately, Chamorro said, [Page 3] the Sacasistas are still insisting that at least for the time being they must work strictly within the Framework of the Liberal Party.
In further comments regarding his efforts to pull together the various elements opposing Somoza, Chamorro disclosed that he and his close adviser, Dr. Emilio Alvarez Montalvan, had recently met with several university student leaders to discuss how the students might cooperate with the ANC-Social Christian-PLI grouping. Among the students attending were members of the communist-front Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario, the Social Christians, and the Juventud Universitaria Catolica. According to Chamorro, he was stunned by the students’ unanimous and adamant rejection of his overtures. The students made clear, Chamorro said, that they would not participate in “Nicaragua’s present rigged political system” and insisted that Somoza has no intention of allowing representative government to develop here. The students argued that their participation in the current “political game” would only serve to add credibility to an authoritarian regime controlled by oligarchs who will never give up their present control peacefully. Chamorro claimed that the students then gave him another surprise when they told him that if he is willing to head a revolution against Somoza and has access to the needed arms and financial support, they will be ready to follow his leadership. Chamorro said that he pointed out the futility of the revolutionary route in the present circumstances and tried to relate the current situation to his unsuccessful efforts at mounting revolutions in 1954 and 1959; however, Chamorro continued, he made little if any impression on the students who insisted that basic change in Nicaragua can only come about through violence. Chamorro said that his meeting with the students also underscored his previous understanding that there is a widespread sympathy among the students for the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional and that this sympathy is growing.
In discussing his plans for the ANC, Chamorro remarked that he and most of his followers want very much to return to the Conservative Party. He said that he is now convinced that because of the country’s two-party tradition it is virtually impossible to create a new party in Nicaragua which would make a good showing in 1972. The only stumbling block to a Conservative-ANC reconciliation, he argued, is Fernando Aguero, whose dictatorial manner, Chamorro insisted, is [Page 4] ruining the party and alienating some of its best leaders. In time, Chamorro speculated, Aguero will be moved aside because of his lack of success; and when that occurs he, Chamorro, will be ready to come back into the fold. As long as Aguero remains as head of the party, Chamorro said, La Prensa will continue to give Aguero and the party as little coverage as possible and actively look for ways to discredit Aguero.
Chamorro then ranged over his views on a number of the possible Liberal Party presidenciables who might head a national transitional government. As candidates acceptable to him, he mentioned Vice President Alfonso Callejas Deshon, former Foreign Minister Oscar Sevilla Sacasa, Ramiro Sacasa, and Banco Nicaraguense Manager Eduardo Montealegre who, Chamorro said, is not a candidate but is an exceptionally talented and strong-minded individual. Chamorro said that Vice President Francisco Urcuyo is an able politician but does not have the depth of conviction and personal fortitude which would keep him from being a complete Somoza puppet. Chamorro also ruled out former Labor Minister Ernesto Navarro Richardson and Presidential Secretary Noel Pallais as lightweights, and was highly critical of Chamber of Deputies President Orlando Montenegro, who he said is unstable and violent. Chamorro commented that while all of the presidenciables seem to be doing an outstanding job in keeping their names and faces in the newspapers, none of them is apparently doing any organizing but rather each is waiting patiently for Somoza’s decision on re-election and each hopes for Somoza’s blessing of his presidential aspirations.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2 NIC. Confidential. Transmitted to the Department of State as Enclosure 1 to Airgram A–80 from the Embassy in Managua, May 26.↩
- Political Officer Briggs met for two hours with Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, the Owner-Editor of Prensa Libre, to discuss Nicaragua’s political situation, President Somoza’s potential continuation in power, and the disenfranchisement of university students. He also noted the growing sympathy for the Sandinista movement.↩