Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972

Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972: Document List

Document 1: National Security Study Memorandum 15, Washington, February 3, 1969.

President Nixon asked for a review of U.S. posture toward internal political developments in Latin America, U.S. security interests, development assistance strategy, and the role of the OAS and other multilateral organizations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–134, NSSM 15. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the JCS. An Analytical Summary of the five papers is printed as Document 5. The overall statement of U.S. policy towards Latin America is printed as Document 4.

Document 2: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, May 7, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger summarized a memorandum from AID regarding the possibility of transferring funding from housing to highways in AID programs in Latin America. Kissinger informed Nixon that AID Administrator Rutherford Poats thought it would be difficult to transfer funding and outlined his reasoning. Nixon disagreed with AID's conclusion and asked the State Department for a new study.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, NSC Files, Box 797, Country Files, Latin America, LA General, volume I 1–7/69. No classification marking. At the end of the memorandum the President wrote, “1) I expected this. 2) I am not satisfied. 3) In all our Latin program I want to turn away from Housing and other welfare handouts—and toward highways, etc.—which produce wealth and where we know our money does something tangible. 4) Have Meyer et al. Give me a report on this.” A report was not found.

Document 3: Minutes of an NSC Review Group Meeting, Washington, July 3, 1969, 2–3:50 p.m.

The participants reviewed U.S. interests and policy in Latin America. In addition, the participants discussed issues of political structure, economic development, and the future of U.S. assistance to the region.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) Box H–111, SRG Minutes, Originals. Confidential. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The revised version of the Latin American Study, which was written in response to NSDM 15, is printed as Document 4.

Document 4: Study Prepared in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 15, Washington, July 5, 1969.

The Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs outlined general considerations and guidelines for determining U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. The study focused on the basic nature of U.S.-Latin American relations, defining U.S. objectives in the hemisphere, establishing what style or technique would guide U.S. policy, and where the United States should concentrate its attention.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box–134, NSSM 15 [1 of 3]. Secret. The revised draft of a study prepared by the IB/ARA in March 1969. The original draft is not published. National Security Study Memorandum 15 is Document 1.

Document 5: Analytical Summary Prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Latin America, Washington, undated.

To brief the NSC for its July 9 meeting on Latin America, the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Latin America outlined U.S. interests in the region and discussed the possible directions that United States-Latin American relations might take during the Nixon administration.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–23, NSC Meeting 7/9/69, Latin America. Secret. Forwarded under cover of an undated memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, in which Kissinger recommended that the President make no decisions at the July 9 NSC meeting on Latin America. The memorandum is not published. The IG Paper is printed as Document 4. NSC meeting minutes were not found, but Alexander Haig kept handwritten notes. (Ibid., Box H–121, NSC Meeting, July 9, 1969)

Document 6: Editorial Note.

Document 7: National Security Study Memorandum 68, Washington, July 12, 1969.

Following the July 9 NSC meeting on Latin American policy, Nixon directed that the CIA prepare a report on the Catholic Church in Latin America by October 10 and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepare a report on the Military Establishments in Latin America by October 30.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–159. Secret. A copy was sent to the Secretary of Defense. The CIA report is printed as Document 13. The JCS report has not been found.

Document 8: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 22, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger recounted the preliminary conclusions for the President of the CIA paper “The Church and Change in Latin America.” The paper highlighted that advocacy by the Catholic Church for social reforms may, in some cases, produce greater instability. Over a longer period of time, those reforms had the potential of spurring revolution in some areas and more radical trends promoted by the Church would most likely strengthen anti-American sentiment in the region.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 797, Country Files, Latin America, Latin America General, volume II, September–October 1969. Secret. Sent for information. On the first page, Nixon wrote, “K—get this info to Buchanan for some column and think pieces.” Attached but not published at Tab A is the CIA's July 10 report. The July 9 NSC meeting is referenced in Document 6. The CIA study is Document 13.

Document 9: Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Undersecretaries Committee (Richardson) to President Nixon, Washington, August 13, 1969.

Richardson discussed the efforts of the NSC Undersecretaries Committee to convince Congress to modify the Conte Amendment which restricted the Administration from selling jet military aircraft to Latin American nations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 779, Country Files, Latin America, Colombia, Vol. 1. Secret. For more information on the concerns of the Nixon administration regarding Congressional restrictions on military sales to Latin America, see the Argentina, Colombia, Brazil, and Venezuela country chapters of this volume.

Document 10: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 2, 1969.

In this 4 page memorandum, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger discussed the 4 proposals regarding U.S. negotiations on financing the cost of the Darien Gap portion of the Pan American Highway. Nixon agreed to the 4 recommendations presented by Kissinger and agreed to inform President Lleras of Colombia of his intentions.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 797, Country Files, Latin America General, volume 2, September–October 1969. Secret. Sent for action. Nixon initialed for approval on all recommendations on October 7. Attached but not published are Tabs A through F. Tab A is a June 13 memorandum of conversation; Tab B is an August 13 memorandum from the Department of State to the President; Tab C is an August 18 memorandum from Volcker to the President; Tab D is an August 20 memorandum from Hughes to the President; Tab E is a July 10 memorandum from Kearns to Secretary Rogers; and Tab F is a June 30 memorandum from Beggs to Secretary Rogers. Attached but not published at Annex I is a paper titled, “Alternative Financing Formulas.” In a December 8 memorandum to the President, Kissinger requested his support for a bill in the House of Representatives for funding to complete the Pan American highway. Nixon initialed his approval on December 10. (Ibid., Box 798, Country Files, Latin America General, volume 3, November 1969–May 1970)

Document 11: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 8, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger reported on the views of the personal assistant to Colombian PresidentLleras, Rodrigo Botero, on the U.S.-Latin American economic relations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC File, Box 797, Country Files, Latin America, Latin America General, volume 2, September–October 1969. Confidential. Sent for information. In the margin next to the section beginning with “What they need basically,” Nixon underlined most of the sentence and wrote, “ agree —this Oct 31 speech must not be a dud stylistically.” Nixon also underlined most of the next statement and the penultimate sentence, and wrote, “do it” in the margin. Nixon's comment was dated October 20. The attached memorandum of conversation has not been found.

Document 12: Minutes of an NSC Review Group Meeting, Washington, October 9, 1969, 2:15–4:15 p.m.

The Review Group discussed U.S. economic policy towards Latin America and the upcoming IA–ECOSOC meetings.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1969. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The agendas for the October 15 and 17 meetings were forwarded to the NSC Review Group under the cover of an October 4 memorandum from Davis. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 797, Country Files, Latin America, Latin America General, volume 2, September–October 1969) The IA–ECOSOC paper was forwarded to Nixon under the cover of an undated memorandum from Kissinger. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–211, NSDM Files, NSDM 30) The proposals for the IA–ECOSOC are published as Document 15. The minutes of the October 15 NSC meeting are published as Document 14.

Document 13: Intelligence Memorandum 2609/69, Washington, October 9, 1969.

In this 3 page memorandum titled “The Church in Latin America,” the CIA reported that, while foreign priests played an important role in the more progressive, social-reform branch of the Catholic Church, they remained a minority segment, facing an ambivalent Vatican and traditional Latin American conservatism.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–177, NSSM 108. Secret. The study was prepared in response to NSSM 68, published as Document 7. The study was prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

Document 14: Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, Washington, October 15, 1969.

The participants discussed United States-Latin American economic issues, particularly trade. President Nixon concluded the meeting by stating that the United States needed to firmly support its friends in Latin America, including military governments in the region.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1969. Secret. According to the President's Daily Diary, the following attended the meeting, the meeting lasted from 10:05 a.m. to 12:20 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

Document 15: Annex A to a Paper Prepared in the Department of State, Washington, undated.

The Under Secretaries Committee identified 26 proposals for the U.S. position at the November Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA–ECOSOC) meetings.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–211, NSDM Files, NSDM 30. Confidential. Attached to a memorandum from Richardson to Nixon, October 17. For the proposals adopted, see Document 17.

Document 16: National Security Decision Memorandum 28, Washington, October 20, 1969.

The President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, informed Secretary of State William Rogers and AID Administrator Hannah that the President had decided to untie all AID procurement loans to Latin America.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–211, NSDM Files, NSDM 28. Confidential. A copy was sent to the Secretaries of Treasury and Commerce, and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. For the text of Nixon's October 31 speech see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 893–901. The October 15 NSC meeting is published as Document 14. In an October 17 memorandum to the President, Hannah advocated Nixon only untie U.S. assistance used to acquire local currencies for financing local costs of development programs in Latin America. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 193, Agency Files, AID, January 1969–December 1969, Vol. 1)

Document 17: National Security Decision Memorandum 30, Washington, November 5, 1969.

In anticipation of the IA–ECOSOC meetings, President Nixon approved 12 of the proposals made by the Under Secretaries Committee without modification, and did not approve four of the proposals. He approved eight of the proposals with modifications.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–211, NSDM Files, NSDM 30. Confidential. A copy was sent to the Secretaries of Defense and Labor; the Director of the Bureau of Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the CIA, the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors. For the text of the October 31 speech, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 893–907. A list of the Under Secretaries' proposals are published as Document 15. NSDM 28 is Document 16.

Document 18: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 2, 1969.

Vaky summarized the list of recommendations on individual countries made by Governor Rockefeller after his Latin American visit.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 798, Country Files, Latin America, Latin America General, Volume 3, November 1969–May 1970. Confidential. Sent for information. Kissinger wrote on the first page, “Pete—Can we show this to Rockefeller?” Also written, in an unknown hand, was “OBE.” Nixon dispatched Rockefeller to Latin America confer with leaders in the region.

Document 19: Intelligence Memorandum, OCI No. 2622/69, Washington, December 8, 1969.

In this 5 page intelligence memorandum titled “The Military and Nationalism in Latin America,” the CIA analyzed the influence of nationalism on the behavior of Latin American militaries and implications for U.S. policy.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, Job 79–T00829A. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. NSSM 68 is Document 7. The JCS response to NSSM 68 has not been found.

Document 20: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee, Washington, December 30, 1969.

As a follow-up to President Nixon's October 31 speech on U.S. policy toward Latin America, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger directed the Under Secretaries Committee to submit a report to the President that outlined U.S. positions on various issues that would be discussed at the forthcoming round of IA–ECOSOC talks.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Economic Policy), Subject and Country Files: Lot 72 D 464, IA–ECOSOC, Caracas, January and February 1970. Confidential. The Committee's report, January 21, 1970, is ibid., National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee Decision Memorandum, 1969–1977; Lot 83 D 276, NSC U/DM 25. Kissinger communicated Nixon's responses to the Committee's recommendations in NSDM 39 (Document 23).

Document 21: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 1, 1970.

National Security Council staff member Vaky urged President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger to allocate more resources to Latin America, give it special treatment, advocate pro-Latin American policies even if they conflicted with U.S. domestic interests, and cultivate sympathy and understanding toward the region.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 798, Country Files, Latin America, Latin America General, Volume III, November 1969–May 1970. Confidential. Sent for information. Kissinger wrote on the top of the memorandum, “Excellent paper.” At the end of the memorandum, Kissinger wrote, “All right, how do we get it?”

Document 22: National Security Decision Memorandum 37, Washington, January 27, 1970.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger communicated President Nixon's response to the Under Secretaries Committee's recommendations on Latin American economic policy, particularly efforts to promote multilateral assistance, strengthen capital markets, and expand exports.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–213, NSDM 37. Confidential. A copy was sent to the Secretaries of Defense, Labor, Interior, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Chairman of the JCS, the DCI, the President of the EXIM Bank, the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, and the Chairman of the CEA. The proposals are described in Document 23. The NSC Under Secretaries Committee issued its report on January 21. (Ibid., Department of State, National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee Decision Memorandum, 1969–1977: Lot 83 D 276, NSC U/DM 25)

Document 23: National Security Decision Memorandum 39, Washington, January 29, 1970.

President Nixon approved the existing GATT standstill commitment for Latin America, the untying of local currency loans, and the componentry rule for untying AID-financed loans for the upcoming Special Meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–213, NSDM Files, NSDM 37. Confidential. A copy was sent to the Secretaries of Defense, Labor, and Interior, the Administrator of AID, the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, the Director of Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the JCS, the DCI; the President of the EXIM Bank, the Special Representative for Trade negotiations, and the Chairman of the CEA. Hannah's November 21 memorandum to Nixon is printed as Document 14 in Foreign Relations, vol. IV, 1969–1976, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972. The NSC Under Secretaries Committee issued its report on January 21. (Ibid., Department of State, National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee Decision Memorandum, 1969–1977: Lot 83 D 276, NSC U/DM 25)

Document 24: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 29, 1970.

In this 4 page memorandum, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger discussed the U.S. position for the special meetings of the IA–ECOSOC. Kissinger informed the President of the decisions that he had made on behalf of the President regarding the IA–ECOSOC special meetings.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–213, NSDM Files, NSDM 39. Confidential. Sent for information. Annex I has not been found. Annex II is published.

Document 25: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 17, 1970.

President Nixon approved the cash sale of jet military aircraft to Argentina and postponed decision on the broader issue of restriction waivers for arms sales to other Latin American countries.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 797, Country Files, Latin America, Latin America General, Volume 3, November 1969–May 1970. Secret. Sent for action. Nixon initialed for approval on February 20. Attached but not published at Tab A is the February 2 NSC Under Secretaries Committee Decision 26. In NSDM 42, February 19, Nixon approved the sale of the aircraft. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs), Numbers 1 through 50, January 1969–April 1970)

Document 26: National Security Decision Memorandum 46, Washington, March 5, 1970.

President Nixon approved in principle waiving the aid penalty provision of Section 119 of the Foreign Assistance Act for Chile, Colombia, and Brazil to allow those countries to purchase jet military aircraft, but demurred on the waiver of FMS credit restrictions, pending further consultations with Congress.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–214, NSDM 46. Secret; Nodis. A copy was sent to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the DCI, and the Chairman of the JCS.

Document 27: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 13, 1970.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger recommended that the U.S. Government support a replenishment of the Inter-American Development Bank to assist the institution's efforts to expand lending operations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) Box H–215, NSDM files, NSDM 54. Confidential. Sent for action. Kissinger initialed approval for the President on April 15. Attached but not published are Tabs A and Tab B. Written under the recommendation was “CFB [C. Fred Bergsten] informed Treasury (Petty) orally 4/15, 2:30 p.m.” The replenishment of IDB, including NSDM 54, is discussed in Foreign Relations, volume IV, 1969–1976, Foreign Assistance, International Development, and Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 25.

Document 28: Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee (Samuels) to President Nixon, Washington, August 31, 1970.

Acting Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee Samuels reported on key issues for the upcoming IA–ECOSOC meetings and outlined the Department's recommended responses to Latin American requests for reductions or elimination of trade barriers on exports from the region.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–219, NSDM Files, NSDM 83. Confidential. Attached but not published are the Annexes, and the August 28 memoranda from Palmby to Samuels and from Nehmer to Samuels.

Document 29: National Security Decision Memorandum 83, Washington, September 7, 1970.

The President decided not to increase the level of the 1970 meat import program, demurred on changes to the level of textile imports, but concurred with the recommendation to include the Options I and II lists in the trade preference scheme.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 363, National Security Decision Memoranda, Nos. 51–96. Confidential. The Under Secretaries Committee August 31 memorandum is printed as Document 28.

Document 30: Memorandum From the Senior Military Attaché in Paris (Walters) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 3, 1970.

Arguing that Latin America was a key region in the struggle against communism, military attaché Walters outlined alternative courses of action for military and economic assistance to the region to engage its allies and counter the communist influence.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 147, Agency Files, CIA Colby, General Walters. Secret. Sent for information. In the margin of the second paragraph of section 4, Nixon wrote, “ This is my preference. ” In the margin of the last paragraph, he wrote, “This should be our line, ” and underlined significant portions of the paragraph. Attached but not published is a paper prepared by Walters titled, “Specific Actions in the Military Field in Latin America.”

Document 31: Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 16, 1970.

National Security Council staff member Nachmanoff provided President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger with briefing material for his upcoming luncheon meeting with the Argentine, Brazilian, and Uruguayan ambassadors to discuss regional security, Chile, and trade issues.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 768, Country Files, Latin America, Argentina, 1969–August 31, 1971. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “HAK has seen.” Attached but not published are Tabs A, B, and C. Tab A is background on Argentina, Tab B is background on Brazil, and Tab C is background on Uruguay. Also attached is telegram 517 from Brasilia, November 12. It is printed as Document 129. Although no record of the meeting was found, Kissinger's Record of Schedule indicates the meeting occurred at the Argentine Ambassador's residence from 12:51 to 2:36 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Henry A. Kissinger, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule)

Document 32: National Security Study Memorandum 108, Washington, December 10, 1970.

President Nixon directed that a review be made of U.S. policy toward Latin America, including options to improve bilateral political relations, focusing specifically on trade and development assistance, security assistance, strengthening the OAS, and expanding and protecting U.S. private investment.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–178, NSSM Files, NSSM 108. Secret; Limdis. A copy was sent to the Secretaries of Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture, the Administrator of AID, and the Directors of OMB and USIA. NSSM 15 is Document 1. The summary of the Rockefeller Report recommendations is Document 18. The study requested by the President, “Review of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America,” is Document 35. The Intergovernmental Group for Inter American Affairs prepared an Analytical Summary in response to NSSM 108, June 17, 1971, in anticipation of an August 17 Senior Review Group meeting. (Ibid., Box H–59, SRG Meeting–Latin America, 8/17/71) A supplement, September 3, was titled, “U.S. Policy Toward the Nations of Latin America.” (Ibid.).

Document 33: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 25, 1971.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger reported on the findings of a NSC Under Secretaries Committee study on cross-border contacts and coordination among insurgent groups in Latin America.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 798, Country Files, Latin America, Latin America General, Vol. 4, January–June 1971. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon wrote in the margin next to the last sentence, “good—follow up diligently.” Attached but not published are Tabs A and B. Tab B is titled “Insurgency in Bolivia and Latin America.” Tab C, a DOD annex to the study, has not been found.

Document 34: National Security Study Memorandum 117, Washington, February 16, 1971.

President Nixon directed that a comprehensive review of U.S. policies in the Caribbean be conducted, with a focus on the following issues: expropriation of foreign companies' assets, regional effects from the reduced power of Great Britain, Caribbean nations' desire to trade with Cuba, the growth of black power, and increased Soviet military activities.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–59, Latin America, Caribbean, 1/17/71. Secret. A copy was sent to the Administrator of AID and the Director of USIA. The IG for Inter-American Affairs study, August 10, was titled, “Review of U.S. Policy in the Caribbean Area.” The portion of the study that discusses bauxite in the Caribbean is published as Document 46. The IG produced a supplementary report, dated September 3, titled, “Political and Security Aspects of U.S. Relations with Caribbean Countries.” (Ibid.) A DOD Report, dated December 13, 1972, was entitled, “The Future U.S.-Bahamas Relationship.” (Ibid.)

Document 35: Paper Prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs, Washington, March 1971.

In this paper, titled “Review of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America: Response to National Security Study Memorandum 108,” the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs (IG/ARA) provided an overview of U.S. interests in Latin America.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–177, NSSM Files, NSSM 108. Secret. NSSM 108 is printed as Document 32.

Document 36: Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the President's Assistant (Haldeman), the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), and Director of Central Intelligence Helms, Washington, March 5, 1971.

The participants discussed the Catholic Church in Latin America, and individual countries in the region in general terms.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 462–5, Oval Office. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed specifically for this volume. The transcript is part of a larger conversation that took place between 8:30–10:15 a.m. According to the President's Daily Diary, Haig joined the meeting at 9:15 a.m. and Helms joined the meeting at 9:29 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

Document 37: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 27, 1971.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger summarized a Department of State report on the status of the Pan American Highway.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 798, Country Files, Latin America, Latin America General, Vol. IV, January–June 1971. Confidential. Sent for information. Nixon wrote on the top of the document: “K—State really has no enthusiasm for roads. They want the money for welfare projects—I want to change the emphasis.” At the bottom of the memorandum, Nixon wrote, “H—tell K and Scali I know all this—1) But what are we doing to get symbolic credit for RN's leadership on this since his visit to Central America in 1955? 2) And on substance let's get a plan for a road all the way—.” Nixon circled the word “average” in the penultimate sentence and wrote in the margin: “a dodge of my question.” Nixon also wrote in the margin next to this sentence, which he underlined, “Our goal is a road usable year round —from NY to the tip of S.A. [South America].” Tab A, undated, is attached but not published.

Document 38: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, May 14, 1971.

President Nixon approved a recommendation that President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger direct priority attention to completing the Darien Gap portion of the Pan American Highway.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–224, NSDM files, NSDM 109. Secret. Sent for action. Nixon approved the recommendation. The document bears Nixon's stamped signature. Tab A, a May 5 report of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, has not been found. The NSC Under Secretaries Committee produced a revised version of the May 5 report on July 16. (Ibid., Department of State, S/S files: Lot 81 D 309, NSC–U/SM 100C)

Document 39: Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon, Washington, May 22, 1971.

Secretary of Defense Laird proposed the disestablishment of U.S. Southern Command.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 806, Country Files, Latin America, Southcom. Secret.

Document 40: National Security Decision Memorandum 109, Washington, May 25, 1971.

President Nixon directed that the Department of State consult with the Governments of Colombia and Panama, and that the Departments of State and Transportation consult with the Appropriations Committees of the Congress to accelerate construction of the Darien Gap Highway.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–223, NSDM files, NSDM 109. Secret. A copy was sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Office of Management and Budget, the Administrator, Agency for International Development the Director of Central Intelligence Agency; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee. The May 5 report of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee was not found. The NSC Under Secretaries Committee produced a revised version of the May 5 report on July 16. (Ibid., Department of State, S/S files: Lot 81 D 309, NSC–U/SM 100C)

Document 41: Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State (Irwin) to President Nixon, Washington, June 9, 1971.

Acting Secretary of State Irwin reported on efforts by some Caribbean and South American countries to nationalize the bauxite industry and steps being taken by the Department of State to respond to the situation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 798, Country Files, Latin America, Latin America General, Volume 4, January–June 1971. Secret. In Airgram Kingston A–90, the U.S. Embassy in Jamaica reported that the rise of Black Power in the Caribbean and increased economic nationalism in Jamaica might push the Jamaicans toward nationalization of the bauxite industry, Document 414. In Intelligence Memorandum 1839/69, August 6, 1969, the CIA reported on the rise of black radicalism in the Caribbean. (Ibid., Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Jamaica, Vol. 1)

Document 42: Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 11, 1971.

President Nixon and President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger discussed U.S. relations with Chile in the broader context of the administration's policy towards Latin America.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 517–4. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording published here specifically for this volume. The transcript is part of a larger conversation, 9:37–10:36 a.m. In the portion printed here, Nixon and Kissinger discussed different options for increasing assistance to Chile. The assassination of the right-wing Christian Democrat, who headed up the right-wing segment of the Christian Democratic Party, former Interior Minister Edmundo Perez Zujovic, is discussed in Lester A. Sobel, Chile & Allende, pp. 42–43.

Document 43: Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the President's Assistant (Haldeman), and Secretary of the Treasury Connally, Washington, June 11, 1971.

In a discussion on the communist threat to Latin America, President Nixon characterized the Department of State's Latin American Division as a “disaster area.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 517–20. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. The conversation took place between 2:05 and 2:38 p.m.

Document 44: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 6, 1971.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger reviewed the pros and cons of disestablishing Southcom and recommended that the President disapprove such action.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 806, Country Files, Latin America, Southcom. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the first page indicates the President saw it. In the fifth paragraph, Nixon circled the words “disestablishment” and “improve” and put a question mark in the margin. Nixon initialed the disapprove option, and lined through the other options. The memorandum at Tab B is printed as Document 39. In a July 20 memorandum, Kissinger communicated the President's decision to Laird, while indicating that Nixon would welcome recommendations “to make the Command more effective in carrying out essential Department of Defense programs in the Latin American area.” (Ibid.)

Document 45: Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting, Washington, August 4, 1971, 2:50–3:40 p.m.

The Senior Review Group discussed options for responding to the expropriation of property owned by U.S.-based companies overseas.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–112, SRG Minutes (Originals), 1971. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. An attached August 11 covering memorandum from Davis to Kissinger was stamped “HAK has seen” on September 7. A copy was sent to Kennedy, Hormats, and Nachmanoff. The participants discussed a July 31 paper prepared by an ad hoc group chaired by Legal Advisor John R. Stephenson which is published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 157. The undated memorandum to the President mentioned in the Summary of Conclusion is printed as Document 168, ibid.

Document 46: Study Prepared by the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs, Washington, August 10, 1971.

In this response to NSSM–117, the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs (NSC–IG/AR) laid out options regarding bauxite policy in the Caribbean, including diplomatic representations and a more hard-line approach.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–214, NSSM Files, NSSM 117. Secret. NSSM 131 is published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 155.

Document 47: Study Prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs, Washington, August 11, 1971.

This 8 page NSC Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs (NSC–IG/AR) study provided a list of recommendations for improving security assistance programs to Latin America.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–59, SRG Meeting, Latin America/Caribbean, 8/17/71. Secret. The title of the Report is “ Latin America —NSSM 108 and Military Presence Study.” Attached but not published at Tab B is “The Future of Grant MAP Material.” The January 12 study has not been found.

Document 48: Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting, Washington, August 17, 1971, 3:15–4:30 p.m.

The Senior Review Group discussed bilateral and multilateral policy objectives in Latin America and the Caribbean, including military assistance to the region.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–112, SRG Minutes (Originals), 1971. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. The response to NSSM 131 is published in Foreign Relations, volume IV, 1969–1976, Foreign Assistance, International Development, and Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 157. The IG recommendations on the Caribbean are published in Document 46. The recommendations of the NSSM 108 study are published in Document 47. Nixon met with Shearer on August 11, 1970. The IG/ARA paper on the Caribbean, September 3, supplemented the response to NSSM 117. (NA, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–181, NSSM Files, NSSM 117) The requested paper for a NSC meeting has not been found, and there is no record of a meeting.

Document 49: Memorandum of Meeting, Washington, September 4, 1971, 10 a.m.

In a conversation with Sanz de Santamaría on U.S.-Latin American relations, President Nixon reiterated his commitment to continuing development assistance and expanding trade with the region.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 332, Subject Files, Alliance for Progress, March 1969–March 1973. Confidential. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting lasted until 10:47 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) According to a September 9 memorandum from Nachmanoff to Kissinger, there were two versions of this memorandum. The version printed was for the White House files only. The version for general distribution did not include the statement by the President that Treasury would be more influential than State on the matter of U.S.-Latin American trade, and included the President's private comment that he would not object if Sanz de Santamaría sought a waiver of the U.S. surcharge on Latin American commodities. Nixon's August 17 statement is in Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 891–892.

Document 50: Conversation Among President Nixon, Attorney General Mitchell, and the Counselor to the President (Finch), Washington, September 30, 1971.

President Nixon briefed Counselor Finch on his upcoming goodwill visit to South America, which aimed at improving United States-Latin American relations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 581–4. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. The transcript is part of a larger conversation, 10:07–11:03 a.m.

Document 51: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 12, 1971.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger forwarded recommendations from the President's counselor Robert Finch and Pete Peterson that the administration introduce generalized tariff preferences and announce the expropriation policy to coincide with some positive foreign assistance action. Kissinger indicated that he agreed with Finch and Peterson that negotiating trade concessions from Latin America in exchange for lifting the surcharge would be counterproductive.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 814, Name Files, Senator Finch. Confidential. Sent for action. Kissinger approved both recommendations for Nixon. Attached but not published at Tab I is the November 10 memorandum from Finch and Peterson to Nixon.

Document 52: Memorandum From the Counselor to the President (Finch) to President Nixon, undated.

In this 15 page memorandum, Counselor Finch asserted that U.S. policymakers needed to come up with a coherent plan to link overall U.S. policy objectives to day-to-day programs.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–178, NSSM files, NSSM 108. Secret. It was drafted on December 2 by Hewitt. The memorandum is un-initialed. According to a January 18, 1972 covering memorandum from Hewitt to Kissinger, Nixon instructed that Finch's report, when finalized, be included in the Latin American Policy Review, in which he wanted Finch to participate. No final version of Finch's report or the Latin American Policy Review has been found. Hewitt recommended that Kissinger call Finch to inquire about the status of his report. No record that Kissinger contacted Finch has been found.

Document 53: Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of Treasury Connally, June 6, 1972.

President Nixon instructed Secretary Connally to inform Latin American heads of state with whom he would meet during his upcoming trip the President had a long-standing interest in Third World countries.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 954, VIP Visits, Connally Trip 6–7/72. No classification marking. Nixon informed Kissinger in a May 19 memorandum that “The Connally trip is vitally important, not only from the standpoint of our personal relationship, but also in terms, I believe, of the good it can do in the foreign policy area. What I have in mind is that he should go first-class with a Presidential-type aircraft to four countries in Latin America— Peru, Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia.” Nixon concluded, “Don't consult a lot of people in State about this thing. Just give me your own recommendation later today.” (Ibid., Box 341, Subject Files, HAK/President Memos, 1971–)

Document 54: Telegram 3549 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State and the Embassy in Venezuela, June 11, 1972, 2000Z.

President Caldera and Secretary Connally discussed oil, U.S. support for Codesur, and upgrading military equipment. The Ambassador concluded that Connally's conversation aided the Embassy in its dealings with Venezuela.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US /Connally. Secret; Exdis. It was repeated to Bogotá. Connally visited Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, and Peru on his Latin American trip, and made similar representations. Documentation on his trip can be found ibid.

Document 55: Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon, Washington, June 23, 1972.

In this 4 page memorandum, President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Haig reviewed the South American portion of Secretary Connally's trip and concluded that it was a success for U.S. policy. According to Haig, while generally avoiding detailed discussions over bilateral issues, Connally informed the Latin American leaders that President Nixon was committed to generalized trade preferences.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 954, VIP Visits, Connally Trip 6–7/72. Secret. Sent for information. A handwritten notation on the first page indicates the President saw it.

Document 56: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 30, 1972.

In this 3 page memorandum, Executive Secretary Eliot recommended against attempting to obtain Law of the Sea concessions from Ecuador, because such concessions might jeopardize resolution of the fisheries dispute.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, NSC Files, Box 799, Country Files, Latin America, Latin America (General), Vol. 6, July 1971–1974. Confidential. R. T. Curran signed above Theodore Eliot's typed signature. The May 18 memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger has not been found. NSDM 147 is Document 312. In a January 2 memorandum to President Nixon, Kissinger argued that the U.S. should seek Law of the Sea concessions from Ecuador, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, E–volume 1, Global Issues, 1969–1972, Document 418.

Document 57: Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) for the President's File, November 30, 1972, 10:15 a.m.

In a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Nixon indicated he wanted more U.S. military assistance for Latin America.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 862, For the President's Files (Winston Lord)–China Trip/Vietnam, Camp David Memos, September–December 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting lasted until 11:34 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

Document 58: Study Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, November 1972.

In its annual review of worldwide developments, the CIA noted continuing problems with Latin American economic nationalism and politically motivated violence affecting U.S. interests in the region.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–194, NSSM Files, NSSM 161. No classification marking. The study is titled, “Response to NSSM No. 161—A Review of Major International Developments During 1972.” NSSM 161, the President's Annual Review of American Foreign Policy, was issued September 25. (Ibid.)

Document 59: Study Prepared by the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs, Washington, October 9, 1969.

This Country Analysis and Strategy Paper served as an official statement of U.S. Government policy towards Argentina.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NSC/IG/ARA Files: Lot 72 D 96, Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) Argentina 1970. Secret. According to an attached NSC–IG/ARA Decision Memorandum #45, October 9, CASPs were an official statement of U.S. Government policy subject to change as events and circumstances warranted. So long as the general conditions set forth in the CASP prevailed, CASPs served as the policy frame for the annual program budget submissions for State, AID, DOD, USIA, and for activities of all other U.S. Government agencies with respect to this country. A CASP is subject to modification at any time by subsequent IG decisions. CASPs were written yearly for Argentina, and country team submissions and supporting documentation for the 1969–1972 are primarily in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 ARG–US.

Document 60: Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer) to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson), Washington, December 9, 1969.

The Inter-Agency Group called for terminating AID's program for Argentina, largely because the nation's purchases of arms from the United States would, under the Conte-Long Amendment, require such a severe cutback in assistance that AID's program could not be sustained.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, ARA Files: Lot 73 D 115, Argentina 1970. Secret. Sent through AID Administrator Hannah. Drafted on November 20 by Tragen and cleared by Gawf. Richardson, who approved both recommendations on February 2, 1970, penciled in an asterisk for Tab B and then penned at the bottom of the page, "*subject to updating as may be required." Attached but not published are Tabs A and B. Tab A is a December 8 memorandum from Fowler (AID AA/LA) to Hannah, which elaborated on the nature of the weaponry and Tab B is "Scenario," a strategy for notifying Argentina of the termination of the AID program. Additional documentation on the termination of the AID is ibid., Central Files 1967–69, AID (US) ARG. The Conte-Long Amendment to the Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations Act of 1968, adopted January 2, 1968 directed the President to withhold economic assistance in an amount equivalent to the amount spent by any underdeveloped country for the purchase of sophisticated weapons systems. (PL 90–249; 81 Stat. 936)

Document 61: Memorandum From the Ambassador in Argentina (Lodge) to President Nixon, Buenos Aires, February 11, 1970.

Ambassador Lodge outlined why it was in the U.S. interest to sell 16 A–4B airplanes to Argentina.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 768, Country Files, Argentina 1969–71. Secret. With his signature, Lodge handwrote, "and with warm personal regards." Nixon replied on March 5 indicating he had approved the sale of the airplanes. (Ibid.)

Document 62: National Intelligence Estimate 91–70, Washington, May 21, 1970.

This estimate predicted future Argentine economic growth, that Onganía's Government would continue in power for next two years, and that the nation's deep social and political tension would persist, and efforts to work closely with the United States would continue.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OCI Files, Job 85–T00875R, NIE. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on covering sheet, the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the NSA participated in the preparation of the estimate. All members of the intelligence board concurred in the estimate on February 13 except the FBI and the Atomic Energy Commission, on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. Although the report did not predict Ongonía's fall which occurred on June 9, Collins in a July 10 memorandum to Abbott Smith stated that the NIE was "basically sound." (Ibid., Job 79–R0102A, Box 392, Folder 5, Outlook for Argentina. Secret)

Document 63: Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, June 10, 1970.

Secretary Rogers stated that President Onganía had been ousted by General Alejandro Lanusse because Onganía refused to accept a military plan for gradual return to democracy and had vague plans for a "corporatist state." U.S. citizens and investment were unharmed by the coup.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 768, Country Files, Latin America, Argentina 1969–31 August 1971. Secret. The commanders in chief of the Argentina military argued that their resumption of power was legally consistent with the revolution of 1966 and required no recognition. (Telegram 2115 from Buenos Aires, June 10, ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL ARG–US.) The Assistant Legal Advisor for ARA also took this position in a June 10 memorandum to Tragen. (Ibid.) On June 12 Meyer informed Lodge that the Department had decided that a question of recognition did not exist. (Telegram 091622 to Buenos Aires, June 12, ibid.)

Document 64: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 16, 1970.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger summarized two letters from Ambassador John Davis Lodge to President Nixon. Lodge questioned whether it would be in the U.S. interest for Argentina to return to representative democracy. In the second letter Lodge proposed Bebe Rebozo visit Argentina.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 768, Country Files, Argentina 1969–31 August 71. Secret. Sent for action. Nixon approved the recommendation and wrote on the bottom of the memorandum, "Consider whether I should go there [Argentina] early in 1971." Nixon never made the trip. Attached but not published at Tab A is Nixon's October 22 reply to Lodge in which the President declared he was giving careful attention to Chile, and handwrote an additional note, "The campaign is heating up—we should gain some in the Senate and would win it—if it were not for the economic drag." Also attached but not printed is Tab B, two September 10 letters from Lodge to Nixon.

Document 65: Memorandum From the Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 23, 1971.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger concluded that General Alejandro Lanusse's takeover would not result in any significant change in policy, and did not represent a threat to U.S. interests.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 768, Country Files, Latin America, Argentina 1969–71. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Hewitt of the NSC staff sent this memorandum to Kissinger on March 23 with the recommendation that Kissinger send it to the President. On March 30, Kissinger cleared a congratulatory message from Nixon to Lanusse. (Ibid.)

Document 66: Talking Points Prepared by Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff for the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 18, 1971.

National Security Council staff member Nachmanoff briefed President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger for his meeting with Ambassador Lodge. Nachmanoff discussed SOUTHCOM, the role of the Ambassador, and the political and economic situation in both Argentina and Chile.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 768, Country Files, Latin America, Argentina 1969–71. Secret. Sent for information. No record of the meeting appeared in Kissinger's schedule book. Sent under a covering May 18 memorandum from Nachmanoff to Kissinger.

Document 67: Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Argentina (Lodge) to the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer), Buenos Aires, June 30, 1971.

Ambassador Lodge discussed the process he thought necessary for Argentina to receive U.S. economic assistance.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 768, Country Files, Latin America, Argentina 1969–71. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

Document 68: Backchannel Message From the Deputy Chief of Mission in Argentina (Barall) to the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer), Buenos Aires, July 2, 1971.

Deputy Chief of Mission Barall stated that the Argentine situation was deteriorating, and that the Argentinean Government needed a quick response to its request for U.S. aid.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 ARG. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis; Eyes Only. The message is as prepared for transmission. On June 24, Argentine President Alejandro Lanusse sent a backchannel message to Nixon, requesting assistance from the United States to support the Argentine peso. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 768, Country Files, Latin America, Argentina, 1969–1971)

Document 69: Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon, Washington, July 14, 1971.

President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Haig recommended that President Nixon go along with Secretary of State Rogers' idea that the U.S. Government could not meet his request. However, the U.S. Government would be willing to work with Argentine President Alejandro Lanusse and international agencies to come up with a sound economic program for the South American nation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 768, Country Files, Latin America, Argentina 1969–71. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. Nixon approved the recommendation. Attached but not published at Tab A is a July 3 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon. Tab B, a June 30 cable from Lodge to Meyer is printed as Document 67. Attached but not published at Tab C is a June 29 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, with a June 24 attachment from Lanusse to Nixon.

Document 70: Special National Intelligence Estimate 91–71, Washington, July 15, 1971.

During President Lanusse's administration, Argentina would experience significant economic and political problems. Although Argentine-United States relations were troubled in some respects, these relations would probably deteriorate under any successor government in the country.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 768, Country Files, Latin America, Argentina 1969–1971. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the NSA participated in the preparation of the estimate. All members of the intelligence board concurred in the estimate on February 13 with the exception of the FBI and the Atomic Energy Commission, on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. A July 28 covering memorandum from Hewitt to Kissinger that summarized the estimate bears the notation, "HAK has seen."

Document 71: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, August 24, 1971.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger informed President Nixon that President Lanusse would request assistance from the Soviet Union if the United States did not give assistance to Argentina. The Argentine leader also requested a personal representative from Nixon to travel to Argentina to discuss the country's economic problems.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 768, Country Files, Latin America, Argentina 1969–71. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. The memorandum was approved by "Haig for HAK for Pres." Written on the bottom of the second page, in an unknown hand, was, "8/24–Nachmanoff and Kennedy alerted." Attached but not published is an August 14 memorandum with Lanusse's request for assistance, which is discussed at the end of the first paragraph. Attached but not published is Tab A, an August 25 memorandum from Kissinger to the Secretaries of State and the Treasury informing them that the President had decided to send a personal representative to President Lanusse. Attached but not published at Tab B is an undated backchannel in which Nixon informed Lanusse he planned to send a personal representative to Argentina.

Document 72: Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Argentina (Lodge) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot), Buenos Aires, August 31, 1971.

The wide-ranging discussion revealed President Lanusse's motives for U.S. assistance, and U.S. attitudes towards Argentina. Nixon's personal representative, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, John Petty, discussed the reasons why the United States could not meet its requests for assistance.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 769, Country Files, Latin America, Argentina, 1 September 1970–31 December 1973. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The document was sent under a September 1 covering memorandum from Haig to Kennedy; not published. In the covering memorandum Haig stated that "we should move rapidly on a change of ambassadors. This man [Lodge] apparently does not have the confidence of President Lanusse; and from reading the dialogue, it is also evident that he hasn't the humility to recognize it."

Document 73: Memorandum From Ashley C. Hewitt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 29, 1971.

National Security Council staff member Hewitt noted Ambassador Lodge's lack of contact with top Argentine officials and how many such officials held Lodge in contempt. In addition, morale at the Embassy was very low.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 769, Country Files, Latin America, Argentina 9/1/70 to 12/31/73. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information; Outside the System. Tab A is attached but not printed. In a February 7, 1972 telephone conversation, Flanigan stated to Kissinger, "The President wants to leave him [Lodge] because he is surrounded by competent people. The President wants another post for him." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 371, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking) Lodge left his post as Ambassador to Argentina on November 10, 1973.

Document 74: Memorandum for the President's File, Washington, February 7, 1972.

President Lanusse thanked President Nixon for the helpful attitude of U.S. officials working with the Brignone Mission from Argentina. Nixon stated that he would do what he could to help Argentina economically.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Memos for the President's File, Beginning February 6, 1972. No classification marking. The call took place at 11:15 a.m. Drafted by interpreter Donald Barnes. The Brignone Mission, headed up by the President of the Central Bank of Argentina, Carlos Brignone, was a group of Argentine officials who worked with U.S. officials and the International Monetary Fund, to coordinate a loan for Argentina. According to telegram 581 from Buenos Aires, January 29, Lanusse requested the call to Nixon on January 28. (Ibid., Box 769, Country Files, Latin America, Argentina 1 September 1970–31 December 1973)

Document 75: Memorandum of Meeting, Washington, February 7, 1972.

Ismael Bruno Quijano, Argentina's Minister of Justice, noted the importance of U.S. economic assistance for his country, and asked for President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger to notify the Treasury Department that it should put in a good word with First National City Bank of New York to ensure the Argentine Financial Mission's success the following week.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 769, Country Files, Latin America, Argentina, 1 September 1970–31 December 1973. Secret. This memorandum is attached to a February 8 memorandum from Hewitt to Kissinger, which made two recommendations: "1.—That Kissinger call Secretary Connally concerning the Argentine Financial Mission's discussions with the New York banking community," which Kissinger approved; and "2.—That Kissinger approve distribution of the memorandum of meeting to the Department of State on a limited basis," which Kissinger disapproved. In a January 11 memorandum from Kissinger to Hewitt, the National Security Advisor agreed to meet with Quijano sometime between February 1–10. (Ibid.)

Document 76: Telegram 8185 from the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State, December 26, 1972, 2135Z.

The Embassy's country team predicted that former President Peron's return to Argentina was a positive development for the nation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 30–2 ARG. Confidential.

Document 76a: Editorial Note.

Document 77: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 27, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger reported on presidential succession after the death of President Barrientos. He predicted that the head of the armed forces, General Alfredo Ovando Candia, who had presidential aspirations, would emerge as the strong figure.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Bolivia, Vol 1. Secret. A note on the memorandum indicated the President saw it.

Document 78: Intelligence Note 520 from the Director of Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, July 9, 1969.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) reported that the Bolivian military feared Siles's attempt to build his political base amongst miners and students, and began preparing a coup against the President. Despite his desire to become president, Ovando seemed to be a reluctant to take power by military force.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 BOL. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Limdis.

Document 79: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 26, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger predicted that the new military government would adversely affect U.S. interests in Bolivia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Latin America, Bolivia, Vol. 1, 1969–1970. Confidential. Sent for information. A note on the front of the memorandum indicates the President saw it on October 6. Tab A is attached but not published.

Document 80: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 17, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger outlined for President Nixon the implications of the nationalization of Gulf Oil.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Bolivia, Vol. 1 1969–1970. Confidential. Sent for information. The memorandum was not initialed by Kissinger. The Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was initially approved in August 1962 and subsequently revised in December 1963. Sponsored by Senators Burke B. Hickenlooper and E. Ross Adair, the amendment stipulated that the President suspend assistance to any country that expropriated the property of U.S. citizens or corporations without proper compensation. (76 Stat. 260)

Document 81: Telegram 178650 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bolivia, Washington, October 22, 1969, 0147Z.

The Department instructed the Embassy to express concern at the present state of relations between the United States and Bolivia, and asked the Embassy to inform the Bolivian Government that it must pay compensation for nationalized U.S. companies.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 BOL. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated priority to Lima. Drafted by Crimmins and Chapin; cleared by Samuels, Vaky, Legal Advisor Stevenson, Meyer, USIA, ISA, CIA, AID, DoD, JCS, and Treasury; and approved by Richardson.

Document 82: Telegram 7658 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State, October 23, 1969, 1605Z.

As instructed in State telegram 178650, Ambassador Siracusa expressed concern to General Ovando about the deterioration of United States-Bolivian relations. The Ambassador told the President the U.S. Government was reviewing its assistance programs toward Bolivia.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 BOL. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Lima, USCINCSO, and AMCONSUL Cochabamba.

Document 83: Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State (Meyer) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, (Samuels), Washington, November 6, 1969.

Assistant Secretary Meyer outlined positions of Bolivia and Gulf Oil in the dispute over Bolivia's nationalization of Gulf's assets. The Department of State aimed to bring the two parties together for negotiations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, ARA Assistant Secretary Subject and Country Files: Lot 72 D 467, CAM [Charles A. Meyer] Chronological File, November 1969. Confidential. Drafted by Chapin; and cleared in draft by Feldman and Stevenson, and by phone by Trezise. The memorandum is an unsigned copy.

Document 84: Telegram 8579 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State, December 27, 1969, 1730Z.

Siracusa and Ovanda discussed some of the problems in United States-Bolivian relations, in particular Gulf Oil, and U.S. assistance to Bolivia.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1967–1969, POL BOL–US. Confidential. Repeated to Lima and USCINSCO.

Document 85: Backchannel Message From Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer) to the Ambassador in Bolivia (Siracusa), January 9, 1970.

Assistant Meyer instructed Ambassador Siracusa to identify, by January 20, "moderate elements in the Bolivian power structure," but without giving the impression the Embassy was interfering in Bolivian affairs.

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 19, Bolivia 1973–1980. Secret. Drafted by Chapin and Crimmins. The document is the draft of the message as authorized by Meyer.

Document 86: Telegram 327 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State, January 23, 1970, 1410Z.

Ambassador Siracusa reported a two hour meeting with President Ovando. Ovando assured Siracusa that the Government of Bolivia did not concur with what Siracusa termed a "campaign of vilification" against him and that Ovando fully trusted the Ambassador.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Latin America, Bolivia, Vol. 1 1969–1970. Secret; Exdis; Immediate; Eyes Only for Assistant Secretary Meyer. The telegram was stamped "White House Situation Room '70 Jan 23 pm 5:26."

Document 87: Telegram 11357 From the Department of State in Washington to the Embassy in Bolivia, January 23, 1970, 2245Z.

[ 1 page not declassified ]

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 14, La Paz, 1970. Secret.

Document 88: Airgram A–76 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State, March 26, 1970.

U.S. officials identified political stability, internal security, and economic growth as the key U.S. goals in Bolivia. In addition, Washington leaders aimed to convince the Bolivian Government that its interests lay in collaboration with the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 BOL–US. Confidential.

Document 89: Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State, Washington, April 7, 1970.

At President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger's request, the Department of State provided a memorandum that discussed possible Bolivian compensation for the expropriation of Gulf Oil, and how the United States was trying to create a favorable environment for an agreement over compensation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Latin America, Bolivia, Vol. I, 1969–1970. Confidential. Sent for information. The memorandum was attached to an April 9 memorandum from Vaky to Kissinger, stating, "This is really intended for your information, but has been prepared as a memo to the President in case you feel it would be useful to provide this information to him." Kissinger signed an April 13 covering memorandum to the President summarizing this memorandum. The April 13 memorandum is not published.

Document 90: Memorandum From the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to President Nixon, Washington, August 22, 1970.

Undersecretary Johnson provided President Nixon with a "Report on Insurgency in Bolivia." Johnson summarized the report noting that, although the guerrilla insurgency in Bolivia could threaten the stability of that country, no special U.S. effort was needed.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Latin America, Bolivia, Vol. 1, 1969–1970. Secret; Limited Distribution. Kissinger's July 24 memorandum is in Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC: 330–76–067, Box 66, B 1970. A summary of the study on insurgent groups is published as Document 33.

Document 91: Telegram 4519 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State, September 5, 1970, 1700Z.

Ambassador Siracusa discussed a meeting held with President Ovando the previous evening. Siracusa concluded that the international community would look favorably on the Gulf Oil settlement. Ovando stated that, even though opponents in Bolivia would criticize the settlement, he would uphold it.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Latin America, Bolivia, Vol. 1, 1969–1970. Confidential. Repeated to Buenos Aires, Madrid, Lima, and USCINCSO. Gulf Oil and Bolivia reached an agreement on September 1 (Telegram 4428 from La Paz, dated September 2, Ibid.)

Document 92: Memorandum From President Nixon to Director of Central Intelligence Helms, and the Acting Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee (Johnson), Washington, September 15, 1970.

President Nixon, citing intelligence reports, stated that a continent-wide revolutionary group might be forming in South America. He asked the Under Secretaries Committee to write a report on insurgencies in the region.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, ARA Assistant Secretary Subject and Country Files: Lot 73 D 115, White House Correspondence, 1970. Secret; Limdis. The CIB was not found. On December 1, Hartman circulated Nixon's memorandum to Packard, Kissinger, Helms, Moorer, and Hannah. (Washington National Records Center, OASD Files: FRC 330–760–067, B 1970) A summary of the Under Secretaries report is published as Document 33.

Document 93: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 7, 1970.

When briefing President Nixon on the ouster of President Ovando by General Torres on October 6, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger predicted that the new regime would be ultranationalistic, leftist, and anti-United States.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Latin America, Bolivia, Vol. 1, 1969–1970. Secret. Sent for information. In his October 7 covering memorandum to Kissinger, Vaky stated, "I think Torres will be far more radical than the Peruvian generals. He is a real potential Nassarist." Attached but not printed is biographical information.

Document 94: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 8, 1970.

National Security Council staff member Vaky suggested the United States quietly give assurances to General Torres that if he acted reasonably, the United States could work with him.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Latin America, Bolivia, Vol. 1, 1969–1970. Confidential. Sent for information. "Action" was handwritten on the memorandum. Kissinger wrote "I agree with pvt. [private] contact. HK" on the memorandum. In an October 14 note to Haig, Vaky stated that on October 9 Torres asked for a continuation of relations. Vaky asked the Department of State to respond affirmatively. Vaky also asked the Department to make an approach to Torres along the lines his October 8 memorandum to Kissinger. Vaky concluded, "I think this little gambit will pay off." Haig initialed the note. On October 13, the Department made the approach to Torres. (Telegram 168190 from the Department of State, ibid.)

Document 95: Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 15, 1970.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger predicted that Torres' government would be more like the Peruvian Government, as opposed to the prospective Allende government in Chile. Kissinger argued that if the U.S. Government signaled it would support him, General Torres might pursue a moderate course.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Latin America, Bolivia, Vol. 1 1969–1970. Confidential. Sent for information.

Document 96: Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (Crimmins) to the Acting Secretary (Irwin), Washington, December 5, 1970.

Acting Assistant Secretary Crimmins argued that the U.S. Government should postpone tin sales for 90 days starting on December 7 in order to stabilize Bolivia's economy and thus support General Torres's inclinations towards political moderation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject and Country Files: Lot 73 D 353, JHC [John H. Crimmins] Chronological File, July, August, September 1970. Secret. Drafted by Freeman. Copies were sent to U, J, C, and D. The memorandum is an unsigned copy. Tab A, Telegram 6098 from La Paz, was not found. Attached but not printed at Tab B is the December 2 memorandum. In a July 24 memorandum to Rogers, Crimmins predicted that sales of the U.S. Government tin stockpile "might well push President Ovando to the left, away from the political center of gravity which he has been seeking, would present new opportunities for exploitation by the USSR." (Ibid.)

Document 97: Memorandum From Ashley C. Hewitt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 15, 1971.

National Security Council staff member Hewitt noted that, although the Torres government was weak, there appeared to be no other viable alternative for the United States to support. Hewitt then suggested that support from the United States might strengthen Torres, but that it would behoove the U.S. Government to keep looking for alternatives.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Latin America, Bolivia, Vol. 2, 1970–1974. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger wrote "Should go to SRG" on the front. The SRG meeting on Bolivia was never held. Attached but not published at Tab A is the February 19 CIA Intelligence Memorandum 1255/71, "The Prospects for Torres and Bolivia." Attached but not published at Tab B is the NSC Staff's February 15 synopsis.

Document 98: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 14, 1971.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger reported on President Torres's favorable reaction to the U.S. decision to suspend sales of stockpiled tin.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Latin America, Bolivia, Vol. 1I 1970–1974. Confidential. Sent for information. Attached but not published at Tab A is telegram 1740 from La Paz, dated April 8.

Document 99: Editorial Note.

Document 100: Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon, May 6, 1971.

President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Haig briefed President Nixon on his meeting with Ambassador Siracusa. The topics included tin, the prospects for the Torres government, U.S. investments, and Bolivia's relations with its neighbors.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Latin America, Bolivia, Vol. 2, 1970–1974. Limited Official Use. Sent for information. Tab A is attached but not published. According to the President's Daily Diary, he met with Siracusa on May 7 from 4:16 to 4:32. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) In a telephone conversation the same day, Nixon said of Siracusa: "He's just one of a few tough hard-line ambassadors." (Ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation Among Nixon, Kissinger, Haldeman, Conversation 493–15, Oval Office)

Document 101: Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and President Nixon, Washington, June 11, 1971.

President Nixon and President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger discussed how the Torres regime in Bolivia had damaged U.S. interests in Bolivia, and the possibility of attempting to remove Torres from power.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 517–4, Oval Office. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording published here specifically for this volume. The transcript is part of a larger conversation, 9:37–10:36 a.m.

Document 102: Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 17, 1971.

National Security Council staff member Nachmanoff outlined options for military and economic assistance to Bolivia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–55, SRG Meeting Bolivia 6/17/71. Secret. Sent for action. In a covering memorandum, Kissinger approved a telephone poll on the policy if an SRG meeting was not possible. No record of an SRG meeting on Bolivia on or after June 17 has been found. Kissinger wrote on the covering memorandum, "I favor option D on mil[itary] and Option B on economic." A note in another hand reads; "Phoned to Arnie [Nachmanoff] DH." There were five attachments. Tab A, Talking Points, has not been found. Tabs B through E are attached but not published. Tab B is the June 14 IG/ARA Options Paper; Tab C is Telegram 3022 from La Paz, June 7; Tab D is the June 11 CIA Chronology of Soviet Moves; and Tab E is June 16 CIA Intelligence Memorandum 1707/71, "Bolivia Under Torres."

Document 103: National Security Decision Memorandum 114, Washington, June 23, 1971.

President Nixon approved Option D for economic assistance and Option B for military assistance of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs (IG/ARA) Options Paper.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–224, NSDM Files, NSDM 114. Secret. Copies sent to the Chairman of the JCS and the DCI. The June 14 paper is Tab B to Document 102. On June 28, Kissinger sent a memorandum to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, stating that with regard to the last sentence in the NSDM, "The President's decision intended to mean that the United States representatives in international agencies should abstain without comment if Bolivian loan requests are brought to a vote." Copies sent to the Chairman of the JCS, and the Director of Central Intelligence. (Ibid.)

Document 104: Memorandum for the 40 Committee, Washington, June 29, 1971.

This 7 page memorandum proposed a covert action program to aid the moderate political opposition to the Torres regime.

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 19, File Bolivia, 1973–1980. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent to Meyer, Crimmins, and Fischer on July 6. The covert assistance plan is discussed in Document 105.

Document 105: Memorandum for the Record, Washington, July 6, 1971.

The Committee discussed the usefulness and potential problems of covert aid to the opposition to President Torres, in particular to the MNR. The Committee decided to wait for Ambassador Siracusa's thoughts on such assistance before acting.

Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meeting Minutes. Secret; Eyes Only. Copies sent to Mitchell, Packard, Johnson, Moorer, and Helms. In an attached covering memorandum from Jessup to Kennedy, Kennedy informed Jessup that he would pass the minutes on to Nachmanoff and Kissinger. Siracusa's views are in Document 106. The State Department paper was not found.

Document 106: Backchannel Message From the Ambassador in Bolivia (Siracusa) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer), La Paz, July 9, 1971.

Fearing the repercussions if U.S. covert assistance to President Torres's opponents was revealed, Ambassador Siracusa argued against such assistance. Instead, he thought overt U.S. Government military and economic assistance would maintain U.S. influence with Torres.

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 19, Bolivia, 1973–1980. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Siracusa sent a letter with a similar argument to Meyer on July 14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, POL 23–9 BOL)

Document 107: Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 19, 1971, 10:15 a.m.

National Security Council staff member Nachmanoff informed President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger that certain United States actions in La Paz could be interpreted there as U.S. support for a coup. On August 21, General Hugo Bánzer Suárez overthrew President Torres.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Latin America, Bolivia, Vol. 2, 1970–1974. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information; Outside the System. Kissinger wrote on the front of the memorandum, "Let's just relax and see what happens. HK." Attached was a transmittal indicating that the memorandum was sent to Kissinger, who was in San Clemente. Although Nachmanoff said Flannery acted prematurely in passing funds to the opposition, Helms told Kissinger on August 24 the 40 Committee had ordered the passing of the funds. See Document 108.

Document 108: Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to The President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 24, 1971.

[ 1 page not declassified ]

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, DCI Helms, Job 80–B01285A, Box 13, Folder 8, DCI HELMS, 1 July–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

Document 109: Telegram 265 From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State, January 14, 1972, 1810Z.

Ambassador Siracusa concluded that compared to a year before, Bolivia was more politically stable and economically vibrant. However, budget woes and the threat of terrorism by guerrillas clouded the current situation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2 BOL. Confidential. Repeated to Lima, Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Asunción, Santiago, and USCINCSO.

Document 110: Memorandum From Ashley Hewitt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 4, 1972.

National Security Council staff member Hewitt summarized a study of the situation in Bolivia to ensure that the United States was doing all it could to support new President Hugo Bánzer Suárez.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–232, NSDM Files, NSDM 160. Secret. Sent for action. Kennedy and Hormats concurred. Kissinger wrote "see notes, see me" on the first page. In the margin of the "Issues and Recommendations" section, Kissinger wrote, "Why are we always so tough with friends?" Next to the paragraph that begins, "The study recommends," Kissinger wrote, "Within limits." Attached but not published at Tab A is a proposed version of National Security Decision Memorandum 160 (Document 111) and at Tab B is the February 14 paper, "The Situation and Outlook in Bolivia."

Document 111: National Security Decision Memorandum 160, Washington, April 4, 1972.

President Nixon approved $20 million of U.S. AID funds for additional economic assistance for Bolivia without its acceptance of an IMF standby agreement. He also approved the 3 to 4 year MAP.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–232, NSDM Files, NSDM 160. A copy was sent to the Secretary of the Treasury. The recommendations of the Bolivian request for modern military aircraft are in Tab B of Document 112. The progress report has not been found.

Document 112: Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 17, 1972.

In order to prevent over-burdening the Government of Bolivia's finances, and to stay within Congressional ceilings, National Security Council staff member Jorden recommended selling Bolivia three A–37Bs in the current fiscal year, three more the next fiscal year, and defer action on the more expensive C–130s.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Latin America, Bolivia, Vol. 2, 1970–1974. Confidential. Sent for action. Haig initialed the memorandum for Kissinger. Kennedy cleared in a draft. Attached but not published at Tab A is Kissinger's signed April 20 memorandum to State and Defense and at Tab B is an April 6 memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger. Tab C is Document 111. The interagency report submitted in February is Tab B of Document 110.

Document 113: Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), Washington, May 20, 1972.

National Security Council staff member Jorden thought financial support for President Bánzer was important, but feared that direct financial support for the Government of Bolivia might get lost in the bureaucracy, and would not be immediately channeled into productive enterprises. Jorden informed President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Haig that he would ask National Security Council staff member Hewitt to come up with options for financial help for Bolivia if the U.S. Government decided to increase its assistance to the nation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Latin America, Bolivia, Vol. 2, 1970–1974. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information; Outside the System. Haig wrote on the bottom of the memorandum, "Let's get into regular channels—too much for black bag—see Kennedy and CIA Staff Liaison [illegible] Ratliff to see how we can move it." Attached but not published at Tab A is a May 19 memorandum from Helms to Kissinger. On May 31, Haig informed Helms that Bánzer needed to make his request for assistance to the Embassy. (Ibid.)

Document 114: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, June 15, 1972.

President Nixon agreed with Treasury Secretary Connally that Bolivia should receive a $20 million loan before the end of FY 1972 without the stipulation of devaluation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 770, Country Files, Latin America, Bolivia, Vol. II, 1970–1974. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Haig initialed the memorandum for Kissinger. In a June 14 covering memorandum, Jorden and Kennedy recommended Kissinger send the memorandum to the President. The President underlined the last paragraph of the memorandum, and wrote at the bottom "Haig—Cable Connally from RN—my decision—plus send him the underlined portion as the summary of the reaction we have had from our embassies and other sources—to date." Haig wrote "done" and initialed next to Nixon's note. Nixon wrote "OK" next to Haig's initials. The cable to Connally is ibid.

Document 115: Telegram 6896 from the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State, December 6, 1972, 2205Z.

Ambassador Siracusa informed officials in Washington that President Bánzer desired to meet President Nixon in Washington. Siracusa discussed how Bánzer's government was much more pro-United States than the Torres government, and that Bánzer would gain considerable domestic public support from a visit with the President.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 BOL. Secret; Nodis. Although Bánzer was scheduled to visit Washington on October 16, 1973, he postponed the visit. On October 2, Bánzer informed the U.S. Ambassador that he could not leave the country during the announcement of controversial economic reforms because there might be significant unrest. The visit was never rescheduled. For documentation on Bánzer's planned visit to the United States, see ibid., Box 911, VIP Visits, Bolivia President Bánzer Visit 10/31/73.

Document 116: Memorandum From the Senior Department of Defense Attaché in France (Walters) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Paris, undated.

Defense Attaché Walters summarized recent Brazilian foreign policy and political history. He stressed that the U.S. Government should firmly support the Brazilian Government.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 1, HAK Administrative and Staff Files, Transition, November 1968–January 1969, Brazil. No classification marking. Although the document is undated, similar memoranda from Walters offering advice on Eastern Europe and France were dated December 31, 1968. (Ibid., Eastern Europe and France) The memorandum is unsigned. Vernon Walters had a long connection with Brazil, serving as U.S. Army Liaison Officer to the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy in World War II and Defense Attaché in Brazil from 1962 to 1967. Walters used the last sentence of this memorandum in his memoir, Silent Missions (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1978, p. 386), in recounting the events of the Brazilian Revolution of 1964.

Document 117: Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, January 24, 1969.

Acting Assistant Secretary Vaky discussed political repression and the potential for future anti-Americanism in Brazil.

Source: National Archives, Office of Brazilian Affairs Files: Lot 75 D 277, Originals, Memos & Memcons, 1969. Confidential. Drafted on January 23 by Kubisch and Lippincott. Copies sent to Richardson and U. Alexis Johnson. A note in an unknown hand after the subject line reads: "For your 12 appointment with Ambassador Tuthill." A record of the Rogers-Tuthill conversation has not been found.

Document 118: Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the Senior Military Advisor, National Security Council Staff (Haig), Washington, February 27, 1969.

National Security Council staff member Nachmanoff related the decision of the NSC Inter-Agency Group (NSC–IG) for Latin America to consider aid to Brazil, and raised questions about the ramifications of delaying arms sales.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional (H-Files), Box H–249, Under-Secretaries Memorandum Files, Under-Secretaries Study Memoranda, U/SM 1–9. Secret. On February 27, the Under Secretaries Committee, chaired by Richardson agreed to the $75 million tranche, and went ahead with negotiations ("stretched out as much as possible") on the nine outstanding U.S. AID project loans, totaling $113 million. Action on the DEs and A–4 aircraft was deferred. (ibid., NSC Undersecretaries Files: Lot 83 D 276, NSC–U/DM 3)

Document 119: Memorandum From the Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 18, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger recommended that the U.S. Government proceed with previous aid commitments to Brazil, but hold in abeyance a decision to build two destroyer escorts.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 771, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil through August 1970. Confidential. Sent for action. A handwritten note on the first page reads: "Note: President saw this, but did not indicate approval or disapproval.—A." A handwritten notation by Haig on the second page of the memorandum reads: "No Action. —We assumed approval. AH." Attached but not published is a March 17 memorandum from Richardson to the President, entitled "Brazil: Economic and Military Assistance."

Document 120: National Security Study Memorandum 67, Washington, July 12, 1969.

President Nixon directed a broad-ranging review of U.S. policy toward Brazil that included a thorough presentation of "interests, objectives, and policy options."

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 43–103. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of the USIA, the Director of the Peace Corps, and the Secretaries of Commerce and Agriculture. The introduction to the November 1 study is Document 125.

Document 121: Telegram 7183 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State, September 4, 1969, 2002Z.

The Embassy reported on the kidnapping of Ambassador Elbrick.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–9 BRAZ. Secret; Flash. Repeated to Sao Paulo, Brasilia, and USCINCSO. In Rio de Janeiro 7181, received 1820Z, September 4, DCM Belton reported: "Ambassador Elbrick's chauffeur has just phoned embassy to say Ambassador has been kidnapped from his limousine. We will furnish further information as soon as possible." (Ibid.) Despite his abduction, all of the telegrams from Embassy Rio de Janeiro continued to bear his name during the period of the kidnapping.

Document 122: Telegram 149761 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil at Rio de Janeiro, Washington, September 4, 1969, 2256Z.

Under Secretary Richardson stated that the U.S. Government should comply with the demands of the kidnappers to secure Ambassador Elbrick's release.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–9 BRAZ. Secret; Exdis; Flash. Drafted by Dean; cleared by Meyer and Executive Secretary Eliot; and approved by Richardson.

Document 123: Editorial Note.

Document 124: Memorandum From the Assistant for National Security (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 26, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger summarized the impact of Ambassador Elbick's abduction on Brazilian politics and United States-Brazilian relations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 771, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, through August 1970. Confidential. Sent for information. The memorandum bears the following handwritten note: "Back from Pres 10–1". Attached but not published at Tab A is a September 20 memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger.

Document 125: Brazil Program Analysis, Washington, November 1, 1969.

In this 7 page Analysis, the Under Secretaries Committee identified three key goals for U.S. policy in Brazil: a pro-United States Government, economic growth, and helping to promote a more modern social structure.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–49, Senior Review Group, Brazil Program Analysis, 12–1–70. Secret.

Document 126: Airgram A–709 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State, December 9, 1969.

The Médici Government stated it planned to focus on improving education, health, and agriculture. Thus, Chargé Belton concluded that since Médici's goals were more in line with the priorities of the U.S. Government than was the case with the Costa e Silva Government, U.S.-Brazilian relations would be closer under the new regime.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15 BRAZ. Confidential. Drafted on December 4 by Johnson; cleared in draft by Elbrick and the Country Team; and approved by Belton. Médici was nominated for president by the Brazilian military on October 6. (Telegram 8348 from Rio de Janeiro, October 7, ibid.; POL 15–1 BRAZ) He was elected by the Brazilian Congress on October 25, and inaugurated on October 30. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, October 27; ibid.)

Document 127: Memorandum From the Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 15, 1970.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, for President Nixon, approved $112 million in sector, technical assistance, and PL 480 support for Brazil. In addition, $75 million in program loans was deferred, awaiting a NSC policy review.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 771, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, Vol. 1, Through August 1970. Confidential. Sent for action. Kissinger approved for Nixon on May 2. Attached but not published are Tabs A and B. Tab A is a March 18 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon and Tab B is an April 3 memorandum from Schlesinger to Nixon. In a covering memorandum from Vaky to Kissinger, Vaky argued against the $75 million program loan at the present time, because "it would lock the President into an overall policy stance toward Brazil before he has had an opportunity to consider all of the policy issues and implications involved…. We should at least consider the question of whether this kind of close identification with the Médici regime will alienate other sectors of Brazilian society which in the longer term may be more important to achievement of a constructive U.S.-Brazilian relationship ."

Document 128: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 19, 1970.

National Security Council staff member Vaky recommended that the Administration complete "pending cash sales" of U.S. armaments to Brazil, despite some Congressional opposition.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 771, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, Vol. 1, Through August 1970. Secret. Sent for action. Osgood concurred. Attached but not published are Tabs A and B. Tab A is a May 23 memorandum from Kissinger informing Eliot of his approval of the recommendation and Tab B is a May 16 memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger.

Document 129: Telegram 517 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State, November 12, 1970, 1845Z.

Ambassador Rountree reported a conversation with Brazilian Foreign Minister Gibson on the 200-mile limit, soluble coffee issues, and allegations of excesses by the Brazilian police.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 768, Country Files, Latin America, Argentina, 1969–August 31, 1971. Confidential. Although the United States maintained an office in Brasilia since 1960, when the city was made the capital of Brazil, Rountree was the first United States Ambassador to maintain his embassy there rather than in Rio de Janeiro. This telegram was attached to Document 31.

Document 130: Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 25, 1970.

National Security Council staff member Nachmanoff analyzed the NSSM 67 study and concluded it ignored a number of aspects of the complex United States–Brazilian relationship: coffee, U.S. import policy and arms policy, and the nature of Brazil's military government.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–49, Senior Review Group-Brazil Program Analysis, 12/1/70. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Kennedy and Smith. NSSM 67 is Document 120. The NSSM 67 paper is Document 125.

Document 131: Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 27, 1970.

National Security Council staff member Wayne Smith stated that the NSSM 67 study analyzed all of the important aspects of United States-Brazilian relations, and related them to the importance of Brazilian economic development. Smith noted that the study did not go into great detail regarding operational issues, because it was necessary to await approval from the President for his decision on the overall policy towards Brazil.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–49, Senior Review Group, Brazil Program Analysis, 12/1/70. Secret. Sent for information. Smith's November 3 memorandum to Kissinger is ibid. The talking points prepared for the SRG are ibid. Nachmanoff's memorandum to Kissinger is Document 130. The introduction to the Brazil study is Document 125.

Document 132: Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting, Washington, December 1, 1970, 2:40–3:39 p.m.

The Senior Review Group (SRG) discussed the NSSM 67 study for the purpose of preparing a memorandum to the President Nixon on the matter.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1970. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. An Analytical Summary of the IG paper, with Kissinger's handwriting in the margins, dated November 3, is ibid. On December 8, Kissinger requested the IG complete a study of U.S. military groups in Latin America by December 23, 1970. (Ibid., Box H–49, Senior Review Group, Brazil Program Analysis 12/1/70) The report was completed on January 12, 1971. (Ibid.)

Document 133: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, December 11, 1970.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger recommended that the Department of State step up its efforts to negotiate a settlement with Brazil on coffee imports.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 771, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, Volume 2, September 1970–July 31, 1971. Confidential. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon approved the recommendation. Davis informed Eliot in a December 29 memorandum transmitting the President's decision to the Department of State, "If a settlement cannot be negotiated by March 15, 1971, the President is prepared to reconsider the question of imposing a fee on imports of Brazilian soluble coffee at that time."

Document 134: Memorandum of Meeting, Washington, December 14, 1970.

President Nixon stated that, regarding U.S. relations with Latin America, close relations with Brazil and Argentina were the most important. Nixon wanted to make it clear to the Brazilian Government that the United States would not be judgmental regarding Brazil's form of government.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 771, Country Files, Brazil, Volume 2, September 1970–31 July 31 1971. Confidential; Nodis. The conversation took place in the Oval Office. On a December 3 briefing memorandum from Kissinger, Nixon wrote: "K—I want a stepped up effort for closer relations with Brazil's government—order Meyer to carry out (from RN)." (Ibid., Box 29, President's Daily Briefing, Chronological File, December 1–15, 1970)

Document 135: Memorandum From C. Fred Bergsten and Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 24, 1971.

National Security Council staff members Bergsten and Nachmanoff reported the Department of State's belief that there was an opportunity for Brazil and the United States to settle a dispute over Brazilian coffee exports. Resolving the dispute had larger ramifications for other coffee producing nations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 771, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, Vol. 2, September 1970–July 31, 1971. No classification marking. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum. Brazil and the United States reached an agreement on soluble coffee on April 2. See U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vol. 22, Part 1 (1971), pp. 654–659.

Document 136: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 7, 1971, 9:30–10:10 p.m.

National Security Council staff member Nachmanoff asked Ambassador Araujo Castro and Minister Celso Diniz if Brazil could delay implementing new fishing regulations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 771, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, Volume 2, September 1970–July 31, 1971. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. On May 7, Kissinger notified the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce that the President had decided to send a mission to Brazil to induce "the Government of Brazil to delay implementation of its fishing regulations from June 1 until next fall." (Ibid.)

Document 137: Editorial Note.

Document 138: Telegram 480 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State, June 7, 1971, 1755Z.

Ambassador Rountree reported that he urged the Brazilians to avoid incidents with U.S. ships so as to not jeopardize negotiations over the 200-mile limit. President Médici responded that incident would occur if ships advised to leave Brazilian waters actually did, and that his government was committed to preventing incidents.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–4 BRAZ–US. Secret; Exdis. Repeated immediate to Rio de Janeiro.

Document 139: Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and President's Assistant (Haldeman), Washington, June 11, 1971.

President Nixon and President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger lamented that the fisheries dispute and congressional refusal to ratify the International Coffee Agreement had soured relations with Brazil.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 517–4, Oval Office. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. The transcript is part of a larger conversation, 9:37–10:36 a.m. Nixon, Connally, and Kissinger also discussed Brazil in Document 42.

Document 140: Editorial Note.

Document 141: Memorandum for the President's File, Washington, December 7, 1971, 11:30 a.m.

President Médici stated that his administration had successfully worked to change the anti-foreign investment stance of the pre-1964 Brazilian Governments, and President Nixon praised his leadership. In addition, both Nixon and Médici agreed that the United States should not change its policy toward Cuba.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcons—The President and President Médici, Dec. 7–9, 1971. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The conversation took place in the President's office. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon, Walters, and Médici met from 11:13 a.m. to 12:38 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary). Médici visited Washington from December 6 through December 9. On December 5, Nixon discussed his upcoming meeting with Médici in a conversation with an unknown participant. There is a presidential recording of this conversation ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation No. 16–2, White House Telephone.

Document 142: Memorandum of Meeting, Washington, December 8, 1971, 5:15 p.m.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and members of the NSC Staff met with Médici, Gibson, and Castro. Their conversation focused on global implications of China's admission to the United Nations, and the nature of Brazil's place in "the global foreign policy concept of the United States."

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 911, VIP Visits, Brazil. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held at the Blair House. Kissinger initialed Nachmanoff's December 10 covering memorandum that recommended the memorandum of conversation receive "no dissemination outside your office."

Document 143: Memorandum for the President's File, Washington, December 9, 1971.

Presidents Nixon and Médici agreed that U.S. policy towards Cuba should remain the same. The two presidents also discussed the situations in Chile and Peru, and the construction of new highways in the interior of Brazil.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, Presidential/HAK Memcons, President-President Médici. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the President's Office at 10 a.m. The proposed draft communiqué referred to in the penultimate paragraph is attached to a memorandum from Kissinger to the President, December 8. (Ibid., VIP Visits, Box 911, Brazil.) For text of final communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, January 2, 1971, p. 14.

Document 144: Memorandum From the Senior Department of Defense Attaché in France (Walters) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, undated.

Defense Attaché Walters discussed a range of topics that came up in the meetings between Presidents Nixon and Médici. Walters informed President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger that the President "wished action taken" on these topics.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, Presidential/HAK Memcons, President-President Médici. No classification marking. It was drafted and typed by Walters.

Document 145: Memorandum From the Acting Director of Central Intelligence (Cushman) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 29, 1971.

According to CIA reporting, Presidents Nixon and Médici held a secret conversation in which they discussed support for "safeguarding the internal security and status quo in the hemisphere, including the governments of Bolivia and Uruguay."

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Secretary Subject Files, Job 80–B01086A, Box 12, Brazil. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to the Secretary of State. The covering memorandum stated that, "The attached memorandum contains comments regarding commitments allegedly made to President Médici by President Nixon. They have not been included in the dissemination and are being forwarded for your information." Attached but not published is Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable TDCSDB 315/07838–71 of December 22, "Reactions within Brazil to Visit of President Emílio Garrastazu Médici to the United States." On December 20, in a conversation with British Prime Minister Edward Heath, Nixon stated, "The Brazilians helped rig the Uruguayan election."

Document 146: National Intelligence Estimate 93–72, Washington, January 13, 1972.

The intelligence community estimated that over the next several years Brazil would probably chart a more independent and nationalistic course in its foreign policy, and U.S.-Brazilian relations would probably deteriorate.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 361, Subject Files, National Intelligence Estimates, Part 3. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to the covering sheet, the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the NSA participated in the preparation of the estimate. All members of the intelligence board concurred in the estimate except the FBI and the Atomic Energy Commission, on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

Document 147: Telegram 0769 From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State, March 7, 1972, 1345Z.

United States Embassy officials discussed Brazilian and Argentine cooperation in supporting the Bordaberry (Uruguay) and Banzer (Bolivia) governments. In addition, Embassy officials noted the Brazilian leadership distrusted Argentinean President Lanusse.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 772, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, Vol. 2, August 1, 1971–December 1972. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Buenos Aires, La Paz, and Montevideo.

Document 148: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 28, 1972.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger stated that a draft fisheries agreement between the United States and Brazil both protected the U.S. legal position, and the interests its shrimp fishing industry.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 772, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, Volume 2, August 1, 1971–December, 1972. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Tab A, dated April 10, is attached but not published. Preliminary talks between the United States and Brazil on fisheries took place from October 25 to October 30, 1971, resumed February 23, 1972, and were completed on March 6. Summary reports of the October talks and position papers for the February talks are ibid., RG 59, ARA/LA Assistant Secretary's Files: Lot 73 D 139, Brazil–Fishery Talks, 1972. Telegrams and draft agreements from both the October and February talks are ibid., Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–4 BRAZ–US. Haig informed the President of the draft agreement on March 24. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, E–volume 1, Global Issues, 1969–1972, Document 426.

Document 149: Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon, Washington, undated.

President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Haig recommended that President Nixon discuss with Brazilian Finance Minister Neto the U.S. Government's concern about rising coffee prices.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 772, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, Vol. 2, August 1, 1971–December 1972. Confidential. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. According to the President's Daily Diary the President, Neto, Castro, and Haig met from 11:37 to 11:54 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary). No other record of the meeting has been found.

Document 149a: Editorial Note.

Document 150: Memorandum of Meeting, Washington, June 12, 1969, 11 a.m.

President Nixon and President Lleras Restrepo of Colombia discussed inter-American trade, U.S. armaments sales to Colombia, a possible meeting on fisheries, United States-Peruvian relations, highways, and radical movements in Latin America.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 COL. Secret; Limdis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting lasted until 12:27 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary). According to a June 23 covering memorandum from Davis to Haig, special distribution of the memorandum, through Haig, was made to State, Defense, Treasury, Commerce, and CIA. On June 6, Rogers sent a memorandum to Nixon and stated that the main purpose of the meeting was to solicit Lleras's views on inter-American relations, and to lay the groundwork for future support by Lleras for U.S. policy in the region. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 7 COL)

Document 151: Memorandum of Meeting, Washington, June 13, 1969, 11:30 a.m.

Presidents Nixon and Lleras Restrepo discussed the importance of the Pan American Highway.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 7 COL. Secret; Exdis. Part 1 of 5 parts. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting lasted until 12:06 p.m. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) A covering June 14 memorandum from Vaky to Davis indicated special distribution was made to the Departments of State, Treasury, and Transportation, and AID.

Document 152: Memorandum of Meeting, Washington, June 13, 1969, 11:30 a.m.

President Nixon told President Lleras Restrepo that Nixon wanted to eliminate the "additionality" provisions from U.S. economic assistance programs, and he wanted to announce it at the forthcoming IA–ECOSOC meeting in Trinidad.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 7 COL. Secret; Exdis. Part 3 of 5 parts. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting lasted until 12:06 p.m. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) According to an attached covering memorandum from Vaky to Davis, special distribution of the memorandum was made to the Departments of State and Defense.

Document 153: Memorandum of Meeting, Washington, June 13, 1969, 11:30 a.m.

President Nixon stated that working groups would be set up after the IA–ECOSOC meeting to study tariffs and preferences. Nixon also said that he liked the idea of regional preferences, if that seemed the best future step to take.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 7 COL. Secret; Exdis. Part 4 of 5 parts. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting lasted until 12:06 p.m. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) An attached covering June 14 memorandum from Vaky to Davis, indicated that special distribution of the memorandum was made to the Departments of State, Commerce, and Treasury, and DuBridge.

Document 154: Memorandum of Meeting, Washington, June 13, 1969, 11:30 a.m.

President Lleras thought many radical Catholic clerics were influenced by Marxism. President Nixon requested the Rockefeller mission to report on the Church and asked Assistant Secretary Charles Meyer to prepare an analysis of why parts of the Church have become radical.

Source: Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, VIP Visits, Box 913, Colombia, State Visit of President Lleras, June 12–13, 1969. Secret; Exdis. Part 5 of 5 parts. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting lasted until 12:06 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) An attached covering June 14 memorandum from Vaky to Davis, indicated that special distribution of the memorandum was made to the Department of State and CIA. The conclusion of the Rockefeller Report is printed as Document 18 in the Regional Compilation. No record of Meyer's analysis was found.

Document 155: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Laird and Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, June 13, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger informed the Secretaries of Defense and State that President Nixon wanted a joint recommendation on how to provide an arms modernization program for Colombia, given pending legislation in Congress.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 779, Country Files, Latin America, Colombia, Vol. 1. Confidential. A copy was sent to the Bureau of Budget. On July 25, the NSC Undersecretaries Committee proposed setting up a task force of the Congressional liaison offices of State, DoD, and AID to come up with a strategy for getting Congress to loosen restrictions on sales of aircraft to Colombia, and other Latin American nations. (Ibid.)

Document 156: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 8, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger informed President Nixon of the status on the sale of jet aircraft for Colombia. Nixon agreed to have the U.S. Ambassador in Colombia tell President Lleras Restrepo that the Administration wanted to license a modest number of F–5 or A–4 aircraft.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 779, Country Files, Colombia, Vol. 1. Secret. Sent for information. The President initialed his approval on September 15. Haig wrote on the front of the memorandum, "to Vaky for Guidance." Attached but not published at Tab A is an August 13 memorandum from Richardson to the President. Tab B is attached and printed as Document 155.

Document 157: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 27, 1970.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger recommended President Nixon's approval for a $88.5 million economic assistance program for Colombia, in a single release.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 779, Country Files, Colombia, Vol. 1. Confidential. Sent for action. Kissinger initialed approval of both recommendations for the President. Attached but not printed are Tabs A and B. Tab A is a January 29 memorandum from Mayo to Nixon; and Tab B is a February 11 memorandum from Mayo to Nixon. NSDM 10 is published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 7. On March 2, Watts informed Eliot of the President's decision. A copy was sent to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Administrator of AID. (Ibid.)

Document 158: Letter From President Lleras Restrepo of Colombia to President Nixon, Bogotá, March 5, 1970.

President Lleras Restrepo praised President Nixon's annual foreign policy report to the U.S. Congress for its recommendations for regional economic integration and liberalized tariff preferences that favored the developing countries.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 779, Country Files, Colombia, Vol. 1. No classification marking. For Nixon's First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 115–190. The document bears Lleras Restrepo's typed signature. Nixon's February 18 letter has not been found.

Document 159: Intelligence Memorandum 0505/70, Washington, May 5, 1970.

The memorandum noted that retired General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla won Colombia's April 19 election with 39 percent of the vote. Because the Colombian Government feared Rojas' victory would lead to popular demonstrations and perhaps violence, it imposed a state of seize on April 21, with Rojas and his daughter, Senator Maria Eugenia Rojas de Moreno, under virtual house arrest.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job Number 79–T00830A, Office of Current Intelligence, Box 4, Colombia, The ANAPO: What is it? No. 0505/70. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. An April 24 State Department Intelligence Brief noted that Rojas's supporters "could later pose a serious threat to Colombia's stability." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 COL)

Document 160: Memorandum of Meeting, Washington, June 8, 1970, noon.

President Nixon and Ambassador Botero discussed the need for a modernization program for the Colombian military and Congressional opposition to arms sales.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 779, Country Files, Latin America, Colombia, Vol. 1. Confidential; Exdis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 12:39 p.m. to 12:50 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) On April 20, Kissinger sent a memorandum to the President recommending he meet with Botero, because President Lleras "has been most helpful to us this last year, and has strongly supported our positions and policies." (Ibid.)

Document 161: Letter From President Nixon to President Lleras Restrepo of Colombia, Washington, July 7, 1970.

President Nixon told President Lleras Restrepo that a 47 percent increase in coffee prices complicated efforts to obtain Congressional support for the International Coffee Agreement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot 72 D 320: Presidential and Secretary of State Correspondence with Heads of State, 1969–1971. No classification marking. Lleras Restrepo's April 14 letter is ibid.

Document 162: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 26, 1971.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger explained the proposed 1971 Colombia aid program and recommended approval.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 512, Country Files, Far East, Cambodia vol. XII, February 1–June 30, 1971. Confidential. Kissinger initialed for Nixon on April 1. Attached but not published are Tabs A and B. Tab A is Secretary Rogers' March 3 request and Tab B is a March 19 memorandum from OMB Director Schultz to Nixon. In an April 6 memorandum, Kissinger informed Rogers of the President's approval. (Ibid.) For Nixon's reaction to the Peterson Report, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 128. For Nixon's September 15, 1970 message, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 745–756.

Document 163: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 30, 1971.

Colombian Minister of Finance Rodrigo Llorante and Assistant Secretary Meyer discussed commodity and trade issues.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 COL. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Little. Written at the bottom of the memorandum, in an unknown hand, was "Thus aid could be in the form of generalized preferences as part of Latin American's concept of ‘compensation' for commercial dislocations."

Document 164: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 18, 1972.

United States and Colombian officials discussed three issues: coffee, the draft treaty on Quita Sueno, and expropriation policy.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL COL–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Taylor. The meeting was held in Assistant Secretary Meyer's office in the Department of State. The treaty on Quita Sueno is in telegram 165684 to Bogotá and Managua, September 11. (Ibid., POL 4 COL–US)

Document 165: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, May 3, 1972.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger argued that assistance to Colombia was important, as it would stabilize the government and support its economic and social development. Kissinger noted that U.S. assistance to Colombia did not substitute for Colombia's own efforts.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 779, Country Files, Latin America, Colombia, Vol. 1. Confidential. Sent for action. Haig approved for Kissinger, who approved for the President. Attached but not published are Tabs A and B. Tab A is Secretary Rogers' April 7 request and Tab B is an April 26 memorandum from Director Shultz of OMB to Nixon. Davis, in a May 12 memorandum, informed Eliot of the President's approval.

Document 166: Letter From President Nixon to President Pastrana of Colombia, Washington, November 7, 1972.

President Nixon informed President Pastrana that the U.S. Government was prepared to help Colombia prevent the spread of foot-and-mouth disease to allow for the continued construction of the Pan American Highway through the Darien Gap.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Foreign Affairs, Box 32, EX FO 3–1/1–2, 1973–1974. Limited Official Use.

Document 167: Letter From President Pastrana of Colombia to President Nixon, Bogotá, December 5, 1972.

President Pastrana discussed a number of the problems Colombia would face in attempting to prevent the spread of foot-and-mouth disease. In particular, he noted that displacing a large number of cattle, located in remote areas, would be costly.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Foreign Affairs, Box 32, EX FO 3–1/1–2, 1973–1974. The letter bears Pastrana's typed signature. Nixon's letter to Pastrana is printed as Document 166.

Document 167a: Editorial Note.

Document 168: Telegram 563 From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State, February 27, 1969, 2134Z.

The Embassy reported that the Government of Costa Rican had received an offer from the Soviet Union to rehabilitate two major ports, financed through loans repayable with coffee exports to the USSR.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 779, Country Files, Latin America, Costa Rica. Confidential.

Document 169: Telegram 1011 From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State, April 17, 1969, 2339Z.

A report received by the Embassy described a pledge by Costa Rican President José Figueres to legalize the Costa Rican Communist Party—prohibited under the Costa Rican Constitution, Article 98. Ambassador Boonstra indicated that he personally discussed with Figueres the danger presented by communists. Boonstra indicated that the Embassy planned a "discreet campaign" to oppose the Communist Party's legalization.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 12 COSTA RICA. Secret; Noforn; Limdis.

Document 170: Telegram 69007 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Panama and Costa Rica, May 2, 1969, 2133Z.

The Department of State reported on its May 2 conversation with Panamanian Ambassador Alemán regarding Costa Rican allegations that Panamanian National Guard forces had entered Costa Rican territory. Alemán, denied the allegations, but reported "shooting across the border both ways" on April 30, and indicated that a "bilateral solution" would be found.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 COSTA RICA–PAN. Confidential. Drafted on May 2 by Sanders (ARA/PAN); cleared by Breen and Ford; and approved by Sanders. It was repeated to USCINCSO.

Document 171: Telegram 311 From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State, February 6, 1970, 2352Z.

The Embassy reported preliminary information indicating that José Figueres won the 1970 presidential elections with a 73,000 vote margin over his nearest competitor, Mario Echandi.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 COSTA RICA. Confidential. Repeated to Guatemala City, Managua, Panama, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, and USCINCSO. In Airgram A–44 from the Embassy in San José, February 20, the Embassy reported the official results from the election, which indicated that Figueres won 55.3 percent of the national total. (Ibid.)

Document 172: Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, undated.

The intelligence memorandum detailed a personal "loan" channeled to president-elect Figueres from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 779, Country Files, Latin America, Costa Rica. Secret; Sensitive. It was forwarded to Kissinger by Helms under an April 10 covering memorandum, in which Helms promised to follow developments closely and report discussions with the Department of State.

Document 173: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 11, 1970.

National Security Council staff member Vaky forwarded and analyzed Document 172 under a covering memorandum in which he recommended a 40 Committee meeting to discuss the matter and provided four options for dealing with the situation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 779, Country Files, Latin America, Costa Rica. Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger placed a check-mark next to Vaky's recommendation to go with Option 3 and suggested that the person to carry it out would be Governor Nelson Rockefeller. At the bottom of the page, Kissinger wrote, "OK. HK. Let's just have Helms & Johnson keep out of Defense." No record of a 40 Committee meeting was found. In Telegram 2872 from San José, June 7, the Embassy reported that Figueres had made a secret agreement with Costa Rican Communist Party Secretary General Manuel Mora, that Figueres was "deeply in debt," and that the agreement might have been motivated by "both political and financial" concerns (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 14 COSTA RICA)

Document 174: Telegram 1246 From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State, May 21, 1970, 1730Z.

The Embassy reported that President Figueres told Ambassador Ploeser that Costa Rica intended to conduct trade with the communist bloc, but that it would remain firmly on the U.S. side.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 COSTA RICA. Confidential. It was repeated to Guatemala, Managua, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, and CINCSO/POLAD.

Document 175: Telegram 1621 From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State, June 23, 1970, 2358Z.

Ambassador Ploeser noted that President Figueres informed the Embassy that his government was considering a plan to allow Sandinista captive Carlos Fonseca Amador to escape to Spain. According to the Embassy, the Nicaraguan Government was aware of the plan and had no objections.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 COSTA RICA. Secret. It was repeated to Managua, Madrid, and USCINCSO for POLAD.

Document 176: Telegram 1730 From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State, July 6, 1970, 2300Z.

President Figueres told the Embassy that the Costa Rican Government was still studying a plan to arrange the escape of Sandinista captive Carlos Fonseca Amador to a third country.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 29 COSTA RICA. Confidential; Priority. It was repeated to Guatemala, La Paz, Madrid, Lima, Managua, Santiago, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, and USCINCSO.

Document 177: Telegram 2278 From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State, September 7, 1970, 1900Z.

The Embassy reported on an informal dinner between Ambassador Ploeser and President Figueres, during which they discussed Costa Rica's policy toward the Soviet Union.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 779, Country Files, Latin America, Costa Rica. Confidential; Priority. It was repeated to Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, San Salvador, and Tegucigalpa.

Document 178: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 15, 1970.

National Security Council staff member Vaky forwarded President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger an update on President José Figueres' dealings with the Soviets. He indicated that CIA and the Department of State had decided to collect information to use as a trump card against Figueres at the proper moment. Vaky recommended that the issue be placed on the agenda for the next 40 Committee meeting.

Source: National Security Council Files, Country Files, Costa Rica, 15 Sept 70–5 Mar 71. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Frank Chapin. The memorandum is a "non-log" item. Neither recommendation was initialed. Attached is a September 10 memorandum from Broe to Vaky, which included a memorandum detailing the information summarized in Vaky's September 15 memorandum to Kissinger.

Document 179: Telegram 2860 From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State, November 10, 1970, 2238Z.

Ambassador Ploeser reported on an informal dinner with President Figueres, in which they discussed a variety of topics, including the Soviet presence in Costa Rica.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL COSTA RICA–US. Secret; Priority.

Document 180: Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 17, 1970.

Director of Central Intelligence Helms verified that President Figueres had received money from the Soviet Union and that he had developed increasing ties to the Soviets. Helms recommended that retired Ambassador C. Allan Stewart, a long-time friend of Figueres, be sent to confront Figueres with the evidence.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 779, Country Files, Costa Rica. Secret, Eyes Only. A copy of the memorandum was sent to Johnson.

Document 181: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 20, 1970.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger forwarded CIA's proposal for a confrontation with President José Figueres regarding his relationship with the Soviets. President Nixon approved the recommendation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 779, Country Files, Latin America, Costa Rica. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. The memorandum was a "non-log" item. Attached at Tab A is a November 17 memorandum from Helms to Kissinger, Document 180. A December 16 note from Nachmanoff to Kissinger, indicates that "Ambassador Stewart has agreed to undertake the mission" (Ibid.)

Document 182: Telegram 3129 From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State, December 10, 1970, 0002Z.

Foreign Minister Facio contacted the Embassy to discuss Costa Rica's plans to permit the Soviet Union to open an embassy in San José. Ambassador Ploeser described Facio as embarrassed about the decision and suggested exchanging intelligence on the Russians with the Embassy.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL COSTA RICA–USSR. Confidential. It was repeated to Guatemala, Managua, Moscow, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, and USCINCSO.

Document 183: Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 9, 1971, 5:30 p.m.

National Security Council staff member Nachmanoff summarized an attached report of Ambassador Stewart's confrontation with President Figueres regarding his ties to and receipt of money from the Soviets. Figueres denied having received any money, but discussed his relations with the Soviets. Stewart provided Figueres with hard facts and Figueres seemed shaken by the confrontation, but remained unimpressed regarding the dangers of Russian subversion.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 779, Country Files, Latin America, Costa Rica. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Outside System. On December 14, Broe provided a copy of the "Hard Fact Paper" to Meyer, in addition to a "Talking Paper," "Contingency Plan," and additional supporting materials (Ibid.) (S)

Document 184: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 8, 1971.

Responding to a February 7 Miami Herald article, which alleged that President José Figueres had demanded the recall of both the U.S. Ambassador and "the reputed CIA chief in Costa Rica," Executive Secretary Eliot noted that Figueres had not requested the Ambassador's removal.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 779, Country Files, Latin America, Costa Rica. Secret. An unknown person signed for Eliot above his typeset signature.

Document 185: Memorandum From Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 25, 1971.

Deputy Director Karamessines sent a report, which concluded that President Figueres and Communist Party Secretary General Manuel Mora were encountering difficulties in implementing their 1968 secret agreement. Figueres had encountered stiff opposition from the Legislature and his own party.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, ODDP Registry, Job Number 80–B01086A. Secret; No Foreign Dissemination; Controlled Dissemination; No Dissemination Abroad; Background Use Only. Copies were sent to Helms, Irwin, Johnson, and Meyer. On March 29, Nachmanoff sent this memorandum with a covering memorandum summarizing it to Kissinger, who initialed it. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 779, Country Files, Latin America, Costa Rica)

Document 186: Telegram 810 From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State, April 1, 1971, 1420Z.

The Embassy reported that President Figueres gave an interview to state that his goal in warming relations with the Soviet Union was "in favor of peace, not war," and that he would provide a full written statement to clear up any misunderstandings about his policy. Figueres also publicly offered to open up Costa Rica to U.S. intelligence to allow for any necessary vigilance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL COSTA RICA–USSR. Confidential. Joint State-USIS message. Repeated to Guatemala, Managua, Mexico City, Moscow, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, and USCINCSO.

Document 187: Memorandum for the Record, Washington, May 6, 1971, 1500–1645 Hours.

In a weekly meeting, William Broe indicated that President Figueres continued to deal with the Soviets.

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, Latin America General, 1971–72. Secret.

Document 188: Airgram A–283 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, June 11, 1971.

Ambassador Kubisch notes that anti-U.S. comments made by Costa Rican President José Figueres embarrassed Mexican President Luis Echeverría so much that he had the remarks "deleted from press accounts."

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 COSTA RICA. Confidential. It was drafted on June 8 by Zweifel and approved by Matthews. It was repeated to San José. Stamped notations on the Airgram indicate that it was received at the Department of State's Bureaus of Inter-American Affairs and Mexican Affairs on June 16.

Document 189: Telegram 2000 From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State, July 27, 1971, 2028Z.

Ambassador Ploeser reported the growing opposition within Costa Rica to President Figueres' efforts to normalize relations with the Soviet Union. In particular, the Catholic Church and the president's own political party opposed the opening of a Soviet Embassy in San José.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12 COSTA RICA. Confidential.

Document 190: Letter From the Ambassador in Costa Rica (Ploeser) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer), San José, September 1, 1971.

Ambassador Ploeser reported an improvement in relations between Embassy personnel and Costa Rican officials during the months successive to the January confrontation with President José Figueres.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL COSTA RICA–US. Secret; Eyes Only; Official-Informal.

Document 191: Intelligence Memorandum, No. 2111/71, Washington, December 29, 1971.

The memorandum discussed President José Figueres' efforts at negotiating a commercial relationship with the Soviet Union.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, Job 79–T00831A. Secret; No Foreign Dissemination.

Document 192: Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines) to the Office of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kennedy), Washington, January 7, 1972.

Deputy Director Karamessines forwarded a memorandum regarding Guatemalan plotting against President Figueres, noting that Ambassador Ploeser informed Figueres of the plot.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 779, Country Files, Latin America, Costa Rica. Secret/Sensitive. Attached to the covering memorandum but not published is Intelligence Information Cable, TCDSDB–315/00090–72, dated January 5, 1972.

Document 193: Telegram 376 From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State, February 8, 1972, 2125Z.

The Embassy reported that President Figueres informed Ambassador Ploeser that he was aware of a Guatemalan sponsored plot to "overthrow him" in late February. Ploeser agreed to inform Figueres if the Embassy found any confirmation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 779, Country Files, Latin America, Costa Rica. Secret; Exdis. It was repeated to Guatemala and Managua.

Document 194: Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 9, 1972.

National Security Council staff member Jordan informed President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger of intelligence indicating that the Soviets and Costa Rican communists had become irritated with President Figueres.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 720, Country Files, Europe, USSR Vol. XXIV August 1972. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Attached but not published at Tab A is the CIA Intelligence memorandum.

Document 194a: Editorial Note.

Document 195: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 31, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger advised President Nixon that the new administration could expect correspondence from Cuban exiles. Noting the potential for embarrassment, Kissinger recommended that such correspondence be referred to the Department of State.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 780, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. 1. Confidential. Written in an unknown hand in the upper right hand corner reads, "Shown to A. Nachmanoff 2/3/69." Under the recommendation is a note in President Nixon's handwriting which reads, "I disagree. State has handled this with disgusting incompetence. The careerists are Pro Castro for the most part. Possibly Allen could handle these on a controlled discreet basis–showing at least some sympathy for their plight."

Document 196: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 7, 1969.

In reference to a February 6 memorandum from Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger noted that progress had been made with Cuba in dealing with the problem of aircraft hijacking. According to Kissinger, in 1961, Cuba had proposed an agreement to deal with hijacking that closely resembled the agreement that the U.S. had now proposed to Cuba. That proposal had been rejected by the United States.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 780, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for information. Attached but not published is a February 6 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon.

Document 197: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 11, 1969, 2:45 p.m.

The Swiss Ambassador to Cuba, Alfred Fischli, met with Secretary of State Rogers to discuss Swiss representation of U.S. interests in Cuba.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL CUBA–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by J.F. Fitzgerald (ARA/CCA) and approved in S on March 14. In LA Staff Note 1–69, January 27, CIA concluded, "Except that it is in our hemisphere, the Cuban government is not substantially different from many Communist governments with which the U.S. has far better relations." (Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Office Files, Job 79–T00968A) In a March 17 memorandum to Kissinger, which reported on the March 11 meeting between Fischli and Rogers, Vaky observed that "other recent Cuban actions reflect a more moderate attitude toward the U.S. than has been the case, and there definitely appears to be an overall pattern suggesting a bid for a détente." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 780, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. I)

Document 198: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 4, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger informed President Nixon that Secretary of State Rogers had requested authorization to determine the meaning of a message from Castro, indicating a desire for détente with the United States.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 780, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. I. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. A notation in the upper right corner of the memorandum reads, "OBE." An unsigned message in President Nixon's handwriting, at the bottom of the memorandum below Kissinger's recommendation, reads, "A very, very cautious probe only, which I will be." Attached but not published at Tab A is an April 3 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon. Attached to the memorandum is a typewritten note, which reads, "Back from the President. Please note that Presidential note does not seem to be completed." An attached note in Haig's handwriting reads, "Means keep me posted!"

Document 199: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 11, 1969, 5 p.m.

In a meeting with Under Secretary Johnson, Swiss Ambassador Felix Schnyder reported on Ambassador Fischli's discussions with Cuban officials, particularly concerning hijacking. According to Schnyder, the Cuban Government had indicated that the problem might be dealt with through informal measures, as opposed to a formal agreement.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 780, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. I. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Fitzgerald. On April 16, Nachmanoff forwarded a copy of the memorandum of conversation to Kissinger, who signed an April 18 memorandum to the President summarizing it. (Ibid.)

Document 200: Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee, Washington, April 26, 1969.

The memorandum discussed the feasibility of covert operations against Cuba, including historical background, an overview of current operations, and a discussion of additional options for covert actions

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba 69–70–71. Secret; Eyes Only. In an April 28 covering memorandum to Johnson, Meyer indicated that ARA and INR found the main thrust of the memorandum acceptable. Meyer recommended that Johnson endorse it. During a weekly meeting with the Department of State, April 25, CIA indicated that "Kissinger had asked the Director to study the feasibility of stepping up action programs against Cuba, with the emphasis on the covert actions, and also to discuss the use of Cuban exiles." (Ibid., Latin America General, 1969–1970)

Document 201: Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Trueheart) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer), Washington, May 5, 1969.

Deputy Directory Trueheart forwarded an excerpt from the minutes of the 303 Committee meeting, May 1 on the feasibility of cover operations against Cuba.

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee, January–June 1969. Secret; Eyes Only.

Document 202: Abstract of Research Memorandum RSE–39 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, May 9, 1969.

This abstract is a summary of an Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) paper on USSR-Cuba relations, which also focused on U.S.-Cuban and U.S.-Soviet relations and possible Soviet reactions to a warming of U.S.-Cuba relations. The study concluded that the USSR would favor improved U.S.-Cuban relations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL CUBA–USSR. Secret.

Document 203: Paper Prepared at the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, undated.

CIA prepared a study on the feasibility of covert economic warfare against Cuba.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 207, Agency Files, CIA, Vol. I, January–December 31, 1969. Secret; Sensitive. Attached to a covering May 15, 1969 memorandum from Karamessines to Kissinger. Attached but not published is a 2-page summary titled, "Denial to Cuba of Free World Sugar Market."

Document 204: Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 16, 1969.

The Department of State provided President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger with a study on possible steps toward recognition of a provisional Cuban Government in exile.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 780, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. I. Top Secret; Nodis. Attached but not published are the following: a June 16 memorandum outlining the possible program to develop and recognize a Provisional Government in Exile for Cuba and a list of potential Cuban exile leaders, with individual biographical information (Tab A).

Document 205: Study Prepared in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 32, Washington, July 2, 1969.

The Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs outlined three Cuba policy approaches: (1) the Castro regime's forceful elimination; (2) a continuation of the policy of isolating Cuba; or (3) a move toward constructive change through the use of incentives and disincentives.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–39, Meeting Files, Senior Review Group Meetings, NSSM 32–Cuba, 9/23/69. Secret. In the margin next to paragraph 1 on U.S. interests, Kissinger wrote, "Tactical nukes?" The study was prepared in response to a National Security Study Memorandum from Kissinger, March 21, 1969. (Ibid.)

Document 206: Memorandum From Dave McManis of the National Security Council Staff to John Howe of the National Security Council Staff, Washington, August 1, 1969.

National Security Council staff member McManis reported on Soviet submarine operations in the Caribbean, including the presence of a tender, which could support up to eight conventionally powered submarines.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 780, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. I. Secret; Sensitive. The word "Thanks," followed by Haig's initials, appears on the upper right corner of the page. Attached to McManis's message is an August 1 CIA memorandum, which notes that "There is no evidence to support the rumors that have circulated in recent years to the effect that there are Soviet polaris-type submarine bases in Cuba." On July 20, the National Military Command Center reported that 7 Soviet Navy ships had entered Havana Harbor. (Ibid.)

Document 207: National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 85–69, Washington, September 2, 1969.

The estimate examined the situation in Cuba, Cuban relations with the Soviet Union, and the possibility of a change in United States-Cuban relations.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of CIA submitted this estimate with the concurrence of the USIB with the exception of the representatives of AEC and FBI who abstained on the grounds that it was outside their jurisdiction.

Document 208: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 23, 1969.

National Security Council staff member Vaky reported that the Cuban Government had announced an anti-hijacking law.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 780, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for information. A note indicates that Kissinger saw the memorandum on September 26. Attached but not published is the wire service story.

Document 209: Minutes of an NSC Review Group Meeting, Washington, September 23, 1969, 2:10–3:15 p.m.

The Review Group met to discuss NSSM 32 and U.S. policy toward Cuba.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, SRG Meetings Minutes, Originals [2 of 3]. Secret. The July 2 IG paper was sent to Kissinger under a July 3 covering memorandum from Meyer and is published as Document 205. The Annex mentioned in paragraph four of page three was not found.

Document 210: Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Cole) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 25, 1969.

President's Special Assistant Cole informed President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger that President Nixon had seen a press report indicating that developments in Latin America could lead to improved U.S.-Cuban relations. Nixon instructed that the Department of State be informed: " absolutely not ."

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 780, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. I. No classification marking. Cole signed Ken above his typeset signature. Haig passed the instruction to Eliot by telephone and asked Vaky to do the same, but not to do so in writing. (Memorandum from Haig to Vaky, September 25; ibid.)

Document 211: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 12, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger forwarded a memorandum from Secretary of State Rogers, requesting an exchange of notes with the Cuban Government to return captured hijackers on a reciprocal basis. Kissinger recommended approval of the Secretary's recommendation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 780, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. II, 1970. Confidential. Sent for action. Nixon approved Kissinger's recommendation on November 13. For the full text of Tab A, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–1, Global Issues, 1969–1972, Document 125. Tabs B and C were attached but not published.

Document 212: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, December 22, 1969, 10:15–10:35 a.m.

In an unscheduled visit to the Office of the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs, Juanita Castro Ruz (Fidel Castro's sister) expressed concern over efforts by Cuban exile organizations to launch attacks against Cuba.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 30–2 CUBA. Limited Official Use. It was drafted by Matthew D. Smith (ARA/CCA/M).

Document 213: Telegram 23858 From the Department of State to All ARA Diplomatic Posts, February 17, 1970, 1640Z.

Responding to ongoing public and official debate over the possibility of reintegrating Cuba into the Organization of American States and the hemispheric community, the Department of State ordered its diplomatic posts to reaffirm to the Foreign Ministers of each of the countries in the Western Hemisphere that no change in U.S. policy was contemplated.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CUBA–US. Secret. It was drafted by Crimmins, Hurwitch, and Funseth; cleared by Meyer, Bowden (EUR/SOV), Gardiner (INR/DDG), Jova, Feldman, and Vaky; and approved by Johnson. It was repeated to Belgrade, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, London, Moscow, Paris, Prague, Rome, Sofia, USUN, and Warsaw. In intelligence brief INRB–26 from Cline to Rogers, February 5, INR analyzed increased pressure to reintegrate Cuba into the OAS. (Ibid., POL CUBA–LA)

Document 214: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer) to the Under Secretary of State (Johnson), Washington, March 23, 1970.

Assistant Secretary Meyer forwarded a memorandum requesting that the 40 Committee approve a continuation of radio broadcasts to Cuba. Meyer recommended approval of the program.

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Reports, 1970–71. Secret. Attached but not published is a March 14 memorandum for the 40 Committee, which details the radio broadcast program. According to a March 30 memorandum for the record, during its March 25 meeting, the 40 Committee unanimously approved continuation of CIA's radio broadcast capability against Cuba was unanimously approved. (Ibid.)

Document 215: Memorandum for the Record, Washington, March 25, 1970.

In a meeting that included President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, President Nixon asked Director of Central Intelligence Helms what policy toward Cuba he would recommend. Helms advised the President to continue the policy of isolation and economic sanctions.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Files of the Executive Registry, DCI Helms, Job 80–B01285A. Secret.

Document 216: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 28, 1970.

National Security Council staff member Vaky reported that the Miami-based Cuban exile organization, Alpha–66, had launched an unsuccessful raid against Cuba. Vaky recommended that a meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group be convened to consider contingencies for responding to potential attacks against Guantánamo.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 780, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. II, 1970. Secret. Sent for action. On May 4, Kissinger responded affirmatively to Vaky's suggestion of a WSAG meeting. Attached but not published are Tabs A, B, and C. Tab A is an April 22 memorandum and Tab B is an April 24 telegram to the White House Situation Room. Tab C is an April 22 telegram from COMNAVBASE GTMO to CINLANTFLT.

Document 217: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 30, 1970.

National Security Council staff member Vaky provided President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger with new intelligence, which suggested that Alpha–66 was planning another raid on Cuba.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 780, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. II, 1970. Secret; Sensitive. A note on the upper right of the page, which bears Kissinger's initials, reads, "No formal action. Have discussed with Pres." Attached but not published at Tab A is an April 29 CIA Intelligence Information Cable, TDCS DB 315/02156–70. Tab B is Document 216.

Document 218: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 11, 1970.

National Security Council staff member Vaky reported on improved Soviet-Cuban relationships, particularly noting warm military to military relations and an increase in Soviet naval deployments to Cuba. Vaky recommended that he and President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger meet with National Security Council staff member Hal Sonnenfeldt to discuss the situation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 780, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. II, 1970. Secret. Sent for action. Kissinger initialed for approval on May 19. A copy was sent to Sonnenfeldt. A note bearing Kissinger's initials appearing on the upper right corner of the cover sheet reads, "Do memo for Pres. re Soviet strategic forces in Caribbean, May 19, 1970." In a May 20 memorandum, Vaky asked Dave Young of the NSC Staff to schedule the meeting. An unsigned note on the bottom of the memorandum reads, "Noon 5/23?" No record of the meeting has been found. (Ibid.)

Document 219: Information Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State, Washington, undated.

This Department of State memorandum, sent to President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, reported on Soviet naval and aircraft deployments to Cuba.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CUBA–USSR. Secret. Sent to Kissinger on May 15, 1970 under cover of a memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger. (Ibid.)

Document 220: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 18, 1970.

National Security Council staff member Vaky forwarded to President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger a revised memorandum to President Nixon on Cuban exile activities, requesting that authorization to discourage exiles from taking actions that might be counter-productive to U.S. interests.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 780, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. II, 1970. Secret; Sensitive. The memoranda are uninitialed copies and there is no indication they were sent. Tabs A and B are attached but not published. In a May 25 memorandum to Kissinger, Vaky noted that Treasury had been investigating the activities of Alpha–66 since July 1969. A handwritten note by Haig, June 3, at the bottom of the memorandum reads, "Pete–Let's take it easy–this will evoke strong Pres. reaction. Pete, please call me. Al." (Ibid.) A Department of State official met with Cuban exiles, May 15, to discourage them from taking actions against Cuba. (Memorandum of conversation, May 15; Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 30–2 CUBA) In a July 10 memorandum to Mitchell, Helms stated, "I had the distinct impression from the President one day a couple of months ago that he rather favors some anti-Castro activity by this ALPHA 66 group." (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01285A)

Document 221: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, May 28, 1970.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger recommended that President Nixon approve a recommendation by Secretary of State Rogers to enter into an agreement with Cuba for the reciprocal return of hijackers.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 780, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. II, 1970. Secret. Sent for action. President Nixon initialed his approval on June 11. On June 12, Kissinger informed Rogers of the President's authorization. Tabs A through C are attached but not published. Tab A is a May 15 memorandum from Rogers to the President. Tab B is an undated proposed memorandum of understanding between the United States and Cuba. And Tab C is a November 12, 1969 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon containing a Presidential authorization to send the note. (Ibid.)

Document 222: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 17, 1970.

National Security Council staff member Vaky summarized the key points of a CIA memorandum on Cuban-Soviet relations and the establishment of a naval facility at Cienfuegos.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 780, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. II, 1970. Secret. A note on the document indicates Kissinger saw it. Attached but not published is a June 3 CIA intelligence memorandum, OCI 1367–70. (Ibid.)

Document 223: Memorandum From the Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, to the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (Hurwitch), Washington, August 14, 1970.

The Assistant Legal Adviser reported that Cuban exile leader José Elías de la Torriente was planning to recruit Cuban exiles for military action against Cuba and recommended that the Department warn de la Torriente that such activities might violate U.S. criminal laws.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 30–2 CUBA. Confidential. Forwarded by Assistant Secretary Hurwitch to ARA/CCA on August 14. According to an August 31 memorandum of conversation, Matthew D. Smith and Ronald D. Godard of the ARA/CCA Miami Office met with de la Torriente to reiterate the U.S. Government position on violation of U.S. neutrality law. (Ibid.) In a September 17 memorandum to Kissinger, Viron P. Vaky reported that Alpha 66 had unsuccessfully attempted to infiltrate Cuba, resulting in the capture of five Cuban exiles. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 782, Country Files, Latin America, Soviet Naval Activity in Cuban Waters, Vol. I, Cienfuegos)

Document 224: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 18, 1970.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger reported on aerial reconnaissance of Cuba.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 782, Country Files, Latin America, Soviet Naval Activity in Cuban Waters, Vol. I (Cienfuegos). Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Nixon wrote on the third page: "I want a report on a crash basis on (1) what CIA can do to support any kind of action which will irritate Castro (2) what actions we can take which we have not yet taken to boycott nations dealing with Castro (3) most important what actions we can take covert or overt to put missiles in Turkey—or a sub base in the Black Sea—anything which will give us some trading stock." Attached but not published at Tab A is a note from the Soviet Embassy, given to Kissinger during his August 4 meeting with Vorontsov. (Ibid.)

Document 225: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 22, 1970.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger provided President Nixon with an overview of the significance of Soviet naval facilities at Cienfuegos, and a list of policy options, in anticipation of a September 23 NSC meeting.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–29, NSC Meeting, Jordan, September 23, 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The memorandum is a "non-log" item and was not initialed by Kissinger.

Document 226: Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 23, 1970, 9:30 a.m.

The National Security Council met to discuss the evidence and consequences of a Soviet submarine base at Cienfuegos.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Meeting Minutes, Originals, September 23, 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. Tab A was not attached. The conversation is also published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 214.

Document 227: Memorandum for the Record, Washington, September 24, 1970.

The Senior Review Group discussed contingency press guidance for use if information regarding the submarine base at Cienfuegos became public.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 782, Country Files, Latin America, Soviet Naval Activity in Cuban Waters, Vol. II, Cienfuegos. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. In a September 25 memorandum to Rogers, Laird, Helms, and Moore, Kissinger provided press guidance and reported that the President mandated "rigid adherence" to such guidance, with "no backgrounding, comment, or speculation of any kind on this subject by U.S. spokesmen and officials." (Ibid.)

Document 228: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 5, 1970.

National Security Council staff member Vaky noted reports that the Cuban Government was preoccupied with exile incursions and speculated about the relationship between exile activities and the establishment of a Soviet submarine base at Cienfuegos.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 782, Country Files, Latin America, Soviet Naval Activity in Cuban Waters, Vol. I, Cienfuegos. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information and designated "non-log." Attached but not published are Tabs A and B. Tab A is a September 16 telegram from the Canadian Embassy in Havana. Tab B is a September 24 CIA intelligence memorandum, titled, "Cuban Exiles in Central America and the Caribbean." In an October 5 memorandum to Haig, Vaky reported on a Cuban exile plot to assassinate Cuban officials at the United Nations, noting "My view is that it would not help our general capacity to fine-tune and control things to have an assassination like this take place in New York, and that therefore any such plan should be cut off." (Ibid.)

Document 229: Editorial Note.

Document 230: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 14, 1970.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger's account of multiple discussions with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, including discussion of the submarine base at Cienfuegos during meetings on September 25, October 6, and October 9.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 782, Country Files, Latin America, Soviet Naval Activity in Cuban Waters, Vol. I, Cienfuegos. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Attachments A through D are attached but not published. (Ibid.)

Document 231: Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Laird) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 16, 1970.

Secretary of Defense Laird provided President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger with an update on Soviet naval activities in Cienfuegos and Mariel, Cuba.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 782, Country Files, Latin America, Soviet Naval Activity in Cuban Waters, Vol. I, Cienfuegos. Top Secret. Attached was a October 16 memorandum from the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, which detailed Soviet naval activity in the area of Cienfuegos. (Ibid.) In a October 29 memorandum to Kissinger, Richard T. Kennedy indicated that "recent photography had indicated a reduction in construction activity and departure of several Soviet naval vessels" from Cienfuegos. (Ibid.) A November 4 CIA intelligence cable, TDCS 314/11498–70, confirmed that construction of Soviet naval facilities at Cienfuegos had ceased. (Ibid.)

Document 232: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 6, 1970.

Citing evidence that an elite power struggle was occurring, which threatened Castro's hold on power in Cuba, National Security Council staff member Vaky suggested replacing NSSM 32 with a new study of Cuba, more in tune with U.S. policy prerogatives.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 780, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. II, 1970. Confidential. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Colonel Kennedy. Kissinger did not initial approval or disapproval. The attachments at Tab A have not been found. An undated, handwritten note from Haig to Nachmanoff, in the upper right of the cover page, reads, "Arnie—HAK says hold for present."

Document 233: Memorandum From Arnold Nachamanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 25, 1970.

National Security Council staff member Nachmanoff forwarded a draft telegram on U.S. policy regarding Cuban exile actions against Cuba for President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger's approval.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 780, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. II, 1970. Secret; Limdis. Sent for action. A handwritten notation indicates that it was sent to Kissinger via Haig. Kissinger approved on November 30, but instructed: "Hold for four days to see where tender is going." The telegram was sent as 206687 to Guatemala City, Managua, and San José, December 21. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 30–2 CUBA)

Document 234: Memorandum For the Record, Washington, January 15, 1971, 11 a.m.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger discussed Soviet naval activities in Cuba with the Navy Commanders-in-Chief.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 253, Agency Files, Navy, 1969–71. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Roosevelt Room at the White House. In a memorandum to Rogers, Laird, and Helms, President Nixon instructed that there be no further discussion of the understanding with the Soviet Union concerning submarine bases in Cuba. (Ibid., Box 782, Country Files, Latin America, Soviet Naval Activity in Cuban Waters, Vol. II, Cienfuegos) Nixon statement of January 4 is in Public Papers: Nixon , 1971, pp. 17–18.

Document 235: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 2, 1971.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger reported on the status of the Cuban fishing boat case.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 781, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. III, 1971. Confidential. Sent for information. Although not initialed by Kissinger, an attached NSC routing sheet indicates that this memorandum was sent to the President on March 8.

Document 236: Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter American Affairs (Meyer) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, April 5, 1971.

Noting that some OAS members were considering lifting or modifying sanctions against Cuba, Assistant Secretary Meyer recommended that the U.S. maintain a position against any changes in the OAS's stance on Cuba and the active discouragement of any reconsideration of OAS policy toward Cuba.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 24 CUBA. Secret. Drafted on April 1 by Richard A. Poole (USOAS); cleared by Jova; and the recommended actions were approved by Rogers. In telegram 066661 to San José, April 20, the Department reported that Castro had unilaterally rejected normalization of relations with the U.S. and a return to the OAS. (Ibid., POL CUBA–US)

Document 237: Special National Intelligence Estimate 85–71, Washington, April 29, 1971.

The estimate assessed the situation in Cuba, Cuban relations with the Soviet Union, Cuban efforts to improve relations with Latin America, and United States-Cuban relations.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Secret. The annexes are not published.

Document 238: Memorandum From Tom Latimer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 28, 1971.

A U–2 overflight of Cuba revealed that a nuclear powered cruise missile submarine had tied up to a Soviet tender, in Antilla, Cuba.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 782, Country Files, Latin America, Soviet Naval Activity in Cuban Waters, Vol. II, Cienfuegos. Secret.

Document 239: Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 28, 1971.

National Security Council staff member Sonnenfeldt provided analysis on the issue of the Soviet nuclear powered cruise missile submarine, which was moored to a tender in Cuba.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 782, Country Files, Latin America, Soviet Naval Activity in Cuban Waters, Vol. II, Cienfuegos. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. In a May 29 memorandum to Haig, Jon Howe stated, "Unless we are willing to go to the mat to force Soviet withdrawal of the ship, it may be better to take the Soviet move in stride publicly and play it in low key." (Ibid., Box 781, Country Files, Cuba, Vol. III, 1971)

Document 240: Paper Prepared in the Department of State, Washington, July 13, 1971.

At the request of the White House, the Department of State outlined U.S. policy toward Cuban exile groups in the U.S. involved in actions against Cuba.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12 CUBA. Confidential. Cleared on July 13 by Hurwitch. This paper is attached to a July 13 memorandum for the record by Curran, which indicates it was sent at the request of Colonel Kennedy. The memorandum to which this paper is attached is not published.

Document 241: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter American Affairs (Meyer) to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson), Washington, August 13, 1971.

Assistant Secretary Meyer requested Under Secretary Johnson's endorsement on a 40 Committee decision to continue radio broadcasts to Cuba.

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba 69–70–71. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent through Wymberley Coerr (INR/DDC). Drafted by Gardner. A handwritten note in the upper right of the first page reads, "Telephonically approved 3 Apr 72." Attached but not published is the May 24 memorandum for the 40 Committee, titled, "Radio Programming Targeted at Cuban Youth and Its Potential for Attracting Selected Youth Audiences Elsewhere in Latin America."

Document 242: Intelligence Memorandum, OCI No. 1730/71, Washington, September 1, 1971.

The intelligence community provided a joint assessment of Cuban subversion in Latin America.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, Job 79–T00831A. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense participated in the preparation of this assessment. The annexes are not published.

Document 243: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 2, 1971.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger reported that the Cuban Government had announced its intention to unilaterally terminate the Cuban refugee airlift, which had been in place since December 1965.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 781, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. III, 1971. Secret. Sent for information. Attached but not published at Tab A is an August 27 memorandum from Rogers to the President. An attached NSC routing slip indicates that the President saw the memorandum on September 8.

Document 244: Abstract of Research Study Produced in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, October 1, 1971.

The study analyzed problems being faced by Castro and the implications for U.S. policy toward Cuba.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 799, Country Files, Latin America, General, Volume VI, July 1971–1974. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. It was prepared on September 28 by INR/American Republics Analyst Donald F. Herr and approved by Summ.

Document 245: Memorandum From Ashley Hewitt of the National Security Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), Washington, October 14, 1971, 2132 EST.

National Security Council staff member Hewitt forwarded a Department of State report on an August 12 Cuban exile attack the fishing village of Boca de Sana in Cuba. The Department of State recommended an investigation into the incident and requested authorization to remind Cuban exiles that the U.S. Government would enforce its neutrality laws.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 781, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. III, 1971. No classification marking. Attached but not published is the October 14 Department of State memorandum to Kissinger. (Ibid.)

Document 246: Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, RARN–34, Washington, November 8, 1971.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) analyzed the reasons for a Cuban violation of U.S. travel controls and a visit to the island by Kosygin.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CUBA–US. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by Herr and cleared by Summ. RARS–7, "Cuba: Difficult Choices for Castro," is published as Document 244. In an October 26 memorandum, Nachmanoff reported to Haig that a Cuban commercial airplane had landed in New Orleans without permission, in violation of FAA regulations and U.S. travel restrictions. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 781, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. III, 1971) In an October 19 intelligence memorandum, CIA speculated that the reason behind Kosygin's visit to Cuba was to highlight the Soviet Union's commitment to Cuba. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, Job 79–T00831A)

Document 247: Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 9, 1971, 9:13–10:04 a.m.

During a discussion with President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger on Latin American efforts to reintegrate Cuba into the OAS, President Nixon asserted that he would not change U.S. policy toward Cuba.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 633–4, Oval Office. No classification marking. The discussion transcribed here is part of a larger conversation from 9:13–10:04 a.m. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume.

Document 248: Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 15, 1971.

National Security Council staff member Nachamanoff informed President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger that a Panamanian-flagged vessel, the Johnny Express was being pursued by a Cuban naval vessel.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 781, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. III, 1971. Confidential. Sent for information. A handwritten note at the top of the memorandum reads, "HAK has seen."

Document 249: Memorandum From Ashley Hewitt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), Washington, December 16, 1971.

National Security Council staff member Hewitt raised the issue of rules of engagement in dealing with Cuban ship seizures in international waters.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 781, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. III, 1971. Confidential. Sent for information. Haig underlined the words "if we could look at them once they are drafted" are and wrote: "Agree!" In Telegram 5892 to CINCLANT, December 17, JCS told CINCLANT to prepare plans to protect U.S. citizens and freedom of the seas. (Ibid.)

Document 250: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird, Washington, undated.

Assistant Secretary of Defense Nutter discussed contingency plans to protect U.S. citizens and freedom of navigation against Cuban hostile actions and actions already taken in response to the seizure of the Johnny Express .

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 781, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. III, 1971. Top Secret. It was sent to Kissinger under cover of a December 18 memorandum from Laird. The enclosures are not published.

Document 251: Contingency Plan Prepared in the Department of State, Washington, December 19, 1971.

The Department of State, in consultation with other agencies, prepared a contingency plan for safeguarding freedom of navigation in the Caribbean for third country vessels.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 781, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. III, 1971. Top Secret. It was sent to the President under a covering memorandum from Kissinger, which summarized the paper and asked for Kissinger's approval on behalf of the President.

Document 252: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers, Secretary of Defense Laird, Secretary of Transportation Volpe, and the Director of Central Intelligence Helms, Washington, December 23, 1971.

President Nixon approved the contingency plan submitted by the Department of State Inter-Departmental Group for Inter-American Affairs (IG/ARA) with modifications.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Subject Files, Job 80–B01086A. Top Secret. Copies sent to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Attorney General. The contingency plan is Document 251.

Document 253: Study Prepared in the Departments of State and Defense, Washington, undated.

Study on the feasibility of escorting vessels potentially threatened by Cuban attack.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 781, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. IV, 1972. Top Secret. It was sent to Kissinger under a covering January 10, 1972 memorandum from Eliot. In a February 8 memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense, Kissinger indicated that President Nixon had approved the January 10 study's recommendations and had directed "that no substantial change in the nature of the current mission designed to prevent or forestall further attempted seizures by Cuba, nor any major alteration in the level of forces devoted to this mission, be made without his specific authorization." (Ibid.)

Document 254: Memorandum From Ashley Hewitt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 18, 1972.

National Security Council member Hewitt summarized a report on the evolution of relations between Panama and Cuba that was prepared by the CIA.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 781, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. IV, 1972. Secret. Sent for information. Haig initialed the memorandum. Attached but not published at Tab A is a January 13 CIA Intelligence Memorandum. (Ibid.)

Document 255: Editorial Note.

Document 256: Study Prepared in the Department of State, Washington, March 13, 1972.

The Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs at the Department of State prepared a study on Soviet Naval Deployments to the Caribbean.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–189, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM), NSSM 144. Top Secret. It was sent under a covering March 13 memorandum from Ronald I. Spiers, in his capacity as Chairman of the NSC/IPMG, to Kissinger in response to NSSM 144, January 14. (Ibid.)

Document 257: Study Prepared in the Department of State, Washington, March 16, 1972.

The Department of State prepared a study on the legal position of the United States in the event that the U.S. Armed Forces should take action to protect third-country ships from Cuban attack.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 781, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. IV, 1972. Top Secret. Sent under a covering March 16 memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger. Attached at Tab A but not published is Telegram 8394, February 10, from the JCS to RUCBSAA/CINCLANT, describing the Special Rules of Engagement. Tab B, the contingency plan approved by President Nixon, is published as Document 252.

Document 258: Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon, Washington, March 31, 1972.

President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Haig reported that the captain of the Johnny Express was still being held in Havana.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 781, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. IV, 1972. Confidential. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. At the bottom of the memorandum, the President wrote: "Pass to Rebozo." A notation in Haig's handwriting reads, "Done by Haig April 5."

Document 259: Information Memorandum From Joseph B. Norbury of the Office of the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (Crimmins), Washington, April 21, 1972.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Crimmins reported on the Department of State's plans should a Cubana de Aviación, flight overfly U.S. territory en route to Canada.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 31–1 CUBA–US. Secret. Drafted by James S. Landberg (ARA/CCA). At the top of the first page, Crimmins wrote: "OK," his initials, and the date, April 21. A note also initialed by Crimmins appears on the second page next to paragraph (6) (d), and reads, "To be decided at the time." Attached to the memorandum is a copy of telegram 68905 to Ottawa, April 20, in which the Department alerted the Embassy to the possibility and instructed it to ask Canadian authorities about the flight (Ibid.)

Document 260: Paper Prepared in the National Security Council, Washington, May 19, 1972.

The National Security Council staff prepared a chronology of March–May Soviet naval deployments to Cuba.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 782, Country Files, Latin America, Soviet Naval Activity in Cuban Waters, Vol. I, Cienfuegos. Top Secret; Sensitive.

Document 261: Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 12, 1972.

National Security Council staff member Jorden reported on information that the Cuban Ambassador to France had expressed interest in meeting with the American Consul General in Lyon.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 781, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. IV, 1972. Confidential. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum. The referenced telegram was not attached.

Document 262: Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 22, 1972.

National Security Council staff member Jorden reported on a proposal by the Cuban Government to release the ships and crewmen involved in the Johnny Express incident of December 1971.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 781, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. IV, 1972. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. The approval line was not marked.

Document 263: Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense Laird to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, September 22, 1972.

Secretary of Defense Laird indicated that he believed the U.S. Government should protest the use of Soviet TU–95 Bear Delta aircraft, flying out of Cuba, to conduct reconnaissance along the east coast of the United States.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–77A–0099, Cuba 1972. Confidential.

Document 264: Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 14, 1972.

National Security Council member Jorden reported on the status of José Villa, captain of the Johnny Express, who had been held in jail in Cuba since December 1971 and whose family received a promise from the President that the U.S. Government would do all it could to secure his release.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 781, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. IV, 1972. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action; Outside the System. Under option 5, Kissinger wrote, "Bill do memo from me to Haldeman. Emphasize what we've done and how they state objections. Ask about Rebozo." Attached but not published at Tab A is the September 25 letter to President Nixon from Isabel Villa, Isabel Cristina Villa, Mary Pily Villa, and José Antonio Villa. In a November 1 memorandum to Haig, Jorden reported that he had traveled to Miami to meet with José Villa's wife, whom he told that "we were hopeful we could get her husband released from Cuba in the not-too-distant future, but of course could make no promises." (Ibid.)

Document 265: Telegram 221538 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations, December 7, 1972, 1814Z.

The Department of State responded to press speculation that United States-Cuban hijacking negotiations might indicate a change in U.S. policy toward Cuba.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CUBA–US. Unclassified. It was drafted by Philip K. Johnson (ARA/CCA); cleared in ARA/CCA and IO/UNP; and approved by Hurwitch.

Document 266: Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, undated.

CIA provided talking points regarding Cuban exile capabilities.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, ODCI Files, Job 80–R01731R. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent to Helms under a December 11, 1972 memorandum from the Deputy Director for Plans to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Theodore G. Shackley.

Document 266a: Editorial Note.

Document 267: Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans (Karamessines) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms), Washington, March 6, 1969.

Deputy Director Karamessines reported that the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) planned for an anti-government uprising which ultimately failed. CIA informed the Dominican Government, which responded by guarding the anticipated targets of the MPD and forestalling the uprising before it could get underway.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, ODDP Registry, Job Number 80–B01086A. Secret. The memorandum bears Karamessines' typed signature with an indication that he signed the original.

Document 268: Telegram 1129 From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, April 16, 1969, 2355Z.

The Ambassador met with President Balaguer to discuss the killing of four police and military officers by anti-government elements. Balaguer indicated that initial reactions by the Dominican security forces had been brought under control.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 DOM REP. Secret. It was repeated to Sago de los Caballeros. On April 15, the Embassy detailed several incidents of violence against the military and the police. (Telegram 1099 from Santo Domingo, ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Dominican Republic, Vol. I) Intelligence Note No. 318, April 25, from Hughes to Rogers detailed the ongoing political violence and the difficulties faced by the Dominican Government in preventing reprisal attacks against the left by official security forces. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 DOM REP)

Document 269: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, May 22, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger recommended that President Nixon approve a special sugar allocation for the Dominican Republic to support the Balaguer administration's efforts at stabilizing the Dominican economy and demonstrate the continued United States support of the constitutional government.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Dominican Republic, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for action. Kissinger initialed the memorandum. President Nixon approved Kissinger's recommendation. Attached but not published at Tab A is a May 23 memorandum from the President to Secretary of Agriculture Hardin, which President Nixon signed. Attached but not published at Tab B is a May 14 memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Richardson to the President.

Document 270: Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 23, 1969.

During Governor Rockefeller's June visit to the Dominican Republic, President Balaguer requested that the United States provide his country with an increased permanent sugar quota. Executive Secretary Eliot indicated that the Dominicans should not be encouraged to pursue such an increase. Instead, the Department of State suggested that the Dominicans work to diversify their economy while increasing efficiency on existing plantations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Dominican Republic, Vol. I. Confidential. Attached as an enclosure and published is a memorandum detailing the issues raised by Balaguer during meetings with Governor Nelson Rockefeller. Eliot's memorandum was written in response to a July 22 memorandum from Kissinger to Walsh. (Ibid.)

Document 271: National Intelligence Estimate 86.2–69, Washington, September 25, 1969.

The National Intelligence Estimate described the political situation leading to national elections in May 1970 and predicted increased political instability and the possibility of a military coup. On the economic front, the estimate indicated that the Dominican Republic would continue to "depend upon the maintenance of U.S. aid programs at present high levels—supplemented by further special allocations of the U.S. sugar quota."

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A, Box 373, Prospects for the D.R." Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representatives of the AEC and the FBI who abstained on the grounds that it was outside of their jurisdiction.

Document 272: Telegram 4140 From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, October 21, 1969, 0035Z.

Ambassador Meloy relayed his agreement to shift training and funding responsibilities for the Dominican National Police Department of Special Operations to AID's Public Safety Program.

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Santo Domingo, 1963–79. Secret; Priority; Roger Channel.

Document 273: Telegram 4579 from the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, December 6, 1969, 1745Z.

The Embassy reported a deteriorating political situation, marked by increased violence and the possibility of a military coup, particularly if President Balaguer decided not to run for reelection. The Embassy recommended that the United States work to "dissuade would-be plotters" while ensuring that should Balaguer run, he would have a "plausible opposition participating in the elections."

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 2–2 DOM REP. Confidential. It was repeated to Sago de Los Caballeros, Port-au-Prince, CINCLANT, USCINCSO, and DOD.

Document 274: Central Intelligence Agency Information Cable, Washington, January 17, 1970, TDCS–314/00645–70.

CIA reported that, if the Dominican National Police did not release Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) Secretary General Maximiliano Gómez Horacio, the MPD would kidnap a U.S. Embassy official as collateral to ensure Gómez's release.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Dominican Republic, Vol. I. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Field Dissem: State, Army, Navy, Air Force. An advance copy was transmitted to the White House, Department of State, DIA, Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Chiefs of Staff, NIC, NSA, OCI, and FBI.

Document 275: Telegram 620 From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, March 18, 1970, 1635Z.

Ambassador Meloy discussed the upcoming elections with President Balaguer. During the meeting, the Ambassador reminded Balaguer that the United States remained neutral, supported an orderly transfer of power, and strongly opposed any change through violent means.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 DOM REP. Confidential. It was repeated to USCINCSO and USCINCLANT for POLADS. In telegram 598 from Santo Domingo, March 15, Meloy reported that he had relayed the same information to Sacha Volman of the PRD. (Ibid., POL 14 DOM REP)

Document 276: Telegram 696 From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, March 24, 1970, 0330Z.

On March 24, U.S. Air Attaché Lt. Col. Donald J. Crowley, was kidnapped, presumably by members of the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD). Ambassador Meloy reported that he had pressed President Balaguer to accept the kidnappers' demands. The Ambassador also indicated concern over evidence that Dominican security forces might be opposed to negotiating with "their enemies of the left."

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Kidnapping in Dominican Republic. Secret; Limdis; Immediate. The Embassy in Santo Domingo reported Crowley's kidnapping in Telegram 677, March 24. (Ibid.) Attached but not published is the CIA Intelligence Information Cable TDCS–314/03286–70, March 24, which confirmed the Ambassador's concern that there was "considerable opposition on the part of military officers to the idea of complying with the demands of the kidnappers…." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Kidnapping in Dominican Republic)

Document 277: Telegram 43343 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic, March 25, 1970, 0525Z.

The Department of State concurred with Ambassador Meloy's concerns and instructed him to take "personal vigorous effort to persuade Balaguer to release prisoners and take effective steps to obtain safe return of Col. Crowley."

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 DOM REP. Secret; Limdis; Flash. It was drafted by Hurwitch and approved by Nelson Ledsky (S/S). For telegram 696 from Santo Domingo, see Document 276. On March 25, the Ambassador reported in Telegram 700 from Santo Domingo that he had gotten President Balaguer out of bed to ascertain "the intentions of the GODR and what steps had been taken to secure Col. Crowley's safety and eventual release." (Ibid.)

Document 278: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 25, 1970, 1 p.m.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger recommended that President Nixon sign a message to President Balaguer persuading him to agree to the demands of Colonel Crowley's kidnappers.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Kidnapping in Dominican Republic. Secret; Sent for action; urgent. A draft message from President Nixon to President Balaguer is attached. For the message as sent, see Document 279.

Document 279: Telegram 43508 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic, March 25, 1970, 1847Z.

The Department of State instructed Ambassador Meloy to deliver a private message from President Nixon urging President Balaguer to agree to the terms of the terrorists who had kidnapped Lieutenant Colonel Crowley.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 DOM REP. Confidential; Exdis, Flash. Drafted by Crimmins and Hurwitch; cleared by Hawley, Vaky, and Johnson; and approved by Crimmins. In telegram 709 from Santo Domingo, March 25, Ambassador Meloy indicated that he had delivered President Nixon's message to Balaguer. According to Meloy, he told Balaguer "that it was not intended that President Nixon's letter to him be made public." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Kidnapping in Dominican Republic)

Document 280: Telegram 718 From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, March 26, 1970, 1705Z.

The Embassy reported that the Government of the Dominican Republic had reached an agreement with Lieutenant Colonel Crowley's kidnappers to free him in exchange for 20 prisoners.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 DOM REP. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to USCINCSO and USCINCLANT for POLADS, OSI District 27, DIA, USAFFLDACTYGP Ft. Belvoir, VA, and Mexico City. In Telegram 733 from Santo Domingo, March 27, Ambassador Meloy reported that Crowley had been released and that he had arrived at the Embassy at 2140 hours, March 26. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Kidnapping in Dominican Republic)

Document 281: Special National Intelligence Estimate 86.2–70, Washington, April 30, 1970.

This estimate assessed the short-term prospects for political stability in the Dominican Republic both before and after the scheduled May presidential elections, in addition to the implications for the U.S. policy objectives.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representatives of the AEC and the FBI who abstained on the grounds that it was outside of their jurisdiction

Document 282: Notes From Weekly Meeting of Inter-American Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, May 8, 1970.

[1 page not declassified]

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Dominican Republic, 1969–1972. Secret.

Document 283: Intelligence Note RARN–24, From the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, July 2, 1970.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) reported increased left-wing violence, countered by extra-legal violence by the security forces, leading to fears of indiscriminate repression by the Dominican Government.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 DOM REP. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Note prepared in INR/American Republics by Misback, LaMazza, and Summ.

Document 284: Telegram 1712 From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, July 8, 1970, 2045Z.

On July 7, Ambassador Meloy met with President Balaguer to congratulate him on his electoral victory and to discuss Balaguer's plans for the next four years and the role of U.S. assistance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 DOM REP. Confidential.

Document 285: Telegram 109195 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic, July 9, 1970, 2028Z.

In the wake of escalating anti-left violence, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Hurwitch expressed the Department of State's concern that the Government of the Dominican Republic might be implicated. Hurwitch requested the Ambassador's judgment on the usefulness of approaching President Balaguer or other high-level Dominican officials to express concern over the mounting violence and dangers that the official counter-terrorism campaign could reverse economic and political progress.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 DOM REP. Secret. Drafted on July 8 by Warner (ARA/CAR); cleared by Broderick (ARA/CAR); and approved by Hurwitch.

Document 286: Telegram 1893 From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, July 29, 1970, 2325Z.

In a discussion with Secretary of State for the Armed Forces General Pérez y Pérez regarding an apparently planned program of terrorism and counter-terrorism, Ambassador Meloy discouraged him from taking repressive actions that might alienate the Dominican population.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 DOM REP. Confidential.

Document 287: Telegram 3140 From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, December 1, 1970, 1845Z.

The Embassy recommended continued support for the Dominican Police Division of Special Operations (DSO) through the end of FY1972 since it was the only security force capable of coping with the initial stages of a potential rural-based subversive threat.

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Santo Domingo, 1963–1979. Secret; Roger Channel. In telegram 201095 to Santo Domingo, December 10, the Department responded that AID funding for the DSO would continue in FY1972, but that it would be phased out and replaced by GODR funding. (Ibid.) In telegram 1969 from Santo Domingo, May 26, 1971, the Embassy reported that AID had phased-down police assistance and would eventually phase out such assistance entirely. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 DOM REP)

Document 288: Central Intelligence Agency Information Special Report, CSDB 312/00757–71, Washington, March 16, 1971.

On March 10 and 11, intelligence sources reported that a group of Paris-based Latin American revolutionaries were plotting to assassinate President Balaguer with the cooperation of former Dominican General Elías Wessin y Wessin and other prominent Dominican exiles.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Dominican Republic, Vol. I. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. On a March 16 covering memorandum from Acting Deputy Director for Plans Cord Meyer to the Director of Central Intelligence, there is a handwritten note that reads, "I checked this out w/Brownie. He doesn't put much stock in it. We can discuss if you like. R.H." In telegram 2600 from Santo Domingo, July 2, the Ambassador reported that Balaguer had asked that the U.S. bar Wessin y Wessin from entering the United States. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 30 DOM REP) In telegram 120410 to Santo Domingo, July 2, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to ask the GODR to relieve Wessin of his passport, which contained a U.S. visa. (Ibid.) In telegram 2618 from Santo Domingo, July 5, the Embassy reported that Wessin y Wessin was expelled from the Dominican Republic. (Ibid.)

Document 289: Letter From the President of the Dominican Republic (Balaguer) to President Nixon, Santo Domingo, May 19, 1971.

President Balaguer requested an increase in the Dominican Republic's special sugar allocation to ensure the country's economic and political stability.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Dominican Republic, Vol. I. The translation of Balaguer's original letter has no classification marking. President Nixon responded to Balaguer's letter on June 30, indicating that his request would "be taken into account." (Ibid.) On July 13, the CIA's Office of National Estimates (ONE) noted that the U.S. House of Representatives cut the Dominican Republic's sugar export quota by 25 percent. If the house reduction became law, CIA estimated it would deal a serious blow to the Dominican economy. (Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Office, Job 79–T00918A, LA Staff Notes, LA Staff Note No. 3–71, 1971, Box 3)

Document 290: Conversation Among President Nixon, Gulf-Western Chairman Charles Bluhdorn, the President's Assistant for Domestic Affairs (Ehrlichman), and Secretary of Commerce Peterson, Washington, June 16, 1971, 3:40–4:30 p.m.

Gulf-Western Chairman Bluhdorn lobbied President Nixon for an increase in the Dominican Republic's sugar quota.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 523–4, Oval Office. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording published here specifically for this volume.

Document 291: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 20, 1971.

The Department of State called President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger's attention to the fact that the Senate Finance Committee proposed to eliminate the President's discretionary authority for special allocations under the pending Sugar Act. The Senate's decision came after President Nixon had already signed an undelivered letter indicating approval of a special sugar allocation for the Dominican Republic. The Department of State recommended that a new letter be drafted to include the caveat that any special sugar allocation would be contingent on Congress.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 783, Country Files, Latin America, Dominican Republic, Vol. I. Confidential. Ted C. signed for Eliot above Eliot's typeset signature. Attached is a draft of a suggested revised letter. On July 22, President Nixon signed the revised letter. (Ibid.)

Document 292: Telegram 3023 From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, July 31, 1971, 0010Z.

The Embassy reported that Ambassador Meloy met with President Balaguer to express concern over the climate of violence in the Dominican Republic, particularly the reported role of Government forces in repressive acts and apparent violations of constitutional rights and civil liberties.

Source: National Archives, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 DOM REP. Confidential.

Document 293: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 20, 1971.

Ambassador Meloy met with Ramón Castillo, Dominican Consul General in Tokyo, who indicated that President Balaguer was concerned that press criticism in the United States might have a negative influence on U.S. sugar legislation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12 DOM REP. Confidential. It was drafted by Meloy. In telegram 0126 from Santo Domingo, January 10, 1972, the Embassy, in its year-end assessment, reported that "Balaguer gained an important psychological victory with the passage of the U.S. sugar legislation which provided an ample quota for Dominican sugar." (Ibid., POL 2 DOM REP)

Document 294: Telegram 913 From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, March 1, 1972, 2315Z.

The Embassy reported that President Balaguer had announced an agrarian reform.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 DOM REP. Confidential; Priority.

Document 295: Telegram 197500 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic, October 31, 1972, 1606Z.

Ramon Castillo visited Deputy Director INR/RAA Alfonso Arenales to ascertain State Department views on President Balaguer's agrarian reform and his possible reelection to a third term. Arenales indicated that he was unaware of any changes in the Department's favorable view of the Balaguer administration.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 DOM REP. Confidential. Drafted by Arenales; cleared for information by Burke; and approved by Hurwitch. Repeated to Santo Domingo and Saigon.

Document 296: Airgram A–33 From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State, February 8, 1969.

This Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) argued that Ecuador could play a key role in United States-supported multilateral programs, in particular the Alliance for Progress, and hemispheric security programs. The major U.S. economic interests were fishing rights, and oil.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 1 ECUADOR–US. Confidential. The final version of the report was not found.

Document 297: Telegram 626 From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State, February 12, 1969, 2230Z.

Ambassador Crowley reported the negative consequences of a reduction in U.S. Government assistance toward Ecuador.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 1 ECUADOR–US. Confidential. The Pelly Amendment to PL 90–629 of 1967, the Fisherman's Protective Act (22 USC Sec. 2751 et seq.) stated that if a nation conducted its fishing operations in a manner that compromised effectiveness of international fishery conservation, Washington could embargo that nation's products. The Kuchel Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1965, as amended (21 USC Sec. 2100 et seq.) gave the President discretionary authority to cut off all assistance to any country which seized a U.S. flag vessel on the high seas.

Document 298: Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the Senior Military Assistant (Haig), March 7, 1969.

National Security Council staff member Nachmanoff reported that because Ecuador and Peru seized U.S. fishing vessels, they could not receive U.S. military aid. He noted that the Department of State was considering lifting the suspension of military sales if Ecuador participated in a four-power conference on the fisheries problem.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 784, Country Files, Latin America, Ecuador, Vol. 1, 1969–1970. Confidential. Haig wrote on the memorandum, "Arnie HAK[Kissinger] has seen—he doesn't feel this should be used to pressure Peruvians. Al"

Document 299: Editorial Note.

Document 300: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 3, 1969.

National Security Council staff member Vaky reported that Governor Rockefeller relayed a request from President Velasco for economic assistance. Rockefeller stated that Ecuador was in bad economic shape, and noted Velasco's strong measures against Communist and subversive elements. He recommended the U.S. Government consider debt reduction, increased PL 480 assistance, and loans.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 784, Country Files, Latin America, Ecuador, Vol. I, 1969–1970. Confidential. Sent for action. Kissinger approved the recommendation. Attached but not published are Tabs A and B. Tab A is a December 11 memorandum from Watts to Eliot;Tab B is a November 13 letter from Rockefeller to Kissinger, with an attached message from Velasco to Rockefeller dated October 29. The Woods plan for debt reduction is discussed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 12. The report by the Department of State, dated January 16, is Tab D in the source note to Document 301.

Document 301: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff, to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 9, 1970.

After describing Ecuador's fiscal problems, National Security Council staff member Vaky suggested President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger ask the Department of State to write up a specific description of the assistance it would be prepared to provide, and to write continuing status reports on Ecuador.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 784, Country Files, Latin America, Ecuador, Vol. I, 1969–1970. Confidential. Sent for action. Neither approved nor disapprove was checked. Although Kissinger signed the letter to Rockefeller, he wrote on the front of the memorandum, "I think we better forget this." Attached but not published are Tabs A, B, C, and D. Tab A, undated, is a letter Governor Rockefeller; Tab B is a December 11, 1969, memorandum from Watts to Eliot; Tab C is a December 3, 1969 memorandum from Vaky to Kissinger; Tab D is a January 16 memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger. Rockefeller's letter to Kissinger, November 13, 1969, is referenced in the source note to Document 300.

Document 302: Telegram 2773 From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State, June 23, 1970, 0045Z.

President Velasco Ibarra assumed "supreme power" on the morning of June 21. Velasco's main motive was to preserve his fiscal reforms, which he thought were threatened. The crackdown also served the purpose of quelling student and leftist dissenters.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 784, Country Files, Latin America, Ecuador, Vol. I, 1969–1970. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Lima, Santiago, Guayaquil, USCINCSO, and Bogotá for information. Section 2 of the telegram was not found.

Document 303: Intelligence Note RARN–27, Washington, July 9, 1970.

After Velasco's assertion of a supreme mandate, the authors of this note predicted he would institute substantial fiscal and social reforms.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 ECUADOR. Confidential. Drafted by Sonandres and approved by Summ.

Document 304: Airgram A–268 From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State, November 20, 1970.

Since President Velasco's assumption of supreme power on June 22, he had made changes in military personnel so they would have more to gain by keeping him in power than deposing him.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 ECUADOR. Confidential. Drafted on November 18 by Shumate; cleared by Breidenbach, Blaikie, Morgan, and the Ambassador; and approved by Chaplin. Repeated to the Consulate in Guayaquil and USCINCO/POLAD.

Document 305: Memorandum From Ashley Hewitt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 18, 1971.

National Security Council staff member Hewitt conveyed to President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger that President Nixon had tasked Secretary of State Rogers with lodging a strong protest with the Ecuadorian Ambassador; suspending Foreign Military Sales (FMS) sales for a year; and considering invoking the Kuchel and Pelley Amendments.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 148, Agency and Congressional Files, State/WH Relationship, Vol. 4. Secret. Sent for information. Haig initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top, "File State/WH relationship." On January 19, Hewitt reported to Kissinger that Ambassador Burns emphasized that measures adversely affecting the Ecuadorian military would hurt U.S. interests and diminish Washington's influence over the long term. Hewitt, however, thought that the FMS suspension would not have a significant effect on U.S. relations with Ecuador. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 784, Country Files, Latin America, Ecuador, Vol. I, 1969–1970)

Document 306: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 9, 1971.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger urged President Nixon to come up with a practical, early settlement of the fisheries dispute. Kissinger also requested that Nixon elicit a report outlining U.S. negotiating strategy from the Secretaries of State and Defense.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 784, Country Files, Latin America, Ecuador, Vol. 1, 1969–1970. Secret. Sent for action. Haig approved for the President on February 10. Attached but not published at Tab A is a January 28 memorandum from Packard to Nixon. Kissinger's tasking of the Secretaries of Defense and State, dated February 10, to produce a negotiating strategy is Foreign Relations 1969–1976, volume E–1, Global Issues, 1969–1972, Document 387. In telegram 637 from Quito, February 9, Burns told Meyer it was important to resolve the fishing dispute to protect U.S. oil interests in Ecuador, and to strengthen the position in the OAS and the Law of the Sea negotiations. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–4, ECUADOR–US).

Document 307: Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 8, 1971.

National Security Council staff member Nachmanoff informed President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger of the Department of State's inaction in negotiating a settlement of the fisheries dispute as Kissinger had requested. Nachmanoff recommended that Kissinger call Under Secretary of State Irwin to ask for a paper on the issue.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 784, Country Files, Latin America, Ecuador, Vol. I, 1969–1970. Secret; Limdis. Sent for action. A handwritten notation indicated that it was sent through Haig. Haig initialed the memorandum. A copy was sent to Colonel Kennedy. On April 12, Kissinger wrote in the "approve" option, "No—send memo." Tab A is published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–1, Global Issues, 1969–1976, Document 387.

Document 308: Telegram 1670 From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State, April 16, 1971, 2327Z.

Ambassador Burns reviewed recent developments in Ecuadorian politics, and concluded they would have minimal effect on relations with the United States. Burns thought is possible one or more of the political groups might create a "foreign diversion" by whipping up anti-United States sentiment to achieve short-term gains.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL ECUADOR. Confidential. It was repeated to USCINCSO/POLAD and AmConsul Guayaquil.

Document 309: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, June 11, 1971.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger informed President Nixon that in an attempt to resume Foreign Military Sales (FMS) shipments, and facilitate an agreement to reach a solution on the fisheries dispute, President Velasco halted seizures of U.S. fishing vessels in Ecuadorian waters through September 30.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 784, Country Files, Latin America, Ecuador, Vol. I, 1969–1970. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. Nixon circled the word "State" at the beginning of the last paragraph and wrote "good" in the margin. A June 4 covering memorandum from Nachmanoff to Kissinger indicated that copies of the memorandum were sent to Haig, Wright, Negroponte, and Clift.

Document 310: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, June 24, 1971.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger informed President Nixon that releasing an AID loan to Ecuador might lead to a reciprocal gesture which would indicate its sincerity in working out an agreement to the fishing dispute. If Ecuador responded positively, Kissinger thought the Administration should inform Congress that it would lift the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) suspension.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 784, Country Files, Latin America, Ecuador, Vol. 1, 1969–1970. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation indicates the President saw it. Haig initialed for Kissinger. Kissinger wrote at the top, "What's the point of sending this to Pres[ident?]" Nixon wrote at the bottom, "Connally is to call the signals on this." Tab A, dated June 22, is published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, E–volume 1, Global Issues, 1969–1972, Document 399. Tab B is published as Document 309. In telegram 2482 from Quito, June 15, Burns stated, "I strongly urge that we move with the greatest possible speed to implement our package [U.S. releasing AID loans in exchange for a positive Ecuadorian démarche] with the Ecuadorians." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–4 ECUADOR–US)

Document 311: Telegram 2769 From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State, July 6, 1971, 2255Z.

Ambassador Burns discussed the progress on the impasse over fishing. He argued that lifting the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) ban on Ecuador could lead to four-party talks among Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and the United States, to resolve the fishing dispute.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–4 ECUADOR–US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. It was repeated to Lima. Telegram 2482 from Quito, June 15, is referenced in the source note to Document 310. NSSM 125 is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–1, Global Issues, 1969–1972, Document 390.

Document 312: National Security Decision Memorandum 147, Washington, January 4, 1972.

President Nixon approved submission to Congress of an amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act and issued instructions for further negotiations with the Ecuadorian Government.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, NSDMs, Nos. 145–264. Secret. The December 24, 1971 memorandum is referenced in the source note to Document 418 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, E–volume 1, Global Issues, 1969–1972. A note, January 6, addressed by McIntyre apparently to De Palma, which was attached to another copy of this NSDM, reads, "Sam: Meyer, Stevenson and McKernan feel the emphasis placed on Ecuador's straits position is wrong and are trying to get greater negotiating flexibility from the White House." (Department of State Files, OES/OLP/OCEANS Files: Lot 90 D 180, Box 3, POL 33.14(c), CEP talks on fisheries)

Document 313: Airgram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State, April 10, 1972.

This section of the Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) assessed U.S.-Ecuadorian relations since General Rodríguez led a military take-over of the Ecuadorian Government on February 16. The main interests of the United States in Ecuador were to maintain access to oil and gas reserves and to avoid acrimonious relations with Ecuador in order to prevent it from establishing ties to countries hostile to the United States. A key component of maintaining harmonious relations with Ecuador was a resolution of the fishing dispute.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 ECUADOR–US. Secret. Background information on Rodríguez's takeover is in telegrams 680 and 1462 from Quito, February 18 and April 13, respectively; ibid., POL 15 ECUADOR.

Document 314: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 18, 1972.

Executive Secretary Eliot outlined the Department of State's strategy to get Ecuador to compromise on its 200-mile territorial sea limit. The Department of State would release development assistance loans which had been held under review, and begin "quiet, informal" talks.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 784, Country Files, Ecuador, Vol. 1, 1969–1970. Confidential. RH Miller signed for Eliot above Eliot's typeset signature. Attached but not published is a May 22 covering memorandum to Kissinger, in which Hewitt stated, "Essentially the strategy is to use the fisheries agreement recently concluded with Brazil as a lever to pry Ecuador loose from its hardline position on 200-mile territorial limits while at the same time dangling a carrot in terms of potential economic development and military assistance."

Document 315: Telegram 2819 From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State, July 15, 1972, 1310Z.

The Embassy informed the Department of State of the progress in the two most important and sensitive aspects of U.S.–Ecuadorian relations: fisheries, and oil. The Embassy also informed the Department of State about internal unrest in Ecuador.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL ECUADOR. Confidential. It was repeated for information to AMCONSUL Guayaquil and USCINCO for POLAD.

Document 316: Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State (Irwin) to President Nixon, Washington, August 29, 1972.

Under Secretary of State Irwin suggested that the U.S. Government lift the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) ban. In addition, he advocated notifying Ecuador of the names and other pertinent information of all U.S. flag vessels likely to fish in waters off Ecuador for the remainder of the year, and pay the nation a flat sum of money. In return, Ecuador would issue licenses for U.S. vessels to fish off the coast of Ecuador.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–4 ECUADOR–US. Confidential. Written at the bottom was, "No Drafting Information." On September 16, Eliot sent a memorandum to Kissinger that the initiative with Ecuador would collapse unless the U.S. government lifted the FMS suspension to advance the negotiations. (Ibid.) Nixon signed a Presidential Determination on October 27 which waived the FMS suspension, and indicated the U.S. government was willing to enter into interim bilateral fisheries arrangements, see Documents 318 and 319.

Document 317: Airgram 187 From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State, October 13, 1972.

Aside from correcting the fiscal problems by the Velasco Government, the Embassy concluded that the military regime had accomplished little in its first eight months. Petroleum legislation had made it more difficult for international companies to operate in the country.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL ECUADOR. Confidential. It was drafted on October 11 by Burns and Mason; cleared by the DCM, POL/H, ECON, and DATT in draft form. Stamped notations on the Airgram indicates that it was received at the Department of State on October 20 at 3:35 pm, 1972 and at the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs on October 25, 1972.

Document 318: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 24, 1972.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger recommended a scenario for reaching an agreement with Ecuador regarding the seizures of U.S. fishing boats.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–237, NSDM files, NSDM 194. Confidential. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. Nixon approved both recommendations. Attached but not published is Tab I, dated October 27. Tab II, which authorized the resumption of military sales to Ecuador and approved bilateral negotiations is Document 319. Attached but not published are Tabs A, B, and C. Tab A is an August 29 memorandum from Irwin to Nixon; Tab B is a September 15 memorandum from Laird to Nixon; and Tab C is a September 22 memorandum from OMB to the President.

Document 319: National Security Decision Memorandum 194, Washington, October 27, 1972.

President Nixon permitted military sales and credits and guarantees for Ecuador. The lifting of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) ban was conditioned on an oral understanding that there will be no further seizures of U.S. fishing boats.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–4 ECUADOR–US. Confidential. A copy was sent to DCI Helms. Acting Secretary of State Irwin's August 29 memorandum is Document 316.

Document 319a: Editorial Note.

Document 320: Airgram A–35 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, Guatemala City, February 16, 1969.

The Embassy reported on internal security incidents and guerrilla activities during the month of January, including the capture and "neutralization" of the fourth of 12 guerrillas implicated in the 1968 assassination of Ambassador John Gordon Mein.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23 GUAT. Confidential. Drafted on February 12 by David H. Clare (POL) and approved in draft by Wilson (POL) and approved by Political Officer Matthew D. Smith. Stamped notations on the Airgram indicate that it was received at the Department of State on February 18, at 8:24 a.m. and at the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs on February 20. Enclosed but not published is a Chart of Incidents.

Document 321: Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 31, 1969.

The CIA advised Kissinger that the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) planned to conduct a terrorist campaign during the visit of Governor Nelson Rockefeller, with Ambassador Davis and other Embassy personnel as potential targets.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 803, Country Files, Latin America, Rockefeller Mission, Vol. I, April–May. Secret. No Foreign Dissem.; Background Use Only. It was sent under a March 31 covering memorandum from the Deputy Director for Intelligence, R.J. Smith. (Ibid.) On April 3, Nixon approved Secret Service protection for Rockefeller during his trip and unsuccessfully discouraged him from going to Guatemala. (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon; ibid., Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala)

Document 322: Telegram 617 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State, April 18, 1969, 1737Z.

From Nicaragua, where he had been posted as Guatemala's Ambassador since April 1968, Colonel Carlos Arana announced that he would run for the Guatemalan presidency in upcoming elections.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17 GUAT–NIC. Unclassified. Repeated to Guatemala. In Airgram A–43 from Guatemala City, February 27, the Embassy in Guatemala reported at length on Arana's political views and that he had been nominated for the presidency on January 10 by the Movimiento Liberación Nacional (MLN). (Ibid., POL 14 GUAT)

Document 323: Memorandum of Conversation, Guatemala City, June 17, 1969, 1–3:30 p.m.

Ambassador Davis met with Movimiento Liberación Nacional (MLN) candidate Carlos Arana Osorio and MLN representatives to discuss his candidacy, the problem of political violence, and MLN plans to promote law and order. Davis reiterated U.S. neutrality in the upcoming elections.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 12–6 GUAT. Confidential. Transmitted to the Department in Airgram A–163 from Guatemala City, June 27, 1969. (Ibid.)

Document 324: Intelligence Note 729 From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to the Acting Secretary of State (Richardson), Washington, October 10, 1969.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) reported that FAR rebel activities in rural areas were on the rise with an attack on oil drilling sites operated by the U.S.-based Monsanto Chemical Company, and plans to attack U.S. Embassy personnel.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–7 GUAT. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. In Intelligence Information Cable, TDCS 314/14485–69, October 6, CIA reported that the FAR was planning to assassinate or kidnap U.S. Embassy personnel. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I)

Document 325: Telegram 4677 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, October 31, 1969, 0130Z.

The Ambassador and Foreign Minister Fuentes Möhr discussed the border dispute with British Honduras and what role, if any, the United States might play in providing technical and financial assistance as a "‘carrot' for working out some kind of cooperation agreement." Ambassador Davis indicated that he would find out what the "USG attitude" was on the matter.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I. Confidential; Exdis. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room November 1 at 9:50 a.m. In telegram 192533 to Guatemala City, November 14, the Department of State indicated that it could not give a direct response to Fuentes Mohr's question regarding possible U.S. financial and technical assistance, but it would welcome input from him on how the United States might contribute to a cooperation agreement between Guatemala and British Honduras. (Ibid.)

Document 326: Intelligence Note 873 From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, December 24, 1969.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) reported on increased terrorism in Guatemala and guerrilla efforts to undermine presidential elections.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 GUAT. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. In telegram 5253 from Guatemala City, December 18, the Embassy reported establishment of a state of siege in the wake of the FAR assassination of prominent "rightist" David Guerra Guzmán. (Ibid.)

Document 327: Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State, Washington, undated.

The Department of State provided background information for President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Secretary of State Rogers on Guatemalan presidential elections, scheduled for March 1, in which the U.S. Government was officially neutral, but hoped the Partido Revolucionario (PR) would win the elections.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I. Confidential. The paper was prepared for Secretary of State Rogers and forwarded to Kissinger under cover of an Eliot transmittal memorandum of February 27. (Ibid.)

Document 328: Telegram 691 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, March 4, 1970, 0225Z.

The Embassy offered its prognosis of what to expect from President-elect Arana and the implications for U.S. policy. The Embassy suggested he would probably be more moderate and centrist than most expected.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 GUAT. Secret; Immediate. In a March 3 Intelligence Brief, INRB–45, INR concluded that "While Arana faces many problems and pitfalls, he can provide Guatemala with a constructive administration and the U.S. probably will be able to work with him." (Ibid.)

Document 329: LA Staff Note No. 1–70, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, March 6, 1970.

Responding to the Embassy analysis of Arana's election, the Office of National Estimates at the Central Intelligence Agency countered that it was not at all confident that Arana was committed to evolving Guatemala's political system.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Office, Latin American Staff Notes, 1970, Job 79–T00968A. Secret.

Document 330: Telegram 729 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, March 6, 1970, 2103Z.

The Embassy reported that Labor Officer Sean Holly had been kidnapped.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I. Confidential; Critic; Limited Official Use. In telegram 746 from Guatemala City, March 7, the Embassy forwarded a transcript of a FAR bulletin, in which the guerrillas claimed responsibility for Holly's kidnapping and threatened to execute him if the Guatemalan Government failed to release 4 imprisoned FAR guerrillas. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 GUAT)

Document 331: Central Intelligence Agency Information Cable, TDCS 314/02581–70, Washington, March 7, 1970.

The Central Intelligence Agency reported that President Montenegro had ordered the Guatemalan National Police to release FAR prisoners.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. In telegram 768 from Guatemala City, March 8, the Embassy reported that Holly had been released. The telegram is not published. (Ibid.)

Document 332: Telegram 785 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, March 10, 1970, 0015Z.

The Embassy reported the debriefing of Labor Officer Sean Holly, kidnapped on March 6 and released by the FAR on March 8.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 GUAT. Confidential; Limdis; Priority. In response to a Congressional request, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense William E. Lang stated, "During the past year at one time or another special forces MTT's were in eleven countries for periods ranging from four days to six months. The size of the teams ranged from one to sixteen people." (Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–72A–6309, Box 22, Latin America, 1969)

Document 333: Telegram 980 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, March 25, 1970, 0000Z.

Ambassador Davis met with President-elect Arana to discuss Guatemala's internal security problems and to offer assistance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 GUAT. Confidential.

Document 334: Intelligence Brief INRB–87 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cline) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, April 7, 1970.

Following the kidnapping and assassination of the German Ambassador to Guatemala, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) analyzed the potential for targeted actions against U.S. Government personnel in Guatemala. INR concluded that pressuring the Guatemalan Government to act under such circumstances might legitimate the guerrillas' "long-time contention that the US calls the shots in Guatemala" and potentially affect Guatemalan Government stability.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I. Secret. A stamped notation on the brief indicated it was received at the NSC on April 8 at 8:32 a.m. Haig's handwritten initials appear above the date on the cover page.

Document 335: Telegram 1275 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, April 9, 1970, 2319Z.

The Government of Guatemala requested U.S. assistance in working with Mexico in addressing the guerrillas' ability to easily pass back and forth across the Mexican border.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 GUAT. Confidential. Repeated to Mexico. In telegram 53101 to Guatemala City, April 10, the Department of State replied that it would then be willing to follow up an approach by Guatemala with an expression of United States concern to Mexico based on threats to U.S. personnel in Guatemala. (Ibid.)

Document 336: Telegram 1630 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, May 1, 1970, 0048Z.

Ambassador Davis met with President Méndez Montenegro's private secretary López Padilla to discuss the security situation in Guatemala and the right-wing "Ojo por Ojo" counter-terror organization.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis; Priority. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room on May 1 at 8:35 a.m.

Document 337: Memorandum for the Record, Washington, May 8, 1970.

During its regular weekly meeting with the Department of State, CIA indicated concerns over the possibility of U.S. Government help to President-elect Arana to deal with internal security problems, fearing that the new government would indulge in counter-terror.

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Latin America General, 1969–70. Secret.

Document 338: Telegram 1841 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, May 19, 1970, 0025Z.

Ambassador Davis met with President-elect Arana to discuss Public Safety in Guatemala and Arana's desire to form an elite and highly professional anti-subversive police unit.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room on May 19 at 8:33 a.m. In telegram 2140 from Guatemala City, June 10, the Ambassador reported that he told Guatemalan Vice President-elect Cáceres Lehnhoff he "was confident new Guatemalan Government could develop effective anti-insurgent police organization." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 GUAT)

Document 339: Central Intelligence Agency Weekly Summary, Special Report No. 0375/70B, "Political Change in Guatemala: Order vs. Violence," Washington, June 19, 1970.

The Central Intelligence Agency presented an analysis of Guatemala's political and security situation in light of the Rebel Armed Forces' (FAR) increased targeting of Americans for kidnapping and political assassination to pressure the Guatemalan Government.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence.

Document 340: Airgram A–170 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, Guatemala City, July 31, 1970.

The Embassy reported on the first month of Arana's presidency, observing that he was committed to pacifying Guatemala and that a lull in guerrilla activities had allowed the Guatemalan Government to settle in and organize.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 GUAT. Confidential. It was repeated to CINCSO for POLAD, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, Mexico City, San José, Managua, and Panama. It was drafted and cleared on July 30 by Political Officer Lawrence A. Pezzullo. Stamped notations on the Airgram indicate that it was received at the Department of State on August 4 at 8:28 a.m. and at the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs on August 5.

Document 341: Intelligence Brief INRB–205 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cline) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, November 13, 1970.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) reported that President Arana had imposed a state of siege and was taking action to pursue insurgents, but that the action would likely have no effect on "hard-core terrorists."

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 GUAT. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.

Document 342: Telegram 4209 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, November 15, 1970, 2230Z.

Ambassador Davis reported that the Embassy had information on residences of "one or two truly important leaders" of the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) and Guatemalan Worker's Party (PGT) and raised the possibility of providing this information to the Guatemalan Government. The Ambassador recognized that providing such information might "pull us closer in," but noted that "we now have Government ready to act on basis of help we can give them."

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I. Secret; Nodis; Priority. A note, initialed by Kissinger, reads, "Al, Put into 40-Committee urgently." Haig initialed the response, "done."

Document 343: Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 16, 1970.

Haig reported that the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs supported providing the Government of Guatemala with the names and locations of Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) leaders, noting that consideration by the 40 Committee might delay action until too late.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I. Secret. In paragraph 1, the word "tomorrow" was crossed out and replaced with the hand-written notation, "(now Wednesday)". Option 2 was approved, but a line was drawn through the memorandum and the letters "OBE" were written at the bottom of the memorandum.

Document 344: Telegram 187819 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guatemala, November 17, 1970, 0255Z.

The Department of State instructed Ambassador Davis to take immediate steps to provide the Guatemalan Government with the location of Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) leaders.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. Drafted on November 16 Hurwitch; cleared in ARA/CEN, S/S–O, O, INR/DDC, and by Kissinger; approved by Johnson. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room November 17 at 8:45 a.m.

Document 345: Telegram 4283 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, November 20, 1970, 2250Z.

Ambassador Davis reported on internal security, counter-terrorism, and the Guatemalan Government's state of siege, noting that "some arrests have been made based on intelligence information."

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 GUAT. Confidential. It was repeated to CINCSO for POLAD.

Document 346: Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 23, 1970.

National Security Council staff member Nachmanoff forwarded a Central Intelligence Agency report indicating that 1 of 3 top Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) leaders had been arrested.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. Initialed by Kissinger. Attached but not published at Tab A is CIA Intelligence Information Cable TDCS 314/12113–70, November 20, which indicated that the FAR leader captured was Enrique Salazar Solórzano (a.k.a. "Antonio"), chief of FAR intelligence. CIA warned that repercussions from the guerrilla's capture "may fall, at least in part, on North American personnel." (Ibid.)

Document 347: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, December 23, 1970, 12:15 p.m.

Secretary of State Rogers met with Guatemalan Ambassador Julio Asensio Wunderlich to discuss Guatemala's request for the sale of military equipment, including 8 A–37B aircraft to be used in counterinsurgency operations.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 330–73A–1975, Guatemala 1970, 000.1. Confidential. Drafted on December 31 by Breen and approved in S. In a December 23 briefing memorandum for Rogers, Crimmins provided detailed background on the Guatemalan request for $12 million in arms purchases. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GUAT–US)

Document 348: Telegram 22560 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guatemala, February 10, 1971, 0148Z.

The Department of State asked the Embassy to express concern to President Arana over the targeting of leftist opposition figures not involved in Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) terrorist activities and feared that "friendly relations with Guatemala over the long run could be threatened by a close identification with what in the public mind are the excesses of a particular government's counter-insurgency campaign."

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on February 9 by Breen; cleared by Hurwitch; and approved by Meyer. In Airgram A–14 from Guatemala City, January 25, the Embassy reported that representatives of the Christian Democratic Party charged that the Arana Administration had embarked on a policy of assassinating the legitimate political opposition. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12 GUAT)

Document 349: Telegram 634 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, February 17, 1971, 0020Z.

Ambassador Davis reported his encounters with President Arana and Foreign Minister Herrera at a diplomatic dinner the day after he had conveyed the Department of State's concerns regarding Guatemala's counterinsurgency activities. President Arana appealed for help, while Herrera responded by alluding somewhat unflatteringly to State Department.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates it was received in the White House Situation Room on February 17 at 8:21 a.m. In telegram 809 from Guatemala City, February 26, Davis reported the arrival of two U.S. journalists on the wake of his meetings with Arana and Herrera and suggested, "GOG may get idea—which they will of course deeply resent—that we issued private warning, they responded, and we disregarded response and socked them." (Ibid.) In telegram 035575 to Guatemala City, March 3, the Department noted its main motive was to try to help anticipate such critical press interest and avoid damage to Guatemala's image and prestige. (Ibid.)

Document 350: Telegram 1083 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, March 13, 1971, 0045Z.

Ambassador Davis reported that Minister of Government Jorge Arenales complained that because the Embassy had expressed concerns over Guatemalan counter-terror activities, President Arana would not allow action against several prominent political opponents.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. A handwritten note at the top of the page reads, "HAK'd WH."

Document 351: Telegram 60510 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guatemala, April 9, 1971, 2152Z.

In a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Meyer, Guatemalan Ambassador Asensio expressed "his chagrin at unpleasant image of Guatemala being cast these days by American press and, indeed, by U.S. officials."

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GUAT. Limited Official Use. Drafted on April 9 by Bell; cleared by Breen, Wiggins, and Hurwitch; and approved by Meyer. In Airgram A–73 from Guatemala City, April 23, the Embassy reported that President Arana faced a dilemma regarding a November 1970 state of siege: "To end the State of Siege without being able to announce a decisive victory against the insurgent Left is politically difficult; to continue under Siege powers for an indefinite period is equally perilous." (Ibid., POL 15–1 GUAT)

Document 352: Telegram 2439 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, June 8, 1971, 0015Z.

Ambassador Davis provided the Department of State with information on exchanges between himself and President Arana regarding Guatemalan political violence.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 GUAT. Secret; Exdis. The report of the broader conversation is in telegram 2438 from Guatemala City, June 8. (Ibid.)

Document 353: Telegram 2564 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, June 15, 1971, 0120Z.

Ambassador Davis, Director Breen, and Foreign Minister Herrera discussed political violence and the Guatemalan Government's concerns over rumors that Senator Frank Church planned to hold hearings on Guatemala. Herrera told the Ambassador and Breen that "he did not expect this violence to subside quickly."

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room at 8:07 a.m. on June 15.

Document 354: Memorandum From the Acting Inspector General of Foreign Assistance of the Department of State (Faunce) to Secretary of Defense Laird, Washington, August 3, 1971.

Acting Inspector General of Foreign Assistance Faunce summarized a report on the U.S. Military Group in Guatemala, noting a disturbing failure to fill one important post for over seven months.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–74A–0083, 19, Guatemala 1971 000.1. Confidential. In the attached July 29 memorandum to Acting Inspector General Faunce, inspectors William T. Briggs, Edward W. Markey, and Bruce Clark noted that the position of Chief of USMILGP/Guatemala had been vacant since December 18, 1970 because "the problem of terrorism in Guatemala City may have influenced the officers' decision not to accept the assignment out of concern for the safety of their families." The attached memorandum is not published.

Document 355: Memorandum For the Record, Washington, August 16, 1971.

During a weekly meeting with the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency reported that President Arana had directly participated in drawing up death lists.

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Latin America General, 1971–72. Secret; Sensitive.

Document 356: Paper Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, undated.

The Central Intelligence Agency reported that the Guatemalan Government was increasingly utilizing "extra-legal" tactics in prosecuting its counterinsurgency operations against the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) and Guatemalan Worker's Party (PGT). According to the CIA, the Guatemalan Government regarded political considerations of more consequence than the insurgency problem, and had targeted both insurgents and President Arana's political opponents.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The paper was attached to a August 18, 1971 covering memorandum from CIA to Packard, Meyer, and Nachmanoff. The memorandum is not published.

Document 357: Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 19, 1971.

National Security Council staff member Nachmanoff suggested a reconsideration of U.S. support for the Arana Government and recommended that the issue be taken up in the 40 Committee.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action; Outside the System. Tab A is Document 356. On an attached August 19 note from Kennedy, Kissinger approved discussion of the issue at a 40 Committee meeting.

Document 358: Memorandum for the Record, Washington, September 16, 1971.

The issue of the extra-legal activities of the Guatemalan Government Security Service was raised in a 40 Committee meeting, but the Chairman and some of the other principals felt that this subject did not come under covert action and should be discussed between the State Department and Defense Department in another forum.

Source: National Security Council Files, NSC Intelligence Files, Minutes of 40 Committee, 1971, Box 7. Secret; Eyes Only. The memorandum was drafted on September 24 by Jessup and a copy was sent to Mitchell, Packard, Johnson, Moorer, and Helms.

Document 359: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 27, 1971.

Country Director for the Office of Central American Affairs Breen met with Pat Holt of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff and the Church Subcommittee to discuss U.S. military and security assistance to Guatemala. Holt argued that the United States should reduce its security assistance profile in order to disassociate itself from Guatemala's ongoing political violence.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 GUAT. Confidential. Drafted by Breen. Copies sent to Meyer, Hurwitch, Kleine, Samuels, Engle, Amembassy Guatemala, USAID Guatemala, Wiggins, Lockard, and Lewis. In telegram 0297 from Guatemala City, January 19, 1972, the Embassy took exception with many of Holt's statements. (Ibid., POL GUAT–US)

Document 360: Telegram 4697 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, October 30, 1971, 1840Z.

Ambassador Bowdler reported on extended conversations with Foreign Minister Herrera and Minister of Government Arenales on political violence and Guatemala's image in the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 GUAT. Secret; Exdis. In telegram 5049 from Guatemala City, November 23, the Embassy reported that Arana had lifted the state of siege. (Ibid., POL 15–1 GUAT) In telegram 5197 from Guatemala City, December 1, the Embassy related that Arana was "generally satisfied he has broken back of guerrilla movement in Guatemala City." (Ibid., POL 14 GUAT)

Document 361: Telegram 380 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, January 24, 1972, 2310Z.

In a conversation with Ambassador Bowdler, President Arana affirmed that he planned to "continue pressure against extremists of the left and right."

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 GUAT. Confidential; Limdis. In Airgram A–21 from Guatemala City, February 11, the Embassy reported that Army counter-guerrilla actions were unsuccessful in the face of FAR attacks on Government personnel. (Ibid., POL 23 GUAT)

Document 362: Telegram 1136 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, March 9, 1972, 1630Z.

Ambassador Bowdler reported that the Government of Guatemala was planning to pressure the British to withdraw reinforcements from Belize and warned that the dispute might draw the U.S. into the middle of a "Hemisphere-UK confrontation in OAS."

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates that it was received at the White House Situation Room at 4:30 p.m. on March 9. In telegram 1200 from Guatemala City, March 13, Bowdler reported that he told Herrera, that the "U.S.G. has projected itself into this dispute as far as it has because we value friendship with both countries and wish to see them settle differences in amicable way." Bowdler also hoped that Guatemala would resume discussions with Britain on the Belize issue and refrain from taking the case to the OAS. (Ibid.)

Document 363: Telegram 3250 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State, July 21, 1972, 1730Z.

The Embassy provided a mid-year assessment of the situation in Guatemala, noting that the Government would likely not re-impose a state of siege and that political violence levels were considerably reduced when compared with 1971.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 GUAT. Secret. It was repeated to Managua, Panama, San José, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, and CINCSO for POLAD.

Document 364: Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 28, 1972.

National Security Council staff member Jorden informed President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger that the Guatemalan Government had captured and executed the top leadership of the country's Communist Party.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. The memorandum was sent through Haig and Kissinger initialed the document. Attached but not published is a September 27 CIA Intelligence Information Cable, TDCS DB–315/08103–72. In telegram 4337 from Guatemala City, September 29, the Embassy reported that the PGT's top leadership had disappeared, concluding that the danger of retaliatory action by the extreme left increased so it was tightening security precautions. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12 GUAT)

Document 364a: Editorial Note.

Document 365: Memorandum for the 303 Committee, Washington, May 23, 1969.

The memorandum contained proposed objectives for U.S. covert aid to Guyana with emphasis given to strengthening Burnham's People's National Congress Party. It recommended continuing the same level of secret support.

Source: National Security Council, NSC Intelligence Files, Country Files, Guyana, 23 May 1969–6 February 1973. Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten note at the bottom of the first page reads, "Approved by the 303 Committee on 17 June 1969 with a proviso re additional source of funds (see minute)."

Document 366: Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Current Intelligence (Lehman) to the Deputy Director for Intelligence (Cushman), Washington, June 17, 1969.

Deputy Director of Current Intelligence Lehman argued that CIA covert funding in Guyana was becoming expensive, and questioned its efficacy. However, he concluded that the investment was ultimately worth it in order to prevent a Castro-like regime in the hemisphere.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, Job 79–B01737A, Box 14, 303 Latin America, 1962–1969. Secret; Eyes Only. There were two attachments, neither found, both concerning support to anti-Jagan political parties in Guyana. The first as dated March 17, 1967, and the second June 5, 1968.

Document 367: Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Trueheart) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer), Washington, June 23, 1969.

Deputy Director for Coordination William C. Trueheart forwarded the portion of the 303 Committee minutes of the June 19 meeting that dealt with a proposal for support to the PNC Party of Guyana.

Source: National Security Council, NSC Intelligence Files, Country Files, Guyana, 23 May 1969–6 February 1973. Secret; Eyes Only.

Document 368: Telegram 557 From the Embassy in Guyana to the Department of State, May 28, 1970, 1615Z.

Ambassador Burns provided a comprehensive review of Prime Minister Burnham's foreign policy and concluded that the United States had no alternative but to support Burnham.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guyana, Vol. 1. Secret.

Document 369: Memorandum for the 40 Committee, Washington, June 15, 1970.

Because covert assistance had helped Prime Minister Burnham to strengthen and organize his political party, the objectives of the aid had been met. It was recommended that the covert support be continued.

Source: National Security Council, NSC Intelligence Files, Country Files, Guyana, 23 May 1969–6 February 1973. Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten note at the bottom stated, "Continuation approved by the 40 Committee on 27 June 1970."

Document 370: Telegram 1436 From the Embassy in Guyana to the Department of State, December 5, 1970, 1700Z.

The Embassy discussed the upcoming negotiations between Guyana and ALCAN, and predicted an agreement would not be reached. Because the issue was very important to many Guyanese citizens, there was a possibility of large demonstrations, which could turn violent.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guyana, Vol. 1. Secret; Priority. Copies sent to Bridgetown, Caracas, Kingston, London, Ottawa, Port of Spain, USINCO POLAD, and Paramaribo UNN.

Document 371: Telegram 106 From the Embassy in Guyana to the Department of State, January 29, 1971, 1430Z.

The success of the negotiations between Prime Minister Burnham and the aluminum companies depended on whether the companies would accept the Government of Guyana having majority ownership and control of the bauxite industry.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guyana, Vol 1. Secret. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room at 9:10 on January 30.

Document 372: Telegram 207 From the Embassy in Guyana to the Department of State, February 17, 1971, 2150Z.

According to Ambassador King, former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg discussed with Prime Minister Burnham the negative economic effects of the nationalization of the bauxite industry for Guyana's economy. Goldberg raised the possibility that Reynolds might construct processing facilities in Guyana, and Burnham showed interest.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guyana, Vol. 1. Secret; Exdis; Priority. Justice Goldberg requested that this message be give no foreign dissemination. After Burnham's conversation with Goldberg, Burnham decided not to nationalize Reynolds, but would nationalized DEMBA. (Telegram 204 from Georgetown, February 17, ibid.)

Document 373: Information Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Regional Economic Policy (Rogers) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer), Washington, March 5, 1971.

Director of the Office of Regional Economic Affairs (ARA/ECP) Rogers outlined the important aspects of Guyana's nationalization of ALCAN (DEMBRA). He concluded that the reaction to the nationalization in Guyana was mixed.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Subject and Country Files: Lot 74 D 343, Economic Policy Plans, Coordination, Guyana, 1970, 1971. Confidential. Sent for information. Drafted by King and Bittner; and cleared by Moser (ARA/ECP). Copies sent to Hurwitch, Szabo, Broderick, Freeman, Heller, Feldman, and Richardson (INR/RAR). The memorandum is an unsigned copy.

Document 374: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Secretary of State Rogers and the Secretary of Defense Laird, Washington, March 17, 1971.

President Nixon requested that the NSC Undersecretaries Committee assess how Guyana's nationalization of part of its bauxite industry would affect the United States.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files, (H-Files), Box H–181, NSSM Files, NSSM 117. Secret. A copy was sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee. A covering memorandum from Kennedy to Kissinger noted that typically such memoranda are sent only to the Chairman of the Undersecretaries Committee, and sending the memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense was a new practice. Kissinger wrote on the bottom, "What I want is the directive to go to all agencies on that committee, as a directive [illegible] from me." Although the study was not found, the portion of the response to NSSM 117 that dealt with bauxite is published as Document 46.

Document 375: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer) to the Undersecretary of State (Irwin), Washington, June 18, 1971.

Assistant Secretary Meyer argued for caution in taking action, such as abstaining on an IBRD loan to Guyana, that would weaken Burnham's support and strengthen Jagan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject and Country Files: Lot 73 D 395, Guyana. Secret; Exdis. It was drafted by Hurwich. The memorandum is an unsigned copy.

Document 376: Memorandum for the 40 Committee, Washington, July 9, 1971.

Covert assistance to Prime Minister Burnham had strengthened his government, and helped to maintain communication between the U.S. Government and the PNC Party. Even though the assistance terminated as planned on June 30, it was expected that Burnham's relationship with the U.S. Government would remain unchanged.

Source: National Security Council, NSC Intelligence Files, Country Files, Guyana, 23 May 1969–6 February 1973. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A handwritten note at the bottom stated, "Telephonically approved by the 40 Committee on 3 April 1972." In a memorandum from Jessup, Kissinger indicated his approval the same day. (Ibid.)

Document 377: Telegram 996 From the Embassy in Guyana to the Department of State, July 14, 1971, 1458Z.

Ambassador King credited former Chief Justice Arthur Goldberg's visit to Guyana as instrumental in the hammering out of an agreement between Burnham and ALCAN.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guyana, Vol. 1. Secret; Exdis. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates that it was received at the White House Situation Room at 4:39 p.m. on July 14.

Document 378: Memorandum From the Ambassador to Guyana (King) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer), Washington, September 20, 1971.

Ambassador King reported that U.S. abstention on a World Bank loan for Guyana helped cause Guyana to reach out to leftist countries.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guyana, Vol. 1. Confidential. On October 7, Eliot sent a copy to Kissinger. (Ibid.) Meyer discussed the negative ramifications of the U.S. abstention on the World Bank loan in Document 375.

Document 379: Memorandum for the 40 Committee, Washington, November 14, 1972.

The 40 Committee approved cutting covert subsidies to Prime Minister Burnham because his policy had become more anti-United States. But, if Burnham changed course prior to the national election in March, 1974, and implemented pro-United Stated policies, the 40 Committee would be advised of his new policies so it could re-evaluate the decision to terminate covert support.

Source: National Security Council, NSC Intelligence Files, Country Files, Guyana, 23 May 1969–6 February 1973. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A handwritten note at the bottom stated, "40 Committee Approved on 12 December 1972." Kissinger indicated his approval the same date in a memorandum from Ratliff dated December 5. In the memorandum, Ratliff concluded, "The key factor in this negative proposal is that Burnham has made it clear that he will win the election with or without our help." (Ibid.)

Document 379a: Editorial Note.

Document 380: Intelligence Memorandum, OCI No. 0558/69, Washington, February 20, 1969.

CIA provided an assessment of Haiti's security apparatus and their potential for controlling events in the event of President Duvalier's demise.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Haiti, Vol. I. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Clandestine Services, Central Intelligence Agency.

Document 381: Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Trueheart) to the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer), Washington, April 29, 1969.

Deputy Director Trueheart reported that at an April 15 meeting, CIA briefed the 303 Committee on covert support to a group of prominent anti-Duvalier Haitian exiles. CIA mentioned concerns over disclosure of the covert program "as the result of possible prosecution by the Department of Justice of two Haitians formerly affiliated with the coalition and four United States citizens for violation of certain U.S. laws in connection with their individual unauthorized participation in the abortive 20 May 1968 invasion of Haiti."

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee, January–June 1969. Secret; Eyes Only. Attached but not published is an April 17 memorandum for the record, which indicates that Kissinger, Johnson, Helms, and Haig attended the meeting. (Central Intelligence Agency, ODCI Files, Job 80–R01284A) The issue of disclosure was again discussed on April 17 at a regular weekly meeting between CIA and Department of State officials. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Latin America General, 1969–70)

Document 382: Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers, No. 334, Washington, May 1, 1969.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) reported that in an apparent effort to win a resumption of aid from the United States, President Duvalier had "cracked down" on Haitian Communists. According to INR's analysis, "the communists in Haiti are few in number and constitute no real threat to the regime."

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–7 HAI. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. On April 17 Nachmanoff sent a memorandum to Kissinger which concluded that Duvalier seemed "to expect better treatment (aid) from this administration than he received from previous administrations." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Haiti, Vol. I)

Document 383: Memorandum for the 303 Committee, Washington, May 27, 1969.

With Assistant Secretary Meyer's concurrence, the memorandum recommended the termination of covert U.S. support for anti-Duvalier Creole broadcasts and the phasing out of support for the exile Haitian Coalition.

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Reports, 1969–70. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent to Johnson under a covering memorandum from Meyer. According to the minutes of the 303 Committee meeting, June 17, the Committee approved the termination. (Ibid.)

Document 384: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 19, 1969, 11:30 a.m.

Foreign Minister Chalmers met with Secretary of State Rogers to discuss President Duvalier's crack down on alleged Communists in Haiti. At the end of the conversation, the Foreign Minister reiterated Haiti's desire to purchase ammunition in the United States and thanked the Secretary for U.S. "efforts to block persons trying to use U.S. soil to launch invasions of Haiti."

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 HAI. Confidential. Copies sent to S, U, J, C, D, INR/OD, S/P, WH, CIA, ARA, J/PM, Amembassy Santiago, Amembassy Port-au-Prince. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that complete distribution was made by CMS on 6/25/69. Also present with Secretary Rogers were Ambassador Claude G. Moss, Assistant Chief of Protocol Marion Smoak, and Director of the Office of Caribbean Affairs Edward T. Long. INR Intelligence Note No. 484, June 20, observed, "In twelve years the exiles have been unable to launch a well organized invasion and their future prospects do not appear any brighter. Not only do they lack effective support in Haiti, but the contenders for power there can be expected violently to oppose any attempt by exiles to enter the field upon Duvalier's passing. (Ibid., POL 15–1 HAI)

Document 385: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates, Latin American Staff Note No. 7–69, Washington, July 1, 1969.

CIA produced an estimate on the future Haiti following President Duvalier's demise and concluded that should the country destabilize, the United States would stand to gain nothing through intervention.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, O/NE Latin American Staff Notes, Job 79–T00968A. Secret; O/NE Distribution Only.

Document 386: National Security Study Memorandum 70, Washington, July 22, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger tasked the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, CIA, and the Agency for International Development with preparing a study of U.S. policy toward Haiti, with a focus on the post-Duvalier period.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–161, NSSMs, NSSM 70 [1 of 4]. Secret.

Document 387: Letter From the Ambassador in Haiti (Knox) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer), Port-au-Prince, April 16, 1970.

Ambassador Knox wrote to Assistant Secretary Meyer with concerns about the U.S. policy of "coolness and correctness" toward Haiti.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 HAI–US. Secret; Official-Informal. A stamped notation on the letter indicates it was received in ARA on April 20. A handwritten notation in the upper right of the cover page reads, "cc: to RAH and then ARA/CAR to draft reply."

Document 388: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 24, 1970, 3:30 p.m.

National Security Council staff member Vaky reported that the Haitian Coast Guard had revolted against President Duvalier.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–161, NSSMs, NSSM 70 [1 of 4]. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it. In telegram 062133 from Port-au-Prince, April 24, the Department of State informed the Embassy that Bonhomme had requested air cover from Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. The Department informed Bonhomme that the "U.S. position is it cannot intervene but, as GOH aware, OAS is available as normal resort when member country feels there is a problem of international concern." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9)

Document 389: Letter From President Duvalier to President Nixon, Port-au-Prince, April 25, 1970, 12:30 p.m.

President Duvalier indicated that members of the Haitian Coast Guard had mutinied and then, in an act of piracy at sea, had attacked an American vessel. He called on the "United States Air and Naval forces stationed at Guantánamo to take action to render the pirate vessels unable to cause further arm."

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 HAI. No classification marking. Translated by the Division of Language Services; transmitted by telegram 468. In telegram 434 from Port-au-Prince, April 25, the Embassy reported that the Haitian Foreign Office had alleged that three American citizens had been captured by rebel Haitian Coast Guard cutters. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Haiti, Vol. I)

Document 390: Telegram 439 From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State, April 25, 1970, 2355Z.

Foreign Minister Chalmers told Ambassador Knox that mutinied Coast Guard cutters were likely heading to Cuba and requested preventative measures by the U.S.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Haiti, Vol. I. Confidential; Limited Official Use; Immediate. Repeated to Santo Domingo and CINCLANT. In an April 26 Memorandum for the Record, the National Military Command Center reported that U.S. Naval forces had "positively identified the vessels sailing toward Guantánamo Bay." Upon docking there, the crewmen had reportedly requested "political asylum or refuge." (Ibid.)

Document 391: Telegram 65668 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Haiti, April 30, 1970, 2242Z.

President Nixon responded to President Duvalier's April 25 letter, which detailed the Coast Guard mutiny and Haitian allegations of piracy. President Nixon indicated that the ships had arrived at Guantánamo Naval Base and that they were en route to Puerto Rico, where they would be made immediately available for repatriation to the Government of Haiti.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 HAI. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Drafted on April 29 by Robert C. Felder (ARA/CAR/H); cleared by Long, Vaky, S/PRS, and S/S; and approved by Hurwitch.

Document 392: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 2, 1970.

National Security Council staff member Vaky forwarded a copy of NSSM–70 Study on Haiti for President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger to review in preparation for the June 11 Review Group Meeting. The cover memorandum, which is printed here, briefly describes NSSM–70 study's key points.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–45, Senior Review Group Meetings, Haiti and Cuba 6/11/70. Secret. Sent for action. Attached but not published is the attached January 8 NSSM 70 Study on Haiti. The memorandum was not initialed by Vaky. The Senior Review Group did not meet on June 11; Kissinger decided to ask for agency positions on the options and present them to the President. (Memorandum from Vaky to Kissinger, October 14; ibid., Box H–222, NSDM 94)

Document 393: Telegram 814 From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State, July 1, 1970, 2005Z.

Ambassador Knox reported that the Government of Haiti had delivered a formal note calling on the U.S. Government to take action against Haitian exiles, who were allegedly preparing to attack Haiti from the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 HAI. Confidential.

Document 394: Memorandum From the Special Executive Secretary (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 9, 1970.

Haitian Ambassador Bonhomme requested an interview with President Nixon to discuss Haitian exile attacks. Bonhomme had repeatedly requested such meetings, but his request had been refused each time. Executive Secretary Eliot recommended against granting the interview, arguing that "We do not believe any important interest would be served."

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Haiti, Vol. I. Confidential. Attached but not published are the Department of State's suggested reply and the Haitian note of June 30.

Document 395: Intelligence Note From the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, No. RARN–34, Washington, August 20, 1970.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) reported that President Duvalier had made conciliatory gestures toward the United States, probably in response to Ambassador Knox's efforts to improve U.S.-Haiti relations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Haiti, Vol. I. Secret. It was drafted by Summ and Schimel (INR). Kissinger's initials appear next to the subject line.

Document 396: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 31, 1970.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger forwarded a summary of NSSM 70 Study on Haiti to President Nixon, noting the key points of the study and recommending that Nixon authorize him to issue an NSDM approving multilateral and humanitarian assistance to Haiti.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–220, NSDM 94. Secret. Sent for action. Attached but not published are Tabs A, B, and C. Tab A is an undated Analytical Summary; Tab B is NSSM 70 Study on U.S. Policy Toward Haiti; and Tab C is the agency positions (State, OEP, Defense, JCS and CIA). President Nixon initialed his approval on November 6. NSDM 94, November 13, is printed as Document 397.

Document 397: National Security Decision Memorandum 94, Washington, November 13, 1970.

President Nixon reviewed NSSM 70 and decided to encourage increased multilateral assistance and expand U.S. humanitarian assistance to Haiti.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–220, NSDM 94. Secret. Copies sent to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Directors of the Offices of Emergency Preparedness and Management and Budget.

Document 398: Telegram 96 From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State, January 29, 1971, 1955Z.

The Embassy reported the rumor that President Duvalier planned to step down and cede power to his son Jean-Claude. Duvalier was reputedly suffering from prostate cancer.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Haiti, Vol. I. Confidential. Repeated to Santo Domingo. In Intelligence Information Cable, TDCS 314/00796–71, January 29, CIA reported that Duvalier planned to travel to Europe for surgery after installing his son as President. (Ibid.)

Document 399: Telegram 264 From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State, March 23, 1971, 2045Z.

Ambassador Knox analyzed the "cool and correct" policy toward Haiti, concluding that it had failed to achieve U.S. objectives for the country.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 HAI–US. Secret.

Document 400: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 22, 1971.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger reported that President Duvalier had died and informed President Nixon he was calling a Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) meeting to assess the situation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Haiti, Vol. I. Secret. The minutes from the April 22 WSAG meeting are printed as Document 401.

Document 401: Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, Washington, April 22 1971, 11:15–11:46 a.m.

[9 pages not declassified in time for publication]

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–115, Washington Special Actions Group. Secret; Nodis.

Document 402: Telegram 745 From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State, July 20, 1971, 2000Z.

In an evaluation of President Jean-Claude Duvalier's first 90 days in office, the Embassy concluded that the new government had made an effort to maintain "an open, progressive image" and intended to cooperate with the United States. The Embassy recommended considering modest requests for bilateral assistance and the abandonment of the "cool and correct" policy toward Haiti.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 HAI. Confidential; Limdis. In a September 9 information memorandum, the ARA/NSC/IG advised its members that they would meet at the Department on September 15 to consider modification of U.S. policy toward Haiti and modest requests for bilateral assistance. (Ibid., Department of State, NSC–IG/ARA Information Memos, 1971, Lot 76 D 325) For a summary of the group's report, see Document 404.

Document 403: Telegram 3364 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, October 9, 1971, 1610Z.

Secretary of State Rogers met with Foreign Minister Raymond to discuss Haiti's need for foreign assistance. During the conversation, Rogers indicated that he was encouraged by reports he had received, but made no commitments regarding economic assistance to Haiti.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 HAI. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Port-au-Prince and Santo Domingo.

Document 404: Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, November 2, 1971.

Secretary of State Rogers reported on the recommendations of the September 15 Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs (IG/ARA), which included modifying U.S. posture toward the Haitian Government to adopt a more normal stance and normalization of bilateral assistance.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Haiti, Vol. I. Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. In a January 10 memorandum to William D. Broderick, Director of ARA/CAR, David A. Ross of ARA/CAR observed that Knox favored the "the re-establishment of a military mission to Haiti" as part of a more normal relationship with that country. Ross cautioned that U.S. interests in Haiti did not "warrant such close involvement with Haitian politics or such intimate association with the new Duvalier regime." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 HAI–US)

Document 405: Intelligence Note From the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, RARN–2, Washington, January 24, 1972.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) provided an assessment of President Jean-Claude Duvalier's new government and concluded that closer relations with the United States indicated "a turn away from the old attitudes of suspicion and self-isolation."

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 HAI. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted on January 20 in INR/American Republics by Godfrey and Pace.

Document 406: Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Caribbean Countries (Broderick) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer), Washington, March 13, 1972.

Director of the Office of Caribbean Countries Broderick provided Assistant Secretary Meyer with a current overview and assessment of U.S. policy toward Haiti, in anticipation of a March 14 meeting with an official visit by Haitian officials.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 HAI. Confidential. Sent through Hurwitch. Drafted on March 13 by Ross; cleared by ARA/CAR, ARA–LA/CAR, LA/DP, and AA/LA.

Document 407: Telegram 615 From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State, May 20, 1972, 1530Z.

Ambassador Knox reported that he met with President Duvalier and cabinet members Luckner J. Cambronne and Adrien Raymond, and they discussed bilateral assistance, given the new administration's first year record.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 HAI. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Bogotá.

Document 408: Telegram 1036 From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State, August 14, 1972, 1920Z.

Ambassador Knox indicated that in spite of many shortcomings, Haiti had "perhaps the best government it could have in the existing circumstances."

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 HAI–US. Confidential.

Document 409: Telegram 3700 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, October 6, 1972, 0147Z.

Secretary of State Rogers met with Foreign Minister Raymond to discuss U.S.-Haiti relations and the forthcoming provision of U.S. assistance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 HAI. Confidential. Repeated to Port-au-Prince.

Document 410: Airgram A–13 From the Embassy in Jamaica to the Department of State, Kingston, January 24, 1969.

In Part I of its Country Analysis and Strategy Paper for Fiscal Year 1971, the Embassy identified the significance of Jamaica to the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 1 JAM–US. Confidential; LOU attachment. Drafted on January 22 by DCM David Wilken; cleared by Arthur L. Jacobs, Charles H. Taquey, Kenneth N. Rogers, Dennis C. Goodman, Homer G. Gayne, Nancy Ostrander, Defense Attaché H. Watts, William B. Paxson, William L. Carr, and Haviland Smith, Jr; and approved by DCM Wilken. Stamped notations on the Airgram indicate that it was received at the Department of State at 1:57 p.m. on January 27, at the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs on January 28, and at the AN/RS Analysis Branch. Attached but not published at Enclosure 1 is a July 1968 Peace Corps Program Memorandum.

Document 411: Report Prepared by the Governor of New York Rockefeller, Albany, August 30, 1969.

Governor Rockefeller reported on meetings with Prime Minister Shearer and opposition leader Michael Manley during his July 3–4 visit to Jamaica.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 802, Country Files, Latin America, Latin America General, Rockefeller, Report on Conversations with Latin American Leaders, May–July 1969. Confidential; Personal.

Document 412: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 7, 1970.

National Security Council staff member Vaky reported an "early warning signal" indicating that Jamaica might attempt to gain equity participation in the bauxite industry.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Jamaica, Vol. I. Secret; Limdis. Sent for information. Attached but not published at Tab A is telegram 12 from Kingston, January 5. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it on January 15. A handwritten message, apparently written by Kissinger, reads, "De Roulet should take it easy."

Document 413: Telegram 962 From the Embassy in Jamaica to the Department of State, April 23, 1970, 2200Z.

The Embassy reported on a meeting between Ambassador de Roulet and Jamaican Finance Minister Seaga, in which Seaga indicated that the Jamaican Government had decided on a course of action to gain equity participation in the bauxite industry.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Jamaica, Vol. I. Secret; Limdis.

Document 414: Airgram A–90 From the Embassy in Jamaica to the Department of State, Kingston, May 6, 1970.

The Embassy reported on the future of the Jamaican bauxite industry and concluded that the rise of Black Power in the Caribbean and increased economic nationalism in Jamaica were the forces pushing the Jamaican Government to press for equity participation in the bauxite industry.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Jamaica, Vol. I. Confidential. Drafted on May 6 by DCM Roberts; cleared by Rogers and Goodman; and approved by Ambassador de Roulet. The airgram is unsigned. Attached but not published is an enclosure, a study titled, "The Future of the Jamaican Bauxite Industry." An attached forwarding note indicates that the Airgram and its enclosure were forwarded to Kissinger on May 12. A handwritten note, May 18, reads, "No further action required per Vaky." In Airgram A–85 from Kingston, April 27, 1970, the Embassy analyzed the Black Power movement in Jamaica. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 13–10 JAM)

Document 415: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 20, 1970.

National Security Council staff member Vaky informed President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger that President Nixon had agreed to meet with Prime Minister Shearer to discuss the bauxite problem and covert support for Shearer's reelection. In reference to the bauxite question, Vaky recommended that the President listen to the Prime Minister and promise to study the situation. Concerning covert support for Shearer's reelection, Vaky indicated his opposition to the idea.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 786, Country Files, Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Jamaica, Vol. I. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. The memorandum is a "not logged" item. A handwritten note by Kissinger, which appears next to Vaky's recommendation against covert reelection support, reads, "Let's talk to Helms." Neither of the attachments is published. The attachments are: Tab A, a July 7 letter from de Roulet to Haldeman, requesting a meeting between Shearer and President Nixon; and an August 2 note from Nachmanoff to Kissinger indicating that the President agreed to see Shearer on August 11 at 11:30 a.m., but no memorandum of conversation of the meeting has been found. On August 10, Kissinger sent Nixon a briefing memorandum for the proposed meeting; not published. (Ibid.)

Document 416: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy, Washington, August 18, 1970.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger relayed instructions from President Nixon to arrange discussions with the Jamaican Minister of Finance on the question of double taxation, an issue raised during President Nixon's August 11 meeting with the Jamaican Prime Minister.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Jamaica, Vol. I. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Secretary of Commerce Stans.

Document 417: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers and the Administrator, Agency for International Development (Hannah), Washington, August 24, 1970.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger forwarded a directive from President Nixon to form a high-level inter-agency commission to examine social and economic development in the Caribbean, with special emphasis on Jamaica.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Jamaica, Vol. I. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of Commerce and Treasury, and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.

Document 418: Letter From Ambassador to Jamaica (de Roulet) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Kingston, September 4, 1970.

Ambassador de Roulet opined that U.S. policy toward the Caribbean should be separated from that of Spanish and Portuguese speaking Latin America and that a private sector profit-oriented approach be taken to developing and executing that policy.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Jamaica, Vol. I. No classification marking. Attached but not published is the enclosed extract, titled "The Proposal—An alternative bureau structure." De Roulet sent the letter to Alexander Haig on September 4, asking him to forward it to Kissinger and observing, "The Caribbean needs a policy, the Caribbean needs a push, the Caribbean needs effective management and it will not be easy to achieve." Haig forwarded the letter to Kissinger with a handwritten note that read, "Some gems in attached." Kissinger responded, "Al—Let's hear what he has to say." No record of a follow-up meeting or conversation has been found. (Ibid.)

Document 419: Paper Prepared in the Department of State, Washington, October 5, 1970.

The Department of State reported on the activities of the inter-agency commission set up by President Nixon to examine social and economic development in the Caribbean, and recommended that the commission be sent only to Jamaica to avoid duplicating the work of a similar commission that had already been established by the OAS.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Jamaica, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent as an enclosure to an October 5 memorandum from Under Secretary John Irwin to President Nixon. In an October 27 memorandum to Alexander Haig, Howe reported that the inter-agency commission was "expected to depart for Jamaica in late November." (Ibid.)

Document 420: Intelligence Memorandum, Washington, December 11, 1970.

Intelligence analysis of the Jamaican political situation suggested that foreign control of the Jamaican bauxite industry could become a major issue in the next elections.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Jamaica, Vol. I. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Forwarded to Haig under a December 11 covering memorandum from Helms. (Ibid.) The report of Shearer informing de Roulet that Jamaica would follow Guyana's lead on bauxite is in telegram 3011 from Kingston, December 7. (Ibid.)

Document 421: Telegram 7 From the Embassy in Jamaica to the Department of State, January 4, 1971, 2251Z.

The Embassy reported that in separate conversations Prime Minister Shearer, opposition leader Michael Manley, and high-ranking members of the Jamaican Government told the Ambassador that if foreign-owned bauxite companies in Guyana capitulated in negotiations with the Burnham Government, then internal political pressures would force Jamaica to make similar arrangements with the bauxite industry.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 JAM. Confidential. Repeated to Georgetown and Port-au-Spain. In telegram 50 from Kingston, the Embassy reported that a bauxite industry principal informed the Ambassador about "the degree to which the companies were cooperating in their mutual problems here in Jamaica." (Ibid.)

Document 422: Telegram 49571 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jamaica, March 24, 1971, 2249Z.

The Department of State instructed the Embassy to influence the Jamaican Government to maintain a dialogue with the bauxite companies and avoid direct involvement in any potential negotiations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Jamaica, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room at 11:43 a.m. on March 25.

Document 423: Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State (Irwin) to President Nixon, Washington, April 13, 1971.

The Department of State reported on the inter-agency commission that had been sent to Jamaica to examine social and economic problems there. The commission recommended selective assistance through AID, trade relations, and international organizations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Jamaica, Vol. I. No classification marking. The "Report of the Commission to Jamaica" was not enclosed. Irwin's memorandum was forwarded to Haig under a April 16 covering memorandum from Nachmanoff, in which Nachmanoff stated, "I am holding the full report in my files," which he did not believe was worth sending to the President. Haig concurred with Nachmanoff's decision by initialing and writing, "OK."

Document 424: Telegram 1782 From the Embassy in Jamaica to the Department of State, July 22, 1971, 2122Z.

The Embassy reported that in a speech before the Jamaican Parliament, Prime Minister Shearer stated that the Jamaican Government planned to maintain good relations with foreign investors, and discouraged harassment of foreign bauxite companies. The Embassy concluded that Shearer had no plans to nationalize the bauxite industry.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL JAM. Confidential. In telegram 134034 to Kingston, the Department replied, "We are heartened by the general views expressed by Shearer regarding the United States, and by his constructive stand on the question of foreign investment. It is particularly encouraging that he does not regard Guyana as an inevitable model for Jamaica." (Ibid.)

Document 425: Letter From the Ambassador to Jamaica (de Roulet) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), Kingston, October 14, 1971.

Ambassador de Roulet reported on the upcoming Jamaican national elections, the potential for radicalization, and U.S. neutrality during the electoral process.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Jamaica, Vol. I. Secret. A handwritten note from Haig appears on the letter, which reads, "Arnie, reply please for my signature." In an October 23 letter to de Roulet, Haig replied, "It seems that you have things under control in Kingston, and I will pass on to Dr. Kissinger the information you provided." (Ibid.)

Document 426: Airgram A–316 From the Embassy in Jamaica to the Department of State, Kingston, November 17, 1971.

The Embassy analyzed the coming Jamaican national elections and speculated on what it would mean for U.S. relations with Jamaica if the opposition should win.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12 JAM. Secret; Limdis. Drafted on November 9 by Kenneth Rogers; approved by DCM Roberts; and signed by Ambassador de Roulet. Attached but not published is the enclosed PNP Election Program. Stamped notations on the Airgram indicate that it was received at the Department of State at 8:20 a.m. on November 19, and at the RS/AN Analysis Branch.

Document 427: Telegram 538 From the Embassy in Jamaica to the Department of State, March 2, 1972, 2015Z.

The Embassy reported on the outcome of the Jamaican national elections, concluding that the incoming Manley Government had a clear mandate for change.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12 JAM. Confidential. Repeated to Bridgetown, Georgetown, Port-au-Spain, USCINCSO, and CINCLANT.

Document 428: Airgram A–144 From the Embassy in Jamaica to the Department of State, Kingston, June 16, 1972.

The Embassy reported on a June 6 speech by Jamaican Governor General Sir Clifford Campbell, in which he spelled out the policy guidelines of the new PNP Government, led by new Prime Minister Manley. Among the issues discussed, the Embassy noted that the new government planned to examine Jamaica's bauxite arrangements, and that the country's foreign affairs would stress improved relations with Africa and the developing world.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 JAM. Limited Official Use. Drafted on June 14 by Falkner; cleared by Slater and Rogers; approved by Roberts; and signed by de Roulet. Stamped notations on the Airgram indicate that it was received at the Department of State at 8:32 a.m. on June 26, the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs on June 29, and at the RS/AN Analysis Branch.

Document 429: Telegram 2024 From the Embassy in Jamaica to the Department of State, August 9, 1972, 1650Z.

The Embassy reported that Prime Minister Manley told Ambassador de Roulet that the Jamaican Government had no intention of establishing diplomatic or trade relations with Cuba while U.S. restrictions were still in effect.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 17 JAM–CUBA. Confidential. In telegram 1928 from Kingston, July 29, the Embassy reported that Manley denied press reports that his government had invited Fidel Castro to attend Jamaican independence day celebrations. (Ibid.)

Document 430: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 16, 1972.

Secretary of State Rogers met with outgoing Jamaican Ambassador Richardson, who indicated that the new Jamaican Government was under pressure from radical elements. Richardson voiced the concern that as the new government sought to take actions to narrow economic disparities, those actions might be misinterpreted as a move to the left.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL JAM–US. Confidential. It was drafted by Burke (ARA/CAR). In telegram 3104 from Kingston, November 1, the Embassy reported that the Jamaican Government had launched a "massive campaign" to refute claims that it was leading the nation to the far left. (Ibid., POL 12 JAM)

Document 431: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 6, 1972.

Executive Secretary Eliot reported that Prime Minister Manley told Ambassador de Roulet that the Jamaican Government, along with the Governments of Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Guyana planned to establish diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Jamaica, Vol. I. Confidential. Richard W. Mueller signed for Eliot above Eliot's typeset signature. An NSC routing slip indicates that Jorden forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger for information on November 9. On December 8, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Guyana established diplomatic relations with Cuba. On January 17, 1973, Dick Campbell forwarded the memorandum back to Jorden, asking "Is the attached memo OBE or should it be re-submitted for HAK's info?" On January 19, Jorden noted in the routing slip that the memorandum "OBE."

Document 432: Telegram 1460 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, March 21, 1969, 1805Z.

The Chargé reported a discussion with Foreign Secretary Antonio Carrillo Flores raising the possibility of a resolution to the bilateral dispute over the Ojinaga borderlands, which had been under U.S. control since 1895.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 MEX–US. Confidential.

Document 433: Telegram 53095 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mexico, April 8, 1969, 1330Z.

The Department of State instructed the Embassy to explore the possibility of a "mutually acceptable compromise in terms of division of Ojinaga area and relocation of river channel on boundary."

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 MEX–US. Confidential. Drafted on April 7 by T. R. Martin (ARA/MEX), cleared in ARA/MEX, L/ARA, and by US–IBWC Commissioner Friedkin; and approved by Vaky. An April 1 memorandum of conversation details the meeting between Meyer and Carrillo Flores. (Ibid.) In Telegram 1844 from Mexico City, April 10, the Embassy reported that President Díaz Ordaz had agreed to pursue a package solution with certain conditions. (Ibid.)

Document 434: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 1, 1969.

National Security Council staff member Vaky informed President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger that Assistant Secretary Meyer had been designated Chairman of the U.S. Section of the United States-Mexican Commission for Border Development and Friendship (CODAF). According to Vaky, although the Commission's activities were not dramatic, they were important in promoting good relations with Mexico.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. I, January 1969–December 31, 1969. No classification marking. Sent for action. Attached but not published are Tabs A and B. Tab A is a July 12 memorandum to Meyer from Kissinger and Tab B is a memorandum from Meyer to Kissinger.

Document 435: Telegram 140240 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mexico, August 20, 1969, 1858Z.

The Department of State provided information on the President's Marihuana and Dangerous Drug Task Force, which included documentation on "Operation Intercept," a U.S. effort to interdict narcotics at the border with Mexico. The Department requested the Embassy's views on Mexican sensitivities.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. I, January 1969–December 31, 1969. Secret; Exdis; Eyes Only Ambassador. Drafted by Michael Yohn (ARA/MEX); cleared by U; and approved by Meyer. In telegram 4658 from Mexico City, August 25, McBride recommended that the U.S. inform Mexico's President, Foreign Secretary, and Secretary of the Interior about "Operation Intercept." (Ibid.) In telegram 147028 to Mexico City, August 29, the Department of State authorized McBride to inform Carrillo Flores of the task force, emphasizing that it was U.S. policy to give full advance information. (Ibid.)

Document 436: Memoranda of Meetings, El Mirador, Mexico (Amistad Dam), September 8, 1969.

During the dedication of the Amistad Dam, Presidents Nixon and Díaz Ordaz discussed bilateral relations and regional affairs. Topics included narcotics, trade issues, and Mexico's assistance in securing the release of Ambassador Elbrick, who had been kidnapped by Brazilian terrorists.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–1 MEX–US. Secret; Exdis. The memoranda of meetings consist of six parts.

Document 437: Telegram 4958 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, September 9, 1969, 1905Z.

Ambassador McBride reported a meeting with President Díaz Ordaz in which the two discussed at length Díaz's desire to assist in controlling drug traffic and the problem of Bracero workers.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL MEX–US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis.

Document 438: Telegram 153621 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mexico, September 11, 1969, 0044Z.

The Department of State indicated its concern that press leaks about Operation Intercept had damaged the U.S. ability to insure continued Mexican cooperation in our narcotics enforcement activities along the border.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. I, January–December 31, 1969. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted on September 10 by Petrow (ARA); cleared by Justice, Treasury, and the Bureau of Customs; and approved by Hurwitch. In telegram 5007 from Mexico City, September 12, McBride suggested that repeated leaks had minimized the possibilities of success for Operation Intercept and increased the damage it would cause to U.S. relations with Mexico. McBride questioned whether Operation Intercept was really worth the risk. (Ibid.)

Document 439: Letter From the Ambassador in Mexico (McBride) to Secretary of State Rogers, Mexico City, September 17, 1969.

Ambassador McBride wrote to Secretary of State Rogers to advise him of unfavorable developments in United States-Mexico relations.

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Guatemala City 1963–79, Roger File. Secret; Roger Channel; Special Handling. A copy was sent to Meyer and Petrow. In telegram 4881 from Mexico City, September 5, McBride advised the Department local press carried stories from Havana that Humberto Carillo, Press Counselor of Mexican Embassy in Cuba, was a CIA agent. The telegram is not published. (Ibid.)

Document 440: Telegram 5076 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, September 18, 1969, 0030Z.

Ambassador McBride briefed Secretary of the Interior Luis Echeverría on Operation Intercept.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. I., January–December 31, 1969. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The telegram's classification was raised from Exdis to Nodis by S/SO.

Document 441: Telegram 5122 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, September 19, 1969, 1836Z.

Ambassador McBride recommended against attempting any further briefings of Mexican officials regarding Operation Intercept and concluded it could have catastrophic consequences for U.S. relations with Mexico.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. I, January–December 31, 1969. Secret; Nodis. In telegram 160292 to Mexico City, September 20, the Department advised McBride that Operation Intercept would begin at 3 p.m. Los Angeles time on Sunday, September 21, and left to his discretion whether to inform appropriate Mexican officials in advance. (Ibid.)

Document 442: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 30, 1969.

National Security Council staff member Vaky reported on the effects of Operation Intercept on U.S.-Mexican relations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. I, January–December 31, 1969. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the first page indicates that Kissinger saw the memorandum on October 2.

Document 443: Telegram 5388 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, October 2, 1969, 2201Z.

Ambassador McBride reported that he met with Foreign Secretary Carrillo Flores to discuss Operation Intercept and informed him of the Department's desire to hold bilateral talks in Washington to decrease tensions.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL MEX–US. Confidential; Immediate. In telegram 166422 to Mexico City, October 1, the Department instructed McBride to approach Mexico about bilateral talks. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. I, January–December 31, 1969) Less economically severe Operation Cooperation replaced Operation Intercept on October 10. ( Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 830–857)

Document 444: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 12, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger summarized information regarding a proposed treaty between the United States and Mexico to settle all outstanding boundary problems.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. I, January–December 31, 1969. No classification marking. Sent for information. A handwritten November 17 notation on the cover page reads, "Back fm Pres." Attached but not published at Tab A is a November 3 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon.

Document 445: Letter From President Nixon to President Díaz Ordaz of Mexico, Washington, November 18, 1969.

In a letter thanking President Díaz Ordaz for a November 6 letter, President Nixon referred to efforts to deal with issues bilateral concern and expressed his "personal regret for the friction which Operation Intercept has caused in the relations of our two countries."

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. I, January–December 31, 1969. No classification marking. In a November 17 memorandum to the President recommending that Nixon sign this letter, Kissinger observed that "Díaz Ordaz was very deeply disturbed by the narcotics drive, Operation Intercept." Attached but not published to the November 17 was a translation of Díaz Ordaz's November 6 letter to Nixon.

Document 446: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, December 5, 1969.

Mexican Ambassador Hugo B. Margain discussed U.S.-Mexican relations with the Department Mexican Country Director, ARA/MEX, Chris G. Petrow. Margain stated that Díaz Ordaz was pleased with President Nixon's November 18 letter, and he believed that the cordiality which had existed before Operation Intercept had been "virtually restored."

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL MEX–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Petrow. Copies sent to the Secretary, Hastings, U, J, C, D, Vaky, Meyer, Hurwitch, E/OT, INR, Ambassador McBride, and DCM Kubisch.

Document 447: Letter From the Ambassador in Mexico (McBride) to Secretary of State Rogers, Mexico City, December 31, 1969.

Ambassador McBride offered an assessment of United States-Mexican relations during 1969 and speculated on potential for anti-American sentiment brought on by U.S. import restrictions on Mexican tomatoes and differences over border industries.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL MEX–US. Confidential. McBride signed Bob above his typeset signature. In a January 20, 1970 letter, Rogers assured McBride that the Department of State would strike a proper balance between the conflicting claims of important domestic interests and friends abroad." (Ibid.)

Document 448: Telegram 182 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, January 13, 1970, 2130Z.

Ambassador McBride recommended that President Nixon host a tripartite meeting with President Díaz Ordaz and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau to discuss common problems, particularly regarding economic issues.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL MEX–US. Confidential. It was repeated to Ottawa.

Document 449: Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 16, 1970.

Responding to Ambassador McBride's recommendation for a tripartite meeting (Canada, Mexico, and the United States), Sonnenfeldt listed several factors running against that suggestion.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. II, January 1, 1970–December 31, 1971. Confidential. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Vaky. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it on January 21. Vaky's January 14 memorandum to Kissinger summarized this cable and asked if Kissinger wanted to draft a recommendation to the President or ask for State's recommendation. Kissinger chose the latter option on January 21. (Ibid.)

Document 450: Telegram 1077 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, March 7, 1970, 0015Z.

Ambassador McBride reported on a meeting with presidential candidate Luis Echeverría, who told the Ambassador he "could inform Washington that his foreign policy would not change from Díaz Ordaz policy."

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 MEX. Confidential; Priority; Limdis.

Document 451: Telegram 1588 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, April 3, 1970, 2340Z.

In a one-hour meeting with Ambassador McBride, after discussing the damage done to United States-Mexican relations by Operation Intercept and indicating that he could not afford another such episode, President Díaz Ordaz expressed the hope that old problems between the U.S. and Mexico could be resolved.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. II, January 1, 1970–December 31, 1971. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates that it was received at the White House Situation Room at 9:59 a.m. on April 4.

Document 452: Telegram 2213 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, May 6, 1970, 1933Z.

Presidential candidate Luis Echeverría discussed border problems with Ambassador McBride, including salinity, border industries, immigration, and the Ojinaga issue.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. II, January 1, 1970–December 31, 1971. Confidential; Exdis.

Document 453: Telegram 3332 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, June 21, 1970, 0228Z.

The Embassy reported on a meeting between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger and President Díaz Ordaz, in which the Mexican president talked about the negative effects of Operation Intercept on U.S.-Mexican relations. Kissinger assured Díaz Ordaz that there would not be a repetition of the incident.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. II, January 1, 1970–December 31, 1971. Confidential; Limdis.

Document 454: Telegram 4025 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, July 24, 1970, 1711Z.

Herbert Klein met with Foreign Secretary Carrillo Flores to discuss President Nixon's upcoming visit to Puerto Vallarta and highlighted the two major issues that remained outstanding in United States-Mexican relations: salinity in the Colorado River and the Ojinaga border tracts.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. II, January 1, 1970–December 31, 1971. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Forwarded to the Western White House at San Clemente on July 24.

Document 455: Message WH01239 From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 30, 1970, 1932Z.

National Security Council staff member Vaky forwarded a status report on negotiations for a settlement to the Ojinaga border dispute. He recommended that the President contact Secretary of State Rogers to assure that the boundary settlement was resolved in time for the Puerto Vallarta meeting, and that Rogers was prepared to accept the 75/25 position.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. II, January 1, 1970–December 31, 1971. Confidential; Eyes Only. A handwritten note initialed by Kissinger reads "I'll call." An August 20 memorandum of conversation, details a U.S.-Mexico joint statement on the boundary settlement, which was issued in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, on August 21 after the meeting between Nixon and Díaz Ordaz. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL MEX–US) For the text of their joint statement, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 687–688.

Document 456: Telegram 5988 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, November 3, 1970, 2245Z.

Ambassador McBride reported on a discussion with President-elect Luis Echeverría, which dealt with the Colorado River salinity issue and finalization of the boundary treaty.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 MEX. Confidential; Limdis. In a November 14 memorandum to Irwin, Meyer recommended a 1-year extension of the 5-year agreement with Mexico on the Colorado River salinity problem to allow President-elect Echeverría sufficient time to consider the U.S. proposal for a new 5-year agreement. Irwin approved the recommendation. (Ibid., POL 33–1 MEX–US) In telegram 6342 from Mexico City, November 23, the Embassy reported that McBride and Carrillo Flores had signed the boundary treaty. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 32–1 MEX–US)

Document 457: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 2, 1971, 4:15 p.m.

In a meeting with Secretary of State Rogers, Foreign Secretary Emilio Rabasa outlined a Mexican counter-proposal to deal with the Colorado River salinity issue.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–1 MEX–US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by T.R. Martin (ARA/MEX/IBWC) and approved on February 10 in S. Copies sent to C, S/S, INR/OD, S/PC, ARA, and the American Embassy in Mexico. In a February 9 memorandum to Assistant Legal Adviser Mark Feldman, David A. Gantz (L/ARA) analyzed Rabasa's counter-proposal, which concluded that "international rivers are subject to reasonable use, with equitable distribution of benefits." Rabasa maintained that U.S. pollution must be compensated for and proposed bilateral diplomatic negotiation, or lacking that, ICJ arbitration. (Ibid.)

Document 458: Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) to President Nixon, Washington, March 17, 1971.

[2 pages not declassified]

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. II, January 1, 1970–December 31, 1971. Secret.

Document 459: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 8, 1971.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger reported that the only high profile difficulty in United States-Mexican relations was in regard to trade.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. II. January 1, 1970–December 31, 1971. Confidential. The memorandum is not initialed by Kissinger.

Document 460: Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 14, 1971.

National Security Council staff member Nachmanoff provided background on the Colorado River salinity problem with Mexico. He recommended that President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger meet with the Mexican Ambassador to discuss the issue.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. II, January 1, 1970–December 31, 1971. Confidential. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent through Alexander Haig. Kissinger approved the recommendation on April 16. Attached but not published at Tab A is an April 12 memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, detailing the Colorado River salinity problem. (Ibid.) Kissinger met with Ambassador Olloqui on April 21. During the meeting, Kissinger noted that it would probably be impossible to cede to Mexico's demands on the salinity issue, and hoped that Mexico would reconsider the U.S. July 1970 proposal. (Ibid.)

Document 461: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of the Interior Morton, Washington, April 28, 1971.

President Nixon directed that vigorous efforts be made to negotiate as expeditiously as possible a practical settlement of the Colorado River salinity problem.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. II, January 1, 1970–December 31, 1971. Confidential; Limdis.

Document 462: Telegram 3224 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, June 11, 1971, 0105Z.

The Embassy reported that on June 10, violence erupted during a student demonstration in Mexico City, during which the Mexican Government sent in "Halcones" to break up the demonstration.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 MEX. Confidential; Priority. In telegram 3304 from Mexico City, June 16, the Embassy reported that official Mexican statements on the June 10 incident omitted any reference to the "Halcones," and noted that the "possibility of whitewash now seems even more likely." (Ibid.)

Document 463: Telegram 3330 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, June 17, 1971, 0115Z.

The Embassy expressed its concern "over possibility USG may be linked by hostile elements to recent student disturbances, especially the violent June 10 riots, through our training program for up to 20 Mexican police officials."

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. II, January 1, 1970–December 31, 1972. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates that Part 2 was received in the White House Situation Room at 8:36 a.m. and Part 1 was received at 8:37 a.m. on June 17.

Document 464: Telegram 108794 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Mexico, June 18, 1971, 0015Z.

Responding to the Embassy's concerns that hostile elements might link the U.S. Government to the "Halcones," the Department instructed the Embassy to issue a statement to the press only if it appeared silence would be even more damaging.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. II, January 1, 1970–December 31, 1971. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Drafted by Petrow, cleared by ARA/PAF, and approved Hurwitch. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room at 8:46 a.m. on June 18. In a June 8 Intelligence Note RARN–21, INR stated "that the Halcones membership is recruited from university age students who are sons of people friendly with PRI officials enjoying the personal confidence of President Echeverría." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 MEX)

Document 465: Telegram 3364 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, June 18, 1971, 0103Z.

Chargé Kubisch reported that he had expressed concern to Mexican Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Gallastegui that the U.S. Government might be linked to the training of the "Halcones" or the June 10 incident.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. II, January 1, 1970–December 31, 1971. Secret; Exdis; Priority. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room at 8:47 a.m. on June 18. In telegram 3382 from Mexico City, June 18, the Embassy reported that Gallastegui told Kubisch: "Not to worry—proper measures have been taken." (Ibid.) In a June 21 Intelligence Information Cable TDCS DB–315/03453–71, CIA reported that President Echeverría knew of the "Halcones," and that he had "ordered or agreed to the use of the ‘Halcones' against the student demonstration held on 10 June 1971." (Ibid.)

Document 466: Telegram 3558 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, June 25, 1971, 1904Z.

The Embassy reported that Foreign Secretary Rabasa told Ambassador McBride that the Mexican Government had requested training for its police and that he assumed total responsibility for ensuring that there was no harmful publicity aimed at the United States stemming from Mexico's decision to request such training.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. II, January 1, 1970–December 31, 1971. Secret; Exdis. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room at 11:25 a.m. on June 26.

Document 467: Memorandum Prepared by the Government of Mexico, Tlatelolco, Mexico City, June 25, 1971.

The Government of Mexico proposed a 6-year agreement to deal with the Colorado River salinity issue.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–1 MEX–US. No classification marking. A handwritten note on the first page indicates that Secretary of Foreign Relations Rabasa gave the note to Secretary of State Rogers on June 28. Another handwritten note indicates that Rogers replied on July 24.

Document 468: Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to Secretary of Foreign Relations Rabasa, Washington, July 22, 1971.

Secretary of State Rogers informed Foreign Secretary Rabasa that the U.S. Government could not accommodate Mexico's proposed 6-year agreement for dealing with the Colorado River salinity issue, but offered a counter-proposal.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–1 MEX–US. No classification marking. In telegram 4238 from Mexico City, July 27, the Embassy reported that it had delivered the new proposal to Echeverría and Rabasa, both of whom agreed to carefully study it, but made no commitments. (Ibid.) Rabasa's proposal is published as Document 467.

Document 469: Telegram 4659 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, August 17, 1971, 2120Z.

The Embassy transmitted an August 16 letter from President Echeverría to President Nixon, dealing with the recently announced 10 percent surcharge on all U.S. imports. Echeverría told President Nixon that the new tax might have a seriously negative social and economic impact on Mexico.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL MEX–US. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Telegram 4658 from Mexico City, August 17, contained an August 17 message to Nixon, in which Echeverría indicated that a Mexican delegation would be sent to Washington to discuss the effects of the 10 percent surcharge. (Ibid.)

Document 470: Telegram 5063 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, September 4, 1971, 1912Z.

Ambassador McBride reported that the Mexican Government planned to reject the U.S. proposal on the salinity issue. While it was willing to appoint a legal expert to work toward a solution with an American counterpart, Mexico was disposed to proceed to an international body to adjudicate the solution.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–1 MEX–US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. In telegram 199862 to Mexico City, November 2, Rogers indicated that the U.S. concurred with Rabasa's suggestion for a six-year extension to allow time to negotiate a permanent solution to the salinity issue. (Ibid.)

Document 471: Telegram 6304 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, November 12, 1971, 1739Z.

The Mexican Government indicated that it wished to extend the standing salinity agreement, Minute 218, for only another year.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–1 MEX–US. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. On ARA and L recommendation, Rogers approved a one-year extension on the salinity agreement. (Memorandum from Crimmins and Stevenson to Rogers, November 15; Ibid.) In telegram 6492 from Mexico City, November 24, the Embassy reported that Rabasa "saw no real possibility of agreement on this point in the absence of mediation or interpretation by some third party." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 787, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. II, January 1, 1970–December 31, 1971)

Document 472: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, January 19, 1972.

Assistant Secretary Meyer and Mexican Foreign Secretary Rabasa discussed trade relations, border economics, the bracero program, Mexico's $343 million trade deficit with the United States, and the 10 percent surcharge on imports.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL MEX–US. Confidential. Drafted by Robert A. Stevenson (ARA/MEX). The meeting between Meyer and Rabasa took place following an earlier meeting on January 19, between Rogers and Rabasa, which covered general United States-Mexican relations, a Mexican offer to provide "good offices" in negotiations over the Panama Canal, and the agenda and activities of the Organization of American States. (Ibid.)

Document 473: Telegram 718 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, February 12, 1972, 0048Z.

During a lunch meeting at the U.S. Ambassador's residence, Foreign Minister Rabasa made an "impassioned pitch" for settlement of salinity issue before the Echeverría-Nixon in June.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–1 MEX–US. Confidential; Limdis. In telegram 31524 to Mexico City, February 24, the Department was "not sanguine re possibility settlement salinity problem by time Echeverría visit unless Rabasa proves much more realistic in understanding U.S. position and practical possibilities open to us." (Ibid.)

Document 474: Study Prepared by William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff, Washington, undated.

National Security Council staff member Jorden prepared a background study for President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger on the Colorado River salinity issue, which included a list of policy options.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 788, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. III, 1972. Confidential. This study is attached to a covering March 25, 1972 memorandum from Jorden to Kissinger. According to an attached note, this study was "Noted by HAK" on March 28.

Document 475: Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 11, 1972.

In preparation for an April 12 meeting with Foreign Secretary Rabasa, National Security Council staff member Jorden provided President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger with an update on the status of salinity negotiations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 788, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. III, 1972. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for action; Outside system. Attached but not published are Tabs A, B, and D. Tab A is an April 7, 1971 memorandum from McBride to Kissinger, Tab B is a chart identifying 4 options for resolving the salinity issue, Tab D has 3 letters from Echeverría to Nixon, one dated April 6, the other two undated, and biographical information on Rabasa. Attached at Tab C is a memorandum from Jorden to Kissinger, March 25. It is published as Document 474. Kissinger and Jorden met with Rabasa on April 12, 11:51 a.m.–12:32 p.m. No further record of a conversation has been found. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Henry A. Kissinger, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule)

Document 476: Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer), Washington, April 26, 1972.

Under Secretary Irwin provided Assistant Secretary Meyer with a summary of U.S. policy priorities in Mexico for the FY 72–73 period. Among the major focal points were the Colorado River salinity issue, bilateral trade differences, narcotics control, illegal immigration, and development assistance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1–1 MEX–US. Secret. Attached but not published at Annex A is "Indicative Resource Guidance." In telegram 2281 from Mexico City, May 3, the Embassy reported that Rabasa listed as the 3 most important issues in United State-Mexican relations, "salinity, trade problems, and situation of Mexicans working illegally in U.S." (Ibid., POL 7 MEX)

Document 477: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, May 6, 1972.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger provided background on the salinity issue and suggested a long-range solution that would obviate the need for arbitration.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 788, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. III, 1972. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action; Outside system. There is no indication of the President's action. In a memorandum to Kissinger, June 7, Hewitt indicated that the May 6 memorandum was still with the President. (Ibid.)

Document 478: Memorandum for the Record, Washington, May 15, 1972, 3–3:30 p.m.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger and Foreign Secretary Rabasa discussed the Colorado River salinity issue and illegal immigration. On salinity, Rabasa suggested third party arbitration, to which Kissinger responded "that if we decided we could go the arbitration route, the approach outlined by Rabasa seemed quite fair." On illegal immigrants, Rabasa suggested that the United States and Mexico issue a joint communiqué announcing the creation of a Joint Commission to study the problem.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 788, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. III. Secret; Sensitive. It was prepared by Jorden. Jorden signed WJJ above his typeset signature. The memorandum to which Kissinger referred is published as Document 477.

Document 479: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 8, 1972, 3–4 p.m.

In a meeting with President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger on the Colorado River salinity issue, Foreign Secretary Rabasa indicated that Mexico would reject any drainage water and "that if something were not done in ‘5 or 6 months' Mexico would simply stop using ‘bad water.'" Rabasa implied that during his upcoming visit, President Echeverría might use the issue to "turn the Mexican-American community against the Administration." Kissinger responded "that the Mexicans would be making a serious mistake if they advanced this kind of an ultimatum."

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 788, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. III, 1972. Secret. In a July 7 memorandum to Meyer, Stevenson indicated that President Nixon and President Echeverría had agreed to a 6-month interim arrangement regarding salinity on the Colorado River. (Ibid., POL 33–1 MEX–US)

Document 480: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, June 14, 1972.

In anticipation of President Echeverría's June 15–16 visit, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger provided President Nixon with background on the Colorado River salinity issue, which he characterized as the most important issue for Mexico.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 932, VIP Visits, Mexico: President Echeverría, 15 June 1972 [2 of 3]. Secret. Sent for action. Sent as an add-on to a June 14 briefing memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon. Attached but not published at Tab A are the Talking Points. (Ibid.)

Document 481: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, June 15, 1972.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger reported that he and Foreign Secretary Rabasa had come to a general agreement on steps to work toward a definitive solution to the Colorado River salinity issue.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 932, VIP Visits, Mexico: President Echeverría, 15 June 1972 [3 of 3]. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Presidents Nixon and Echeverría discussed the salinity issue and illegal immigration again in a second conversation on June 16, 11:22 a.m.–12:26 p.m. The conversation is not published. (Ibid., White House Tapes, Conversation No. 737–4, Oval Office)

Document 482: Conversation Among President Nixon, President Echeverría, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 15, 1972.

During a 2-hour meeting on bilateral and regional issues, Presidents Nixon and Echeverría discussed the Colorado River salinity issue and the growing problem of illegal immigration.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation No. 735–1, Oval Office. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portion of the conversation published here, which was part of a larger conversations, specifically for this volume. The portions transcribed are part of a larger conversation, which ran from 10:31 a.m. to 12:10 p.m. Alexander Haig and Donald F. Barnes, who acted as an interpreter, were also present at the meeting. In an August 9 telephone conversation, which is not published, Kissinger asked Herbert Brownell to lead a commission to undertake a thorough study on Colorado River salinity and propose a long-term solution to the issue. (Ibid., Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 15)

Document 483: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers, Attorney General Mitchell, Secretary of Agriculture Butz, Secretary of Labor Hodgson, and Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Richardson, Washington, August 26, 1972.

During meetings with President Nixon in Washington, on June 15 and 16, President Echeverría raised the issue of illegal immigrants from Mexico and their treatment in the United States. In the wake of their discussions, President Nixon "directed that a special group be established within our Government to study this problem and to make recommendations to him."

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 788, Country Files, Latin America, Mexico, Vol. III, 1972. Confidential. A June 17 Joint Communiqué notes that "With regard to the question of migratory workers, the two Presidents discussed the economic, social, and political factors that produce this problem and agreed it was desirable for each government to undertake immediately a study of this question with a view to finding a mutually satisfactory solution." ( Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 684–686)

Document 484: Briefing Memorandum From Francesco J. Alberti, International Relations Officer, Office of Mexican Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Crimmins), Washington, October 4, 1972.

International Relations Officer Alberti updated Deputy Assistant Secretary Crimmins on United States-Mexican relations. Among other issues, he highlighted regular Task Force meetings dealing with the Colorado River salinity issue, the first meeting of an Inter-Departmental Special Study Group on Illegal Immigrants From Mexico, Narcotics Developments, economic and labor issues, and an incident involving body search of Foreign Secretary Rabasa's niece by U.S. Customs officials.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL MEX–US. Limited Official Use. In telegram 3731 from USUN, October 6, the Mission reported that Rabasa had criticized the U.S. border check program for unduly humiliating and treating Mexicans like animals, and asserted that eliminating demand for narcotics was just as important as eliminating the supply. (Ibid., POL 7 MEX) In telegram 3848 from USUN, October 12, the Mission reported that in an October 6 meeting with Rabasa, Rogers "expressed apologies for unwarranted customs examination of Fonsec Rabasa's niece." (Ibid.)

Document 485: Telegram 7204 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, December 16, 1972, 0026Z.

Ambassador McBride reported that President Echeverría indicated optimism that 1973 would see the settlement of the long-standing salinity problem.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–1 MEX–US. Confidential. In telegram 7363 from Mexico City, December 28, the Embassy reported an exchange of notes with Rabasa that extended the temporary salinity agreement until April 30, 1973. (Ibid.) In a memorandum to Nixon, December 29, Johnson forwarded a copy of Herbert Brownell's report and recommendations for a permanent resolution to the Colorado River salinity issue. Neither is published. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 789, Country Files, Latin America, Brownell Report on Salinity Problem with Mexico)

Document 486: Airgram A–115 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State, June 9, 1969.

During Governor Nelson Rockefeller's visit to Nicaragua, President Anastasio Somoza indicated his interest in developing a transportation route along the San Juan River basin. Since the Byran-Chamorro Treaty of 1914 prohibited Nicaragua from developing the region on its own, the Embassy requested permission to begin discussions with Somoza regarding the Treaty's future.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–3 NIC. Confidential. Drafted on June 6 by David W. Burgoon (POL) and approved by Malcolm R. Barnebey. Stamped notations on the Airgram indicate that it was received at the Department of State at 8:29 a.m. on June 12 and at the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs on June 13. Ambassador Crockett signed the Airgram. In telegram 1435 from Managua, August 14, Crockett urgently requested authorization to initiate discreet discussions with Somoza on the future status of the Treaty. (Ibid.) In telegram 142594 to Managua, August 22, the Department of State replied that Panama Canal Treaty negotiator Ambassador Anderson felt strongly that without prior consultation appropriate members of Congress, Panama Canal negotiations would be affected adversely. (Ibid.)

Document 487: Memorandum From the Country Director for Panama (Grove) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Hurwitch), Washington, November 14, 1969.

Country Director for Panama Grove reported that Panama Canal negotiator Ambassador Anderson had no objections to the eventual termination or substantial amendment of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty. According to Anderson, the Treaty offered the United States little or no leverage for ongoing negotiations with Panama, because "nearly everyone knows that we are not going to build a canal there."

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33 NIC. Secret. Drafted by Grove. A copy was sent to Anderson, Sheffey of the Canal Study Commission, Breen, Feldman, and Meyer.

Document 488: Airgram A–5 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State, January 18, 1970.

The Embassy provided an overview of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua. The security assessment noted that President Somoza faced continued urban and rural threats from Sandinista insurgents and concluded that the Guardia Nacional would need continued U.S. assistance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 NIC–US. Secret. Stamped notations on the Airgram indicate that it was received at the Department of State at 8:27 a.m. on January 21 and at the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs on January 22.

Document 489: Memorandum of Conversation, Managua, January 20, 1970.

Embassy Political Officer James E. Briggs met with Dr. Fernando Agüero, the President of the opposition Partido Conservador Tradicional (PCT) to discuss a wave of violence sponsored by the "pro-Castro" FSLN. According to Agüero, the violence was symptomatic of economic and social difficulties which could be considerably relieved if the United States persuaded Somoza not to seek re-election.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2 NIC. Confidential. Drafted on January 28 by Briggs and cleared by Barnebey. Sent under the covering airgram, A–11, from Managua, February 1. In Airgram A–35 from Managua, March 8, the Embassy reported that it had "seen no evidence that there are any Cubans directly involved with the guerrillas." (Ibid.)

Document 490: Telegram 272 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State, February 18, 1970, 2236Z.

Ambassador Crockett reported that President Somoza urgently requested four helicopters for use in counter-guerrilla operations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23 NIC. Confidential; Immediate. It was repeated to USCINCSO and USCINCSO for POLAD. In telegram 1991 from Managua, November 5, 1969, the Embassy reported that the FSLN had increased its activities and that it had demonstrated that it was a continuing threat. (Ibid.)

Document 491: Telegram 354 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State, March 5, 1970, 1730Z.

The Embassy reported that the March 4 announcement of United States-Nicaraguan agreement to re-examine Byran-Chamorro Treaty had received widespread local approval.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–3 NIC. Unclassified. Repeated to Panama and San José.

Document 492: Telegram 645 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State, April 17, 1970, 2246Z.

The Embassy noted that assistance to improve public safety capability of Guardia Nacional was major U.S. Government objective in Nicaragua and requested the assignment of a Public Safety Adviser to Nicaragua.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 NIC–US. Limited Official Use. It was repeated to USCINCSO and USCINCSO for POLAD. The CASP enclosed in Airgram A–5 is published as Document 488.

Document 493: Memorandum of Conversation, Managua, May 6, 1970.

Political Officer Briggs met for two hours with Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, the Owner-Editor of Prensa Libre, to discuss Nicaragua's political situation, President Somoza's potential continuation in power, and the disenfranchisement of university students. He also noted the growing sympathy for the Sandinista movement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2 NIC. Confidential. Transmitted to the Department of State as Enclosure 1 to Airgram A–80 from the Embassy in Managua, May 26.

Document 494: Telegram 83319 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nicaragua, May 30, 1970, 2326Z.

The Department of State indicated that it was concerned about President Somoza's proposed visit with Cuban exiles in Miami, and that the visit could be detrimental to both U.S. and Nicaraguan interests, particularly in light of problems involving Alpha 66.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 NIC. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. For Chargé from Hurwitch. Drafted on May 30 by Funseth (ARA/CCA) and Eltz (ARA/CEN); cleared by Killoran and S/S; and approved by Hurwitch. In telegrams 830 and 886, May 19 and 26, the Embassy requested assistance in arranging a meeting between Somoza and Cuban exile leaders in Miami. (Ibid.)

Document 495: Telegram 896 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State, May 31, 1970, 1913Z.

Embassy Chargé Barnebey relayed the Department of State's concerns about President Somoza's planned visit with Cuban exiles in Miami. Somoza responded by acknowledging the Department of State's concerns and then telephoned the Cuban exile group to cancel the publicized event, suggesting that he might instead meet with a small group of exiles in private. Somoza requested that the Department of State arrange the alternative meeting.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 790, Country Files, Latin America, Nicaragua, Vol. I (1969–1974). For Hurwitch. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. A stamped notation indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room at 8:38 a.m. on June 1. In telegram 83335 to Managua, May 31, Hurwitch responded that the Department of State was "unable to accede to Somoza's request for our help in arranging even a private meeting with a few exiles." (Ibid.)

Document 496: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 9, 1970.

The Department of State recommended against extending a presidential invitation to President Somoza to visit the United States, and cited concerns that Somoza might be planning to extend his term in office despite a constitutional ban on immediate re-election.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 790, Country Files, Latin America, Nicaragua, Vol. I (1969–1974). Confidential. Drafted on June 4 by Eltz; and cleared by Breen, Hurwitch, and Emil Mosbacher, Jr. (S/CPR). A typewritten note appears at the top of the cover page of the Department of State's copy, which reads, "Approved per Memo from Mr. Watts to Mr. Eliot dtd 6/12/70." The June 12 memorandum from William Watts is not published. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 NIC)

Document 497: Telegram 1696 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State, September 28, 1970, 1617Z.

The Embassy reported that university students had occupied the Managua Cathedral to protest government repression. Archbishop Obando y Bravo supported the students the "first occasion where Church and students have stood together against President Somoza's Guardia Nacional and its time honored practices."

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 NIC. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Guatemala, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, and San José. In telegram 1700 from Managua, September 29, the Embassy reported that the occupation had ended peacefully the previous afternoon, and that "students and liberal religious elements (mainly young Jesuit priests) regard settlement as major victory over GON and will surely be ready to apply successful formula when next civil crisis inevitably presents itself." (Ibid.)

Document 498: Telegram 1815 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State, October 16, 1970, 2225Z.

The Embassy reported that Conservative Party President Fernando Agüero had told them that President Somoza would not "seek to extend his time in office" as had been supposed.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12 NIC. Confidential. In Airgram A–135 from Managua, October 7, the Embassy detailed efforts by the Liberal and Conservative Parties to negotiate Somoza's withdraw from power and the establishment of a transition government. (Ibid.) In telegram 1938 from Managua, November 5, the Embassy described Somoza as "evasive on continuism" when asked during a press conference whether he planned to remain in office. (Ibid., POL 15–1 NIC)

Document 499: Telegram 25 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State, January 7, 1971, 1511Z.

Ambassador Shelton reported on conversations with President Somoza during a weekend at the President's lakeside house. Much of the discussion surrounded Somoza's planned retirement from politics, continuation as head of the National Guard, and plans for a provisional government and general elections.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 NIC. Secret; Limdis.

Document 500: Memorandum of Conversation, Managua, January 18, 1971.

Ambassador Shelton met with President Somoza to discuss Nicaragua's political situation and United States-Nicaraguan relations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2 NIC. Confidential. Transmitted to the Department of State as Enclosure 1 to Airgram A–10 from Managua, January 31. Drafted by Hines (ARA/LA/CEN). Attached but not published at Enclosure 2 is a January 19 memorandum of conversation with Fernando Agüero.

Document 501: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 29, 1971.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger forwarded a report from Secretary of Commerce Stans, regarding his December 8–10, 1970, visit to Nicaragua. Kissinger's memorandum lists requests made by President Somoza.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 790, Country Files, Latin America, Nicaragua, Vol. I (1969–1974). Confidential. Sent for action. Attached but not published are Tabs A and B. Tab A was a January 30 letter of appreciation to Secretary Stans, which Nixon signed, and Tab B was Secretary's Stans' December 18, 1970 report on his visit to Nicaragua.

Document 502: Telegram 722 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State, March 30, 1971, 2310Z.

The Embassy reported that President Somoza and Conservative Party President Agüero signed an agreement on presidential succession, which would ostensibly initiate a process of structural change in the country's economy and political life.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12 NIC. Confidential. In Airgram A–40 from Managua, April 11, the Embassy forwarded a copy of the agreement between Somoza and Agüero and translated copies of the speeches they gave at the signing ceremony. (Ibid., POL 15–1 NIC)

Document 503: Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer) to the Acting Secretary of State (Irwin), Washington, April 12, 1971.

Assistant Secretary Meyer supported Nicaraguan Ambassador Sevilla-Sacasa's request for "some sign of special attention by President Nixon" for President Somoza during his visit.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 NIC. Confidential. Drafted by Hines; cleared by Hurwitch, Breen, William R. Codus (S/CPR), and Von Stroebel (Commerce); cleared in info by Colonel Wyrough (DOD). Copies sent to U, J, C, and ARA/CEN/N. Irwin approved Meyer's recommendation on April 13 and sent the attached memorandum to the President. On the memorandum to Nixon, there is a typed note that indicates that Nixon would meet Somoza for dinner in June. (Ibid.)

Document 504: Memorandum for the Record, Washington, June 2, 1971, 7:30 p.m.

President Nixon and President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Haig met with President Somoza and discussed the military in Latin America, the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, economic developments, including quotas for commodities, and Nicaragua's political future. Somoza indicated that he had reached an agreement to step down at the completion of his term, but noted that he planned to run as his party's presidential candidate in the 1974 election.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 790, Country Files, Latin America, Nicaragua Vol. I (1969–1974). Secret; Sensitive. An attached sanitized version was prepared for transmittal to the Department of State.

Document 505: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 8, 1971, 3:15–3:45 p.m.

During a courtesy visit with Secretary of Defense Laird, President Somoza expressed concern over the administration's policy of phasing out military assistance to Latin America and referred to "the continued threat posed by Cuba."

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–74–083, Nicaragua 1971, 000.1. Confidential. It was prepared by Wyrough on June 9 and approved by Armistead I. Selden, Jr. This conversation is published from a copy that bears Selden's stamped signature with an indication that he signed the original.

Document 506: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, August 13, 1971.

The Department of State indicated that, except for textiles, little could be done to respond to President Somoza's requests, because quota policies were governed by international agreements. The Department of State recommended that the textile quota be doubled. Despite a dissenting view from the Commerce, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger recommended that President Nixon approve the Department of State's recommendation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 790, Country Files, Latin America, Nicaragua Vol. I (1969–1974). Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Attached at Tab A is a draft letter to Somoza as signed, it is published as Document 507. Attached but not published at Tabs B and C are a July 15 memorandum from the Department of State to Kissinger and a July 14 memorandum from the Stans to Kissinger, objecting to the Department of State's recommendations.

Document 507: Letter From President Nixon to President of Nicaragua Somoza, Washington, September 7, 1971.

President Nixon informed President Somoza that he had doubled Nicaragua's cotton textile allocation. Nixon indicated that he would send a Department of Agriculture representative to Nicaragua to discuss fruit and vegetables, and was working to benefit Nicaragua in the area of sugar import allocations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 790, Country Files, Latin America, Nicaragua Vol. I (1969–1974). No classification marking.

Document 508: Airgram A–112 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State, September 26, 1971.

The Embassy reported on the Somoza-Agüero national unity pact, suggesting that Somoza's Liberal Party sought U.S. association with the pact to lend it "an air of respectability and international acceptability," while Agüero's Conservative Party hoped that the United States would "be the guardian of the agreement and the potential enforcer should Somoza fail to comply with it. The Embassy recommended staying aloof and avoiding "the embraces of local politics."

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12 NIC. Confidential. Drafted by Cheek, approved by White, and signed by Shelton. Copies sent to Guatemala, San Jose, Tegucigalpa, San Salvador, USCINCSO for POLAD. Stamped notations on the Airgram indicate that it was received at the Department of State at 8:30 a.m. on September 25, at the Bureau of Inter-American affairs on October 1, and at the RS/AN Analysis Branch.

Document 509: Intelligence Memorandum, OCI No. 2080/71, Washington, October 18, 1971.

CIA assessed the emergence of "national unity" pacts in Honduras and Nicaragua. According to the Agency, while ostensibly providing for democratic transitions, such pacts were "ploys by strongmen whose terms of office are legally terminated to disguise continuismo."

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, Job 79–T00831A. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The intelligence memorandum was self-initiated at CIA. Three inserts included in the memorandum, are not published. They were a map with "Selected Examples of Continuismo," "The Honduran Unity Pact," and "Opposition Participation in Nicaragua."

Document 510: Telegram 2682 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State, November 20, 1971, 1713Z.

Nicaraguan Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo publicly indicated his intention to abstain from the scheduled 1972 Constituent Assembly elections. Nicaragua's leading opposition newspaper, La Prensa, "welcomed the Archbishop's apparent support for its position that voters should abstain because the Kupia Kumi and its elections are a farce."

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–7 NIC. Confidential. Repeated to Guatemala, San José, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, and USCINCSO for POLAD. In Airgram A–134, November 24, the Embassy reported that the opposition Partido Social Cristiano (PSC) had begun a petition campaign to force the Liberal and Conservative Parties to allow it to participate in the coming elections. (Ibid., POL 12 NIC)

Document 511: Airgram A–003 From the Embassy in Nicaragua, January 4, 1972.

Ambassador Shelton met at his residence with the leadership of the opposition Partido Social Cristiano (PSC), who stated that if the Supreme Electoral Court rejected their petition, the only road to ending Somoza's dictatorship would be through violent revolution. The Embassy reported that the December 21 Supreme Electoral Court ruling against the PSC's petition could convince some dissident elements in Nicaragua that violence was the only way.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12 NIC. Confidential. Drafted by Turnquist, cleared by Cheek, and approved by Shelton. Repeated to Guatemala, San José, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, and USCINCSO for POLAD. Stamped notations on the Airgram indicate that it was received at the Department of State at 8:34 a.m. on January 12, at the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs on January 14, and at the RS/AN Analysis Branch.

Document 512: Memorandum of Conversation, Puerto Somoza, January 24, 1972.

During an informal two-hour meeting with Ambassador Shelton, President Somoza discussed his plans for governing jointly with Conservative Party leader Fernando Agüero and the future of two-party politics in Nicaragua.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 NIC. Confidential. Drafted by Hines. A copy was sent to ARA/CEN, INR/RAR, CIA/OCI, CIA/BR, and the Embassy in Managua.

Document 513: Telegram 446 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State, February 23, 1972, 0132Z.

The Embassy reported that President Somoza's Liberal Party had crushed the Conservative Party in the February 6 elections, and the loss actually enhanced the chances that an opposition coalition would emerge for the 1974 elections. The Embassy concluded that the election results and long range implications did not threaten U.S. interests.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 NIC. Confidential; Priority. It was repeated to Guatemala, Tegucigalpa, San Salvador, San José, USCINCSO, and USCINCSO for POLAD.

Document 514: Memorandum of Conversation, Managua, March 7, 1972.

Embassy Political Officer James R. Cheek discussed the outcome of the February 6 elections with Conservative Party President Fernando Agüero, who claimed he expected to lose the elections, because they had been conducted under the "old, corrupt system." Agüero explained that honest elections were a sine qua non for continued political peace and stability in Nicaragua, and that should these fail in 1974, revolution would be the only alternative.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12 NIC. Limited Official Use; Exempt. Drafted by Cheek. Transmitted to the Department in Airgram A–23 from Managua, March 10. Repeated to Guatemala, San José, Tegucigalpa, San Salvador, and USCINCSO for POLAD.

Document 515: Telegram 966 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State, May 3, 1972, 2305Z.

The Embassy reported that Somoza had officially resigned as President and had handed over authority to the 3 member National Governing Council, which was elected on February 6. Somoza was to remain as the Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 NIC. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Guatemala, Tegucigalpa, San Salvador, San José, USCINCSO, and USCINCSO for POLAD.

Document 516: Memorandum of Conversation, Managua, October 25, 1972.

Political Officer Cheek met with Archbishop Obando y Bravo to discuss the political role of the Church and increased confrontation with the state. Obando y Bravo indicated that the Church had an obligation to fight injustice and other evils, and criticized the Government of Nicaragua for acts of violence against the population.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–7 NIC. Confidential. It was repeated to Guatemala, San Salvador, San José, Tegucigalpa, and USCINCSO for POLAD. It was transmitted to the Department as an Enclosure to Airgram A–104 from Managua, November 3, which is published as Document 517.

Document 517: Airgram A–104 From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State, November 3, 1972.

The Embassy reported on trends in Church-State relations during 1972, which began to deteriorate with a May pastoral letter, which criticized the Nicaraguan Government and called for change.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–7 NIC. Confidential. It was repeated to Guatemala, San Salvador, San José, Tegucigalpa, and USCINCSO for POLAD. Drafted and approved by Cheek; and cleared by Warner. Stamped notations on the Airgram indicate that it was received at the Department of State at 3:28 p.m. on November 6, the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs on November 8, and the RS/AN Analysis Branch. Attached and published as Document 516 is a memorandum of conversation between Political Officer Cheek and Archbishop Obando y Bravo.

Document 518: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 25, 1969.

The Department of State reported that the new Panamanian Government showed little concern that the actions it took could damage its relations with the United States. The Department of State stated it was encouraging the return to constitutional government, maintaining a satisfactory working relationship, and assuring continued National Guard cooperation in protecting the Panama Canal.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 2 PAN. Confidential. Drafted on January 24 by Guthrie; and cleared by Sanders and Vaky. Robert Brown signed above Benjamin Read's typeset signature. SNIE 84–69, January 30, provided additional information on Panama and concluded that "relations with the U.S. are likely to be somewhat strained throughout the period of military rule. We think the officer corps of the Guardia has become more nationalistic over the last couple of years, yet we doubt that the new regime will encourage blatant anti-Americanism, for fear it could not control an aroused populace." (Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A, Box 373, Folder 2, Situation in Panama)

Document 519: Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Walsh) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 20, 1969.

If Ambassador Aleman raised the question of treaty negotiations, the Department of State suggested that President Nixon tell him that it would be difficult for the United States and Panama to discuss new treaties until Panama returned to constitutional government.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17–1 PAN–US. Confidential. Drafted by Parker. JW Davis signed above John Walsh's typeset signature. Also enclosed but not published is a biographical sketch of Aleman. No memorandum of their conversation has been found, but according to the President's Daily Diary, the President, Mosbacher, Vaky, and Aleman met on February 21 from 10:04 to 10:16 a.m. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

Document 520: Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, March 7, 1969.

Acting Assistant Secretary Vaky noted that a power struggle in the Panamanian National Guard had resulted in the exile of four officers to the United States. He concluded that opportunistic Panamanian politicians might attempt to take advantage of the instability in the nation by stirring up future dissension in the Guard.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15 PAN. Secret. Drafted on March 6 by Guthrie.

Document 521: Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, July 15, 1969.

Secretary of State Rogers reviewed the Panama Review Group's terms for initiating Panama Canal negotiations. The most important topics included the issue of negotiating with the unconstitutional government in Panama City, the findings of the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission, and the expiration of U.S. rights to the Rio Hato Military Training Area.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 790, Country Files, Latin America, Panama, Vol. 1, January 1969–February 28, 1970. Secret. Rogers' signed WPR above his typeset signature. Neither approval nor disapproval was checked, but the President indicated his approval in Document 524. Attached but not published is the enclosed memorandum.

Document 522: National Security Decision Memorandum 22, Washington, August 27, 1969.

This NSDM directed the following action: the National Security Council Inter-departmental Group for Latin America (NSC–IG/ARA) was to replace the Panama Review Group as the organization that formulated and implemented policy towards Panama, and the Canal. The Panama Review Committee would continue to be responsible for the coordination of information and proposals relating to Panama, and United States-Panamanian relations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, Box 363, NSDMs, Nos. 1 through 50. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the JCS, the Secretary of the Army, and Robert Anderson, the Special Representative for United States-Panama Relations. National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 296 is published in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968 volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Document 414.

Document 523: Report Prepared by the Governor of New York (Rockefeller), Albany, August 30, 1969.

In this 12 page report, Rockefeller discussed his meeting with the Minister of Foreign Relations and recounted his meeting with President Torrijos. Rockefeller concluded that the Panamanian Government had very young, able, Cabinet leadership, and that Torrijos wanted to sign a new set of Panama Canal Treaties. Rockefeller also stated that the United States needed more politically skillful representatives in the nation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 802, Country Files, Latin America, Latin America General, Rockefeller, Report on Conversations with Latin American Leaders, May–July, 1969. Confidential; Personal. Nixon dispatched Rockefeller to Latin America to confer with leaders in the region.

Document 524: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, September 3, 1969.

President Nixon requested a review of the U.S. stance regarding the Canal Treaties that included, first, the objectives of the 1967 draft treaties, and, second, U.S. interests and objectives in concluding new treaties.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–169, NSSM Files, NSSM 86. Secret. Rogers's July 15 memorandum to the President is published as Document 521. A summary of the review requested by the President is referenced in the source note to Document 530.

Document 525: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, December 18, 1969

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger discussed the recent unsuccessful attempt to overthrow President Torrijos. Because Torrijos suspected that the United States was involved in the coup attempt, it reinforced his existing mistrust of the U.S. Government. Kissinger concluded that U.S. officials should attempt to shape Torrijos's attitudes so the Panamanian leader would act in a more pro-U.S. fashion.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 790, Country Files, Latin America, Panama, Vol. 1, January 1969–February 28, 1970. Secret. Sent for information. Written on the document was "ret'd [returned]," which was stamped December 22.

Document 526: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 29, 1969.

National Security Council staff member Vaky reported to President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger that President Torrijos believed that members of the U.S. Army Intelligence Unit in the Canal Zone were involved in the December 15 attempt to oust him from power. The Department of State instructed the U.S. ambassador to inform Torrijos that an investigation of the matter would be quickly initiated.

Source: Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 790, Country Files, Latin America, Panama, Vol. 1, January 1969–February 28, 1970. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Kissinger wrote on the top of the page, "Do memo for Pres conclusion : I shd [should] talk to [Melvin] Laird that this info comes to WH [White House] as matter-of-course. Al [Haig]—Check on army intelligence—this sounds very circumstantial." In the margin next to the first sentence of the last paragraph, Kissinger wrote, "Why?" In the margin next to the last sentence, he wrote "and [illegible]." Attached but not published was telegram 4158 from Panama City, December 27; and telegram 407 from Panama City, December 27. Kissinger summarized this memorandum in a December 30 memorandum to the President, but there is no indication the President saw it. (ibid.)

Document 527: Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (Hurwitch) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, January 2, 1970

Deputy Assistant Secretary Hurwitch informed Secretary of State Rogers that U.S. Army personnel may have been involved in a coup attempt in Panama on December 14–15. Hurwitch also stated that on December 9 the Army withheld intelligence information from the U.S. Embassy on coup plotting for 72 hours.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–9 PAN. Secret. Drafted by Grove. On January 26, Kissinger informed Laird and Helms that President Nixon wanted them to ensure that intelligence is passed to policymakers as quickly as possible, and he wanted a report on recommendations for improving intelligence collection in Panama. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 332, Subject Files, Review of Intelligence Activity.) (Secret) Laird and Helms recommended in a memorandum to the President, dated February 25, that non-essential duplication of intelligence activities should be eliminated, and coordination of intelligence activity should be improved. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01086A, Box 15, Folder 2, P–17 Panama) (Secret)

Document 528: National Security Study Memorandum 86, Washington, January 2, 1970.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger directed the National Security Council Inter-Departmental Group for Inter-American Affairs (NSC–IG/ARA) to prepare a study of U.S. interests in agreeing to new canal treaties with Panama. He emphasized that the study should analyze policy options, whether any objectives of the 1967 treaty proposals should be revised, and the internal situation in Panama.

Source. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–43, Review Group, NSSM 86, Panama Canal, 3/13/70. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the JCS and the Director of Central Intelligence. The President approved the drafting of the NSSM in a December 30, 1969 memorandum from Kissinger. (Ibid.) Kissinger's September 3, 1969 memorandum is published as Document 524. A summary of the NSC–IG/ARA review is published as Document 530.

Document 529: Telegram 10581 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Panama, January 22, 1970, 2238Z.

The Department of State instructed Ambassador Sayre to ask Foreign Minister Tack when Panama would complete its review of the 1967 Canal Treaty drafts and when it wanted to resume treaty discussions.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–3 CZ. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Grove and Hurwitch; cleared by Anderson; and approved by Meyer. A copy was sent to USCINCSO.

Document 530: Paper Prepared by the NSC Inter-Departmental Group for Inter-American Affairs, Washington, January 27, 1970.

The National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs (NSC–IG/ARA) provided two basic options available to the United States for negotiation with Panama over the Panama Canal: maintain the existing treaties and negotiate interim measures providing substantial benefits to Panama, or use the 1967 draft treaties as a starting point for negotiating new treaties.

Source. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–169, NSSM Files, NSSM 86. Secret.

Document 531: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 19, 1970.

National Security Council staff member Vaky reported to President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger that a Department of Defense report found that, even though the 470th Military Intelligence Group in the Canal Zone had been collecting intelligence information between December 14 and 16, 1969, there was no evidence of Military Intelligence Group participation in the coup attempt in Panama on December 15.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 790, Country Files, Latin America, Panama, Vol. 1, January 1969–28 February 1970. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicated that Kissinger saw it. The February 14 memorandum from Froehlke to Kissinger has not been found. In a February 3 memorandum from Undersecretary of the Army, Thaddeus R. Beal, to Laird, Beal confirmed that the U.S. military was not involved in the December 15, 1969 coup attempt. However, Sayre and Mather "believe that there was a failure of times dissemination of intelligence gather by the 470th and that the way in which it has operated with agents in the GN has to be changed." Mather stated that because the GN was so closely involved in Panama's political affairs, intelligence gathering would have to be more circumspect. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–067, 81, Panama 1970)

Document 532: Minutes of an NSC Review Group Meeting, Washington, March 13, 1970, 2:35–3:40 p.m.

The National Security Council Review Group discussed options presented by the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs (NSC–IG/ARA) and directed that Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs Robert Hurwitch prepare a memorandum for President Nixon recommending comprehensive negotiations for new Canal treaties, spell out the choices for the negotiations, and include discussion of the timing.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, SRG Minutes Originals, 1970. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The participants discussed the January 27 NSC–IG/ARA report. A portion is published as Document 530. According to a March 26 covering letter from Davis to Kissinger, Hurwitch's memorandum to the President would be submitted by April 3. The memorandum is published as Document 533.

Document 533: Memorandum From the NSC Inter-Departmental Group for Inter-American Affairs to President Nixon, Washington, April 6, 1970.

The National Security Council Inter-Departmental Group for Inter-American Affairs (NSC–IG/ARA) reviewed the key issues for the United States in writing new Canal treaties with Panama. The NSC–IG/ARA focused on the following concerns: canal capacity, sovereignty, control and defense of the Canal, jurisdiction, the timing of the transfer, and economic benefits of the Canal for Panama.

Source. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–169, NSSM Files, NSSM 86. Secret. NSSM 86 is Document 528. Attached is an annex titled, "NSC/IG–ARA Response to NSSM–86." A portion of that annex is published as Document 530.

Document 534: Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 4, 1970.

The Department of Defense recommended that the U.S. Government maintain exclusive control over the Canal and assume total responsibility for defense of the Canal. Enclosed is a 2 page paper titled "Views of the Department of Defense on the Issues Outlined in the Response to NSSM 86."

Source. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–216, NSDM files, NSDM 64. Secret Enclosed but not published is an April 23 memorandum from Moorer to Laird.

Document 535: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, June 1, 1970.

After summarizing a National Security Council Inter-Department Group for Inter-American Affairs (NSC–IG/ARA) paper on the Canal, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger recommended Presidential guidance for future negotiations. Kissinger suggested that the U.S. Government maintain control over Canal operations and its defense; recognize reasonable Panamanian aspirations for more influence over Canal management and a greater share of the economic benefits of the Canal; and seek the right to build a new sea level canal or enlarge the present Canal.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–216, NSDM, NSDM 64. Secret. Sent for action. Tab A is published as Document 536. Tab B is published as Document 533. Tabs C through E are not published. Tab C is an undated appendix "Key Issues—Panama Canal," and Tab D is a letter from Burns to Woods, dated April 21, asking that the President's Secretary give Nixon the enclosed views of Walter Williams and Roger Cake, both members of the Panama Canal Board.

Document 536: National Security Decision Memorandum 64, Washington, June 5, 1970.

President Nixon stated that the U.S. Government should be prepared to discuss fundamentally new treaties with Panama regarding the Canal.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs, Nos. 51–96, April 1970–December 1970. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of the CIA, and Ambassador Robert Anderson, Special Representative for U.S.-Panama Relations. The paper in response to NSSM 86 is published as Document 533.

Document 537: Telegram 2278 from the Embassy in Panama to the Department of State, June 17, 1970, 1445Z.

The Embassy reported that it had told President Torrijos that the Nixon administration sought exploratory talks on new Canal treaties. Torrijos stated his first priority was a treaty system that reduced friction between the United States and Panama and avoided the problems of the of the 1967 treaty drafts.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–3 CZ. Secret. Copies sent for information to the Governor of the Canal and to USCINCSO.

Document 538: Memorandum by the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, October 1, 1970.

After summarizing Panamanian politics and relations with the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency concluded that the outlook for successful negotiations on the Canal treaties was likely to remain bleak for some time.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–216, NSDM Files, NSDM 64, Secret. Coordinated with representatives of the Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of Economic Research, and the Directorate of Plans. Kissinger wrote on the cover, "Vaky—Please give me brief memo on where we stand on Canal issue. Should have summary for Pres. before Sunday. Also I need to know how we propose to move. What happened after Review Group last year?" At the bottom of the cover page, written in an unknown hand was " Done 10–24–70."

Document 539: Memorandum of Meeting, Washington, October 25, 1970, noon.

Presidents Nixon and Lakas both agreed that if new Canal treaties could be worked out, both would try to convince their respective governments to approve them.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–3 PAN. Confidential; Limdis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon, Nachmanoff, and Lakas met from 12:09 to 12:40 pm. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary).

Document 540: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 26, 1970.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger recommended that the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission release its report in its own name to the public on December 1. Kissinger further recommended that the White House announce that the President received the report for study at the recommendation of the Commission.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Panama, Atlantic-Pacific International Ocean Canal Study Commission, Vol. 1, 1971. Secret. Sent for action. Kissinger initialed approval for Nixon. Attached to this memorandum was a note to Kissinger in which Vaky stated, "I would hope you could clear for the President. I have however prepared a memo for him in the event you wish to take it up with the President; you may decide to do this because Anderson may try to appeal directly with the President." Kissinger approved for the President on October 29.

Document 541: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 9, 1971.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger recommended that President Nixon ask the Under Secretaries Committee to review a report by the Atlantic-Pacific Canal Study Commission, consider its implications for the U.S. position in treaty negotiations, and call for submission of a strategy for negotiations by next month.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–216, NSDM Files, NSDM 64. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation. Attached but not published are Tabs A and B. Tab A is a classified letter from the Atlantic-Pacific Canal Study Commission and Tab B is the December 1 Commission Report. Tab C is published as Document 536.

Document 542: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin), Washington, January 18, 1971.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger conveyed President Nixon's instructions to the Under Secretaries to review the Canal Study Commission's report, to consider the implications of the report for the U.S. position in the treaty negotiations, and to prepare recommendations for the U.S. Government's negotiating strategy.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–169, NSSM files, NSSM 86. Secret. A copy was sent to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury; Director of OMB, Secretary of the Army, Chairman of the JCS, the DCI, and the Special Representative for Interoceanic Canal Negotiations. Kissinger did not sign the memorandum.

Document 543: Telegram 1443 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Panama, January 27, 1971, 2310Z.

The Department of State sent the Embassy a Panamanian position paper on renewed treaty negotiations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAN–US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Grove, cleared by Carson, approved by Crimmins.

Document 544: Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 17, 1971.

National Security Council staff member Nachmanoff recommended that President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger approve for President Nixon the text of Special Representative for U.S.-Panama Relations Anderson's reply to Ambassador de la Ossa. The letter states that for the United States the defense and efficient operation of the Canal are very important, and suggests further discussions be held.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Panama, Atlantic-Pacific International Ocean Canal Study Commission, Vol. 1, 1971. Secret. Sent for action. Haig initialed for Kissinger and initialed his approval for Kissinger. Attached but not published are Tabs A and B. Tab A is the draft letter to de la Ossa and Tab B is a February 10 letter from Anderson to Nixon. The final version of Anderson's letter to de la Ossa was not found.

Document 545: Special National Intelligence Estimate 84–71, Washington, February 18, 1971.

This 10 page estimate, titled "Panama and the Canal Treaty Negotiations, reviewed key political and economic events in Panama during President Torrijos regime, and concluded that Torrijos will demand more concessions for Panama than were contained in the 1967 treaty drafts. For the Panamanian leader, the key issues were jurisdiction over the Canal and a substantial increase in economic benefits for Panama.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC files, Job 79––R01012A, Panama and the Canal Treaty Negotiations. Secret.

Document 546: Memorandum From Ashley C. Hewitt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 5, 1971.

National Security Council staff member Hewitt summarized five studies and reports about the Panamanian Government leadership as well as the Canal negotiations. Hewitt predicted that President Torrijos would demand major concessions in the areas of legal jurisdiction in the Canal Zone and a greater share of the economic benefits.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Panama, Atlantic-Pacific International Ocean Canal Study Commission, Vol. 1, 1971. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the first page of the document. Attached but not published at Tab A is a January 29 CIA Working Paper, "Panama Canal Negotiations: Torrijos vs. the US." Tab B is published as Document 545. Attached but not published at Tab C is a report on Torrijos and at Tab D, telegram 1473, February 26, from the Canal Zone. Tab E, telegram 1020 from Panama, March 4, is not attached.

Document 547: Memorandum From the National Security Council Undersecretaries Committee to President Nixon, Washington, June 10, 1971.

In this 5 page memorandum, the Undersecretaries Committee presented their recommendations for negotiating new Panama Canal treaties. This report identifies those cases in which the recommendations from the Department of State and Defense differ and focuses its analysis on the following issues: the possible duration of a new agreement, jurisdiction, control, and defense over the Canal, canal capacity expansion, and potential economic benefits.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–261, Under Secretaries Committee Memorandum File, Under Secretaries Study Memorandums, U/SM 97–99. Secret; Exdis.

Document 548: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, June 18, 1971.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger summarized the status of Canal treaty negotiations and presented the positions of the Departments of State and Defense and Special Representative for U.S.-Panama Relations Anderson regarding how to proceed and discussed the disagreements between the two agencies. Kissinger then made his recommendations concerning procedures and jurisdiction.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Panama, Atlantic-Pacific International Ocean Canal Study Commission, Vol. 1, 1971. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action. President Nixon approved the first three recommendations, but did not agree to a meeting with Anderson. He signed both the letter to Anderson and the NSDM. Nixon wrote across the last page: "No—Haldeman and K[issinger:] 1. Have State handle it. 2. This is typical of type of issues I must not waste my time with." Attached but not published are Tabs A, D, and E. Tab A is a June 24 letter from Nixon to Anderson; Tab D is an April letter from Anderson to the President; and Tab E is a March 1 letter from Nixon to Anderson. Not attached are Tabs B, an early draft of NSDM 115, and G, a Summary of Agreed Negotiating Objectives. NSDM 115, Tab C (the Undersecretaries Committee report) and Tab F (NSDM 64) are published as the Documents 549, 547, and 536 respectively.

Document 549: National Security Decision Memorandum 115, Washington, June 24, 1971.

President Nixon authorized Special Representative for U.S.-Panama Relations Anderson to undertake negotiations on new Panama Canal treaties and outlined the U.S. Government's negotiating position.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–224, NSDM Files, NSDM 115. Secret; Exdis. Copies sent to the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the JCS, the DCI, and the Special Representative for Interoceanic Canal Negotiations. Anderson's letter is referenced in the source note to Document 548. Recommendations B–3 through B–7 of the June 10 NSC Undersecretaries Committee report are published in Document 547. On July 29, the Under Secretaries Committee submitted its recommendations to the President. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–261, Under Secretaries Committee Memorandum File, Under Secretaries Study Memorandums, U/SM 97–99.

Document 550: Telegram 118183 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Panama, July 1, 1971, 0243Z.

Under Secretary John Irwin summarized the first meeting of the treaty negotiations, which focused on issues of jurisdiction and duration. Irwin stated that the U.S. position called for a treaty which accommodated existing defense arrangements.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAN–US. Confidential. Copies sent to USCINCSO and the Panama Canal Company. Drafted on June 30 by Finn; cleared by Curran; and approved by Finn.

Document 551: Intelligence Memorandum 1297/71, Washington, July 13, 1971.

The Central Intelligence Agency predicted that President Torrijos' strategy would be to negotiate in a very tough manner and that a violent confrontation within Panama was likely.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–224, Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations, NSDM 115. Secret; Sensitive; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only. Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

Document 552: Letter From President Nixon to the Special Representative for Inter-Oceanic Canal Negotiations (Anderson), Washington, July 27, 1971.

President Nixon informed Special Representative for Inter-Oceanic Canal Negotiations Anderson that, before the U.S. negotiators agreed to accept fixed-term treaties, he was to consult with the Senate on the acceptability such treaties. Nixon also stated that he would ask the Department of State to explore the Panamanian position on duration.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAN–US. Secret. The July 9 letter from Anderson to Nixon has not been found.

Document 553: Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon, Washington, September 3, 1971.

In this 7 page memorandum, Secretary of Defense Laird addressed the opposing positions on duration, the temporary decision on the issue, examined the termination arguments, and recommended that Panama be informed that the United States would not agree to a fixed-term treaty. He also recommended that the U.S. Government proceed much further into the negotiations and settle all other major terms in detail in order to present President Nixon as complete a document as possible for approval.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISD Files: FRC 330–74–083, Panama 1971, 821. Secret; Noforn. Prepared on August 26 by Colonel Mallett (DOD/IA). Published from a copy that bears Laird's typed signature with an indication that he signed the original. The President's July 29 memorandum has not been found. Anderson's August 20 letter to the President is referenced in the source note to Document 554.

Document 554: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 10, 1971.

In this 3 page memorandum, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger updated President Nixon on Special Representative for Inter-Oceanic Canal Negotiations Anderson's most recent reports and advised Nixon to allow Anderson to negotiate a fixed-term Canal treaty with Panama since the collapse of the Canal negotiations would have high political costs for the United States.

Source. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–227, NSDM Files, NSDM 131. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Tabs A, E, G, and H are published as Documents 555, 553, 549, and 536 respectively. Tab B, not attached, is a letter from Nixon to Special Representative Anderson, apparently explaining the change in policy. Tabs C, D, and F have not been found. Tab C is an August 20 letter from Anderson to Nixon; Tab D is an August 26 memorandum from Rogers to the President; and Tab F is a July 9 letter from Anderson on Nixon.

Document 555: National Security Decision Memorandum 131, Washington, September 13, 1971.

President Nixon stated that Special Representative for Inter-Oceanic Canal Negotiations Anderson would be permitted to inform Panama that the United States would consider the possibility of a termination formula for the Canal Treaties. In addition, Anderson should attempt to obtain a guarantee from the Panamanians that the Canal would be open to all world commerce without discrimination at reasonable toll levels.

Source. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–227, NSDM Files, NSDM 131. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman, Joint chiefs of Staff, the DCI, and the Special Representative for Interoceanic Canal Negotiations. Anderson's August 20 letter to Nixon is referenced in the source note to Document 554.

Document 556: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 23, 1971.

Executive Secretary Eliot provided a status report on five months of meetings between Panamanian and United States officials. He explained that, although agreement was not reached on major issues, tentative understandings had been reached on a number of articles of secondary importance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAN–US. Confidential. Drafted on November 20 by Hurwitch and Finn; and cleared by Mundt, Pringle, and Hurwitch. Attached but not published was "U.S. Position on Treaty Issues," dated November 19.

Document 557: Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff, to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 26, 1971.

National Security Council staff member Nachmanoff summarized a recent memorandum from Executive Secretary Eliot regarding potential problems that might result from a recent narcotics seizure and informed President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger that Panama had become a major conduit for heroin and cocaine traffic to the United States. Nachmanoff's main concern was the possible effect that public and Congressional attention on the narcotics problem might have on the Canal negotiations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 791, Country Files, Latin America, Panama, Vol. 1, 1 March 1970–31 December 1971. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. Attached but not published at Tab A is a November 23 memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger. (Ibid.)

Document 558: Memorandum From Ashley C. Hewitt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 19, 1972.

National Security Council staff member Hewitt summarized two CIA reports regarding the Panama Canal treaty negotiations. In the first report, Torrijos criticized the U.S. stance in the Canal negotiations, and the second indicated that the Panamanian Government would slow the pace of negotiations until after the August National Assembly elections.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Panama, Atlantic-Pacific International Ocean Canal Study Commission, Vol. 2, 1972. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Attached but not published are Tabs A and B. Tab A is a January 14 CIA memorandum, "Plan of Panamanian Government to Issue Official Statement on Status of Canal Treaty Negotiations;" Tab B is a January 17 CIA memorandum, "Criticism by General Omar Torrijos of the Position Taken by the United States in the Treaty Negotiations."

Document 559: Special National Intelligence Estimate 84–72, Washington, May 11, 1972.

In this 3 page intelligence estimate, the Central Intelligence Agency discussed the political stance and probable negotiating position of the Torrijos regime regarding the Canal. In addition, the Agency analyzed different threats to the Canal, and the possible reaction of the Panamanian Government to those threats under a new treaty relationship.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 361, Subject Files, National Intelligence Estimates, Part 3. Secret.

Document 560: Memorandum From Edward Ridley Finch, Jr. to the Deputy Secretary of State (Irwin), Washington, October 16, 1972.

In this 5 page memorandum, Finch recounted his conversation with General Torrijos and President Lakas over topics in U.S.-Panamanian relations, including narcotics, the Pan American Highway, and the Panama Canal.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAN–US. TLE Sensitive; Personal and Confidential; Nodis. There was a handwritten note attached which stated, "JDI [Irwin] has asked ARA to redraft Finch's report to make it less sensational. He will ask Finch to sign redrafted version and then send it to WH [White House] under Irwin/Pres memo. This version being given only to ARA and us. Ted - do you want a TLE sensitive for now?" The later version of the letter was sent to the President on November 13 and is ibid., POL 2 PAN. Nixon's October 9 letter to Torrijos is ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 760, Presidential Correspondence, 1969–1974, Panama, President Demetrio B. Lakas. Nixon's letter to Lakas has not been found.

Document 561: Telegram 4843 From the Embassy in Panama to the Department of State, October 26, 1972, 1859Z.

Ambassador Sayre reported that General Torrijos requested a meeting with President Nixon after the U.S. election. Sayre sought authorization to tell the Panamanian head of state that he would not recommend a meeting until he was confident it had a good chance of success.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 791, Country Files, Latin America, Panama, Vol. 3, January 1972. Secret; Exdis. No record of a meeting between Torrijos and Nixon has been found. Torrijos's comments to Finch are in Document 560. Anderson's October 5 letter to Tack and Tack memorandum of August 3 have not been found.

Document 562: Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 20, 1972.

National Security Council staff member Jorden discussed efforts to gain the release of two U.S. ships, a possible meeting between President Nixon and General Torrijos, an upcoming UNSC meeting in Panama, and Canal negotiations. If President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger thought it were necessary, Jorden stated that he was willing to ascertain from Torrijos what he wanted regarding the Canal negotiations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 791, Country Files, Latin America, Panama, Vol. 3, January 1972. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. The memorandum was sent to Kissinger through Haig. Kissinger approved the recommendation, and wrote next to Jorden's name, "I think you should go. HK." [text not declassified] Tab B, "Previous Scenario 11/1/72," has not been found. For documents on efforts to release the ships, see Documents 258, 262, and 264 in the Cuba compilation. Jorden traveled to Panama February 9–11, 1973.

Document 563: Intelligence Memorandum 2438/72, Washington, November 28, 1972.

In this 2 page intelligence memorandum titled, "Panama 1973: The Year of the Treaty?" the Central Intelligence Agency concluded that the current round of Canal treaty talks had stalled mainly because President Torrijos had been unwilling to move from exploratory negotiations to bargaining on the issues to be resolved.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, Job 79–T00832A, Panama, 1973—The Year of the Treaty?. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.

Document 564: Country Analysis and Strategy Paper for Paraguay, February 7, 1969.

The Embassy stated that the main interest of the United States in Paraguay was to maintain a stable, pro-U.S. Government. A secondary interest was to promote the liberalization of the Paraguayan economy.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 1 PAR–US. Secret. Transmitted to the Department of State as an attachment to Airgram A–14, February 7, 1969.

Document 565: Paper Prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs for the National Security Council, Washington, March 3, 1969.

In its evaluation of the Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) for Paraguay, the NSC–IG/ARA highlighted two key issues in United States-Paraguayan relations: military aid, and whether increased assistance should be devoted to education.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NSC Interdepartmental Group, Subject and Country Files: Lot 71 D 224, NSC–IRG/ARA Information Memorandums, 1969. Secret. The CASP for Paraguay is Document 564.

Document 566: Country Analysis and Strategy Paper for Paraguay, February 13, 1970.

The Embassy stated that the main interest of the United States in Paraguay was to maintain a stable, pro-U.S. Government, bulwarked by economic and social development, and broader participation in the political process.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 PAR–US. Secret. Drafted by Arzac; cleared by the Country Team in draft form; and approved by Brewin. Transmitted to the Department of State as an attachment to Airgram A–12.

Document 567: Telegram 280 From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State, February 20, 1970.

The Embassy reported complaints from Foreign Minister Sapena that a leftward-moving Bolivia was receiving significantly more U.S. assistance than Paraguay, which was traditionally friendly towards the United States. Sapena added that Paraguay was devoting nearly all its resources to economic development rather than arms purchases.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 13–1 BOL. Confidential. Repeated to USCINCSO for POLAD, La Paz, and Santiago.

Document 568: Decision Memorandum 65 of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs, Washington, July 1, 1970.

The NSC–IG/ARA reviewed and modified three aspects of the FY 1972 CASP for Paraguay: emphasizing the importance of increasing multilateral assistance, recommending that the United States would stay out of the Church-State dispute, and suggesting reduced military assistance to Paraguay.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of Policy and Coordination, Subject Files: Lot 74 D 267, Country Analysis and Strategy Paper—Paraguay 1973. Secret. The CASP is published as Document 566.

Document 569: Letter From President Stroessner of Paraguay to President Nixon, July 20, 1970.

President Stroessner told President Nixon that Paraguay faced a threat from communist subversion. The Paraguayan leader expressed concern that there would be cuts in U.S. military assistance.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 760, Presidential Correspondence, 1969–1974, Paraguay, President Alfredo Stroessner. No classification making.

Document 570: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 15, 1970.

In a briefing memorandum for President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger's meeting with Ambassador Avila, National Security Council staff member Vaky stated that Avila wanted to reverse a decision to cut the Military Assistance Program (MAP) for Paraguay. However, President Nixon had already decided to reduce the MAP and that Paraguay was not a high priority for U.S. policymakers.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Paraguay, Vol 1. Confidential. Sent for information. Attached but not published at Tab A is "U.S. Military Assistance to Paraguay." Tab B is not published. Kissinger wrote on the front of the memorandum, "I bet we have laid into Paraguay with particular relish." No substantive record of the meeting between Kissinger and Avila has been found. On August 20, the Department informed the Embassy in Asunción that Paraguay should not expect the MAP cuts to be restored. (Telegram 135418 to Asunción, ibid.)

Document 571: Letter From President Nixon to President Stroessner of Paraguay, October 8, 1970.

President Nixon replied to President Stroessner's request for U.S. military assistance. Even though he stated that the prospect for restoring cuts in Military Assistance Program (MAP) assistance did not look likely, Nixon said he would request authorization from Congress for credit for the purchase of military equipment.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US–PAR. No classification marking. Nixon wrote at the bottom of the letter, "I recall with great pleasure my visit to Paraguay in 1958." A telegraphic copy of Stroessner's letter of July 20 is published as Document 569.

Document 572: Telegram 1942 From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State, December 16, 1970, 1530Z.

The Embassy reported that the U.S. military presence in Paraguay provided a means for receiving information on Paraguayan politics, and for exerting influence over the Government of Paraguay.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–9 US–PAR. Secret. Repeated to USCINCSO. The NSC policy decision is published as Document 34.

Document 573: Telegram 741 From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State, April 27, 1971, 2125Z.

The Embassy conveyed Paraguay's request for additional military assistance. Citing the threat posed by political instability in Bolivian and the leftist Chilean governments, the Embassy concluded that if the U.S. Government failed to provide increased assistance, the Paraguayans could "lose confidence" in the United States.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Paraguay, Vol 1. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. Copies sent for information to Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Lima, Rio de Janeiro, and Santiago. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room at 10:29 p.m. on April 27.

Document 574: Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, July 28, 1972.

Secretary of State Rogers suggested sending Nelson Gross, the Department of State's Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters, to prompt the extradition of Auguste Ricord, an alleged international drug trafficker, to the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of East Coast Affairs, Lot 78 D 26, Narcotics–A, Paraguay, August 1972. Secret. Drafted on July 17 by Friedman, Stedman, and Skol; it was concurred in draft by Pfund and Lister; and concurred in by Hurwitch and Stedman. Attached but not published is Nixon's August 2 letter to Stroessner.

Document 575: Telegram 2217 From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State, August 9, 1972, 1517Z.

Department of State's Coordinator on International Narcotics Matters Gross informed Paraguayan officials that Paraguay faced a cutoff of U.S. and multilateral assistance unless they extradited Auguste Ricord to the United States. Stroessner decided on August 11 to extradite him.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Paraguay, Vol. 1. Secret; Exdis. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room at 7:41 a.m. on August 10. President Nixon sent a letter to President Stroessner on October 3 thanking him for expediting Ricord's extradition. (Ibid., Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Office of East Coast Affairs (ARA/ECA): Lot 78 D 26, "NARCOTICS–A, PARAGUAY, August 1972")

Document 576: Briefing Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State for the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 28, 1969.

Peru's expropriation of a portion of the International Petroleum Company (IPC) would require the President to suspend assistance and the sugar quota, unless Peru adequately compensated the company. The Department of State predicted and that these sanctions would precipitate widespread criticism of the United States throughout Latin America.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 794, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, 21 January–31 March 1969, Vol. I, IPC Hickenlooper Amendment. Confidential. The note at the end of the memorandum, added by the NSC staff, was based on a January 28 memorandum from Rogers to the President; National Archives, RG 59, S/S Presidential Evening Reading, 1964–7/73: Lot 74 D 164, Box 410. Kissinger informed the President in a January 29 covering memorandum that NSC IG for Inter-American Affairs was working up plans if U.S.-Peruvian relations deteriorated.

Document 577: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 6, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger wrote President Nixon about a possible meeting with Ambassador Jones.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 794, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, 21 January–31 March 1969, Vol. 1, IPC Hickenlooper Amendment. Confidential. Nixon checked the option "Prefer you [Kissinger] see him," and wrote, "and bring him in to say hello at end of conversation." In a February 5 memorandum to Kissinger, Haig wrote, "I have little doubt that this is going to be one of President Nixon's first major crises." (Ibid.)

Document 578: National Security Study Memorandum 18, Washington, February 7, 1969.

President Nixon requested a review of U.S. policy towards Peru, with emphasis given to the options available concerning the current situation and the IPC expropriation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, NSSMs, NSSMs 1–42. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the JCS. The study of the NSC IG Study for Latin America, "U.S. Relations With Peru," March 7, 1969, is printed as Document 581.

Document 579: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 14, 1969, 2:45 p.m.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger informed President Nixon that he would explore with Ambassador Jones the advantages and disadvantages of sending a presidential emissary to Peru. In addition, Kissinger reviewed recent incidents of Peruvian harassment of U.S. fishing vessels and concluded that the incidents were not necessarily related to the IPC issue.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 794, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, 21 January–31 March 1969, Vol. I, IPC Hickenlooper Amendment. Confidential. No other substantive record of the meeting has been found.

Document 580: Special National Intelligence Estimate 97–69, Washington, March 6, 1969.

This report, titled "Peru and the U.S.: The Implications of the IPC Controversy," predicted that the Velasco regime will almost certainly not meet the requirements of U.S. law or compensation of the IPC. Therefore, the crisis with Peru over the IPC will probably be significant, and the U.S.-Latin American relations could deteriorate.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–34, Review Group Peru, 3/13/69. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Evidence that the Review Group meeting was held has not been found.

Document 581: Study Memorandum Prepared by the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs, Washington, March 7, 1969.

In this 20-page memorandum, the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs (NSC–IG/ARA) summarized U.S.–Peruvian relations, outlined U.S. objectives over the next 6 months and potential policy options that would become available in the following month, and examined possible case scenarios in which those options might be employed.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–135, NSSM Files, NSSM 18. Secret.

Document 582: Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 12, 1969.

In response to investigations by Goodwin and Mankiewisz, Helms responds to their allegation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 794, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, 21 January–31 March 1969, Vol. I, IPC Hickenlooper Amendment. Secret. In an attached March 12 note to Kissinger, Helms wrote, "I feel that you should be informed of this matter. I trust the memorandum is self-explanatory."

Document 583: Telegram 2044 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State, March 22, 1969, 1835Z.

Special emissary Irwin informed the Department of State of the Peruvian system of permits and licenses for non-Peruvian ships. Irwin stated that Peru's policy did not isolate it from the international community.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 794, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, 21 January–31 March 1969, Vol. I, IPC Hickenlooper Amendment. Confidential; Limdis. Irwin was sent to Peru on March 14 as a special emissary from the President. Additional telegrams, Irwin No. 2, dated March 14; Irwin No. 7, dated March 19; Irwin No. 13, dated March 22; and Irwin No. 15, March 25, are ibid. The other messages from Irwin to the Department have not been found.

Document 584: Message From William Pawley to President Nixon, Washington, March 25, 1969.

Secretary to President Nixon Rosemary Woods conveyed a message from William Pawley that President of the Dominican Republic Ricardo Balanguer stated that it would be a mistake on the part of the United States to allow Peru or other countries to expropriate U.S. property without reprisal.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 794, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, 21 January–31 March 1969, Vol. I, IPC Hickenlooper Amendment. No classification marking. Next to the sixth paragraph, which starts, "Balaguer says it would be…", Nixon wrote in the left-hand margin: " H.K. Note—This is a very good reason to be hard as hell on Peru next time—." Woods sent the message to Kissinger at the President's request.

Document 585: Study Prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs, Washington, March 25, 1969.

The NSC Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs (NSC–IG/ARA) study concluded that the United States should not enact tough policies toward Peru, but take a softer approach. To take a more "hard-line" tactic risked creating an anti-U.S. nationalist sentiment in Peru; whereas if the United States took a softer line, the sanctions would be less likely to deter future potential expropriations in other nations.

Source: Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–135, NSSM Files, NSSM 18. Secret. The study was entitled, "The Peruvian Problem." According to an introductory note, the study supplements the NCS–IG/ARA study of March 7, printed as Document 581.

Document 586: Draft Memorandum From the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs to President Nixon, Washington, undated.

In this 5 page memorandum, the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs (NSC–IG/ARA) summarized U.S,-Peruvian relations as the Hickenlooper sanction deadline approached. It also discussed policy options for the United States.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 794, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, 21 January–31 March 1969, Vol. 1, IPC Hickenlooper Amendment. Secret. It was sent to Kissinger on March 28 by Vaky.

Document 587: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, March 29, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger outlined policy options concerning the International Petroleum Company (IPC) case and recommended that President Nixon decide whether to employ a hard or soft-line approach with Peru following the April 9 negotiations and to authorize Kissinger to tell the Department of State that, in the negotiations, there must be sufficient reason to believe that the IPC would receive compensation in excess of the debt claimed against the company.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 794, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, 21 January–31 March 1969, Vol. I, IPC Hickenlooper Amendment. Secret. Sent for action. Neither recommendation was checked. A draft version of Tab A is printed as Document 586. The summary of Tab B, "The Peruvian Problem," is printed as Document 585. The conclusion to Tab C is printed as Document 580.

Document 588: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 3, 1969, 9:45 p.m.

After reviewing Special Emissary Irwin's discussions, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger concluded that the administration should defer application of Hickenlooper sanctions on Peru. In addition, he advocated that the United States continue to negotiate while maintaining other forms of pressure on the nation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 795, Country Files, Latin America, Peru–IPC–Hickenlooper Amendment, April 1, 1969. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Neither recommendation was approved, nor disapproved. Tab A, Kissinger's March 29 memorandum, is printed as Document 587. Attached but not published is Tab B, Administrative Process in the IPC Case, and Tab C, "Possible Economic Pressures US Could Apply to Peru While Hickenlooper Sanctions are Deferred." In a telephone conversation on April 5 with Kissinger, Nixon agreed to the recommendations. See Document 589.

Document 589: Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon in Key Biscayne, Florida and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) in Washington, April 5, 1969, 9:45 a.m.

President Nixon and President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger discussed the implications of applying sanctions under the Hickenlooper Amendment.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 369, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

Document 590: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 10, 1969.

After reviewing the opinions on the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) loan to Peru put forth by the Departments of State and Treasury, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger recommended President Nixon approve the loan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. I, Through June 1970. Confidential. Sent for action. Nixon approved the recommendation. On April 11, Kissinger sent a memorandum to Rogers and Kennedy informing them of Nixon's decision. (Ibid.)

Document 591: Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, April 10, 1969.

This memorandum reviewed the recent U.S. pressure on the Government of Peru, and different approaches to the conflict over the International Petroleum Company (IPC) expropriation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 794, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, IPC (DAD). Secret.

Document 592: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 11, 1969.

Kissinger requested that Nixon authorize the CIA to explore whether a large consortium could buy out IPC assets.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 794, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, IPC (DAD [Donald A. Dennis]). Secret. Sent for action. Nixon approved the recommendation. Helm's study is published as Document 591. There is no evidence that the US Government explored the option of a cash payment to President Velasco. Although IPC never received direct compensation from the Peruvian Government, in early 1974 it agreed to give lump-sum payments to the U.S. Government with subsequent distribution to various companies who had lost assets through expropriation. For further information, see Shane Hunt, "Direct Foreign Investment in Peru: New Rules for an Old Game," in Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed., The Peruvian Experiment—Continuity and Change under Military Rule, pp. 302–349.

Document 593: National Security Decision Memorandum 11, Washington, April 11, 1969.

In this National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM), President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger transmitted President Nixon's decision to defer application of the Hickenlooper Amendment with respect to Peru. Nixon directed preparation of a campaign to generate pro-United States support in the region, and to increase pressure on Peru to settle the IPC dispute.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–209, NSDM 11. Secret. A copy was sent to the Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce.

Document 594: National Security Study Memorandum 42, Washington, April 11, 1969.

In this National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM), President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger transmitted President Nixon's directive to the NSC to prepare a plan to implement NSDM 11, and to get Peru to agree to solve the fisheries and overflight problems in a manner acceptable to the United States. In addition, he requested alternative plans be drawn up that would assess the gains and risks for the United States in the event that the IPC controversy could not be resolved and in case of a resolution of the controversy.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–36, Review Group, East-West Trade—Peru, 5/7/69. Secret. Annex 1 of the April 22 Study is printed as Document 596.

Document 595: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 17, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger outlined United States efforts used to pressure Peru economically and argued the impact of the measures on Peru would be limited.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 795, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, IPC, Hickenlooper Amendment, April 1, 1969. Confidential. Sent for information. Nixon wrote on the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, "Keep the heat on and step it up— no compromises." In the left-hand margin, next to the paragraph that begins, "in addition," Nixon wrote, "good—cut by 75% ." In the top of the memorandum in an unknown hand is the note, "4/22 HAK sent memo to Sec State on this." In an April 22 memorandum from Kissinger to Rogers, Kissinger summarized Nixon's marginalia. (Ibid., RG 59, Deputy Assistant Secretary Subject and Country Files: Lot 73 D 353, Peru-Economic)

Document 596: Study Prepared by the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Latin American Affairs, Washington, April 22, 1969.

The National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Latin American Affairs (NSC–IG/ARA) study outlined seven possible economic pressure points—sugar exports and loans from U.S. AID, the Export-Import Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the Inter-American Development Bank loans, private U.S. investors and the IMF—that the United States could use to put pressure on the Velasco regime.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–146, NSSM Files, NSDM 42. Secret. A copy was sent for information to Helms, Kennedy, Hanna, Shakespeare, and Laird. (Ibid., Department of State, RG 59, S/S Files, Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 42)

Document 597: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, April 28, 1969.

National Security Council staff member Vaky discussed the application of the Hickenlooper sanctions, and analyzed three critical points: whether application would result in a net compensation to IPC, improve U.S. political relations in the hemisphere, and limit further uncompensated expropriations of U.S. owned properties in the hemisphere.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 795, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, IPC, Hickenlooper Amendment, April 1, 1969. Confidential. Attached but not published are Annex 1, "Themes for Consultation," and Annex 3. A copy was sent to Halperin and Bergsten. Kissinger wrote in the upper-right hand corner, "a. When do we meet on NSSM 42? B. What are we doing to prepare the ground for application of Hickenlooper, which the President seems determined to do?" The minutes of the Review Group meeting, mentioned in the last sentence, are printed as Document 599.

Document 598: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, May 22, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger proposed a list of five possible conditions that the Peruvian Government would have to meet in order for the United States to waive the suspension of military sales.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 795, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, IPC, Hickenlooper Amendment, Vol. 2. Confidential. Sent for action. Nixon approved the recommendation.

Document 599: Minutes of NSC Review Group Meeting, Washington, May 22, 1969, 2:10–3:15 p.m.

The Review Group discussed the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Latin American Affairs (NSC–IG/ARA) Study on Peru, dated May 16, which analyzed the affect of U.S. economic policy on Peru and on the U.S. relations with the hemisphere. Kissinger concluded that the present course of U.S. policy was unlikely to achieve its objectives. He recommended that an assessment of Velasco's strength within the hemisphere be added to the paper and with that addition, he would submit the information to President Nixon for his consideration.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1969. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. The May 16 NSC/IG, "Peru and IPC—Review of U.S. Strategy," is ibid., Box H–36, East-West Trade, Peru 5/7/69. A revised version, is printed as Document 600.

Document 600: Study Prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Latin American Affairs, Washington, May 24, 1969.

This National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Latin American Affairs (NSC–IG/ARA) study, titled "Peru and IPC: Review of U.S. Strategy," examined U.S. policy toward Peru, issues with employing the Hickenlooper Sanctions, and the implications of those issues on current strategy. It recommended that economic pressure on Peru be continued, while continuing consultations with the Peruvian Government and IPC. In addition, the study concluded that it was important to maintain harmonious inter-American relations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–135, NSSM Files, NSSM 18. Secret. A covering May 26 memorandum from Davis to Pedersen, Nutter, Smith, Unger, and Lindjord stated the memorandum would be sent to the President.

Document 601: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 26, 1969.

National Security Council staff member Vaky summarized a CIA report on the Peruvian Army's reaction to U.S. suspension of arms sales and withdrawal of military missions. The report concluded that anti-U.S. sentiment in Peru strong, and that any successor to President Velasco would be equally difficult to deal with.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. I, Through June 1970. Secret. Sent for information. Attached but not published is the CIA report, TDCS–314/07741–69, May 21. Telegram 3859, dated May 26, from the Embassy in Lima to the Department, stated that the Peruvians requested termination of U.S. military missions. However, a small group of U.S. military personnel could remain in the country. (Ibid.)

Document 602: Telegram 3904 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State, May 27, 1969, 2158Z.

In this telegram, Ambassador Jones recounted a phone call with the Peruvian Foreign Minister in which they discussed deteriorating U.S.-Peruvian relations, the IPC, and the fisheries problems.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL PERU–US. Confidential. In telegram 86660, May 28, the Department of State directed Jones to investigate the Peruvian Government's position further, specifically requesting he determine if the Foreign Minister's suggestion regarding the raising of sanctions on Peru and Ecuador (mentioned in the first paragraph) had Velasco's backing (Ibid.).

Document 603: Telegram 4312 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State, June 11, 1969, 1847Z.

This telegram transmitted a message from Deputy Chief of Mission Ernest Siracusa, in which he recounted a 40 minute meeting with President Velasco. During this discussion, the two spoke about the fisheries dispute and the impasse over the IPC case.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 1, Through June 1970. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates that it was received at the WHCA at 27Z on June 11. In telegram 94400 from the Department of State, June 10, Rogers instructed Siracusa to inform Velasco that the United States would lift its FMS suspension if the CEP governments would announce they would attend a conference on fisheries. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15 PERU)

Document 604: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 1, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger summarized the views of officials from IPC and Standard Oil of New Jersey on Peru's expropriation of IPC. They stated that the 6-month time frame of the Hickenlooper Amendment was too short a time period to resolve such a complicated issue and therefore advocated that the application of the Amendment be deferred.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 2, Chron File, July 1–21, 1969. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. Nixon wrote on the document, "K: Be sure Harlow knows this—so that he can cool off Congressional critics of deferral." The attachment, telegram 103934 from the Department of State, June 24, has not been found.

Document 605: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 2, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger summarized the revised NSC Interdepartmental Group for Latin American Affairs (NSC–IG/ARA) study paper on Peru and IPC, and recommended a three-part plan for implementation for President Nixon's approval.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 795, Country Files, Latin America, Peru–IPC–Hickenlooper Amendment, Vol. 2. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon approved the recommendation. The President wrote on the top of the first page, " 1) OK 2) But I believe you should check it with N.[elson] R.[ockefeller] as a courtesy." Tab A is printed as Document 600. The CIA analytical index was not found. In a July 7 memorandum, Kissinger informed Vaky of the President's approval. Kissinger wrote on the memorandum, "Pete—I have checked with NAR [Rockefeller] and he approves. HK" (Ibid.)

Document 606: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 12, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger updated President Nixon on the passage of a far reaching agrarian reform law passed in Peru the previous month and noted the possible effect that law would have on the political, social, and economic structure of Peru. Kissinger then discussed the fisheries situation, the IPC, and the overall implications of recent developments on U.S. policies. He concluded that U.S. economic sanctions had most likely played a part in convincing the Velasco Government to seek better relations with the United States. As such, the U.S. Government should maintain the pressure, while continuing to negotiate.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 795, Country Files, Latin America, Peru–IPC–Hickenlooper Amendment, Vol. 2. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. Nixon wrote in the top right hand corner, " K Don't be too nice too soon—Let them stew some more." In the margin in the section "Implications of Recent Developments," next to the paragraph on non-overt economic pressures, Nixon wrote " note ." In a July 22 memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger concluded that the agrarian reform would have a limited impact on U.S. economic interests in Peru, and it would bolster Velasco's political position. (Ibid.)

Document 607: National Security Decision Memorandum 21, Washington, July 22, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger transmitted President Nixon's decision to maintain non-overt economic pressure on the Peruvian Government while deferring the application of Hickenlooper sanctions and investigating the possibility of extending the deferral beyond the end of the administrative appeal process.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–211, NSDM Files, NSDM 21. Secret; Exdis. Copies sent to the Secretaries of Defense and Treasury, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development. The NSC IG/ARA paper is printed as Document 600. The August 4 report came in the form of a memorandum from Richardson to Nixon, ibid., Box H–209, NSDM Files, NSDM 21.

Document 608: Memorandum of Conversation, San Clemente, August 20, 1969, 11:10 a.m.

President Nixon declared to the Ambassadors to Australia, Barbados, Canada, Iceland, Peru, and Romania, as well as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Haig that it was important that other Latin American nations not replicate Velasco's "Nassarist" model. Nixon also hinted that there were "signs" Velasco was beginning to realize that a confrontation with the United States would not be in the best interest of Peru.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 1, Through June 1970. Secret. An attached August 26 note indicated Haig dictated the memorandum and Kissinger saw it before it was filed. The meeting took place in the President's Office at the Western White House in San Clemente. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place on August 19, from 11:58 a.m. to 12:15 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

Document 609: Telegram 7265 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State, October 30, 1969, 1826Z.

Ambassador Belcher provided his preliminary views on the salutary effects that the announcement of the Southern Peru Copper Company (SPCC) and International Telephone and Telegraph (IT&T) agreements would have on United States-Peruvian relations. The Ambassador concluded it might be necessary to reconsider NSSM 42—maintaining pressure on Peru while working with friendly governments in the region to ensure they do not lend support Peru in its conflict with the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, INCO 15–2 PERU. Confidential; Priority. Crimmins sent a November 4 memorandum to Rogers detailing the SPCC–Peruvian Government accord. (Ibid., Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Assistant Secretary and U.S. Coordinator, Alliance for Progress, Subject and Country Files, 1964–1975: Lot 74 D 467, CAM [Charles A. Meyer] Chronological File, November 1969)

Document 610: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 13, 1969.

National Security Council staff member Vaky summarized a CIA report that outlined President Velasco's observations of Peru's attitude toward the United States and the USSR. The report summarized four key points of Velasco's perception of Peru's relationship with both nations and his opinions on the Peruvian investigation of a U.S. citizen who had worked for CIA and had run private security firms in Lima.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 1, Through June 1970. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The memorandum is stamped "HAK [Kissinger] has seen November 14, 1969." Attached but not published was an Intelligence Information Cable TDCS DB–315/04774–69, dated November 12, from [text not declassified].

Document 611: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 29, 1969.

National Security Council staff member Vaky provided a status report on U.S. objectives toward Peru. Some of the results of U.S. policy included Peru's softening of its negotiating stance on the expropriation of U.S.-owned companies and the fisheries dispute. Vaky was uncertain that U.S. negotiators could pursue U.S. interests by continuing economic pressure.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 1, Through June 1970. Secret. Sent for information. The attachment, "Summary of Peruvian Situation," is not printed. NSDM 21 is Document 607.

Document 612: Telegram 26 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State, January 2, 1970, 2258Z.

Ambassador Belcher noted that he did not think it possible the IPC compensation could be written into contracts being negotiated between U.S. companies and Peru. He also questioned the utility of non-overt financial pressure.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 1 PERU–US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. The December 10, 1969 draft memorandum for the President, referred to in the first paragraph, was not found. A December 24 version of the memorandum can be found ibid., Executive Secretariat National Security Memoranda, 1969–1977: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 21. This memorandum suggested that U.S. corporations explore with IPC the possibility of obtaining compensation for IPC's expropriated assets in their contracts with the Peruvian Government.

Document 613: Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, January 16, 1970.

Secretary of State Rogers informed President Nixon that there was public and Congressional acceptance for the deferral of the Hickenlooper Amendments to Peru and recommended that Export-Import Bank policy regarding U.S. commercial endeavors in Peru remain unchanged.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 PERU–US. Confidential. Drafted on January 12 by Crimmins and Stedman. The January 7 comprehensive review is attached to a memorandum from AID General Counsel Stephen Ives to Poats, January 7 (Washington National Records Center, EXSEC, Office of the Administrator, 1968–1973: FRC 75 A 013, Chron FY 79, January 2–14, 1970). The Peterson Report set forth a new approach to U.S. foreign assistance, clearly delineating the different aspects of U.S. assistance policy, and advocating setting up new institutions to implement the new policy. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 128.

Document 614: Telegram 14287 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Peru, January 29, 1970, 2253Z.

In this telegram, the Department of State stated that the Peruvian Government was attempting to defuse the conflict over fishing rights. The Department of State intended to inform the Conference on Economic Progress (CEP) nations that the U.S. Government appreciated their restraint regarding the conflict over fishing.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–4 PERU–US. Confidential. Drafted by VanCampen; cleared by Stedman; and approved by McKernan. Repeated to Quito, Santiago, and Guayaquil; to Mexico City for the Regional Fishing Attaché; to Caracas for Meyer.

Document 615: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), May 1, 1970.

In this memorandum, Executive Secretary Eliot provided President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger an information report on the principle provisions of the April 1970 Peruvian mining law and described possible implications for U.S. investment and relations with Peru.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 1, Through June 70. Confidential. Robert Snow signed for Eliot above Eliot's typed signature. Watts requested the study in an April 17 memorandum to Eliot. (Ibid.)

Document 616: Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, June 8, 1970.

In response to the May 31, 1970 earthquake that resulted in catastrophic consequences for Lima and its surrounding region, President Nixon issued this memorandum outlining his plans for U.S. aid to be sent to Peru, as well as his ideas for longer-term reconstruction relief.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 1, Through June 1970. No classification marking. The memorandum was also addressed to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; the Administrator of AID; the Director of the Peace Corps; and the Director of USIA. Copies sent to the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of Agriculture; the Secretary of the Interior; the Director of the Bureau of the Budget; and the President of the Export-Import Bank. In an August 19 letter to President Velasco, Nixon did not offer U.S. assistance, but instead thanked Velasco for his hospitality during Mrs. Nixon's visit. (Ibid., Box 760, Presidential Correspondence, Peru, President Velasco)

Document 617: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 3, 1970.

In this memorandum, Executive Secretary Eliot discussed the Soviet airlift bringing disaster relief supplies to assist Peru in rebuilding following the May 31 earthquake. He discouraged interference by the U.S. Government to avoid negative publicity. In addition, he opined that the U.S. Government should not promote the Soviets' relief operations beyond the requirements of courtesy and safety.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 793, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 2, July 1970–13 December 1971. Secret. Brewster signed for Eliot. Attached but not published is a map of the world and a picture of a Soviet AN–22, and the Department's Contingency Press Guidance.

Document 618: Telegram 5166 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State, September 1, 1970, 2119Z.

Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) Edward W. Clark and Secretary General of the Foreign Office Garcia Bedoya discussed the matter of overflights through territorial limits claimed by Peru. Clark reported that he told Bedoya that the problems may be taken up "at the very highest level."

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–4 PERU. Confidential; Limdis; No Distribution Outside Department.

Document 619: Telegram 5850 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State, October 2, 1970, 2204Z.

Ambassador Belcher reviewed two years of Peruvian political, economic, and social developments, as well as U.S.-Peruvian relations and concluded that Peruvian Government policy would harm U.S. businesses interests. Belcher feared that the communists were gaining strength within the government.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 PERU. Confidential. Repeated to Santiago, Quito, Buenos Aires, Asunción, Montevideo, Rio de Janeiro, Santo Domingo, Port au Prince, Bridgetown, Georgetown, Kingston, Port of Spain, San José, Managua, Guatemala, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, Mexico, Bogotá, Caracas, Panamá, Moscow, USCINCSO. Sent for information to La Paz.

Document 620: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 12, 1970.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger summarized a memorandum by Secretary of State Rogers in which he discussed options for earthquake aid to Peru. Kissinger recommended a specific amount of approximately $100 million dollars to be distributed over three years. President Nixon, however, approved Rogers's recommendation of assistance on a case-by-case basis.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 793, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 2, July 1970–13 December 1971. Confidential. Sent for action. Nixon approved Rogers's recommendation on October 19. Tab A, a September 8 memorandum from Rogers to the President, has not been found. Tab B is printed as Document 616. Nixon wrote "I agree" in the left-hand margin next to the sentence that begins "A personal message from you might draw adverse…" Next to the last paragraph, the recommendation, Nixon wrote "No" in the right-hand margin and wrote, "I want to give Velasco just as little as we can—in specifics—He is using the earthquake to build his socialist state."

Document 621: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 27, 1970.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger stated that it might be possible to work with the anticommunist President Velasco and induce his government to avoid modeling itself on Cuba and Chile. Kissinger ultimately believed the U.S. Government could convince Velasco to take a more pro-United States stance.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 793, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 2, July 1970–13 December 1971. Confidential. Sent for information. Nixon wrote on the bottom of the memorandum, "Makes sense—perhaps we should make a gesture toward him—as we continue our coolness toward Allende." Tab A, telegram 6837 from the Embassy in Lima, has not been found.

Document 622: Telegram 23385 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Peru, February 11, 1971, 0312Z.

The Department of State instructed Ambassador Belcher to inform the Peruvian Government that the United States would show restraint in applying sanctions if Peru did not seize U.S. fishing boats.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–4 PERU–US. Confidential. Drafted on February 10 by Weber; cleared in draft form by VanCampen and Hamwell; and approved by Crimmins, Smith, and Feldman. Repeated to Mexico City, Quito, and Santiago.

Document 623: Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 31, 1971.

National Security Council staff member Nachmanoff recommended that the U.S. Government delay any action on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) suspension and quickly devise a strategy for settling the fisheries dispute.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 793, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 2, July 1970–13 December 1971. Confidential. Sent for information. The memorandum was sent by means of electronic transmission to Kissinger in San Clemente. Telegram 1694 from Lima has not been found.

Document 624: Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Connally to the President's Assistant for International Economic Policy (Peterson), Washington, April 26, 1971.

Secretary of the Treasury Connally outlined his reasons for reluctantly supporting an Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) loan to Peru, because he saw no other alternative. He argued it was counterproductive for the United States to provide assistance to nations that were hurting U.S. economic interests.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (IDB) 9 PERU. Confidential. Printed from a copy that bears Connally's stamped signature.

Document 625: Telegram 2280 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State, April 27, 1971, 1700Z.

Ambassador Belcher commented on the Chilean Air Force request to purchase F–5s and C–130s from the U.S. military and reported how that action would influence United States-Peruvian relations. Belcher noted that if the United States sold arms to Chile, and not to Peru, U.S.-Peruvian relations would suffer.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 793, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 2, July 70–13 December 1971. Secret; Nodis. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates it was received at the White House Situation Room at 4:51 p.m. on April 27.

Document 626: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for International Economic Policy (Peterson) to President Nixon, May 1, 1971.

President's Assistant for International Economic Policy Peterson requested President Nixon's agreement that the United States should avoid raising the issue of Peru's economic policy in the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Peterson said President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Under Secretary Irwin concurred with his views.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 793, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 2, July 1970–13 December 1971. Secret. Sent for action. Haig wrote "done" in the margin next to Nixon's approval. Nachmanoff sent the memorandum to Haig on May 3. NSDM 21 is printed as Document 607.

Document 627: Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon, Washington, May 3, 1971.

President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Haig argued that the U.S. Government representatives at the May 4 Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) meeting should not read a statement critical of Peru because it could potentially jeopardize President Velasco's upcoming visit to the United States and could possibly reverse the graduate shift toward more favorable relations with the United States.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 793, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 2, July 1970–13 December 1971. Confidential. Sent for action. Haig approved for Nixon. Attached but not published was an undated memorandum to Nixon, in which Peterson stated that Connally wanted to make a "strong statement on Peru's economic policy and its treatment of private investment." On May 4, Haig wrote to Connally: "As I mentioned to you last night, for purely tactical reasons and in view of certain shifts with have recently occurred in the Peruvian Government as well as the pending visit of Velasco to the United States, the President has asked that on this occasion we not single out the IPC nationalization issue and the treatment of US contractors specifically." (Ibid.)

Document 628: Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 6, 1971.

After discussing the resolved problems in the U.S.-Peruvian relationship, National Security Council staff member Nachmanoff noted that the fisheries problem still persisted and explained that it would be dealt with in the context of NSSM 125, U.S. Oceans Policy.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 793, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. II, July 1970–13 December 1971. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. Tab A, an April 29 memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, was attached, but not published. Although memorandum of conversation of the April 16 meeting was not found, Eliot summarized it for Kissinger in a memorandum dated April 17 which is ibid. NSSM 125 is published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–1, Global Issues, 1969–1972, Document 390.

Document 629: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, May 26, 1971.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger speculated that the reasons why President Velasco declined an invitation for a state visit to the United States might include: still-tense relations between the United States and Peru, internal political problems, and/or scheduling problems.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 793, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 2, July 1970–13 December 1971. Confidential; Nodis. Sent for information. Nixon wrote on the bottom of the memorandum, " Cool it ." In his May 18 covering memorandum Nachmanoff recommended that Kissinger sent the memorandum to the President, stated that "a successful Peruvian experiment, with a constructive relationship with the United States, may be a better defense against the extension of Chilean or Cuban models than regimes based on the rapidly deteriorating traditional structures of the oligarchy, the church and the ‘traditional' military."

Document 630: Telegram 3356 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State, June 5, 1971, 1803Z.

Ambassador Belcher reviewed the last two and a half years of U.S.-Peruvian relations and argued that, despite what appeared to be moderation in its actions against U.S. economic interests, it seemed Peru had recently decided on a firmer policy stance against U.S. business. Belcher though Washington should pursue patient negotiations to resolve disputes.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PERU–US. Confidential; Priority; Exdis.

Document 631: Memorandum of Meeting, Washington, September 29, 1971, noon.

In this meeting President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Peruvian Foreign Minister Edgardo Mercado Jarrin discussed recent developments in the Peru revolution and emphasized that the Peruvian experiment was nationalistic, not Marxist, and affirmed that any changes would be made solely in Peru, and that there was no intent to export its practices. Kissinger told Jarrin that the U.S. Government hoped to see the Peruvian revolution succeed as an example of a non-Marxist alternative to the Chilean experience.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 793, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 2, July 1970–13 December 1971. Confidential; Nodis. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office. According to Kissinger's Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted from 12:42 to 1:05 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Henry A. Kissinger, Box 438, Miscellany, 1969–1976, Record of Schedule) In an October 1 covering memorandum, Nachmanoff requested that Kissinger approve the release of a copy of the minutes to State, Treasury, and Peterson. Haig approved for Kissinger dissemination to State, but not to Treasury and Peterson. Davis sent the memorandum to Eliot on October 8.

Document 632: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 8, 1972.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger summarized the Department of State's recommendation to lift the foreign military sales (FMS) suspension on Peru and analyzed the positions of the Departments of Commerce and Defense. He argued that Washington should lift the suspension if the Peruvians indicated that they would maintain their policy of restraint.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–230, NSDM Files, NSDM 147. Secret. Sent for action. Kissinger approved for Nixon. Attached but not published are Tabs A through C. Tab A is a January 8 memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger; Tab B is a January 7 memorandum from Howard W. Pollock, Acting Administrator National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and Chairman of the Department of Commerce

Document 633: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), to President Nixon, Washington, February 8, 1972.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger reported that President Velasco believed that United States-Peruvian relations had improved in the last year. Velasco thought the United States and Peru should work together more closely to contain communism in the region and thought they should resume a liaison relationship between their intelligence services.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 3, January 1972–31 December 73. Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Next to the second paragraph Nixon wrote "K—! good."

Document 634: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), to President Nixon, Washington, April 13, 1972.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger recommended making the flood zone in northern Peru eligible for U.S. Government reconstruction assistance.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 3, January 1972–31 December 73. Confidential. Sent for action. Kissinger initialed for Nixon. Attached but not printed at Tab A is an April 11 memorandum in which Davis informed Eliot of Nixon's approval on April 19.

Document 635: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 26, 1972.

Director of the South American Department of the World Bank Gerald Alter stated that negotiations on the International Petroleum Company (IPC) had broken down and concluded that while an overt solution was not possible, behind-the-scenes negotiations could be efficacious. Deputy Assistant Secretary Crimmins urged the Department of State to take a more direct role in the IPC discussions.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject and Country Files: Lot 73 D 353, Peru–IPC Case. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Crimmins. Copies sent to Irwin, Samuels, Meyer, Weintraub, Feldman, and Lancaster.

Document 636: Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 4, 1972.

Director of Central Intelligence Helms reported a discussion in which Secretary of the Treasury Connally told President Velasco that Peru must offer a symbolic payment of $1 as compensation for International Petroleum Company (IPC) to reinforce that uncompensated expropriation was unacceptable. In exchange for an agreement between the Peruvian Government and IPC, the United States, according to Connally, would open credit to Peru from all sources.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Subject Files, Job 80–B01086A, Box 14, Folder 448, P8 Peru. Secret. The DDP concurred. Printed from a copy that bears Helms' stamped signature.

Document 637: National Security Study Memorandum 158 and Council on International Economic Policy Study Memorandum 23, Washington, August 13, 1972.

President Nixon requested a review of United States-Peruvian relations that included five major considerations: future political developments in Peru; United States-Peruvian relations in light of U.S. policy towards Latin America, in particular Chile; the Peruvian economy; U.S. assistance to Peru; and the handling of outstanding investment disputes.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–193, NSSM Files, NSSM 158. Confidential. Signed by both Kissinger and Flanigan. Copies sent to the Director of USIA, the Administrator for AID, the President and Chairman of the ExIm, and the President of OPIC. NSSM 18 is Document 578. NSSM 42 is Document 593. Meyer sent the NSC–IG/ARA report, entitled "Review of U.S. Policy Towards Peru," to Kissinger and Flanigan on September 26. A portion of the report is printed as Document 638.

Document 638: Memorandum Prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group on Latin American Affairs, Washington, September 26, 1972.

This National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Latin American Affairs (NSC–IG/ARA) study reviewed U.S. policy towards Peru. United States interests included fostering a favorable trade and investment climate, and maintaining U.S. influence. Three policy options were presented: maintaining the present policy; enacting a harder line policy; or softening the policy stance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–I, NSSMs, 1/69–5/80: Lot 80 D 212, NSSM 158. Confidential. NSSM 158/CIEPSM 23 is printed as Document 637. The minutes of the SRG meeting are printed as Document 639. The Gonzalez Amendment of March 10, 1972 (86 Stat. 59) required U.S. representatives to the IDB to vote against providing loans to nations that had expropriated U.S. investments; or, if U.S. officials voted to proved such loans, to publicly state their legal rationale for their vote.

Document 639: Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting, Washington, November 17, 1972, 3:04–4:13 p.m.

The Senior Review Group discussed outstanding problems with Peru and policy options outlined in a study memorandum prepared by the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Latin American Affairs (NSC–IG/ARA).

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–113, SRG Meeting Minutes, Originals, 1972–1973. Confidential. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. A portion of the study produced in response to NSSM 158 is published as Document 638. Minutes of a future SRG meeting on Peru have not been found. The CIEP/Treasury initiative was not found.

Document 640: National Security Decision Memorandum 199 and Council on International Economic Policy Decision Memorandum 17, Washington, December 26, 1972.

President Nixon directed the Department, Treasury, and the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs to seek a new negotiated settlement for disputes over expropriated assets of U.S. companies. Nixon also decided to defer application of the Gonzales Amendment and to continue the hold on new Ex-Im direct credits.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–237, NSDM Files, NSDM 199. Confidential; Nodis (GDS). A copy was sent to the Director of USIA, the Administrator of AID, the President and Chairman of the ExIm Bank, and the President of OPIC. The interagency study is published as Document 638. The Gonzalez Amendment is described in the source note to Document 638. No minutes of a future SRG meeting on Peru have been found.

Document 641: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 9, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger reported that El Salvador had broken diplomatic relations with Honduras following 10 days of anti-Salvadoran riots in Tegucigalpa that began when Salvadoran soccer fans assaulted Honduran fans during a World Cup regional playoff in San Salvador. While hoping for a peaceful settlement to the dispute, Kissinger declared that the U.S. Government's position should be that this was a Central American problem that should be resolved within the region.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Honduras–Salvador Dispute. Limited Official Use. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

Document 642: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 9, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger indicated that the Salvadoran-Honduran dispute might become an armed conflict. He recommended that President Nixon approve the sending of a personal message in support of Central American mediation efforts to the presidents of both countries.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Honduras–Salvador Dispute. Confidential. Sent for action. On July 9, Kissinger initialed for Nixon his approval of the proposed message and a reply to President Lleras of Colombia. Attached but not published are Tabs A and B. Tab A is the proposed draft message to the presidents of El Salvador and Honduras. Tab B is President Lleras' July 7 cable to Nixon. Also attached but not published is Nixon's message, which was sent as telegram 922, July 10, to Bogotá, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, San José, Managua, and Guatemala. (Ibid.)

Document 643: Intelligence Note No. 526 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, July 11, 1969.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) reported that despite Central American mediation efforts, Salvadoran bellicosity threatened to deepen the crisis between El Salvador and Honduras.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL EL SAL–HOND. Confidential; Limdis. In a July 14 memorandum to Kissinger, NSC Staff member Viron Vaky reported that notwithstanding Central American and OAS mediation efforts, tensions were increasing and the "chances of a military thrust by El Salvador within the next day or so are high." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Honduras–Salvador Dispute)

Document 644: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 15, 1969.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger reported that El Salvador had initiated air attacks against Honduras. Indicating that the United States had supported mediation throughout the crisis, Kissinger recommended continued support for OAS efforts to achieve a ceasefire and negotiate an end to the dispute.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Honduras–El Salvador Dispute. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Attached but not published at Tab A is factual data on El Salvador and Honduras and at Tab B is a map of the two countries. In an undated and un-initialed memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger reported that on July 15 the OAS Council passed a resolution calling for the immediate cessation of hostilities and "the restoration of the situation to what it was before hostilities broke out." (Ibid.)

Document 645: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),Washington, July 16, 1969.

National Security Council staff member Vaky informed President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger that the situation appeared to be deteriorating and observed that if El Salvador refused to agree to a ceasefire, then the OAS would likely condemn them as aggressors under the Rio Treaty.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Honduras–El Salvador Dispute. Secret. Sent for action. A note on the memorandum indicates, "OBE 7–18–69 Return to Vaky." Attached but not published is the proposed memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon to the President. In telegram 117566 to San Salvador, July 16, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to call upon the Salvadoran Government "to issue immediate orders for a cease-fire on all fronts." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL EL SALV–HOND) In a July 17 memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger reported that both countries had, in principle, accepted the OAS ceasefire proposal. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Honduras–Salvador Dispute)

Document 646: Intelligence Note No. 548 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, July 18, 1969.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) warned that the conflict between El Salvador and Honduras could stimulate an arms race throughout Latin America, while observing that the United States could be criticized for not preventing the outbreak of hostilities.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL EL SAL–HOND. Confidential.

Document 647: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 18, 1969, 6:30 p.m.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger reported that the OAS Council had passed resolutions calling for a cease-fire, military withdrawals within 96 hours, the grounding of air forces, security guarantees for nationals of each country in the other's territory, and an end to inflammatory media campaigns.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Honduras–Salvador Dispute. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger did not initial the memorandum. Sent by Vaky to Kissinger under cover of a July 18 forwarding memorandum, which is not published. In TDCS 314/10747–69, July 18, CIA reported that the Salvadoran Government had stated its willingness to accept the ceasefire, but refused to withdraw its troops unless "satisfactory and effective" guarantees were made for Salvadoran nationals in Honduras. (Ibid.) In telegram 2728 from Tegucigalpa, July 19, the Embassy reported that the Honduran Government had implemented the ceasefire. (Ibid.)

Document 648: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 22, 1969.

National Security Council staff member Vaky reported that the OAS brokered ceasefire seemed to be holding, but noted that both El Salvador and Honduras were seeking weapons abroad and El Salvador was indicating that it might not comply with the OAS resolutions on troop withdrawal. In light of the circumstances, the OAS was considering the creation of an inter-American Peace Force.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 784, Country Files, Latin America, El Salvador, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for information. Attached but not published at Tab A is telegram 120597 from the Department of State to all American Republic diplomatic posts. In telegram 120464, July 20, the Department instructed all European posts to seek cooperation in preventing arms sales to El Salvador and Honduras. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL EL SAL–HOND)

Document 649: Central Intelligence Agency Information Cable, TDCS 314/10866–69, Washington, July 22, 1969.

CIA reported that although the OAS-mandated 96-hour withdraw was about to expire and Salvadoran troops were not retreating, the Salvadoran Government had already notified the OAS that it did not plan to re-initiate hostilities. CIA noted the proliferation of anti-OAS and anti-U.S. demonstrations in San Salvador.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Honduras–Salvador Dispute. Confidential; Noforn dissem. A stamped notation on section 1 of this 2 part telegram indicates that the classification was upgraded to Secret; Noforn. The final section of this telegram, however, bears the stamped notation Confidential; Noforn.

Document 650: Telegram 122377 From the Department of State to the Embassy in El Salvador, July 24, 1969, 1505Z.

The Department of State requested that the Embassy comment on statements implying that the Salvadoran Government might hope for the deployment of an international peacekeeping force, in order to publicly justify its withdrawal from Honduran territory.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL EL SAL–HOND. Confidential; Limdis; Immediate. No record of a reply from Tegucigalpa was found. In telegram 1305 from Managua, July 25, Bowdler reported that Somoza told him a reliable Salvadoran contact had confirmed that "GOES strategy in OAS will be to promote the interposition of an Interamerican Peace Force," allowing El Salvador to withdraw its troops without losing face. (Ibid.)

Document 651: Telegram 1727 From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State, July 25, 1969, 2329Z.

The Embassy offered its thoughts on U.S. objectives for the OAS Foreign Ministers meeting on the Honduran–Salvadoran conflict.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL EL SAL–HOND. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated immediate to Tegucigalpa, and to San José, Guatemala, Managua, Panama, USCINCSO, USUN New York, and USCINCSO for POLAD. In telegram 127214 to Tokyo, July 30, the Department of State reported that at the July 29 OAS meeting, Salvadoran Foreign Minister Guerrero stated that El Salvador would withdraw its troops from Honduran territory. (Ibid.)

Document 652: Telegram 127303 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Honduras and El Salvador, July 31, 1969, 0100Z.

The Department of State provided guidance on implementing the resolutions approved at the July 29–30 OAS Foreign Ministers meetings.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL EL SAL–HOND. Confidential; Priority. Drafted on July 30 by Killoran; cleared by Breen and Donald G. Gould (USIA); and approved by Crimmins. In telegram 138553, August 10, the Department of State instructed all ARA diplomatic posts to urge OAS members to continue pressing El Salvador and Honduras to "adopt attitudes conducive to negotiated resolution" of the conflict. (Ibid.)

Document 653: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 1, 1969.

In a report on the status of the Honduran–Salvadoran conflict, the Department of State noted that despite progress with troop withdrawals, prisoner repatriations, and protections for immigrants, tensions remained high and both countries were engaged in large arms purchases, auguring poorly for short-term regional stability.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 786, Country Files, Latin America, Honduras–Salvador Dispute. Confidential.

Document 654: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 5, 1969, 11:30 a.m.

Special emissaries of President-elect Caldera met with Secretary of State Rogers to explore issues that would arise between the two nations, especially concerning petroleum.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 796, Country Files, Latin America, Venezuela, Vol. 1, 1969–1971. Confidential. Drafted by Hill. Attached was a note that read, "Not reviewed and cleared." The meeting took place in the Secretary's Office. According to Roger's appointment book, the meeting took place between 11:35 a.m. and 12:10 p.m. (Personal Papers of William P. Rogers, Appointment Books)

Document 655: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant to the President (Ellsworth), Washington, February 26, 1969.

National Security Council staff member Vaky discussed the importance of Venezuelan oil exports to both the U.S. and Venezuelan economies. He stated that if Venezuelan oil exports dropped, extremist movements in the nation would become more powerful.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 796, Country Files, Latin America, Venezuela, Vol. 1, 1969–1971. Confidential. Drafted by Nachmanoff. Printed from a copy that Vaky did not initial. The attached February 15 letter from Rogers to Hickel was not found. For more information on the President's decision to review oil import policies, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, and Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 182.

Document 656: Intelligence Note 240 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, April 4, 1969.

President Caldera legalized the Venezuelan Communist Party in an attempt to isolate the guerrilla movements in the country. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) predicted it would have little impact on guerrilla activity in the country.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–9 VEN. Secret.

Document 657: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 23, 1969, 10:45–11:15 a.m.

Department of Defense officials and their Venezuelan counterparts discussed insurgency in and U.S. assistance to Venezuela.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 330–72A–6309, Venezuela, 1969, Confidential. It was drafted by Lang and approved on April 25 by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Ware. Copies of this conversation were sent to the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, DASD–IA (ISA), IAW (ISA), OASD, IXR (ISA). The meeting was held in Secretary Laird's office in the Pentagon.

Document 658: Airgram A–255 From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State, June 13, 1969.

The Embassy reported that fear of public disorder prompted President Caldera to postpone Rockefeller's visit.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 2 VEN. Confidential. It was drafted on June 12 by Sleght and approved by Walters. According to a CIA report, student protests and strikes had become so common by May that the Minister of Education suspended classes in the public secondary schools. Caldera feared that he would have to bring in the military to control student protesters during the Rockefeller visit, which could have weakened the political system. (LA Staff Note No. 6–69, Washington, June 19, 1969; Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Office, Job 79–T00968A. Prepared by the Office of National Estimates)

Document 659: Telegram 5819 From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State, December 2, 1969, 0020Z.

Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) Francis Herron reported President Calderas's request that the U.S. Government consult with Venezuela before making a final decision on petroleum import policy. Herron further indicated that Caldera stated that U.S. preferential treatment for petroleum from Canada and Mexico damaged U.S. relations with Venezuela.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PET 17–2 VEN. Limited Official Use; Immediate.

Document 660: Airgram A–10 From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State, January 9, 1970.

Private-sector groups in Venezuela strongly disliked the U.S. Government's announcement of its 1970 petroleum import quotas. Lack of consultation with Venezuelan leaders, preferential treatment for Canada, and fear of a future erosion of Venezuela's petroleum market share in the United States explained the reaction.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 2 VEN. Confidential. It was drafted by Luers; cleared in draft by Fimbres; and approved by Walters. It was repeated to COMANTDEFCOM, COMCARIBSEAFRON, USSOUTHCOM, COMUSAFSO, Addis Ababa, Bogotá, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Georgetown, Guatemala, London, Mexico City, Panama, Port of Spain, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, Santo Domingo, the Consulate in Curaçao, and Paramaribo. A stamped notation on the Airgram indicates that it was received at the Department of State at 3:23 p.m. on January 12 and at the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs on January 14.

Document 661: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 26, 1970.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger outlined the arguments for inviting Western Hemisphere chiefs of state, including President Caldera, during the first half of 1970, to Washington.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 943, VIP Visits, Venezuela, Visit of President Caldera 3–4 June 1970. Confidential. Sent for action. It was drafted by Vaky on January 23. This is printed from a copy that bears Kissinger's stamped initials with an indication that he signed the original. Attached but not published at Tab A is a January 20 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon. Neither recommendation was checked, but in a February 3 memorandum from Chapin to Kissinger, Chapin confirmed that the President agreed to Caldera's visit in the first half of the year. (Ibid.)

Document 662: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 2, 1970.

In order to improve U.S.-Venezuelan relations, Kissinger urged President Nixon to meet with Dr. Hugo Perez, the Venezuelan Minister of Mines. On his two previous visits to the United States, Perez had been unable to obtain an appointment with the President; Kissinger was concerned that, if the President decided not to meet with him for a third time, the perception that Perez was being snubbed could possibly damage U.S. relations with Venezuela.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 796, Country Files, Latin America, Venezuela, Vol. 1, 1969–1971. Confidential. Sent for action. Written on the front was "Returned to Kissinger 2/3." Tab A was not found. There was no indication of approval nor disapproved of the recommendation, but Nixon agreed to a meeting in Document 664.

Document 663: Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) Washington, February 5, 1970.

National Security Council staff member Vaky informed President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger of President Caldera's unhappiness that Canada received a substantial preference over Venezuela for oil exports. Vaky warned that Venezuela's smaller export quota would foster strong, nationalistic, anti-United States movements, and concluded that Caldera would address the question in his upcoming meeting with President Nixon.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 796, Country Files, Latin America, Venezuela, Vol. 1, 1969–1971. Confidential. Sent for information. Attached but not published at Tab A is telegram 588 from Caracas, February 5.

Document 664: Memorandum From Senior Military Assistant to the President General Alexander Haig, Jr. of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan), Washington, February 14, 1970.

Senior Military Assistant to the President Haig desired to confirm President Nixon's meeting with Venezuelan Minister of Mines Hugo Perez. Haig informed President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs Flanigan that if the President had declined to meet with Perez, who was a personal friend of President Caldera's, it was likely to have serious consequences for U.S. relations with Venezuela.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 796, Country Files, Latin America, Venezuela, Vol. 1, 1969–1971. Confidential.

Document 665: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, undated.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger provided a briefing memorandum covering the issues Venezuelan Minister of Mines Hugo Perez might bring up in a meeting with the President. The topics included petroleum exports, Caldera's state visit, the vacancy in the U.S. ambassadorship, and increased tensions between Venezuela and Guyana.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 796, Country Files, Latin America, Venezuela, Vol. 1, 1969–1971. Confidential. Sent for information. A note on the document indicates the memorandum was returned to Kissinger on March 2. Tabs A, B, and C were not attached. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Perez, Ambassador Julio Sosa, Assistant Secretary of State Meyer, and his Assistant for International Economic Affairs Flanigan, and members of the press from 12:22 p.m. to 12:35 p.m. on February 27. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary.) No other record of the conversation has been found.

Document 666: Memorandum of Meeting, Washington, June 4, 1970, 10 a.m.

Presidents Nixon and Caldera discussed the Venezuelan petroleum quota, parity treatment with Canada, military assistance, the economic development of southern Venezuela, and the Venezuela-Guyana border dispute.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 943, VIP Visits, Venezuela, Visit of President Caldera, 3–4 June 1970. Confidential; Exdis. The meeting took place in the President's Office. According to the President's Daily Diary, the participants met from 10:09 to 10:50 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) Ambassador Robert McClintock drafted a memorandum of the same meeting that included discussion of road construction in South America, and a statement to the press about Caldera's visit. No evidence of the statement has been found. To conclude the meeting, in response to Caldera's invitation to visit Venezuela, Nixon supported the idea in principle but did not foresee overseas travel in the near future. (Ibid.)

Document 667: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird, Washington, June 5, 1970.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger passed on President Nixon's directive to the Departments of State and Defense to discuss with the Venezuelans their military needs and determine what the U.S. Government could to fulfill them. President Nixon asked for a status report by August 15.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 796, Country Files, Latin America, Venezuela, Vol. 1, 1969–1971. Confidential; Limdis. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the JCS. The status report, dated August 14, is Document 670.

Document 668: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary Rogers and the Administration of the Agency for International Development (Hannah), Washington, June 5, 1970.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger passed on President Nixon's directive to the Department of State and the Agency for International Development (AID) to come up with a plan to assist Venezuela in implementing its CODESUR development program for Southern Venezuela, and asked for a status report on what had been done by September 1.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 796, Country Files, Latin America, Venezuela, Vol. 1, 1969–1971. Confidential. A copy was sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the President of the Export-Import Bank. The status report is printed as Document 671.

Document 669: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 30, 1970

Executive Secretary Eliot provided a progress report on actions taken in the month following President Caldera's visit in four major areas of U.S. policy towards Venezuela: oil, military equipment, CODESUR, and trade.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 VEN. Confidential. Drafted on June 26 by Robinson; cleared in draft by McClintock, Spence, Erickson, Sinn, and Slott; cleared in draft by Klein is the portion on CODESUR; and cleared by Crimmins and Meyer. R.C. Brewster signed for Eliot above Eliot's typeset signature. Kissinger's memorandum to General Lincoln and Assistant Flanigan has not been found. Kissinger's June 5 memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense is Document 667, and his June 5 memorandum to the Secretary of State and the Administrator of AID is Document 668.

Document 670: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 14, 1970.

Executive Secretary Eliot informed President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger that United States and Venezuelan officials had begun consultations on how the Nixon administration could meet Venezuela's military needs. Eliot concluded by stating that the U.S. Congress was holding up foreign military sales (FMS) sales to Venezuela.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 796, Country Files, Latin America, Venezuela, Vol. 1, 1969–1971. Confidential; Limdis. Robert L. Brown signed for Eliot. The Thirty-Day Progress Report, dated June 30, is Document 669.

Document 671: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 28, 1970.

Executive Secretary Eliot informed President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger that the Department of State had begun discussions with Venezuelan officials to come up with a plan to promote the development of Southern Venezuela. He reported that the Venezuelans had found U.S. efforts helpful.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 796, Country Files, Latin America, Venezuela, Vol. 1, 1969–1971. Confidential. For the June 30 progress report, see Document 669. For the June 5 memorandum to the Secretary of State and Administrator of AID, see Document 668. The progress report discussed in the conclusion is referenced in the source note to Document 674.

Document 672: Telegram 4879 From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State, October 28, 1970, 1639Z.

Ambassador McClintock recounted his discussion with President Caldera in which they discussed Caldera's June 1970 visit to the United States, U.S. military assistance to Venezuela, and Caldera's desire to export more oil to the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 VEN. Secret.

Document 673: Telegram 1516 From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State, March 29, 1971, 2201Z.

Venezuelan Foreign Minister Calvani and Ambassador McClintock discussed comments made by Secretary of State Rogers about Venezuelan Petroleum legislation in testimony before the U.S. Congress.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL VEN. Confidential; Priority.

Document 674: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 22, 1971.

After summarizing a Department of State memorandum on U.S. efforts to aid Venezuela in developing its southern region, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger informed President Nixon that Secretary State Rogers had instructed the U.S. Ambassador in Venezuela to enter into conversations with the Venezuelans to implement Washington's blueprint in this area.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 796, Country Files, Latin America, Venezuela, Vol. 1, 1969–1971. Confidential. Sent for information. Attached but not published at Tab A is a February 23 memorandum from Rogers to the President.

Document 675: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 29, 1971, 5 p.m.

President's Assistant Peter Flanigan stated that Venezuela's increase in taxes on U.S. oil and mining companies meant there was little chance of giving Venezuela hemispheric preference for oil exports to the Untied States. Flanigan also stated that the United States might refuse to accept Venezuelan national gas into the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of North Coast Affairs, Records Relating to Venezuela: Lot 76 D 465, PET 17–2. Secret; Limited Distribution Only. Drafted on April 30 by Ambassador McClintock. Copies sent to the Undersecretary, Trezise, Meyer, and McClintock.

Document 676: Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 1, 1971.

The Venezuelan Congress was on the verge of passing petroleum and gas legislation that would potentially hurt the interests of U.S. companies operating there.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 796, Country Files, Latin America, Venezuela, Vol. 1, 1969–1971. Confidential. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the first page of the document. Written in the top right-hand corner was "Hold HAK [Kissinger]." Attached but not published at Tab A is a June 28 memorandum from Rogers entitled "Pending Venezuelan Petroleum and Gas Legislation."

Document 677: Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon, Washington, July 5, 1971.

President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Haig informed President Nixon that the Departments of State and Defense, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) all argued against selling F–4s to Venezuela. The Departments of Commerce and Treasury advocated the sale. Haig recommended Nixon not make the sale.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 796, Country Files, Latin America, Venezuela, Vol. 1, 1969–1971. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. Haig initialed for Kissinger who approved for the President. Attached but not published are Tabs A, B, C, and D. Tab A is an undated draft of telegram 126467 from the Department of State to Caracas; Tab B is telegrams 3471 and 3621 from the Embassy in Caracas, dated June 23 and July 1, respectively; Tab C is a July 2 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon; and Tab D is a July 1 memorandum from Walker to Nixon and a June 25 memorandum from Stans to Kissinger.

Document 678: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 12, 1972.

Even though both Venezuela and the United States considered their Reciprocal Trade Agreement obsolete, Venezuela's unilateral decision to terminate it raised the issue of whether or not the United States would maintain special, lower tariffs on imports of oil from Venezuela. Executive Secretary Eliot informed President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger the Department of State would keep him informed of proposals to deal with the problems posed by Venezuela's decision.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 797, Country Files, Latin America, Venezuela, Vol. 2, 1972. Confidential, with LOU attachment. Brewster signed for Eliot. Caldera stated that the decision to rescind the treaty would bolster Venezuelan nationalism, and strengthen the economy of the country. (Airgram A–20 from Caracas, January 19, ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2 VEN)

Document 679: Telegram 1073 From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State, February 9, 1972, 1620Z.

Ambassador McClintock recommended that President Nixon write to President Caldera to mitigate the Venezuelan Government's negative reaction to U.S. petroleum policy toward the country.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 797, Country Files, Latin America, Venezuela, Vol. 2, 1972. Secret; Priority; Exdis. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room at 5:15 p.m. on February 9. Caldera's December 31, 1971 letter to Nixon informed him that Venezuela would unilaterally terminate the Reciprocal Trade Agreement between itself and the United States. (ibid., Box 765, Presidential Correspondence, 1969–1974, Venezuela, President Caldera) Nixon responded to Caldera's letter on February 17, in which he proposed to start negotiations with Venezuela on the United States-Venezuela trading relationship. (ibid.)

Document 680: Telegram 1609 From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State, March 2, 1972, 1525Z.

President Caldera defended the timing of his decision to rescind the Reciprocal Trade Agreement, and voiced disappointment that Venezuela had not received hemispheric trade preferences for petroleum. Caldera agreed to start negotiations, which President Nixon had proposed in a letter to him.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 797, Country Files, Latin America, Venezuela, Vol. 2, 1972. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Nixon's letter to Caldera is referenced in the source note to Document 679. Telegrams 29285 and 31327 from the Department, February 18 and 23, respectively, are ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PET 1 US.

Document 681: Telegram 3557 From the U.S. Mission in the United Nations, New York, September 29, 1972, 0012Z.

This telegram transmitted a memorandum of conversation that had taken place earlier that day at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in which U.S. and Venezuelan officials largely agreed on petroleum policy, but disagreed about a policy to combat terrorism. They also discussed the world disarmament conference and Cuba.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2 VEN. Confidential. It was repeated information to Caracas.

Document 682: National Intelligence Estimate 89–72, Washington, October 19, 1972.

This estimate concluded that, because Venezuelan leaders were concerned about declining oil reserves, Venezuela would probably agree to a long-term United States-Venezuelan treaty on petroleum which would meet the needs of the petroleum companies, and both nations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 361, Subject Files, National Intelligence Estimates. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of CIA submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB except the representative of the FBI who abstained on the grounds that it was outside its jurisdiction.