279. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1 2
SUBJECT:
- Coup in Somalia
Elements of the Somali Army and police seined power early this morning from Prime Minister Egalʼs elected government. First reports are very sketchy. The following is the sum of our intelligence up to the moment
—The coup followed immediately upon a report split to Egalʼs governing party over the nomination of a successor for assassinated President Shermarke.
—But there is no evidence that the Army acted on behalf of, or in specific opposition to, either of the factions in Egalʼs party. Egalʼs whereabouts are unknown, and the Somali radio has wed simply that the country will be governed by “military council”.
—Nor is there evidence that the coup is related to the earlier assassination. The only radio broadcast so far by the new regime referred to general corruption and cited the assassination as an example of the breakdown of the civilian government.
—The initial broadcast says the new regime will respect all foreign policy obligations, but also pledges aid to “freedom fighters”, which almost certainly is a reversal of Egalʼs dote with Ethiopia over disputed border territories.
—Thus far the coup has been bloodless. Our Embassy reports all Americans safe. Our Ambassador is meeting with other members of the diplomatic corps this afternoon to hear a forma1 statement from a spokesman of the new government.
Implications for US Interests
Judgments at this point are clearly premature, but my own guess is that this is yet another group of young officers who will remain quietly in the background. They were probably moved in part by disagreement with Egalʼs policy of detente, in part by resentment of the inevitable corruption and inefficiency of African democracies (even in a model government like Somaliaʼs). The assassination and then the apparent disarray among Egalʼs [Page 2] followers over the succession offered a rare opportunity.
For the US, of course, the most important element will be the survival or the collapse of the detente. ICE the Somalis returned to bellicose irredentism (as these first signs seem to suggest), tension will rise throughout the area, including Kenya as well as Ethiopia. The old arms supply spiral could then begin again—with the Somalis going to the Soviets, the Ethiopians to us, the Kenyans to the British.
Having tried detente and failed, Haile Selassie will probably find it impossible to hold his own hard-liners is check. And if the two sides slip back into belligerence, we should expect the Ethiopians to put our interests on the line—the important communications facility at Kagnew—in asking for increased military assistance. As the Somalis modernize their arms, and as Ethiopia diverts more of our help and their own resources to weapons rather than economic development, the only real be beneficiary is the Soviets.
I will have a further situation report for you as soon as we have more details.
- Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 287, Memoranda to the President, October 1969. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The memorandum, an unsigned copy, is marked “recʼd Oct 24, 1969.”↩
- Kissinger reported that elements of the Somali army and police had seized power from Prime Minister Egalʼs elected government. For the United States, the most important issue was the survival or collapse of ditente in the Horn. If Somalia returned to bellicose irredentism, tensions would rise throughout the area, including Kenya and Ethiopia.↩