Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–5, Part 1, Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969–1972

Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969-1972: Document List

Document 1: Central Intelligence Agency Report, Office of National Estimates Memorandum, Washington, March 13, 1969

Washington, March 13, 1969

The CIA reported that a decline of prospects for Communist-oriented radicalism in Africa had apparently led Moscow to some shifts in emphasis in its approach to black Africa. The African elite tended to view Soviet ideology as irrelevant and was still culturally attuned to the West.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, DDI Files, Job 79-R00967A, Box 1, Folder 1. Secret.

Document 2: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 17, 1969, 4:45 p.m.

Washington, April 17, 1969, 4:45 p.m.

During his meeting with Secretary Rogers, Kenyan Ambassador Nabwera said bilateral relations between the United States and Kenya were excellent, but the United States should formulate an independent policy toward Africa and not follow the lead of other Western powers such as the United Kingdom and France. He also expressed concern about the impression among Africans that the United States was not giving much attention to Africa.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 AFR-US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Terence A. Todman (AF/E) and approved in S.

Document 3: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 23, 1969

Washington, April 23, 1969

Morris provided a status report on several African policy issues involving Nigeria, Southern Africa, the Congo, succession problems, and foreign aid.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Kissinger wrote in the margin next to section 4, Succession Problems, "Can't we pull this into NSC.”

Document 4: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 13, 1969

Washington, May 13, 1969

Morris provided an update on the issues discussed in his April 23 memorandum (Document 3).

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Kissinger wrote in the margin next to section 2, Contingency Planning for Nigeria, “Right But practically how do we do it?”

Document 5: Central Intelligence Agency Special Report, Washington, June 20, 1969

Washington, June 20, 1969

In this report on Communist China's presence in Africa, the CIA stated that until China abandoned its Maoist approach it would not make major gains in Africa.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, General, Thru Feb 70. Secret; No foreign dissem.

Document 6: Memorandum for the Record, Washington, July 8, 1969

Washington, July 8, 1969

[2 pages not declassified.]

Source: National Security Council Files, 303 Committee Meetings, Minutes, 1969, Richard M. Nixon.

Document 7: U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace: A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, Washington, February 18, 1970

Washington, February 18, 1970

In this published report the President summarized his administration's goals and policies regarding Africa. A major concern was “that the Continent be free of great power rivalry or conflict in any form.”

Source: Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. No classification marking.

Document 8: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 24, 1970

Washington, February 24, 1970

Kissinger reviewed the main themes of Secretary Rogers' discussions during his trip to Africa. Attached but not published at Tab A are Talking Points for Nixon's meeting with Rogers.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 281, Agency Files, Department of State, 12/01/69-02/21/70, Vol. V. Confidential.

Document 9: Memorandum of Conversation, Abidjan, Ivory Coast, February 24, 1970

February 24, 1970

In a conversation with Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs David Newsom, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, President of the Republic of Ivory Coast, expressed his belief that what was most to be feared in Africa was the spread of communism. He was particularly concerned about the Soviet presence in Nigeria. Newsom noted that the United States was aware of communist activities in Africa but considered it important to view the problem in each country in terms of the local situation and needs.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 IVCOT. Confidential. Drafted by W.F. Miller (ECON) on March 13 and cleared by Ambassador J.F. Root.

Document 10: Memorandum From President Nixon to the President's Assistants (Haldeman), (Ehrlichman) and (Kissinger), Washington, March 2, 1970

Washington, March 2, 1970

President Nixon enumerated specific foreign policy issues of interest to him. Those dealing with Africa were relegated to the lowest priority. The portion of the memorandum concerning domestic issues is not published.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, HAK/President Memorandums 1969-1970. No classification markings; Eyes Only.

Document 11: Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, March 26, 1970

Washington, March 26, 1970

Secretary of State Rogers submitted to Nixon a 25-page statement on U.S. African policy under cover of this March 26 letter. No classification marking.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 281, Agency Files, Department of State, Vol. VI.

Document 12: Letter From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, March 26, 1970

Washington, March 26, 1970

Nixon responded favorably to Rogers's statement on U.S. African policy, which was a more detailed and in-depth discussion on the subject than was given in Nixon's February 18 Report to Congress (Document 7).

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 281, Agency Files, Department of State, Vol. VI. No classification marking. Under Nixon's signature is written in an unidentified hand, “Do the notes on the next two pages suggest this was signed by machine after HAK's approval? The carbon copy indicates /s/RN.” The next two pages, which are not published, include handwritten notes stating that “HAK Approves for President.”

Document 13: Telegram 3414 From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Embassy in Ireland, October 4, 1970, 0600Z

October 4, 1970, 0600Z

The embassy reported on President Nixon's meeting with President Tito on October 1, during which the two men discussed “Black Africa" at some length. Tito commented that it was difficult to assess Sino-Soviet competition in black Africa but he was impressed by Chinese efforts. He agreed with Nixon that China's policy was more clever and sophisticated than that of the Soviets. He advised that change in Black Africa not be regarded as a move towards socialism or communism.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Conference Files, 1966-1972, Entry 3051B, Box 518, President Nixon's Trip to Europe, 9/27-10/5/70, Schedule, Memcons, Public Statements, Vol. I of V. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent to U.S. Office in Limerick.

Document 14: U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace: A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, Washington, February 25, 1971

Washington, February 25, 1971

President Nixon's second foreign policy report to Congress acknowledged Rogers' lengthy policy statement of March 26, 1970, (attachment to Document 11) and then elaborated on his specific goals for Africa: peace, economic development, and justice.

Source: Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. No classification marking.

Document 15: Memorandum Prepared by the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, March 23, 1971

Washington, March 23, 1971

This analysis of what the Chinese Communists “were up to in Black Africa" concerned Chinese efforts to create friction between the United States and the USSR while convincing various African governments that ties to China would be more beneficial to their interests than ties to Taiwan.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 79-R00967A, Box 3, folder 2. Secret.

Document 16: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 18, 1971

Washington, June 18, 1971

In his meeting with President Nixon, President Senghor of Senegal expressed deep concern about the growing Communist Chinese influence in Africa. Nixon assured Senghor that he fully understood his concern and that U.S. efforts to establish a healthier relationship with Communist China were not based on any underestimation of the danger that Maoist philosophy posed to free nations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Senegal, Vol. I. No classification marking. Drafted on June 23.

Document 17: National Intelligence Estimate 70-71, Washington, October 7, 1971

Washington, October 7, 1971

This NIE, “Troubles in East Africa,” examined growing domestic problems, communist activities, and other issues in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia, and discussed the outlook for those counties and the implications for external powers.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, NIC Files, Job 79R-01012A, Box 421, Folder 1. Secret; Controlled Dissem.

Document 18: U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, The Emerging Structure of Peace: A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, Washington, February 9, 1972

February 9, 1972

President Nixon discussed U.S. interests in Africa, the need for mutual respect and restraint, economic cooperation in the form of loans, private investment, and trade, and the Southern African dilemma.

Source: Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. No classification marking.

Document 19: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 6-7, 1972

Washington, March 6-7, 1972

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs David Newsom told the British during talks on Soviet influence and activities in Africa that there had been a significant lack of Soviet success. The Soviets' best position was in Somalia, but they had failed to advance in Nigeria and Ghana while losing ground in Uganda. Newsom saw a possible new cold war in Africa between the Soviets and the Chinese.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL AFR-USSR. Confidential. Drafted by Hal W. Pattison (AF/PPS) on March 10.

Document 20: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 6-7, 1972

Washington, March 6-7, 1972

During U.S.-British talks on Chinese activities and influence in Africa, there was general agreement that Chinese activities merited attention but there was no real cause for concern since the Chinese were expected to achieve only limited success, similar to the Soviets.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL AFR-Chicom. Confidential. Drafted by Pattison.

Document 21: Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, May 2, 1972

Washington, March 6-7, 1972

During U.S.-French bilateral exchanges on Africa, Secretary-General Hervi Alphand said that the Soviets and the Chinese had not been successful in Africa, communist influence was not dominant, and African countries viewed the communists as sources of aid, not ideology. Newsom indicated that he was not especially concerned with the Soviets, although they might be overreaching in Somalia. However, he was concerned about Chinese economic activities, their military establishments, particularly in Tanzania, and their identification with southern African liberation movements.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, ORG 7 AF. Confidential. Drafted by A. Steigman (POL) on May 4.

Document 22: Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, May 2, 1972

Paris, May 2, 1972

During U.S.-French bilateral exchanges on Africa, Secretary-General Hervi Alphand said that the Soviets and the Chinese had not been successful in Africa, communist influence was not dominant, and African countries viewed the communists as sources of aid, not ideology. Newsom indicated that he was not especially concerned with the Soviets, although they might be overreaching in Somalia. However, he was concerned about Chinese economic activities, their military establishments, particularly in Tanzania, and their identification with southern African liberation movements.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, ORG 7 AF. Confidential. Drafted by A. Steigman (POL) on May 4.

Document 23: Telegram 5133 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, January 11, 1969, 2050Z

January 11, 1969, 2050Z

The Department provided its justification for the sale of eight C-97G aircraft to Joint Church Aid U.S.A., Inc. (JCA) and ICRC and included a statement that U.S. Government policy remained “one Nigeria" with relief supplied to both sides in the conflict.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Addis Ababa, London, Paris, Geneva, USUN. Drafted by Deputy Assistant Secretary Moore (AF), D. Smith (AF/W), and Country Director for West Africa Melbourne (AF/W); cleared by Under Secretary of State Katzenbach (U), Walker (S/S), William Lang (DOD/ISA), and North (AID); and approved by Assistant Secretary of State Palmer (AF).

Document 24: Telegram 333 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, January, 14, 1969, 1530Z

January, 14, 1969, 1530Z

The Embassy reported on Ambassador Elbert Mathews' meeting with Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, regarding the C-97G aircraft, relief agencies, U.S. policy, and daylight flights. Gowon preferred to have the ICRC, rather than church groups, operating in rebel territories.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9, Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated priority to ADDIS ABABA. Also repeated to Geneva, London, Paris, and USUN.

Document 25: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 28, 1969

Washington, January 28, 1969

Kissinger's memorandum, drafted by Roger Morris, sketched the background of the Biafra relief problem, the current situation, the interplay of relief and diplomacy, and where other nations stood, and recommended that the President sign a NSSM that would get the bureaucracy moving toward consideration of alternate Biafra relief programs. Tab C is Document 26.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Nixon checked and initialed “Authorize NSSM.” An adjacent note states, “NSSM 11 issued 1/28/69, distributed 1/29/69.”

Document 26: National Security Study Memorandum 11, Washington, January 28, 1969

Washington, January 28, 1969

NSSM 11 directed the preparation of papers on 1) alternative approaches and programs for expanding relief and 2) alternate views of the U.S. interest in Nigeria and Biafra.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-133, NSSM Files, NSSM 11. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler.

Document 27: Intelligence Memorandum, Washington, January 29, 1969

Washington, January 29, 1969

The memorandum analyzed the Biafran relief problem, which was likely to worsen in the next few months. Nigerian authorities were expected to become increasingly suspicious of foreign involvement.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, 3/54. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

Document 28: Talking Paper, Washington, undated

Washington, undated

This paper, prepared in the Department of State, included background information and talking points regarding Nigeria and Biafra for the President's meetings with European leaders during his upcoming trip to Europe.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, President's Trip Files - Europe, Feb-March 1969. Secret.

Document 29: Telegram 16759 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, Washington, February 3, 1969, 1511Z

Washington, February 3, 1969, 1511Z

The Department reported on Secretary William Rogers' and Assistant Secretary Joseph Palmer's meeting with Nigerian Ambassador Iyalla, during which they assured him that the United States's main interest in Biafra was feeding people. Palmer indicated that inspection procedures were not yet completed with Joint Church Aid U.S.A., Inc. (JCA) for the C-97 flights. There also was discussion of ICRC flights and visas for relief experts.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Geneva, London, USUN, Lome, Yaounde. Drafted by G.B. Sherry (AF/W), cleared in S/S and S; and approved by Palmer.

Document 30: Study Prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group on Africa, Washington, February 4, 1969

Washington, February 4, 1969

Paper I considered relief needs in Nigeria and Biafra and alternative U.S. approaches and programs aimed at expediting and enlarging the flow of relief.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-20, NSC Meeting, Biafra, Strategic Policy Issues 2/14/69. Secret.

Document 31: Study Prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group on Africa, Washington, February 4, 1969

Washington, February 4, 1969

Paper II considered alternative views of U.S. interests in Nigeria and Biafra, the range of policy choices open to the United States, and the political consequences of the relief courses described in Paper I.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-20, NSC Meeting, Biafra, Strategic Policy Issues 2/14/69. Secret.

Document 32: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 6, 1969

Washington, February 6, 1969

Morris indicated that the NSC papers on Biafran relief basically told the President that the United States could not expect to expand relief under the present low-involvement policy, and if relief were expanded it would mean becoming more involved in supporting Federal Nigeria. Attached at Tab A are Talking Points attached by Morris in anticipation of an NSC Review Group discussion of Nigeria that afternoon.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 68, NSC Committees & Panels Review Group, Feb-April 1969.

Document 33: Policy Options Paper, Washington, February 7, 1969

Washington, February 7, 1969

Prepared for the February 14 NSC meeting, this paper distilled Paper I and Paper II on Biafra into categories of relief, policy, basic choices, and options with the conclusion that there was little maneuverability in attempting to expand relief without antagonizing Federal Nigeria.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-20, NSC Meeting, Biafra, Strategic Policy Issues 2/14/69. Secret.

Document 34: Telegram 20875 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, February 9, 1969, 1710Z

February 9, 1969, 1710Z

The Department reported on the meetings of Godfrey Amachree, personal representative of Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, and Commissioner Arikpo, Nigerian Federal Commissioner for External Affairs, with Assistant Secretary Joseph Palmer and with several Congressmen and their staffs. Amachree's goal was to sound out U.S. policy at the beginning of a new administration.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential. Repeated to London. Drafted by Palmer and R. Wach (AF/W) and approved by Palmer.

Document 35: Paper Prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa, Washington, February 10, 1969

Washington, February 10, 1969

This background paper discussed the Biafran War, the minority problem, genocide, relief, involvement of other powers, and the U.S. role. A two-page appendix covers the Congressional aspects of Nigeria/Biafra relief.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-20, NSC Meeting, Biafra, Strategic Policy Issues 2/14/69. Secret.

Document 36: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Washington, February 11, 1969, 5:25 p.m.

Washington, February 11, 1969, 5:25 p.m.

Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson and Assistant to the President Henry Kissinger discussed Biafra and the upcoming NSC meeting. Richardson said his position was somewhere between Options 1 and 2. He supported naming a Relief Coordinator without political involvement. Kissinger agreed.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

Document 37: Telegram 22400 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, February 12, 1969, 0101Z

February 12, 1969, 0101Z

The Department reported on Godfrey Amachree's (the personal representative of Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria) meeting with Secretary of State William Rogers on February 11. Rogers stated that with the change of administrations the previous policies would continue unless or until a decision was taken to change them. The administration was reviewing relief policy, regarding which there was great public pressure.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7-Nigeria. Secret. Repeated to London. Drafted by Palmer, cleared in S, and approved in S/S.

Document 38: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 12, 1969

Washington, February 12, 1969

Morris presented his personal views on Biafran relief options, recommending a limited approach. The United States should make a credible effort to get in more food without greater political involvement or risk to American lives, property, and long-range political interests.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Nigeria. Secret.

Document 39: Memorandum From Richard V. Allen of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 13, 1969

Washington, February 13, 1969

Allen commented that the three Biafra situation papers had given insufficient attention to the roles of Western Europe and the United Nations. Anticipating that when a policy decision was made, Nixon's two statements on the Nigerian Civil War made during his Presidential campaign might be recalled, he attached a composite Nixon's statements from July 17 and September 10, 1968.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis.

Document 40: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 14, 1969

Washington, February 14, 1969

In anticipation of the NSC meeting later that day, Morris outlined the latest developments regarding relief flights, prospects for a neutral relief airstrip, the war, and French policy on Biafra.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-20, NSC Meeting, Biafra, Strategic Policy Issues 2/14/69. Secret.

Document 41: Issues Paper, Washington, February 14, 1969

Washington, February 14, 1969

This paper, prepared for President Nixon, outlined issues for decision at the NSC meeting on February 14. Attached was a letter to Nixon from Major-General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, to President Nixon, January 16, 1969.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-20, NSC Meeting, Biafra, Strategic Policy Issues 2/14/69. Secret.

Document 42: Issues Paper Prepared for President Nixon, Washington, February 14, 1969

Washington, February 14, 1969

The paper outlined issues for decision at the NSC meeting on February 14 and recommended courses of action.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-20, NSC Meeting, Biafra, Strategic Policy Issues 2/14/69. Secret; also, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 312, NSC Meetings Feb-Mar 1969. Secret.

Document 43: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Richardson) and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 20, 1969

Washington, February 20, 1969

Kissinger told Richardson that the President wanted the Relief Coordinator to come from outside the Department of State.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

Document 44: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 21, 1969

Washington, February 21, 1969

As recommended by Kissinger, the President authorized a press statement announcing the appointment of C. Clyde Ferguson, Jr., as the Biafran Relief Coordinator.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. No classification marking. The President initialed the “Approve" option. Tab A, a press release, and Tab B, Ferguson's biographic information were attached but not published.

Document 45: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 21, 1969

Washington, February 21, 1969

Kissinger recommended that Nixon sign an attached letter to Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, which stressed U.S. humanitarian interest in Nigeria and U.S. desire to avoid political involvement as much as possible. The letter also informed Gowon that a Relief Coordinator was being appointed to emphasize U.S. humanitarian concern. Tab B, a letter from Gowon to Nixon, is published as the attachment to Document 41.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 1, HAK Memoranda to the President, February 1969. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum is an unsigned copy. Morris drafted both the memorandum and the attached letter to Gowon. The latter is a copy marked with an indication that the President signed the original.

Document 46: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 22, 1969

Washington, February 22, 1969

Nixon approved decisions made at the February 14 NSC meeting, including designation of a Relief Coordinator not closely associated with the U.S. Government, and continuing to regard an ultimate Nigerian victory as best suited to U.S. interests.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-20, NSC Meeting, Biafra, Strategic Policy Issues 2/14/69. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

Document 47: Letter from the Secretary-Treasurer of Joint Church Aid-U.S.A., Inc. (Kinney) to the Special Coordinator on Relief (Ferguson), New York, February 26, 1969

New York, February 26, 1969

Kinney expressed hope that one of Ferguson's first acts would be to ask the Nigerian Government to cease attacking relief planes making night flights into Uli airstrip.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969 -June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 517, D-13 Voluntary Agencies Joint Church AID. No classification marking.

Document 48: Memorandum of Conversation, Paris, March 1, 1969, 10:00 a.m.

March 1, 1969, 10:00 a.m.

According to this draft memorandum, French Foreign Minister Michel Debri emphasized France's support for Biafra on moral and political grounds while Secretary of State William Rogers stressed the necessity for humanitarian relief on both sides.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files 1969-1972, Box 484, President's Trip to Europe 2/23-3/2/69, Chronology, Memcons - Vol. I of VIII. Secret.

Document 49: Telegram 2010 from the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, March 6, 1969, 1500Z

March 6, 1969, 1500Z

Mathews reported that he told Commissioner for External Affairs Arikpo he had been instructed to discuss Nigerian Air Force bombing of civilians in rebel territory. Arikpo said it was not policy or intent of the federal military government to harm civilians and that the government was tightening controls over the Nigerian Air Force to minimize casualties.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Cotonou, London, Ottawa, Paris, Yaounde, USUN, and Geneva.

Document 50: Telegram 36410 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, March 8, 1969, 1954Z

March 8, 1969, 1954Z

The Department reported on Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Palmer's meeting with Nigerian Information Commissioner Anthony Enahoro. They discussed U.S. humanitarian policy, bombing of civilians and relief aircraft, assistance to Relief Coordinator Clyde Ferguson, protection of Ibos, Soviet influence in Nigeria, and delays in Nigerian visa issuances.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 Nigeria. Confidential. Repeated to London, Geneva, Paris, and Cotonou. Drafted by R.J. Wach (AF/W), cleared by Palmer, and approved by Melbourne.

Document 51: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 20, 1969

Washington, March 20, 1969

[4 pages not declassified in time for publication.]

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Presidential Correspondence - 1969-1974, Box 763, United Kingdom: Prime Minister Wilson Correspondence #9. Secret. Sent for action.

Document 52: Telegram 2674 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, March 26, 1969, 1150Z

March 26, 1969, 1150Z

The Embassy reported on Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson's mission, including his meetings with Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, and Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria. Ojukwu objected to daylight relief flights but supported a new airstrip, which Ferguson would not support. Gowon noted that Ojukwu's position blocked relief efforts. Ferguson told Gowon that civilian bombing had unified Ibo resistance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated immediate to Addis Ababa. Also repeated to Geneva and USUN.

Document 53: Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, April 2, 1969

Washington, April 2, 1969

INR's analysis of USSR-Nigeria relations concluded that the USSR had exploited the situation as far as possible and would prefer a negotiated end to the war rather than continued fighting.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 4, President's Daily Briefs. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem.

Document 54: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 8, 1969

Washington, April 8, 1969

Kissinger told Nixon that the war continued to be a stalemate; British Prime Minister Harold Wilson's visit to Nigeria had produced no changes, as anticipated; diplomatic initiatives by Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had been unsuccessful; and Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson's efforts had yielded no results but had satisfied Congressional critics and public lobbies at home.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. Nixon wrote the following note on page one: “Sunday, I have decided that our policy supporting the Feds is wrong. They can't make it. Let's begin to get State off this kick.”

Document 55: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 9, 1969

Washington, April 9, 1969

[7 pages not declassified in time for publication.]

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 763, Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974, United Kingdom: Prime Minister Wilson Correspondence #10. Confidential. Sent for information. Another copy of the attached message is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27- Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; Exdis.

Document 56: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson), Washington, April 15, 1969

Washington, April 15, 1969

Kissinger forwarded a memorandum of David Rockefeller's conversation with Ivory Coast Ambassador Ahoua, who met with Rockefeller to present President Houphouet-Boigny's views on Nigeria. Those views concerned Soviet influence in Nigeria, South African Government financial aid for Biafra, and criticism of Secretary Palmer's commitment to the Nigerian Government.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. This unsigned copy of the memorandum indicates that Kissinger signed the original.

Document 57: Telegram 58725 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Liberia, April 16, 1969, 2343Z

April 16, 1969, 2343Z

The Department reported on Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson's visit to Nigeria, including his meeting with Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria then Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, and again with Gowon between March 15 and March 25. Until a surface corridor into Biafra could be opened, a plan to use both Uli and Obilago air fields for daylight relief flights was proposed. Both men were favorable to the corridor concept but stuck to known positions on daylight flights and use of Obilago airstrip.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; LIMDIS. Drafted by S.C. Schott (U/CF); cleared in AF/W and by Melbourne; and approved in U/CF.

Document 58: Memorandum From the Country Director for West Africa (Melbourne) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer), Washington, April 18, 1969

Washington, April 18, 1969

The memorandum outlined the lobbying activities in Washington of Biafrans Dr. Pius Okigbo, Dr. Eni Njoku, and Dr. Kenneth Dike.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969 - June 1970, Box 514, Lot 70 D 336, Political. Limited Official Use.

Document 59: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 21, 1969

Washington, April 21, 1969

During a four-hour dinner conversation with U.S. officials, three Biafrans representatives proposed that the United States call for an arms embargo and an end to the war against Biafran independence.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential. Drafted by George Sherry (AF/W).

Document 60: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 24, 1969

Washington, April 24, 1969

Kissinger warned the President that the Congressional chorus on Nigeria might be rising again, in particular due to a new organization, “Americans for Biafran Relief,” with Senator Kennedy taking the lead. Tabs to attachment are included with Kissinger's January 28 memorandum, Document 25.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria. Confidential. Sent for information.

Document 61: Telegram 3636 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, April 25, 1969, 1518Z

April 25, 1969, 1518Z

The Embassy suggested that “Americans for Biafran Relief" might present an opportunity to put pressure on Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, to facilitate relief efforts. The Embassy wanted the onus for blocking relief put on Ojukwu.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9, Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential.

Document 62: Situation Report Prepared by Nigerian Task Force, April 29, 1969, 4:00 p.m.

April 29, 1969, 4:00 p.m.

French officials estimated 20-40 tons of arms per day had gone into Biafra since March 31.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria. Secret. Drafted by D.F. Smith (AF/W) and approved by Melbourne.

Document 63: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 5, 1969

Washington, May 5, 1969

In a meeting with Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson, Ambassador Iyalla stated that the Cross River surface corridor was all right in principle. However, the Federal Military Government opposed two more C-97s for church groups involved in relief, and airdrops would be acceptable only if inspected first in Lagos.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret. Drafted by S.C. Schott (U/CF).

Document 64: Telegram 3911 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, May 5, 1969, 1600Z

May 5, 1969, 1600Z

The Embassy assumed the Federal Military Government (FMG) would win the war, then devise a multi-state structure to provide stability, and there would not be a pattern of recurring coups.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 2 Nigeria. Secret. Repeated to Paris, Ibadan, Kaduna, CINCSTRIKE, DIA

Document 65: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, May 15, 1969

Washington, May 15, 1969

In a status report on the war, Kissinger told the President that the fighting and diplomacy were stalemated. Biafra could win only through political exhaustion on the Federal side. U.S. policy was being carried out, i.e., political non-involvement and basic neutrality.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. The document is stamped, “The President Has Seen.” Nixon wrote on page one, “HK - I hope the Biafrans survive!”

Document 66: Memorandum From Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Walsh) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 15, 1969

Washington, May 15, 1969

According to Walsh's report, Bishop Swanstrom had requested that the U.S. Government sell two additional C-97s to Joint Church Aid U.S.A., Inc. (JCA) despite FMG opposition. The FMG was linking surface corridor negotiations to sale of additional aircraft. The U.S. Government decided it would replace one JCA C-97 that crashed and was a total loss. Attachments 1 and 2, Incoming Correspondence and Suggested reply, are not published.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential.

Document 67: Aide Mimoire From the Special Coordinator (Ferguson), Washington, May 16, 1969

Washington, May 16, 1969

Ferguson stated in a message to Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, that the crashed JCA C-97 plane would be replaced but the two additional C-97s were in abeyance during surface corridor discussions.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Unclassified. A handwritten note states that the aide-mimoire was handed to the Nigerian ambassador on May 16.

Document 68: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 26, 1969

Washington, May 26, 1969

Morris briefed Kissinger for his meeting that afternoon with Pius Okigbo. He advised Kissinger to stress relief, U.S. neutrality, and the U.S. hope that the two sides would try negotiations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Attached was Document 65.

Document 69: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 2, 1969

Washington, June 2, 1969

Morris advised Kissinger that Federal feelings had reached a flash point over the recent appearance of a Biafran “air force" piloted by Swedish mercenaries and armed with French rockets. In response, it was possible that Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, would bar all relief flights. This would cause tough decisions for the United States.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Kissinger underlined “all but foredoomed" in paragraph 3 on page one and wrote “Why?" and “Roger, What is it that keeps Feds from winning?" In response to the penultimate paragraph on page two, Kissinger wrote: “When are we going to see paper?" In an attached memorandum dated June 11, Bob Houdek asked Morris to answer the questions Kissinger had posed, referring to the “paper" as “the State contingency paper on relief efforts should the Feds decide to outlaw or stop relief flights.” Written at the top of page one of Morris' memorandum is, “Action completed orally per RMorris, 7/22.”

Document 70: Telegram 5026 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, June 4, 1969, 1540Z

June 4, 1969, 1540Z

The Embassy reported that Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson had asked major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, if there was any change in policy toward relief flights. Gowon stated that the policy had not changed--all night flights were “illegal" and those flying did so at their own risk.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Geneva, London, Addis Ababa, Cotonou, Lisbon, Kaduna, and Ibadan.

Document 71: Situation Report Prepared by the Nigerian Task Force, Washington, June 6, 1969

Washington, June 6, 1969

On June 5, an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) plane was shot down by a Nigerian MIG while en-route to Biafra with relief supplies.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Confidential.

Document 72: Department of State Press Statement, Washington, undated

Washington, undated

In this statement, which was handed out to the press on June 6, the Department expressed U.S. regret for the attack by the Nigerian Air Force and reiterated the U.S. position of avoiding political or military involvement in the Nigerian civil war. The attached briefing paper, which was read but not distributed, acknowledged that relief and arms night flights were intermingled, and urged expanded relief through daylight flights and a land corridor.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil war, February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 517, ICRC, Records. Unclassified. At the top of page one of the statement, Schott wrote, “Clyde - Here is last Friday's statement. The top page was handed out and the second one only read out. SCS.”

Document 73: Telegram 5164 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, June 7, 1969, 2029Z

June 7, 1969, 2029Z

The Embassy transmitted a Federal Military Government (FMG) statement in which that government stated that the press releases of the U.S. and Swedish Governments were hypocritical. The FMG charged that Swedish nationals had bombed and strafed civil installations as mercenaries of Biafra, and the United States did not condemn it.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Unclassified; Immediate. Repeated priority to Lome. Also repeated to Cotonou, Geneva, The Hague, Stockholm, Libreville, Yaounde, and London.

Document 74: Telegram 1835 From the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations to the Department of State, Geneva, June 9, 1969, 1534Z

Geneva, June 9, 1969, 1534Z

Ambassador Roger Tubby reported on a meeting with James Freymond, Acting President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), who expressed grave concern regarding problems dealing with both the Federal Military Government (FMG) and Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria. Tubby also noted profound changes in the attitude of some governments and public groups who had been strong supporters of the ICRC.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; Immediate. Repated immediate to Lagos. Also repeated to London.

Document 75: Telegram 93759 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, June 10, 1969, 1525Z

June 10, 1969, 1525Z

The Department expressed its concern that the Federal Military Government (FMG) statement transmitted in telegram 5164 (Document 73) indicated its policy toward relief flights had changed after the ICRC plane was shot down. The Department was aware of the intermingling of arms and relief flights but believed interdiction of relief planes would do damage to the FMG in the long run.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Cotonou, Lisbon, London, and Geneva. Drafted by Smith (AF/W); cleared by Moore and Ferguson; and approved by Palmer.

Document 76: Telegram 5314 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, June 11, 1969, 1629Z

June 11, 1969, 1629Z

Ambassador Mathews reported on his meeting with Federal Commissioner for External Affairs Arikpo, during which he presented U.S. views on Federal Military Government (FMG) policy toward relief flights, the FMG statement in response to a U.S. press release (see Documents 72 and 73), and FMG assurances that the Nigerian Air Force could be controlled. Arikpo stated that the FMG must control its air space. Regarding the FMG statement, Arikpo said it had come from the Ministry of Information and was not an expression of FMG policy.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Immediate; LIMDIS. Repeated priority to Addis Ababa. Also repeated to Cotonou, Lisbon, London, Geneva, CINCSTRIKE.

Document 77: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 13, 1969

Washington, June 13, 1969

Morris advised Kissinger that now that the Federal Military Government (FMG) was moving to interdict arms flights, this would embargo or cause serious danger to relief flights. He admitted that he was not enchanted with the Federal cause, but this could end the war with a Federal victory, which the President reluctantly has concluded to be in the United State's long-term interests.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret.

Document 78: Telegram 5401 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, June 13, 1969, 1653Z

June 13, 1969, 1653Z

Ambassador Mathews reported on his meeting with Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, and Arikpo, Nigerian Federal Commissioner for External Affairs. Gowon stated that the Federal Military Government (FMG) would do all possible to prevent shooting down genuine relief flights. Aircraft that did not comply with Nigerian Air Force instructions would be subject to attack. The FMG wanted to terminate or reduce the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) role in Nigeria.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Immediate. Repeated priority to Addis Ababa. Also repeated to Cotonou, Geneva, Lisbon, and London. The Department replied in telegram 97185, June 13, that it agreed that Gowon's assurances were the most they could hope for at this stage and under the circumstances it was urgent that both the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Joint Church Aid U.S.A., Inc. (JCA) carefully screen cargo on all future flights to ensure there was nothing aboard which the FMG might consider non-relief items. Ibid.

Document 79: Telegram 99708 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, June 18, 1969, 2131Z

June 18, 1969, 2131Z

The Department transmitted Ferguson's June 18 press release in which he stated that there was agreement by the FMG and Biafran authorities to a surface corridor up the Cross River and that the ICRC had undertaken to manage the new relief arrangement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Unclassified; Immediate. Repeated priority to Addis Ababa. Also repeated to Cotonou, The Hague, Lome, London, Paris, USUN, Ibadan and Kaduna. Drafted by Raymond L. Perkins (AF/P), cleared in P/ON, and approved by Perkins.

Document 80: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 1, 1969

Washington, July 1, 1969

Morris told Kissinger that the Federal Military Government (FMG) had all but kicked out the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and imposed a de facto embargo on relief flights into Biafra. Airlifts into Biafra could operate only in daylight following inspection in Federal territory. Those from Sao Tome were illegal and subject to interdiction. Morris was apprehensive of negative reaction by Senator Kennedy and the Biafra lobby.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret.

Document 81: Telegram 109879 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, July 2, 1969, 2316Z

July 2, 1969, 2316Z

The Department transmitted a statement by Secretary Rogers issued on July 2 about the Nigerian situation. Rogers deplored the curtailment of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) role in Nigeria, stated that the United States financed the charter of two shallow draft vessels for ICRC use on the Cross River, and supported controlled day-time relief flights.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Unclassified. The telegrams was also addressed to Addis Ababa, Cotonou, Lagos, London, Niamey, Paris, Stockholm, Yaounde, Geneva, USUN, Douala, Ibadan, Kaduna. Drafted by Powell (AF/P), cleared in P/ON, and approved by Powell.

Document 82: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 7, 1969

Washington, July 7, 1969

Kissinger summarized where the United States Government stood in the wake of the recent Federal Military Government (FMG) decision to take over the relief operation and presented three broad approaches: contest the Federal relief embargo; guarantee relief corridors against military violation; and separate relief from any appearance of pro-Federal bias.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. The memorandum is stamped, “The President Has Seen.” Nixon marked suggested actions in the margin as “OK,” “Good,” and “NO.” He initialed his approval of the three approaches proposed by Kissinger.

Document 83: Telegram 6116 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, July 7, 1969, 1230Z

July 7, 1969, 1230Z

Ambassador Mathews stated that a new, even more serious crisis in U.S.-Nigerian relations was possible arising from the fact that the United States and the Federal Military Government (FMG) faced a similar problem--how to strike a balance between internal pressures and external political realities. In the FMG's case, restrictions on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and relief organizations were necessary to alleviate internal dissent. According to Mathews, the United States balance had for some time been titled toward internal pressure. Thus domestic sympathy for Ibos had led the United States to waver from its usual post-World War II stance of giving firm political support to friendly governments against internal dissidents.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Exdis; Immediate.

Document 84: Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) to Under Secretary of State (Richardson), Washington, July 7, 1969

Washington, July 71969

In this briefing memorandum on the situation in Nigeria, Palmer discussed U.S. policy and possible initiatives following Federal Military Government (FMG) withdrawal of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) from a relief role in Federal areas and the restrictions placed on relief shipments into Biafra. He was pessimistic about a favorable solution. Tabs A-H are not published.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 89-0028R/4/41. Confidential.

Document 85: Telegram 114395 From the Department of State to the Embassy in New Zealand, July 10, 1969, 2239Z

July 10, 1969, 2239Z

The Department provided the text of a classified report on the Biafran food situation. A survey of Biafra's food needs indicated the supply should be adequate in terms of caloric content, even without relief shipments, at least through the end of the summer but the shortage of protein foods would become acute.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential. Drafted by Fitzcharles (U/CF), cleared in AF/W, and approved in U/CF.

Document 86: Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant to the President (Butterfield) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 14, 1969

Washington, July 14, 1969

Butterfield reported that the President, after reading in his daily news summary an advertisement placed in the New York Times by “Americans for Biafran Relief,” stated that he agreed with it and that he (not State) should do something about Biafra.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. No classification marking. An attached, but unpublished, memorandum from the Staff Secretary to Kissinger, July 15, asked that a plan of Presidential actions be submitted. A handwritten note on the memorandum states, “ROGER MORRIS is preparing plan for HAK's approval, Aug 5.”

Document 87: Telegram 116458 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, July 15, 1969, 0317Z1

July 15, 1969, 0317Z1

Under Secretary of State Richardson instructed Ambassador Mathews to inform Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, when delivering the letter transmitted in telegram 116460, that the United States Government was disturbed at his incitement of public opinion against the United States. Further, if the relief impasse continued much longer, the question of possible new U.S. approaches to the problem would undoubtedly arise.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Drafted by Sherry (AF/W) and Melbourne; cleared in the White House, U, S/S, and by Ferguson and Moore AF; and approved by Richardson.

Document 88: Telegram 116460 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, July 15, 1969, 0321Z

July 15, 1969, 0321Z

In a letter to Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, President Nixon urged the Federal Military Government (FMG) leader to permit an immediate resumption of relief flights by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and religious voluntary agencies and implementation of the Cross River relief corridor.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Drafted by Faville (AF/W); cleared in S/S, the White House, U, U/CF and by Moore; and approved by Richardson.

Document 89: Telegram 116456 From the Department of State to the Embassy in France and the U.S. Mission in Geneva, July 15, 1969, 0313Z

July 15, 1969, 0313Z

The Department transmitted a letter in which President Nixon urged Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny to encourage Biafran authorities to agree to a prompt resumption of relief flights and realization of the Cross River corridor.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Drafted by Sherry (AF/W); cleared in S/S, AF, the White House, AF/CW, EUR/FBX, U/CF and U; and approved by Richardson.

Document 90: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Washington, July 18, 1969

Washington, July 18, 1969

In a conversation with his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, President Nixon indicated a shift in control of Nigerian policy from the Department of State to the National Security Council. Nixon said that the United States had to use everything it had to end the war; support for the Nigerian Government should stop, British Prime Minister Wilson should cease his assistance, and French President Pompidou should increase Biafran support.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 360, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

Document 91: Telegram 2581 From the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations to the Department of State, Geneva, July 23, 1969,1750Z

Geneva, July 23, 1969,1750Z

The Mission transmitted the Biafran Government's open letter to Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson suggesting acceptance of Secretary of State Rogers' statement on relief. Biafra accepted day and night relief flights, day flights to commence immediately, and the Cross River proposal. The letter went on, however, to impose conditions that negated acceptance of the proposals.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Repeated priority to Lagos. Also repeated to London and The Hague.

Document 92: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 31, 1969, 5:00 p.m.

Washington, July 31, 1969, 5:00 p.m.

During a long conversation with Assistant Secretary of State Newsom and the Country Director for West Africa, Roy Melbourne, Saturday Review editor Norman Cousins reported on his trip to Nigeria and Biafra. He met Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, then Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, and believed it might be possible to begin negotiations if the sides could be pinned down.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War February 1969 - June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 517, Memcons (other). Confidential. Drafted by Stokes (AF/W).

Document 93: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 1, 1969, 5:30 p.m.

Washington, August 1, 1969, 5:30 p.m.

Morris provided background information for Kissinger in case Biafra was raised by the French in Paris meetings. According to Morris there were no major military changes, no serious talks were underway, relief flights had been blocked by failure to agree on daytime flights. Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson had the two sides meeting secretly in Geneva, but chances of an agreement were slim.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. “Dispatched" is written at the top of page one.

Document 94: Telegram 2740 From the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations to the Department of State, Geneva, August 1, 1969, 1256Z

Geneva, August 1, 1969, 1256Z

The Mission transmitted the final text of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) note to the Federal Military Government (FMG) dated August 1. The ICRC note stated that daylight relief flights from Cotonou and Santa Isabel could be inspected and observers could board and accompany flights.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Repeated to Lagos, Addis Ababa, London, Paris, The Hague, and USUN.

Document 95: Telegram 129202 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, August 2, 1969, 0106Z

August 2, 1969, 0106Z

The Department believed the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) daytime flight proposal merited careful Federal Military Government (FMG) consideration. The assistance of the United Kingdom High Commissioner should be sought to persuade the FMG to consider the proposal.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; LIMDIS; Immediate. Repeated to Addis Ababa, London, Paris, The Hague, Geneva, and USUN. Drafted by Melbourne and Sherry (AF/W); cleared in U/CF, Gleysteen S/S, and U; and approved by Moore.

Document 96: Telegram 6969 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, August 2, 1969, 1430Z

August 2, 1969, 1430Z

The Embassy reported that the United Kingdom High Commissioner had said that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) proposal was worse than expected. It offered the Federal Military Government (FMG) no concessions, and might end chances for a reasonable compromise.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; LIMDIS; Immediate. Repeated priority to Addis Ababa. Also repeated to London, Paris, The Hague, Geneva, and USUN.

Document 97: Telegram 129331 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Nigeria and the United Kingdom, August 2, 1969, 2122Z

August 2, 1969, 2122Z

The Department expressed its disappointment that United Kingdom High Commissioner considered the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) note so negative from the standpoint of Federal Military Government (FMG) interests. The embassies were urged to press the proposal to the FMG as a neutral.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; LIMDIS; Immediate. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Paris, The Hague, Geneva, and USUN. Drafted by Melbourne and Spigler (AF/W); cleared in U/CF and approved by Moore.

Document 98: Telegram 2773 From the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations to the Department of State, Geneva, August 4, 1969, 1730Z

Geneva, August 4, 1969, 1730Z

The Mission reported on Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson's meeting with International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) officials, who expected the Federal Military Government (FMG) to reject its plan. They also anticipated attacks on Joint Church Aid U.S.A., Inc. (JCA) flights when night fighter planes were acquired. There was severe division within the committee but all agreed the ICRC would leave Nigeria between August 15 and September 3. There was considerable support for the ICRC's becoming “revolutionary humanitarians" if it was to survive.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; LIMDIS; Immediate. Repeated priority to Lagos. Also repeated to Libreville, Addis Ababa, The Hague, London, Paris, and USUN.

Document 99: Telegram 7068 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, August 5, 1969, 1725Z

August 5, 1969, 1725Z

The Embassy expected the negative Federal Military Government (FMG) response as the ICRC failed to consider the sovereignty issue, but the message should not be taken as absolute rejection. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) should consider a new personal mission to Lagos. The Embassy did not believe the FMG was pursuing a policy of genocide nor did Marcel Naville, ICRC president, despite the belief by ICRC Vice President James Freymond and others.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; LIMDIS; Priority. Repeated to Geneva, Addis Ababa, London, Paris, and USUN. The text of Gowon's August 4 message to Naville was transmitted in telegram 7029 from Lagos, August 5. Gowon stated in part: “You have not informed me of any aspects my government's policy which in your opinion contravene any articles Geneva Convention pertinent to situation civil war. My government's policy can only be regarded as defective or unrealistic if can be shown contravene international conventions. Any judgment other than that cannot but be political and this is no function your organization.” (Ibid.)

Document 100: Memorandum Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, August 5, 1969

Washington, August 5, 1969

The memorandum analyzed Federal Military Government (FMG) war aims with specific regard to the Ibos. According to the memorandum, there was no intent to commit genocide, and Gowon and his senior officers probably would take great pains to prevent the massacre of Ibos if federal forces did overrun the Biafran enclave.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. The memorandum was prepared at Morris' request, concurred in by the Clandestine Service, and forwarded to Kissinger by Thomas Karamessines under cover of an August 6 memorandum.

Document 101: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 10, 1969

Washington, August 10, 1969

Morris agreed with Kissinger that Richardson should direct the peace initiative, if approved by the President, but felt that State's Africa Bureau was hopelessly pro-Federal. Morris recommended that he have direct participation in the probe.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Eyes Only.

Document 102: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, August 11, 1969

Washington, August 11, 1969

Responding to Nixon's instruction to consider a Presidential initiative to conciliate Nigeria and Biafra, Kissinger provided a summary on the major elements to be dealt with in peace negotiations and on the President's options, with a recommended plan of action that Nixon approved.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. Nixon initialed his approval of Kissinger's recommendation.

Document 103: Special National Intelligence Estimate, Washington, August 12, 1969

Washington, August 12, 1969

The SNIE concluded that an effective embargo on arms shipments to both parties was highly unlikely. If there were an effective embargo, the level of hostilities would soon diminish but neither party would be any more willing to compromise.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, NIC Files, Job 79R-01012A, Box 372, Folders 1 and 2. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.

Document 104: Special Annex to Special National Intelligence Estimate 64.2-69, Washington, August 12, 1969

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files. Top Secret; Umbra. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files. Top Secret; Umbra.

Document 105: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom), Washington, August 21, 1969

Washington, August 21, 1969

Morris recommended several steps to be taken if a full-scale initiative began to work.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 519, Geneva. Secret.

Document 106: Letter From Norman Cousins to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),

New York, August 25, 1969

Norman Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review, expressed his reservations about the possibility of an early Federal victory and his belief that President Nixon could play an effective role in ending the war. He suggested that the food situation might be serious but was not decisive in Biafra's ability to persevere.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Confidential.

Document 107: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 21, 1969

Washington, August 21, 1969

In anticipation of the President's meeting with Secretary of State Rogers on August 22, Morris provided Kissinger with a copy of Newsom's briefing memorandum for Rogers for the meeting, in which Newsom recommended immediately launching a full-fledged peace probe that Morris considered heavily weighted toward the Federal side. Morris recommended that Kissinger advise the President to pursue a serious peace probe but on a more even-handed basis and with White House participation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, U.S.-Domestic-Agency Files, State/White House Relationship, Vol. I January 28 - October 31, 1969. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. The attached memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State Newsom to Rogers, was classified Secret. The President's Daily Diary indicates that a meeting between the President, who was at the Western White House, and Rogers did not take place on August 22 nor did they meet before the end of the month. The President and Rogers talked by phone on the evening of August 28.

Document 108: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to Anthony Lake of the National Security Council Staff, Washington, August 23, 1969

Washington, August 23, 1969

Morris informed Lake of his confusion over Secretary of State Rogers' intentions in the Nigerian problem.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, U.S.-Domestic-Agency Files, State/White House Relationship, Vol. I January 28 - October 31, 1969. Secret; Sensitive. Tab A of the attachment was attached but not published. Tab B of the attachment is Document 101.

Document 109: Editorial Note

Document 110: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 30, 1969

Washington, August 30, 1969

Morris informed Kissinger that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had offered the Federal Military Government (FMG) the right to call down random flights for inspection on Nigerian territory. They had requested a response to be given by September 1. If the response were anything less than an unequivocal yes, the ICRC would end its operation. That would leave the Joint Church Aid U.S.A., Inc. (JCA) agencies and their “illegal" flights as the only relief operation and force the United States to choose either to support their airlift or bow out of the relief business altogether.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. This copy of the memorandum is not initialed.

Document 111: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Attorney General Mitchell, Washington, September 1, 1969

Washington, September 1, 1969

Kissinger discussed Nigeria/Biafra as one of a series of incidents in which the bureaucracy was either unresponsive to President Nixon's desires or displayed an extraordinary inability to coordinate internal matters.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, U.S.-Domestic-Agency Files, State/White House Relationship, Vol. I, January 18 - October 31, 1969. Secret; Exclusively Eyes Only.

Document 112: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Washington, September 2, 1969

The President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, and Saturday Review editor Norman Cousins discussed Cousins' upcoming trip to Nigeria. The trip would be unofficial. President Nixon did not want to put anything in writing--official involvement would come when there were potential areas of agreement.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 52, Country Files, Africa, “Cousins, Norman” Biafra. No classification marking.

Document 113: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 3, 1969

Washington, September 3, 1969

Kissinger confirmed the unofficial trip by Saturday Review editor Norman Cousins with no U.S. involvement unless Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, and Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, responded positively.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 52, Country Files, Africa, “Cousins, Norman” Biafra. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. This copy of the memorandum is not initialed.

Document 114: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 4, 1969

Washington, September 4, 1969

Kissinger informed the President that Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, had agreed to a 3-week period of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) daylight relief flights to Biafra. A reliable source reported that he made the decision in the face of almost unanimous cabinet opposition.

Source: National Archives, Nixon's Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 10, President's Daily Briefs. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Tab A is not published.

Document 115: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Washington, September 9, 1969

Washington, September 9, 1969

In a telephone conversation with Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, Saturday Review editor Norman Cousins indicated that he was going to meet with a representative from the Eastern region the following day. Kissinger stated he and the President would not take an official position until there was some hope.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 52, Country Files, Africa, “Cousins, Norman” Biafra. No classification marking.

Document 116: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 12, 1969

Washington, September 12, 1969

Morris brought Kissinger up to date on negotiations over International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) relief flights. The Federals had agreed “in principle" to daylight flights while the Biafrans had not because they wanted a guarantee against Nigerian violations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. The memorandum is stamped “HAK has seen.” Telegram 3296 from the U.S. Mission in Geneva to the Department of State, September 15, transmitted a Markpress release stating: “The Government of the Republic of Biafra has rejected the new agreement signed between the Nigerian Government and the ICRC on daylight relief flights to Biafra as it contains no adequate guarantee against Nigerian military exploitation of the flights.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria)

Document 117: Telegram 8336 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, September 16, 1969, 1111Z

September 16, 1969, 1111Z

The Embassy reported that Biafra was expanding its air force through acquisition of T-6 airplanes and needed more aviation gas, which was obtained from relief flights based in Sao Tome and Libreville. This increased friction between the Federal Military Government (FMG) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Delivery of C-97s to Joint Church Aid U.S.A., Inc. (JCA) threatened to have an adverse effect on the U.S. position in Nigeria unless strict fuel control measures were adopted.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 514, Folder A-2. Confidential. Repeated to Geneva, DIA, and CINCSTRIKE.

Document 118: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 20, 1969

Washington, September 20, 1969

Kissinger told the President that Norman Cousins, the editor of the Saturday Review, believed his usefulness in the Nigerian situation had ended. Kissinger recommended, and Nixon approved, that Cousins be authorized to pass a message to the Biafran representatives in Paris that a member of Kissinger's staff would be available for an informal meeting. Nixon initialed “Approve.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action.

Document 119: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 20, 1969

Washington, September 20, 1969

Kissinger recommended a Presidential statement on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) daylight relief flight efforts and a quiet offer of assistance to the ICRC in an attempt to secure Biafran agreement.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 741, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Nodis. Nixon initialed “Approve" and wrote “good work!" below. The memorandum is marked on page one, “Roger Informed" and “File - Special File. Not to Secretariat”. Tab A is not published.

Document 120: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 22, 1969

Washington, September 22, 1969

Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson's 3-hour conversation with Biafran representatives included the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) daylight flight plan, the Cross River route project, and the One Nigeria concept.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 517, Memcons (2/25-12/29/69). Confidential.

Document 121: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 22, 1969

Washington, September 22, 1969

Morris objected to two telegrams from the Embassy in Nigeria that ran counter to the President's Nigeria policy. Morris wrote that he would discuss the telegrams with Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Confidential; Nodis. The memorandum is stamped “HAK has seen Sep 30 1969.”

Document 122: Memorandum of Conversation, New York, September 25, 1969

New York, September 25, 1969

In a meeting with Norman Cousins, the editor of the Saturday Review, and Biafran representatives, Roger Morris of the National Security Council staff stressed that the discussions were informal, secret, and implied no U.S. commitment. The participants discussed starting negotiations, a partial stand-down, the U.S. position, negotiation procedures, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), security guarantees, other powers, relief, and the shape of the settlement. Morris stated that he would convey the content of the conversation to the President and his assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 52, Country Files, Africa, “Cousins, Norman” Biafra. Secret; Sensitive. An October 3 memorandum from Morris to Bill Watts indicates that the memorandum of conversation was forwarded to Kissinger. (Ibid., Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I)

Document 123: Memorandum of Conversation, New York, September 26, 1969

New York, September 26, 1969

Secretary of State Rogers met with Federal Commissioner for External Affairs Arikpo in New York. They discussed International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) flights, reintegration of Ibos into Nigerian society, and meetings with Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Conference Files 1966-1972, Entry 3051B, Box 499, 24th UNGA - Memcons, Vol. II, #30. Secret.

Document 124: Memorandum of Conversation, New York, October 2, 1969

New York, October 2, 1969

Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson met with Nigerian officials in New York and had a candid exchange of views about C-97s, Joint Church Aid U.S.A., Inc. (JCA) operations, and political pressure from churches.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 518, E-1 Office Memoranda, reports to Under Secretary, etc. Confidential.

Document 125: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom), Washington, October 6, 1969

Washington, October 6, 1969

Morris outlined new diplomatic efforts for ending the Biafran War. He believed the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had done some fast shuffling with the daylight flight proposal so the Federal Military Government (FMG) was committed while Biafra was not. Morris felt that the next proposals must be precise.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 517, Memorandum. Secret. Copies were sent to Ferguson and Ruser.

Document 126: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 6, 1969

Washington, October 6, 1969

In anticipation of President Nixon's meeting with Secretary of State William Rogers on October 6, Morris briefed Kissinger on bilateral talks on Nigeria at the United Nations, developments in the war, and the Department of State's line of argument. Morris advocated an activist U.S. role and warned Kissinger against Rogers' hands-off policy.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 280, Agency Files, Department of State, 10/01/69, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for briefing. The cables at Tab A are not published.

Document 127: Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, October 6, 1969

Washington, October 6, 1969

Rogers thought prospects for achieving agreement on relief arrangements were not good, nor was there evidence that either side was prepared to make the concessions required for meaningful negotiations. He outlined a number of “further steps.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret. In an October 8 memorandum for Kissinger, Haig said that Morris thought Rogers' memo completely misrepresented the issues; Morris was preparing a memorandum on it for Kissinger. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Items to Discuss With the President, 8/13/69-12/30/69)

Document 128: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 12, 1969, 1-4 p.m.

Washington, October 12, 1969, 1-4 p.m.

Roger Morris of the National Security Council staff met with Federal Commissioner for External Affairs Arikpo and Nigerian Ambassador Iyalla at the latter's residence and had a slightly acrimonious discussion on a range of topics: Biafran morale, U.S. relief policy, French status, Uli airfield, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, Major General Gowon's, position and authority, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) daylight flights, and U.S. interest in the conflict.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil war, February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 518, President Nixon. Secret; Nodis. A copy was sent to Ferguson.

Document 129: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 15, 1969

Washington, October 15, 1969

Morris briefed Kissinger on Nigeria/Biafra for his meeting that afternoon with Federal Commissioner for External Affairs Arikpo and provided talking points. Morris noted that Under Secretary of State Richardson had “decided" to proceed with the relief initiative the President previously instructed and had also “decided" to get moving on peace probing.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NCS Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Morris attached the memorandum of his conversation with Arikpo and Iyalla on October 12 (Document 128).

Document 130: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 24, 1969

Washington, October 24, 1969

Morris informed Kissinger that he was still very concerned about the low-key way the Department of State was going about the Presidential instruction to mount a serious peace probe. Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson seemed on board and sought to bring Secretary of State William Rogers around by having Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom send a memorandum to the Secretary which Richardson would endorse. But the an advance draft copy of Newsom's memorandum, which Morris attached, “directly contravenes the President's instructions to pursue an even-handed and vigorous initiative.” Morris requested (and received) Kissinger's approval to discuss Saturday Review editor Norman Cousins' peace efforts with Richardson.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for action. Morris made notations on and underlined portions of the attachment.

Document 131: Telegram 180295 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, October 24, 1969, 0443Z

October 24, 1969, 0443Z

The telegram transmitted a message for Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, from President Nixon. The United States stood with the Federal Military Government (FMG) on its commitment to International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) daylight flights without violation. The Biafrans would be asked that Uli not be used for arms flights in daylight hours.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London and Abidjan. Drafted by Brubeck (AF/SN); cleared by Newsom, and in U/CF, S/S, and the White House; and approved by Richardson.

Document 132: Telegram 3001 From the Embassy in Ivory Coast to the Department of State, October 24, 1969, 1650Z

October 24, 1969, 1650Z

Biafra rejected the U.S. proposal for daylight flights, blaming the rejection on the Federal Military Government (FMG).

Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9, Biafra-Nigeria. Secret.

Document 133: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Haig), Washington, October 27, 1969

Washington, October 27, 1969

Morris informed Haig that the Department of State's Bureau of African Affairs personnel had been instructed not to talk to him. Also, Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom had attempted to cut him off from all Bureau of African Affairs papers, memoranda, and policy discussions.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 148, U.S.-Domestic-Agency Files, State/White House Relationship, Vol. 1, January 28 - October 31, 1969. Confidential; Informal; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Morris wrote in hand at the bottom of page 3, “Newsom cleared' his testimony, as pro forma, with Bob--and was told to avoid all statements implying what our policy is or would be. Commerce and Treas. Were told likewise, and they observed the restraint. You can judge from passages at clips how seriously Newsom took the clearance.'”3 The attachments are not published.

Document 134: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 1, 1969

Washington, November 1, 1969

Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson proposed a Presidential statement that placed responsibility on Biafran authorities for the failure to achieve an agreement for daytime International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) relief flights. Robert L. Brown signed the memorandum for Eliot.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria. No classification marking. The statement was not released. See Document 135, Attachment C thereto, and Document 137.

Document 135: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 6, 1969

Washington, November 6, 1969

Morris recommended against a harsh Presidential statement condemning Biafra for its failure to implement daytime relief flights. He wanted Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson to issue a mild statement to preserve an impression of balance and fairness.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Nodis. Tab B is not published. Morris' memorandum at Tab C is marked OBE, Overtaken By Events. The attached draft memorandum was not forwarded to the President. Attachments A and B to the draft memorandum were not published.

Document 136: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 6, 1969

Washington, November 6, 1969

Edward Kinney of Joint Church Aid U.S.A., Inc. (JCA) reported on talks with the Federal Military Government (FMG) and Biafra on JCA daylight flights. The Nigerians were more interested than the Biafrans, but he was not optimistic of a favorable result.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, Lot 70 D 336, Box 517, D-13 Voluntary Agencies JCA. Secret. The memorandum is 8 pages but only the summary is published.

Document 137: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to Anthony Lake of the National Security Council Staff, Washington, November 7, 1969

Washington, November 7, 1969

Morris outlined the ideological clash over Biafra among Secretary of State William Rogers, Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson, and himself. Morris complained that State was not clearing Nigerian policy cables and recommended Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger discuss with Rogers the President's desire for an active peace probe.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Eyes Only; Highest Priority. The memorandum is marked “Sent by wire to K. B., 11/6" and “OK, W" and was initialed by Haig.

Document 138: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 11, 1969

Washington, November 11, 1969

Kissinger informed the President that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had ceased direct relief to Biafra and would channel its funds, food stocks, and equipment (including U.S. donated aircraft) to French and Scandinavian Red Cross agencies operating out of Sao Tome and Libreville.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 13, President's Daily Briefs. Nixon wrote on page 2, “What does State suggest we do?”

Document 139: Statement by Secretary Rogers, Washington, November 12, 1969

Washington, November 12, 1969

In his statement, Rogers rebuked Biafra for rejecting daytime flights and expressed doubt that the Cross River proposal could substitute for relief flights due to a low water level.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-9, Biafra-Nigeria. No classification marking.

Document 140: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 14, 1969

Washington, November 14, 1969

Morris's memorandum on bureaucratic coordination outlined the policy conflict over Nigeria/Biafra among the President, the National Security Council, Secretary of State William Rogers, Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson, and Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom. Morris recommended that Kissinger discuss the policy with Rogers, but Kissinger preferred to discuss it with Richardson.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for action. The option, “I'll handle it with Richardson,” was checked. A handwritten note on page one says, “Action Completed.”

Document 141: Intelligence Note No. 811 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cline) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, November 14, 1969

Washington, November 14, 1969

Cline assessed the recent acquisition of aircraft by Biafra and Nigeria as well as new Nigerian field pieces. He doubted there would be serious negotiations until one side or the other was hurt sufficiently to force concessions.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.

Document 142: Intelligence Note No. 830 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cline) to Secretary Rogers, Washington, November 26, 1969

Washington, November 26, 1969

Although an attempt would be made to have second level talks under Haile Selassie's supervision when Ramadan ended after December 12, Cline believed a military solution was most likely.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem.

Document 143: Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State (Richardson) to President Nixon, Washington, December 4, 1969

Washington, December 4, 1969

Richardson outlined four basic courses of action on relief and indicated that the Department of State planned to proceed with the fourth one: increase U.S. support for humanitarian organizations that had existing airlift programs capable of ensuring a more adequate flow of supplies.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. In a December 23 note to Morris regarding Richardson's memorandum, Jeanne Davis, Director of the NSC Secretariat, stated, “I agree, of course, that this was OBE as of the week following its receipt. However, since we received it on December 5, several days before it became OBE, we are in the embarrassing position of having interdicted a memo from the Acting Secretary of State to the President on an important item. If there was any follow-up action, or if there are mitigating circumstances, could you please do a small memo for the record as a fig leaf to cover our nakedness.” Morris responded in an undated, handwritten note, “This was OBE as a matter of policy substance in State before it arrived, let alone events in Africa being anticipated here. Those who know the substance of the problem, therefore, are quite clothed.”

Document 144: Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 5, 1969

Washington, December 5, 1969

Haig, at National Security Council staffer Roger Morris's suggestion, proposed to Kissinger placing before the President the choice of appealing for a Christmas Humanitarian Truce in Biafra. He expected the African Bureau at the Department of State to drag its feet on the idea. Special Coordinator Clyde Ferguson, however, approved of the idea, which would strengthen the President's position for the coming tragedy. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Henry A. Kissinger/Richardson Meetings, 11/12-69. Top Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger indicated on the memorandum that he had discussed the concept with Richardson and wrote “appealing idea--will make proposal.”

Document 145: Memorandum Prepared for the Under Secretary of State (Richardson), Washington, Washington, December 9, 1969

Washington, December 9, 1969

The memorandum concluded that the population of Biafra was 3.2 million, considerably lower than figures used by relief agencies; the nutritional condition had deteriorated since June, 1969; and 160 tons of relief supplies per night would meet minimum needs.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NCS Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Confidential. The memorandum was forwarded to Kissinger by Theodore Eliot, Department of State Executive Secretary, under cover of a December 10 memorandum stating: “Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum prepared for the Under Secretary.” Written in hand on the cover memorandum is, “No action necessary per R. Morris 12/16/69.”

Document 146: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, December 10, 1969

Washington, December 10, 1969

Kissinger wrote the memorandum in reaction to an article in the Washington Post on December 10 stating that the Agency for International Development (AID) was building a road which was of potential military value to the Federal forces surrounding Biafra. Kissinger told the President that the road was good for relief, but had no military value to the Federals; he thought there was reason to suspend construction and was reviewing the matter further with State and AID.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Sensitive. There are three handwritten notes on page one: Nixon wrote, “K - I think we need another review of our policy here--We are satisfying no one--& accomplishing nothing”; Kissinger wrote, “Roger--crank up another review after talking to me. K”; and a third note states “OBE” per MR 1/16/70.” The article at Tab A and the map at Tab B are not published.

Document 147: Telegram 208132 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, December 16, 1969, 2115Z

December 16, 1969, 2115Z

The Department transmitted a message for Nigerian Federal Commissioner for External Affairs Arikpo from under Secretary of Sate Richardson. The prospect of Addis talks under the supervision of His Imperial Majesty was encouraging, but while Biafran representatives were en-route, Federal Military Government (FMG) participation was in doubt. Richardson sought to convince Arikpo that FMG attendance was essential, if only for positive public relations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Addis Ababa, London, Paris, and USUN. Drafted by Brubeck (AF/SN); cleared by Moore AF, Newsom, and Eliot; and approved by Richardson.

Document 148: Telegram 10757 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, December 17, 1969, 1108Z

December 17, 1969, 1108Z

Ambassador Trueheart reported on Nigerian Federal Commissioner for External Affairs Arikpo's reaction to receiving Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson's message. Arikpo appreciated the points made, but believed it was time to end the “propaganda exercises.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Exdis; Immediate.

Document 149: Telegram 5483 From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State, Addis Ababa, December 18, 1969, 1400Z

December 18, 1969, 1400Z

The Embasssy transmitted the statement to the press issued by the leader of the Biafran delegation to the Addis Ababa peace talks, explaining why the delegation was departing.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 15, President's Daily Briefs. Unclassified; Immediate. Repeated immediate to Lagos. Also repeated to London and Paris.

Document 150: Transcript of Telephone Conversation, Washington, December 23, 1969

Washington, December 23, 1969

Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger discussed National Security Council staff member ROGER MORRIS's proposal for a Christmas truce. Richardson indicated that the Department of State had sought to determine if there was any basis for joining other countries in an appeal and had received little support. He noted that the Federal Military Government (FMG) was engaged in a broad offensive and would believe that unilateral action on the part of the United States would suggest involvement.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

Document 151: Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, January 9, 1970

Washington, January 9, 1970

Rogers provided the President with a status report from the Department of State's perspective on the military situation, relief problems, future contingencies, diplomatic initiatives, and mediation efforts of the Biafra problem.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret.

Document 152: Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 9, 1970

Washington, January 9, 1970

The memorandum illustrates the division between the White House and State over Nigeria/Biafra, with Eagleburger meeting privately with Biafran representatives in Brussels and not informing any Department of State official. Haig advised Kissinger to inform Richardson about the meeting, claiming that the Biafrans refused to deal with State and this was only a feeler.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Top Secret; Umbra; Eyes Only.

Document 153: Memorandum from Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), January 10, 1970

January 10, 1970

Morris expressed his concern over the possibility of genocide by the Federal army and his desire for an armistice that recognized Biafra.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS SCI 17, Memoranda to the President, Jan-April 1970. Secret.

Document 154: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 10, 1970

Washington, January 10, 1970

Kissinger informed the President that, according to the French, Biafran forces were collapsing. The French desired U.S. common action in these grave circumstances. The map at Tab A is not published.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS SCI 17, Memoranda to the President, Jan-April 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Contains Codeword.

Document 155: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 10, 1970

Washington, January 10, 1970

Kissinger provided the President with talking points on Biafra for his telephone call with Prime Minister Wilson.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS SCI 17, Memoranda to the President, Jan-April 1970. Secret. Sent for briefing.

Document 156: Telegram 233 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, January 10, 1970, 2245Z

January 10, 1970, 2245Z

The embassy reported that the Federal Military Government (FMG) had made no victory claims, and no information was available that would suggest Biafran defenses had disintegrated. Hard evidence indicated that Biafrans who had recently come under FMG control were being well cared for.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated priority to London. Also repeated to Paris, Geneva, USUN, Libreville, Addis Ababa, CINCSTRIKE, DIA.

Document 157: Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, January 12, 1970

Washington, January 12, 1970

Rogers provided an updated status report from the Department's viewpoint. An early Biafran capitulation or disintegration was likely, presenting problems of relief and security. Rogers noted the Federal Military Government's (FMG) sensitivity to external meddling and the need for a low-key approach. It was also important for the United States to have a clear record demonstrating its support of an expanded relief effort.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 281, Agency Files, Department of State, 12/01/69 - 02/21/70, Vol. V. Confidential.

Document 158: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 12, 1970

Washington, January 12, 1970

Kissinger recommended announcement of a $10 million emergency donation to Biafra relief and approval of a message to Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, offering assistance and recognizing his conciliatory policy.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. A check mark next to “Approve" and an adjacent handwritten note, “per HAK 1/12,” indicate that the President approved Kissinger's recommendations. A January 12 memorandum from Eliot to Rogers indicates that Rogers approved a telegram containing the letter to Gowon as revised by the White House. Eliot noted that the wording of the proposed letter, as drafted by State, had been changed considerably by the White House but there were few substantive changes. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria)

Document 159: Transcript of Telephone Conversation, Washington, January 14, 1970, 5:40 p.m.

January 14, 1970, 5:40 p.m.

In a conversation with Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger, President Nixon approved Secretary of State Rogers' proposed trip to Lagos but believed he had to be strong with Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria. The President emphasized that Rogers should stress U.S. interest in humanitarian concerns.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 3-14 Jan 1970. No classification marking.

Document 160: Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the White House Situation Room, Washington, January 14, 1970, 2026Z

Washington, January 14, 1970, 2026Z

Director of Central Intelligence Helms forwarded an intelligence report that he believed showed “such cynicism on the part of the French" that Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger might want to bring it to the attention of the President. The report stated that there were no plans at present for French support to Biafran guerrilla resistance. The rationale, it was reported, was that the French supported Biafra because of oil, not the Ibo revolution.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Noforn Dissem; Controlled Dissem. The telegram was forwarded to Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Haig by his secretary under cover of a January 14 memorandum which stated that DCI Helms had called and left the following message for Haig: “It seems to me that this item, although raw intelligence, shows such cynicism on the part of the French, Dr. Kissinger might want to bring it to the attention of the President.”

Document 161: Memorandum for the Record, Washington, January 14, 1970

Washington, January 14, 1970

Morris reported to the NSC Staff that many relief operations in Nigeria had been blacklisted. Kissinger wanted to maintain a moral stance and stress our concern. The United States could not accept the concept that whatever Lagos did was right.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 314, NSC 14, Meetings Staff Meetings 1969-1971. Secret.

Document 162: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Under Secretary of State (Richardson), Washington, January 14, 1970

Washington, January 14, 1970

In this memorandum on “Next Steps in Nigerian Relief,” Morris outlined numerous relief effort possibilities while expressing concern about possible domestic criticism. He stressed the Western Report as the basis for determining food needs in Biafra while doubting the capabilities of the Federal Military Government (FMG). Tab A is not published.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central files 1970-73, POL 27-9, Biafra-Nigeria. Secret; Eyes Only.

Document 163: Telegram 6676 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ivory Coast, January 15, 1970, 2010Z

January 15, 1970, 2010Z

The telegram provided a situation report on Nigeria. Hostilities had ended despite assertions to the contrary by Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria. No evidence of atrocities by either side had turned up. The Federal Military Government (FMG) had blacklisted four governments and five relief agencies. Foreign relief workers who operated illegally in the Biafran enclave had been declared persona non grata.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23 Nigeria. Confidential. Drafted by J.O. Westmoreland, and approved by Brubeck and the Nigeria Working Group. Also sent for action to Addis Ababa, Bonn, Lagos, Libreville, London, Lome, Niamey, Oslo, Paris, Rome, The Hague, Geneva, USUN, CINCSTRIKE, MAC CP Scott AFB.

Document 164: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 15, 1970

Washington, January 15, 1970

Morris recommended that Kissinger see Princess de Bourbon who flew out of Biafra with Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, Military Governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, and had a message for the President. Kissinger deferred to Richardson, who objected because it could ruffle feelings in Lagos, and arranged for her to meet Deputy Assistant Secretary Moore.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. No classification marking. Kissinger initialed “HK” next to “Approve" but wrote, “(But give Richardson opportunity to object.)" A handwritten note on the attachment, “HAK will call,” indicated Kissinger would explain the situation to Galbraith.

Document 165: Transcript of Telephone Conversation, Washington, January 15, 1970, 4:20 p.m.

January 15, 1970, 4:20 p.m.

Norman Cousins urged Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger to organize a large-scale “post-war reparations" program for Biafra.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological Files. No classification marking.

Document 166: Transcript of Telephone Conversation, Washington, January 15, 1970, 6:10 p.m.

Washington, January 15, 1970, 6:10 p.m.

Kissinger told Nixon that Cousins felt the President could gain prestige with groups not usually accessible to him by stressing humanitarian relief to Biafra. Nixon indicated he wanted to be sure that the USG took a leadership role on humanitarian problems.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

Document 167: Telegram 432 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, January 15, 1970, 1703Z

January 15, 1970, 1703Z

The telegram reported on conditions in the former Biafran enclave. There was no misbehavior of Federal troops, no evidence of guerrilla activity by Biafrans, and no pockets of serious malnutrition. There was a fragmentary report that food and drugs were needed at Orlu, but there was puzzlement over the failure to find areas of serious malnutrition.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 Nigeria. Secret; Immediate. Repeated priority to London. Also repeated to Paris, Geneva, USUN.

Document 168: Transcript of Telephone Conversation, Washington, January 16, 1970, 2:40 p.m.

Washington, January 16, 1970, 2:40 p.m.

Rogers stated that Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, was the key to Africa, but that he resented intrusion. As a practical matter, the United States could not do anything that Gowon did not approve.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

Document 169: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, January 17, 1970, 10:30 a.m.

Washington, January 17, 1970, 10:30 a.m.

Four pro-Biafran individuals meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Newsom complained that the United States was doing nothing to prevent starvation while endorsing Federal Military Government (FMG) propaganda. Newsom countered by stressing FMG sovereignty and the need for hard facts.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 517. Confidential.

Document 170: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 19, 1970

Washington, January 19, 1970

Kissinger provided the President with a status report on relief, comparing the findings of Dr. Karl Western, CDC, based on a survey of Biafra in October/November 1969, with those presented in an attached memorandum from Rogers. Western stressed that there would be a completely unacceptable magnitude of starvation and suffering. Rogers disagreed, noting that FMG claimed to have the situation under control.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Sensitive. Tab B is not published.

Document 171: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 19, 1970

Washington, January 19, 1970

Kissinger presented talking points for the President's meeting with Secretary of State Rogers, Special Coordinator on Relief Ferguson, and Assistant Secretary of State Newsom the next day. He stated that the purpose was to impress State with the urgency of the relief situation and the need for action by Nigeria.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 3, Chronological Files, 1969-1975. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for briefing. At Tab A presumably was Document 170.

Document 172: Transcript of Telephone Conversation, Washington, January 20, 1970, 2:43 p.m.

Washington, January 20, 1970, 2:43 p.m.

President Nixon told his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Kissinger, that he believed Special Coordinator on Relief Ferguson and others were convinced that it was necessary to deal with Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria. They discussed the starvation crisis, and Nixon expressed his belief that neither the Department of State nor Ferguson cared.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

Document 173: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, January 19, 1970

Washington, January 19, 1970

Newsom's briefing memorandum for Rogers' meeting with the President emphasized Nigerian sensitivity to interference, the need for cooperation, and the very incomplete and inconclusive information about the situation in Biafra. Tab A indicated food supplies in Biafra were adequate and conditions were improving.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 517. Confidential. The memorandum is an unsigned copy that may have been sent to Ferguson for clearance and thus was not necessarily forwarded to Rogers in this form. Commenting on the last paragraph on page one, Ferguson wrote in the margins: “misunderstanding here of Western Jan memo which gave 4 choices & was addressed to total needs of 4 groups. Also, Western Appendix IV was misconstrued - airlift plus local food plus local commerce trade.” Tabs B through E, entitled “Relief Organization and Tactics,” “External Assistance (Excluding US),” “Food Requirements and Availability,” and “US Actions, “ respectively, are not published.

Document 174: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 20, 1970

Washington, January 20, 1970

Kissinger attached a memorandum from Morris that considered the Western Report valid in all aspects, cast doubt on Gowon's future, and expected large-scale human loss and serious political damage at home. Kissinger agreed that one million to one-and-one-half million people were in danger of dying from starvation or epidemics in the approaching 3 weeks.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Sensitive. Nixon wrote at the bottom of page one, “K - T. Kennedy told me Newsom & Ferguson had done well in their appearance before his committee. - He said he was not concerned about Rape etc. - That always happens - but that starvation is the problem.” Attached to Morris' memorandum was Document 170.

Document 175: Telegram 685 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, January 21, 1970, 2101Z

January 21, 1970, 2101Z

The telegram highlighted observations of Colonel Eugene Dewey, U.S. relief expert, following his recent visit to the enclave area. He reported a developing disaster of major proportions. At least one million people were in acute need, but relief was being hampered by the military in occupied areas.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 10 Nigeria, POL 23 Nigeria. Secret. Repeated priority to London. Also repeated to Geneva and USUN. A February 3 telegram from the CIA to the White House Situation Room stated that a source had reported that Gowon had expelled DEWEY. Gowon explained that he expelled DEWEY because he was personally responsible for overdrawn and sensational reporting after his first visit to the enclave, and much of the subsequent overseas agitation about conditions around Owerri were traceable to his original report. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I)

Document 176: Transcript of Telephone Conversation, Washington, January 22, 1970, 8:05 p.m.

Washington, January 22, 1970, 8:05 p.m.

In a conversation with Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger, Senator Edward Kennedy expressed concern over the possibility that 30 to 60 percent of Biafrans might die. Kissinger expressed his frustration at bureaucratic obstacles and African sensitivities.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 361, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

Document 177: Telegram 738 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, January 22, 1970, 1733Z

January 22, 1970, 1733Z

During a press conference, Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, stated that relief was a Nigerian problem to be solved by Nigerians. He rejected any suggestion of Europeans coming in to provide assistance and said that relief agencies prolonged the war.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Unclassified. Repeated priority to Dar es Salaam. Also repeated to Addis Ababa, London, Lusaka, Paris, USUN, Geneva, CINCSTIKE, DIA.

Document 178: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 23, 1970

Washington, January 23, 1970

Kissinger listed in detail the U.S. actions taken so far in Nigerian relief and then summarized the current situation, concluding that as many as one-and-one-half million people would die in the next 2 to 3 weeks without an airlift of food.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. The memorandum is marked “ret'd Jan 24 1970.”

Document 179: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, January 27-28, 1970

Washington, January 27-28, 1970

In his meeting with the President, Prime Minister Wilson defended the Lagos government and noted that Nigerians did not like to be coerced. He believed reports of starvation were self-serving. Nixon stated that there was considerable suffering and emphasized that the U.S. concern was humanitarian.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/Henry A. Kissinger Memcons, Memcon Nixon/Prime Minister Wilson, January 27-28, 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; NODIS. Haig forwarded the memorandum of conversation to Kissinger under cover of a March 3 memorandum in which he referred to the attachment as an “edited version" of the President's conversations with Wilson on January 27 and 28 which had been “further modified to remove any comments you made during the first day and cut down the first day somewhat.” An unedited version of this memorandum of conversation is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 63, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, 1970.

Document 180: Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to White House Situation Room, Washington, January 30, 1970, 1659Z

Washington, January 30, 1970, 1659Z

A source reported Gowon's anger towards the U.S. Embassy and its efforts to press relief estimates on the Federal Military Government (FMG). The source reported that conditions were quite good in ex-rebel area and U.S. insistence that there were problems was causing deep resentment toward the U.S.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Noforn Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad.

Document 181: Telegram 1005 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, January 29, 1970, 1255Z

January 29, 1970, 1255Z

The Embassy transmitted an eyewitness report by an Embassy officer who traveled through the eastern sector of the Biafran enclave and found that conditions were in good shape with much less devastation than expected.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated priority to London. Also repeated to USUN.

Document 182: Memorandum for the Record Prepared by William Watts of the National Security Council Staff, Washington, February 4, 1970

Washington, February 4, 1970

At a National Security Council Staff meeting, ROGER MORRIS reported that many were dying in the enclave, and there was nothing more the United States could do.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 314, NSC 14, Meetings, Staff Meetings 1969-1971. Secret; Sensitive.

Document 183: Telegram 24460 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo (K), February 10, 1970, 0203Z

February 10, 1970, 0203Z

Under Secretary of State Richardson's message to Secretary of State Rogers sought to prepare him for a meeting with Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria. Richardson noted that having launched a magnanimous policy of reconciliation, Gowon must have found the critical reports over conditions in Eastern Nigeria a rude shock. Rogers should be aware of Nigerian sensitivity and defensiveness and should proceed in a low-key manner.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 746, Country Files, Africa, Vol. I. Secret; NODIS; Immediate. Drafted by Ruser (S/PC); cleared by Moore, Brubeck and Lloyd (S/S); and approved by Richardson. Repeated immediate to Lagos.

Document 184: Memorandum for the Record, Washington, February 15, 1970

Washington, February 15, 1970

National Security Staffer Richard Kennedy reported on his Nigerian visit from January 26 to February 5. He stated that there was widespread malnutrition in the former Biafran enclave but it varied from village to village. There was enough food, but insufficient transportation. Organization of the relief effort was all but chaotic. The attitude of the Embassy seemed to be somewhat “business as usual.” He saw a conflict between the Embassy's desire for good relations and an expanded relief operation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; NODIS.

Document 185: Telegram 1699 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, February 15, 1970, 0955Z

February 15, 1970, 0955Z

Ambassador TRUEHEART believed that U.S. pressures on the relief front had bought U.S.-Nigerian relations close to the breaking point and thus the United States should maintain the lowest of profiles until the irritations recently created had subsided somewhat. He noted that the feeding problem was being addressed with increasing effectiveness.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 Nigeria-US. Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only.

Document 186: Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 16, 1970

Washington, February 16, 1970

Haig reported that the Biafrans might have reversed their attitude towards the Central Government and attached a CIA report on which that view was based. He cautioned against reliance on ultra liberal attitudes that had prolonged the war by their insistence that the Biafrans would be wiped out if the Central Government prevailed. He advised against nit-picking the Central Government, and did not share National Security Council Staffer Roger Morris's attitude with respect to the plight of the Biafrans.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 18, President's Daily Briefs. Secret; Noforn. The attachments to the memorandum at Tab A are not published.

Document 187: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 17, 1970

Washington, February 17, 1970

Kissinger seconded a recommendation from Ambassador to Nigeria Trueheart and Under Secretary Richardson that Secretary of State Rogers, while seeing Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, the next day, deliver a personal letter from the President and extend an invitation to visit the United States. Both steps were calculated to improve strained relations. Kissinger expressed concern that if the United States did not express continuing interest in relief efforts, failure to do so might be taken as satisfaction with current measures.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 4, Memoranda to the President, Jan-Feb 1970, Feb 1970, folder 2. Secret; NODIS. The attachments are not published. Nixon approved both the letter and the invitation but wrote in regard to the latter, “but keep it very vague.” Kissinger noted on page one, “To Haig - Rush.” Attached, but not published, was a February 18 handwritten note from Haig to Kissinger stating, “I've implemented this with very vague' caveat. Note, Richardson cable sent w/out our clearance!”

Document 188: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 24, 1970

Washington, February 24, 1970

Kissinger forwarded Secretary of State Rogers' report of his meeting with Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, and highlighted it in his covering memorandum. Rogers reported that relations with Nigeria had obviously been strained but Gowon sought to improve them and was pleased with the invitation to visit the United States. He believed the relief problem was under control. Rogers thought the Embassy should be given maximum flexibility to deal with the situation.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 288, Memoranda to the President, Jan-Feb 1970, Feb 1970, Folder 3. Confidential; NODIS. Sent for information. The memorandum is a copy marked with an indication that Kissinger signed the original.

Document 189: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 14, 1970

Washington, March 14, 1970

Kissinger forwarded Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson's latest progress report on Nigerian relief and expressed his concern over the poor distribution and low tonnage of relief supplies. While the Nigerian effort had made tangible progress since the first chaotic days in January, the tonnage still fell far short of estimated needs.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for information.

Document 190: Telegram 3073 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, March 26, 1970, 1541Z

March 26, 1970, 1541Z

In its weekly relief roundup, the Embassy reported significant improvement in the relief situation in Owerri and other sectors of the former enclave.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 514. Confidential; Immediate.

Document 191: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, undated

Washington, undated

Newsom reported to Rogers that Ambassador to Nigeria Trueheart had expressed grave concern at the prospect of Dr. George Lythcott, who led the Nutritional Survey Mission in Nigeria, proceeding with further consultations with Nigerian health officials. TRUEHEART feared it could damage already strained relations. The Department wanted him to proceed with his mission, believing that unless the relief program was further strengthened there might be substantial deterioration in the feeding situation in the east.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 518. Confidential. Drafted by William Brubeck on March 30. The memorandum is not signed.

Document 192: Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy and Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 7, 1970

Washington, April 7, 1970

Kennedy and Morris expressed concern that an article in the Washington Star, derived from a leak of a sensitive nutritional survey done by U.S. and Nigerian doctors in February, could have serious consequences for the relief effort and the U.S. role in it.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Confidential. The memorandum is marked, “HAK has seen, 4/11.” In an April 8 letter to the editor of the Star, George Lythcott, who led the American group that participated in the survey, stated that the numbers were incorrect and the conclusions drawn were wholly in error. Lythcott also sent an apologetic letter to Dr. Silva and Dr. Adesyui in Lagos refuting Doyle's article, which was transmitted to Lagos by the Department in telegram 51941. These and other related items are ibid., RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969-June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Boxes 514 and 517.

Document 193: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 14, 1970

Washington, April 14, 1970

Ambassador Iyalla objected to the Star article, preferential treatment for Biafran visa applicants, and Biafran organizations soliciting money in the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL Nigeria 03. Confidential.

Document 194: Special Report Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, May 28, 1970

Washington, May 28, 1970

The report depicted the new Nigeria as more nationalistic, assertive, and pragmatic. There was little enthusiasm for close ties with the USSR. The government was favorably disposed towards the United Kingdom but was suspicious of the United States.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, OCI, SR 0372/70A. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The report was issued by the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

Document 195: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, June 1, 1970

Washington, June 1, 1970

Kissinger forwarded Secretary of State Rogers' proposal for a new course of action on Nigerian assistance together with his own comments. Kissinger thought there was no need to subordinate relief to reconstruction. Kissinger also forwarded a draft response to Rogers, which Nixon approved.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for Action. Nixon initialed his approval of the response to Rogers at Tab A, which is not published. The graph attached to Rogers' memorandum is not published.

Document 196: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, June 12, 1970

Washington, June 12, 1970

Kissinger informed Rogers that the President approved increased attention to rehabilitation and long-term recovery in Nigeria, but saw no contradiction between good relations and a significant continuing U.S. contribution to relief.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret.

Document 197: Dispatch to the Chief, Africa Division, Central Intelligence Agency, July 31, 1970

July 31, 1970

The dispatch provided a number of comments on postwar Nigeria relevant to the preparation of National Intelligence Estimate 64.2-70 (Document 201 ). It was noted, for example, that reintegration of the Ibos into national life had gone much better than could have been expected. The military government had indicated that future U.S.-Nigerian relations would largely depend upon U.S. provision of military training and equipment.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, 78-03050R/1/3. Secret.

Document 198: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 17, 1970

Washington, August 17, 1970

Upon his return from Lagos, Ambassador Iyalla met with Department of State officials for a wide-ranging discussion during which he said that U.S.-Nigerian relations were becoming cordial, the AID reconstruction loan was enthusiastically received, and the U.S. Embassy in Lagos was handling well its relationships with the Federal Military Government (FMG). He continued to object to activities in the United States by the Biafran International Foundation and the Nigeria War Victims Relief Foundation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 Nigeria-US. Confidential.

Document 199: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, Undated

Washington, Undated

Kissinger highlighted an attached report to the President from Secretary of State Rogers on Nigeria 7 months after the war. The report stated that Nigeria's recovery was continuing well, international relief had succeeded in averting mass starvation, and U.S. relations with Nigeria had mainly recovered, but there was lingering resentment over the U.S. role during the war.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Confidential. Morris drafted Kissinger's memorandum and forwarded it to him under cover of an August 20 memorandum, on which Kissinger wrote: “Word must be dependence in Point 3 of memo HK.” (Ibid.)

Document 200: Telegram 177998 from the Department of State to the Embassy in Ivory

Newsom expressed his concern that Ojukwu might seek asylum in the United States, which could do much harm to relations with Nigeria.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 30 Nigeria. Confidential; priority; Limdis. Drafted by Kontos (AF/AFR-N), cleared in (AF/W), and approved by Newsom.

Document 201: National Intelligence Estimate, Washington, November 2, 1970

Washington, November 2, 1970

The estimate examined the “Prospects for Postwar Nigeria.” It noted that relations with the United States were improving, but that Nigeria emerged from the war with a heightened sense of national pride mixed with anti-foreign sentiment. Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, and others in the top military ranks had taken the recent U.S. affirmative response to their military training requests as an indication of U.S. support for, and interest in, Nigeria.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, DDI Files, Job 79R-01012A, Box 391, Folder 5. Secret; Controlled Dissem.

Document 202: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 2, 1971

Washington, February 2, 1971

In a meeting with the Director of the Office of Nigerian Affairs, Ambassador Iyalla, on behalf of Major General Gowon and the Supreme Military Council, strenuously objected to the issuance of U.S. visas to former top leaders of the Biafran regime.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria. Confidential.

Document 203: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 9, 1971

Washington, February 9, 1971

In meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Newsom, Abassador Iyalla again raised the issue of admitting into the United States key members of the former Biafran regime, in particular Christopher C. Mojekwu, formerly Commissioner for Home Affairs. Newsom explained the limitations on what the Department of State could do about it.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 30 Nigeria. Confidential. In telegram 2103 from the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, March 8, 1971, Trueheart reported that he had informed Ambassador Iyalla of the issuance of a visa to Mojekwu. Iyalla's only comment was “General Gowon will not like this.” (Ibid.)

Document 204: Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, April 7, 1971

Washington, April 7, 1971

The President, upon the recommendation of Rogers, approved the furnishing defense articles and defense services to Nigeria. Nigeria's eligibility had been suspended during the civil war, but top Nigerian officials were now interested in sending military personnel to Department of Defense schools in the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 Nigeria. Confidential. Enclosure 1 to Rogers' memorandum is not published.

Document 205: Telegram 60226 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, Washington, April 8, 1971

Washington, April 8, 1971

In a meeting with Secretary of State Rogers, Ambassadro Iyalla stated that he had returned from Lagos with instructions from Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, to protest the visa granted to C.C. MOJEKWU. Mojekwu could become a major problem in U.S-Nigerian relations as he was a chronic troublemaker likely to incite Nigerian students in the United States against the Federal Military Government (FMG).

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL Nigeria-U.S. Confidential. Drafted by FOLEY (AF/NI); cleared in AF, SCA, and S; and approved by Eliot. Repeated to Abidjan and Lisbon.

Document 206: Telegram 3902 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State,

Under instruction from Major General Gowon, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria, Deputy Permanent Secretary of External Affairs B.A. CLARK called in the Deputy Chief of Mission to express unhappiness over issuance of a visa to C.C. MOJEKWU.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL Nigeria-US, XR POL 30 Nigeria. Confidential. Repeated to Lisbon.

Document 207: Telegram 74799 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria,

This joint Department of State-Department of Defense telegram informed the Embassy that it was authorized to inform the Federal Military Government (FMG) that Nigeria was eligible to purchase defense articles and services under the Foreign Military Sales Act, but the FMG should be encouraged to focus primarily on the purchase of training.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 Nigeria. Confidential. Drafted by Kormann (AF/I) and Critz (AF/I); cleared in AF/NI, DOD/ISA, Joint Staff, DOD/ISA/MA&S, AF/I and PM/MAS; and approved in AF/I.

Document 208: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 27, 1971

Washington, May 27, 1971

In a meeting with Department of State officials, Ambassador Iyalla discussed the Paris sessions of the Consultative Group for Nigeria and future U.S.-Nigerian aid relationships. He dwelt extensively on the need to improve AID's image in Nigeria.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL Nigeria-US. Confidential.

Document 209: Airgram A-22 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, Washington, June 21, 1971

Washington, June 21, 1971

The Policy Planning Paper for Nigeria, dated June 1971 and approved by the National Security Council Inter-departmental Group for Africa, contained sections on U.S. interests, U.S. objectives, Nigeria's objectives, and recommended courses of action.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 Nigeria-U.S. Secret; Limdis; Noforn. The annexes are not published.

Document 210: Letter From Major-General Gowon to President Nixon, Lagos,

Gowon responded to Nixon's invitation to visit in October by pleading extensive commitments under the aegis of the OAU as well as State visits to African countries. He requested a new visit date, perhaps in 1972.

Source:National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Presidential Correspondence, 1969-1974, Nigeria - Gen. Gowon.No classification marking. The Department had authorized offering October 5-6 as dates for a state visit in telegram 64751 to Lagos, April 15. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 Nigeria)

Document 211: Letter From President Nixon to General Yakubu Gowon, Washington,

Washington

Nixon responded to Gowon's September 18 letter, regretting that a visit was not possible, but holding the invitation open for 1972.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Presidential Correspondence, 1969-1974, Nigeria - Gen. Gowon. No classification marking.

Document 212: Memorandum of Conversation, The Georgetown Club, Washington, November 8, 1971

The Georgetown Club, Washington, November 8, 1971

In a meeting with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Iyalla expressed concerns that the U. S. Embassy in Nigeria was being downgraded from Class I to Class II and a Black ambassador was being assigned, indicating his country was being placed on the back burner. They also discussed possible visits by Vice President Agnew and Gowon.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL Nigeria-US, Limited Official Use.

Document 213: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 6-7, 1972

Washington, March 6-7, 1972

British and U.S. officials had an open exchange of views regarding Nigeria, including prospects for political stability, economic development and Nigerianization, and U.S., British, and French relations with Nigeria.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL UK-US. Confidential.

Document 214: Memorandum From Fred Rondon of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 11, 1972

Washington, April 11, 1972

Rondon forwarded Secretary of State Rogers' memorandum recommending that Ambassador Iyalla pay a farewell call on the President. National Security Council Staff Secretary Jeanne Davis called the idea a “non-starter" and Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Haig disapproved it.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for action. The suggested schedule attached at Tab II is not published, nor is the biographical sketch attached to Rogers' memorandum. A handwritten notation on Rondon's memorandum states, “disapproved by Gen'l Haig 4-14.” In an April 11 memorandum to John Howe, Jeanne Davis wrote: “I think this is a non-starter. The President's office (Parker) has made it plain that the President does not want to see any more departing Ambassadors unless there are overriding reasons why he should. If HAK really wants to support this, we will have to be prepared to have one or two turn-downs before it actually goes through.” Haig wrote on the memorandum, “AgreeDrop it.” Both Haig and John Howe initialed Haig's comment. (Ibid.)

Document 215: Memorandum From Melvin H. Levine of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 11, 1972

Washington, July 11, 1972

Levine forwarded a Department of State memorandum regarding troublesome relations with Nigeria and added comments of his own. One problem was Nigerian unhappiness at the U.S. resumption of imports of Rhodesian chrome. Another was former Ambassador Iyalla's unhappiness at not seeing the President for a farewell call.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for information. >At the top of the memorandum is written, “HAK has seen.”

Document 216: Telegram 8136 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, Lagos, October 18, 1972

Lagos, October 18, 1972

Ministry of External Affairs Permanent Secretary Joe Iyalla presented Ambassador Reinhardt with a lengthy list of alleged calculated U.S. attempts to downgrade Nigeria which, Iyalla believed, all added up to a pattern of U.S. indifference and a penchant to take Nigeria for granted.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL Nigeria-US. Confidential. Repeated to Ibadan and Kaduna.

Document 217: Telegram 9519 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of State, Lagos, December 11, 1972

Lagos, December 11, 1972

Assistant Secretary of State Newsom reported on his 5-day visit to Nigeria, remarking on Nigeria's independence and sensitivity. He noted that the United States remained popular but suffered from its civil war policy, its stand on South Africa, and the belief that the United States was unwilling to respond to Nigerian priorities on aid.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) Nigeria. Confidential.

Document 218: Editorial Note

In a memorandum dated June 25, 1971, Henry Kissinger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, informed President Nixon that the Burundi Government had claimed that a set of documents indicated the Central Intelligence Agency was active in the country. The chargi, however, had demonstrated that the documents were completely false. The President wrote on the memorandum, “K - withdraw our missions when they make such ridiculous charges.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 34, President's Daily Briefs)

Document 219: Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Irwin) to President Nixon, Washington, May 3, 1972

Washington, May 3, 1972

Irwin informed the President that the Burundi Government had been attacked by insurgents, but President Micombero remained in command. No Americans or Europeans had been harmed, but the 125 Americans, mainly missionaries, had been asked to exercise prudence. Ambassador Melady had offered Catholic Relief Service supplies and would use disaster relief funds in response to Micombero's request for international assistance.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 41, President's Daily Briefs. Confidential. The memorandum is stamped: “The President Has Seen.”

Document 220: Memorandum From Melvin H. Levine of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 26, 1972

Washington, June 26, 1972

Levine stated that the Burundi slaughter was systematic and extensive, probably involving 100,000 victims. He noted that there were humanitarian reasons for the United States to try to end it along with increased political criticism from Senator Edward Kennedy if the U.S. did not, but realistically there was little the U.S. could do.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 735, Country Files, Africa, Burundi, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for information. Kissinger wrote “To whom?” next to the last sentence on page one, commencing “On the diplomatic front.”

Document 221: Telegram 27189 From the White House to the Embassy in Japan, Washington, August 18, 1972, 1430Z

Washington, August 18, 1972, 1430Z

The telegram transmitted a memorandum to Kissinger from the Situation Room reporting on the continuing extermination of Hutus. Among Africans, only Congo President Mobutu was willing to involve the Organization of African Unity.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Kissinger Trip Files, K/023/01/063. Top Secret; Sensitive; Contains Codeword.

Document 222: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 20, 1972

Washington, September 20, 1972

Kissinger reported on the warfare in Burundi between the Hutus and the Tutsis and the reactions of the international community. In a lengthy handwritten note in response to Kissinger's memorandum, Nixon deplored the U.S. reaction as cynical and callous and instructed Kissinger to tell the Africa Bureau in the Department of State to recommend at a minimum how to express U.S. moral outrage. He also ordered the immediate recall Ambassador Yost for consultations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 735, Country Files, Africa, Burundi, Vol. I. Administratively Confidential. Drafted by F. E. Rondon and based on a report that he and Richard Kennedy forwarded to Kissinger on September 20. (Ibid.) The memorandum is stamped: “The President Has Seen.” The President hand wrote a lengthy note on page two of the memorandum, which was transcribed in the White House on September 21. The transcription is included as part of the document.

Document 223: Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), September 23, 1972, 4:50 - 5:10 p.m.

September 23, 1972, 4:50 - 5:10 p.m.

The President told Kissinger that he wanted the ambassador recalled and a follow-up report on his return. Kissinger indicated that Secretary of State Rogers did not want to recall Ambassador Yost because the killing had essentially stopped.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Camp David Secretary's Table, Conversation No. 154-3. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

Document 224: Editorial Note

Document 225: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 24, 1972

Washington, September 24, 1972

Eliot provided a summary of the U.S. diplomatic and humanitarian response to the violence in Burundi, calling it a role of active, quiet leadership. He indicated that Ambassador Yost was returning for consultations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 735, Country Files, Africa, Burundi, Vol. I. Confidential.

Document 226: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 29, 1972

Washington, September 29, 1972

Kissinger summarized Belgium's reactions to the situation in Burundi.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 735, Country Files, Africa, Burundi, Vol. I. Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum is stamped, “The President as Seen.” The President wrote adjacent to the subject line on page one, “What have we done?” Written at the top of page one is, “HK has seen.”

Document 227: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 3, 1972

Washington, October 3, 1972

Kissinger responded to Nixon's question regarding what the United States had done in reaction to the situation in Burundi. After outlining several measures, he recommended that the Department of State and Ambassador Yost be informed that while the present Burundi Government remained in power official relations were expected to be minimal.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 735, Country Files, Africa, Burundi, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for action. The President initialed “Agree” and wrote below: “K also see the Burundi Ambassador.” Tab 1 is Document 225. Tab 2 is Document 226.

Document 228: Memorandum From Fernando E. Rondon of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 10, 1972

Washington, October 10, 1972

Rondon discussed the President's instructions on policy toward Burundi and how to convey them to the Department of State. He also forwarded Ambassador Yost's memorandum on Burundi developments, which recommended retaining the greatest possible flexibility in U.S. policy toward Burundi.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 735, Country Files, Africa, Burundi, Vol. I. Confidential; Eyes Only; Nodis. Sent for action. Kissinger checked “Agree” and wrote “done” next to it.

Document 229: Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, October 30, 1972

Washington, October 30, 1972

Rogers reported that Burundi Ambassador Terence was called to the Department October 18 and informed of the new policy. Terence was defensive and said that national reconciliation was underway.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 735, Country Files, Africa, Burundi, Vol. I. Confidential. Kissinger forwarded Rogers' memorandum to the President under cover of a November 8 memorandum in which he summarized its contents and assured Nixon that Ambassador Yost was fully aware of his instructions and could be expected to carry them out. (Ibid.)

Document 230: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, December 2, 1972

Washington, December 2, 1972

Kissinger forwarded Rogers' memorandum stating that the United States did not plan to object to a World Bank loan to Burundi. The President approved on condition that a strong statement be issued condemning the genocide in Burundi.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 296, Memoranda to the President, December 1972. Confidential. Sent for action. The memorandum is stamped: “The President Has Seen.” The President checked “Approve” and added the following note: “But with a strong statement by the U.S. disapproving Burundi's genocide. The statement is to be broadly publicized. Say our not objecting to the loan does not reflect approval of their policy. K - I consider this an opportunity to get out the horrible story of what happened there.”

Document 231: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of the Treasury Schultz, Washington, December 14, 1972

Washington, December 14, 1972

Kissinger informed Rogers and Schultz of the President's approval regarding the World Bank loan and his condition that a strong statement be issued condemning the genocide.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 296, Memoranda to the President, December 1972. Confidential. Haig signed the memorandum for Kissinger.

Document 232: Airgram 201 From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State, Kinshasa, June 19, 1969

Kinshasa, June 19, 1969

The telegram assessed U.S. interests in the Congo and the impact of U.S. policies, and proposed guidelines for dealing with Congolese internal affairs and with the Congo's role in international affairs.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 The Congo-US. Secret. Repeated to Brussels, Lubumbashi, and CINCSTRIKE.

Document 233: National Intelligence Estimate 65-70, Washington, July 22, 1970

Washington, July 22, 1970

The NIE discussed President Mobutu's foreign policy, economic policy, and his long-range prospects for stability and retention of power.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, DDI Files, Job 79R-01012A, Box 391, Folder 1. Secret; Controlled Dissem.

Document 234: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 29, 1970

Washington, July 29, 1970

This briefing paper provided talking points for Nixon's meeting with Congo President Mobutu. Kissinger considered the Congo to be one of the U.S. foreign policy successes in Africa. He noted Mobutu's concern about Communist influence in Africa and his desire to obtain military and naval equipment.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 944, VIP Visits, Congo, Mobutu Visit, Aug 4, 70, 1 of 3. Confidential.

Document 235: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 4, 1970

Washington, August 4, 1970

The President discussed with Congo President Mobutu political instability, security, and economic development. Mobutu expressed his concerns about Chinese and Russian Communist influences in neighboring countries.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 278, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, June - Sept 1970. Secret.

Document 236: Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 5, 1970

Washington, August 5, 1970

Wright reported that he had arranged authorization from the Department of Defense for sale of three C-130s with waivers of both the 2% charge on quality control and the research and development cost.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 746, Country Files, Africa, Zaire (Republic of the Zaire) (Congo - Kinshasa), Vol. I. No classification marking. Kissinger initialed the memorandum and added a handwritten note, “Good job!” In an August 6 memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Wright confirmed in writing that Kissinger had informed him the President wanted the administration to be as helpful as possible in assisting the Congolese in their purchase of the three C-130 aircraft, including waiver of the normal administrative charges. (Ibid.)

Document 237: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, August 7, 1970

Washington, August 7, 1970

Kissinger informed the President that a Letter of Authorization had been delivered to Congo President Mobutu for purchase of three C-130s; all that needed was Mobutu's signature.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 944, VIP Visits, Congo, Mobutu Visit, Aug 4, 70, 2 of 3. Confidential. Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page state: “Mobutu signed en route to San Francisco and they are being carried back by Vance” and “Presented in New York Sunday Night August 9.”

Document 238: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 1, 1972

Washington, April 1, 1972

Eliot reported that Congo President Mobutu was developing friendlier and closer relations with the USSR and the Eastern European socialist states. It appeared that Mobutu viewed the Soviets as a major source of untapped assistance and a counter to Chinese influence in countries bordering Zaire.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 747, Country Files, Africa, Zaire, (Republic of the Zaire) (Congo-Kinshasa), Vol. I. Secret.

Document 239: Memorandum for the Record, Washington, May 10, 1972

Washington, May 10, 1972

[1 page not declassified]

Source: National Security Council Files, 303 Committee and 40 Committee Records, 1969-1972, Minutes - 1972. Secret.

Document 240: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 25, 1971

Washington, January 25, 1971

Eliot reported a military coup in Uganda appeared to have replaced Milton Obote with IDI AMIN. Statements by military spokesmen suggested a more conservative government than Obote's both in national and international issues. Robert C. Brewster signed the memorandum for Eliot.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 746, Country Files, Africa, Uganda, Vol. I. Confidential.

Document 241: Telegram 14276 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, January 27, 1971, 1721Z

Washington, January 27, 1971, 1721Z

Given the U.S. Government's serious concern about the disruptive effect the coup might have, the Embassy was asked to explore with the British whether any initiative might usefully be taken to avert further deterioration. In addition, the Embassy was requested, together with Ambassador Ferguson, to raise the following points: whether a mediator would be possible, the effect of the coup on the East African Community, and the U.K. assessment of Ugandan President IDI AMIN's support and his administration's ability to endure.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 Uganda. Confidential; Limdis; Priority. Drafted by COOTE (AF/E), cleared in EUR/BMI, and approved in AF-W.

Document 242: Telegram 800 From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, London, January 28, 1971, 1812Z

London, January 28, 1971, 1812Z

Ambassador Ferguson, then in London, rejected a mediator concept, expressed his belief that Felix Onama would be the new leader of Uganda, that Onama and Ugandan President IDI AMIN were sympathetic to the U.K. and U.S. positions, and suggested that Amin lacked the capacity to govern.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 Uganda. Confidential; Exdis; Priority.

Document 243: Africa Staff Note No. 1-71, Washington, February 2, 1971

Washington, February 2, 1971

Entitled "Reflections on the Uganda Coup,” the report stated that the coup appeared to be Ugandan President IDI AMIN's countermove against former Ugandan President Obote's effort to oust him. Amin was more moderate and pro-Western than Obote but might lack the ability to run the government. Radical African leaders were disturbed at the loss of one of their more vocal and rising stars; this would cause Tanzanian President Nyere and Zambian President Kaunda to become more closely allied. The Kenyans, however, were pleased at Obote's being replaced by Amin.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Office of National Estimates. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.

Document 244: Telegram 641 From the Embassy in Uganda to the Department of State, Kampala, February 17, 1971, 1105Z

Kampala, February 17, 1971, 1105Z

Ambassador Ferguson reported that all contacts had been reduced following the coup; he recommended developing contacts at the ministerial level to begin new business relations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL Uganda-US. Confidential; Priority.

Document 245: Telegram 27102 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uganda, Washington, February 17, 1971, 0126Z

Washington, February 17, 1971, 0126Z

The Department agreed with the Embassy's view, but wanted to delay formal public actions that might prejudice African acceptance of the new Ugandan Government or in any way add to problems threatening the future of the East African community.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL Uganda-US. Confidential. Drafted by Kinter (AF/E); cleared in AF/C, L/AF, AF/E, AID/AFR/ESA, AID/AFR/GC, A/OS, and by Moore; and approved by Newsom.

Document 246: Telegram 33749 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uganda, Washington, February 27, 1971, 2007Z

Washington, February 27, 1971, 2007Z

Responding to several requests from Ugandan President Amin, the Department instructed the Embassy to tell Amin that the U.S. Government desired to be responsive to overtures of friendship, but wanted to avoid direct involvement in primarily African issues. Therefore, it was not possible to provide military training or equipment. However, the U.S. Government appreciated the orientation of Amin's government, and therefore was prepared to provide technical assistance and approve commercial purchase of dual-purpose military equipment.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 746, Country Files, Africa, Uganda, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Drafted by Beyer (AF/E) and Newsom, approved by Johnson, Eliot and Wright.

Document 247: Telegram 38065 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uganda, Washington, March 6, 1971, 0313Z

Washington, March 6, 1971, 0313Z

The Department recommended moving toward normal relations in a low key manner, avoiding public statements.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL Uganda-US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Farnham (AFR/ESA) and Kinter (AF/E); cleared in AF/E, AID/AFR/ESA and L/AF; and approved by Moore. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Dar es Salaam, London and Nairobi.

Document 248: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson), Washington, March 13, 1971

Washington, March 13, 1971

Newsom recommended normalizing relations with Uganda through an Agency for International Development (AID) bilateral and a Development Loan Agreement--there would be little or no publicity. Reference telegrams are not published.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL Uganda-US. Confidential. A handwritten note on page 2 of the memorandum states, "tel sent - see attached LDX slip.”

Document 249: Telegram 1154 From the Embassy in Uganda to the Department of State, Kampala, April 21, 1972, 0657Z

Kampala, April 21, 1972, 0657Z

The Embassy stated that the major thrust of U.S. policy in Uganda was developmental and humanitarian. There was a risk this policy would be frustrated due to the chaotic state of the economy, which might last several years.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 AFR-US. Confidential; Priority.

Document 250: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 20, 1972

Washington, July 20, 1972

Eliot reported Ugandan President Amin's accusations that the United States was spying in Uganda through tourists, the Peace Corps, and CIA personnel. These statements were made during Ambassador Ferguson's farewell call. The chargi was instructed to protest to the Ugandan Foreign Minister. Nicholas Platt signed the memorandum for Eliot.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 746, Country Files, Africa, Uganda, Vol. I. Confidential.

Document 251: Telegram 2695 From the Embassy in Uganda to the Department of State, Kampala, August 25, 1972, 1155Z

Kampala, August 25, 1972, 1155Z

Ambassador Melady deplored the Asian expulsion activities of Ugandan President IDI AMIN, but recommended a strict policy of no public comment. He suggested offering special immigration to a small number of expelled individuals.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-10 Uganda. Confidential.

Document 252: Telegram 157288 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uganda, Washington, August 28, 1972, 2251Z

Washington, August 28, 1972, 2251Z

The Department agreed its public involvement in the issue of Ugandan President IDI AMIN's ouster of Asians should be minimal. If asked, the Department would express concern and regret.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-10 Uganda. Confidential.

Document 253: Memorandum of Conversation, London, September 14, 1972, 4:15-5:15 p.m.

September 14, 1972, 4:15-5:15 p.m.

During Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger's meeting with British Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home and British Ambassador Cromer, the issue of where to settle Asians expelled from Uganda was raised. Kissinger doubted that the United States could help very much, and was eager to avoid the issue before November 7.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 62, Folder K/062/06/001. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.

Document 254: Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon, Washington, September 20, 1972

Washington, September 20, 1972

Haig reported that an Interdepartmental Task Force had been updating contingency plans for Uganda; a daily update would be included in the President's morning brief.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 295, Memoranda to the President, September 1972. Secret. The memorandum is stamped, "The President Has Seen,” and Nixon wrote "good" on it, and also "K - we must have contingencies for every possible nutty thing which might happen between now election.”

Document 255: Paper on Uganda, Washington, undated

Washington, undated

Noting that U.S. interests in Uganda were negligible, but that Ugandan President IDI AMIN was uneducated, irresponsible, paranoiac, and racist, the paper recommended that a contingency study be prepared on an urgent basis.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 746, Country Files, Uganda, Vol I. Administratively Confidential. The paper was prepared at Kissinger's request and was forwarded to him, together with a paper on Burundi, by Fernando Ronden and Richard Kennedy of the National Security Coumcil Staff under cover of a September 20 memorandum. Haig wrote on the memorandum, "Thanks Dick Right on as usual.”

Document 256: Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), September 21, 1972, 7:42-7:43 p.m.

September 21, 1972, 7:42-7:43 p.m.

Nixon wanted stronger action taken in Uganda, such as the evacuation of all Americans, and the recall of Ambassador Melady.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, 7:42 - 7:43 PM, White House Telephone, Conversation No. 30-17. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. No classification marking.

Document 257: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 22, 1972

Washington, September 22, 1972

During Kissinger's meeting with British Ambassador Cromer, Cromer referred to the situation in Ugand as “absolute hell.” He believed the U.S. Ambassador should not be recalled but had no suggestions for actions to take. Kissinger noted that the United States was taking some of the expelled Asians. Tab A is not published.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 62, Folder K/062/06/001. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

Document 258: Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Camp David, September 24, 1972, 11:37-11:52 a.m.

Camp David, September 24, 1972, 11:37-11:52 a.m.

In their lengthy conversation on Uganda and Burundi, Nixon and Kissinger discussed possible actions to evacuate American and British citizens from Uganda.

Document 259: Memorandum From Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff, Washington, September 29, 1972

Washington, September 29, 1972

Clift informed Kennedy that all arrangements and clearances had been made for admittance to the United States of 1,000 Ugandan Asians.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 746, Country Files, Africa, Uganda, Vol. I. Confidential.

Document 260: Telegram 179228 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uganda, Washington, September 30, 1972, 1838Z

September 30, 1972, 1838Z

The Department informed the Embassy that up to 1,000 stateless Ugandan Asians would be paroled into the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-10 Uganda. Limited Official Use; Immediate.

Document 261: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 1, 1972

Washington, November 1, 1972

Kissinger reported that since his assumption of power Ugandan President IDI AMIN had been destroying the elite of all tribes not allied or belonging to his own, and the purge was expected to continue. U.S. interests were limited to protecting U.S. citizens and maintaining a presence in Uganda. An attached CIA report called the purge “raw tribalism at work.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 746, Country Files, Africa, Uganda, Vol I. Secret. Sent for information. The memorandum is stamped, “The President Has Seen.”

Document 262: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 11, 1972

Washington, November 11, 1972

Eliot informed Kissinger that in view of Ugandan President IDI AMIN's actions, the Department, together with other agencies, had decided that no long-term decisions would be made at this time regarding Uganda and official activities would be maintained at roughly their current levels. Harry G. Barnes Jr. signed the memorandum for Eliot.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 Uganda-US. Confidential.

Document 263: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, December 4, 1972

Washington, December 4, 1972

Kissinger briefed the President on the current situation in Uganda and recommended that he approve the Department of State's recommendation not to make long-term decisions concerning Uganda and also Department's contingency agreement to represent British interests in Uganda. The President approved both recommendations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 746, Country Files, Africa, Uganda, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for action. Drafted by Rondon. The memorandum is stamped, “The President Has Seen.”

Document 264: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, December 3, 1972

Washington, December 3, 1972

Kissinger informed Secretary Rogers that the President had approved the two recommendations put forward in Kissinger's December 4 memorandum.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 296, Memoranda to the President, December 1972. Confidential.

Document 265: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze), Washington, January 13, 1969

Washington, January 13, 1969

Warnke urged Nitze to press the Department of State on the political viability of alternate sites for the activities at Kagnew.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-75-089, Ethiopia 1969.

Document 266: Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach), Washington, January 14, 1969

Washington, January 14, 1969

Warnke suggested that decisions regarding Kagnew be referred to their successors. While he agreed on the eventual withdrawal from the facilities, there were several functions that should be retained as long as possible.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-75-089, Ethiopia 1969.

Document 267: Telegram 8346 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia, January 17, 1969, 2055Z

January 17, 1969, 2055Z

This joint Department of State-Department of Defense telegram informed the Embassy that Ethiopia would receive $12 million in Military Assistance Program (MAP) funding in Fiscal Year (FY) 69 and in FY 70.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19 US-ETH. Secret; LIMDIS. Drafted by Colonel Hadley (DOD/ISA) and J.A. Buche (AF/NE); cleared in AF/I, AF/NE, DOD/ISA, and JCS; and approved by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Palmer. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/USC INCMEAFSA and CHMAAG Addis Ababa.

Document 268: Airgram A-30 From the American Consulate in Asmara to the Department of State, April 10, 1969

April 10, 1969

Reporting on “The Eritrean Liberation Front [(ELF)] and Kagnew Station,” the airgram stated that although there was no indication of a change in the ELF policy of friendliness to Americans, Kagnew was maintaining an alert security posture. It was recommended that the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and the intelligence community collect information on ELF activities.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 ETH-US. Secret; LIMDIS. Repeated to Addis Ababa.

Document 269: Telegram 78521 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia, May 16, 1969

May 16, 1969

The Department asked the Embassy to extend a Presidential invitation to Emperor Haile Selassie to make a state visit to Washington July 7-9. Themes of the visit would be current African developments and Ethiopia's economic development.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 ETH. Secret; LIMDIS. Drafted May 14 by M. Looram (AF/NE); cleared in draft by Palmer, J, AF/P, DOD/ISA, and S/CPR; cleared in S/S and and by the White House; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Moore (AF). Repeated to Athens.

Document 270: Airgram A-194 From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State, Addis Ababa, June 18, 1969

June 18, 1969

Entitled “An Assessment of the Eritrean Liberation Front,” (ELF) the airgram concluded that there was no indication the ELF intended to attack Kagnew though it was a possibility. The United States should consider reductions in Kagnew personnel and land tracts. Three policy alternatives were presented, but only alternative A, status quo with reductions, was considered feasible.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 13, ETH. Secret. Repeated to Aden, Asmara, Beirut, Cairo, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, Jidda, Karachi, Khartoum, Mogadiscio, Nairobi, New Dehli, Paris, Rome, Tehran, Tel Aviv, and USUN.

Document 271: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, June 28, 1969

Washington, June 28, 1969

Palmer recommended approval of Emperor Selassie's proposed visit to Atlanta to lay a wreath at Martin Luther King's tomb and accept an honorary degree from Morehouse College.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 ETH. Secret.

Document 272: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 3, 1969

Washington, July 3, 1969

Morris provided Kissinger with a “complete run-down" on Haile Selassie's stop in Atlanta. His judgment was that, from a foreign policy point of view, it would be embarrassing but not impossible to avoid making the stop with the Ethiopians.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 914, VIP Visits Ethiopia-State Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie I, July 7 - 10, 1969 1 of 2, Folder 04/054. Confidential; Eyes Only. Kissinger wrote at the top of page one: “Are you sure Ethiopians raised it - or did State do it by putting words into Ethiopians mouth?”

Document 273: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 6, 1969

Washington, July 6, 1969

Kissinger briefed the President for his meeting with the Emperor on July 8. The purpose of the visit was to honor the Emperor and to show that the new administration would continue the close relationship with Ethiopia. The main problem was to reassure Selassie of U.S. support without being drawn into his exaggerated view of threats to Ethiopian security. The United States was key to Ethiopian economic development and provided $12 million yearly for military assistance, 60% of U.S. military assistance to Africa. In return, the United States operated Kagnew communications center.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 914, VIP Visits - Ethiopia - State Visit of Emperor Haile Selassie I, July 7 - 10, 1969, 1 of 2, Folder 04/054. Secret. Sent for briefing. At Tab A is an undated Talking Points paper.

Document 274: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Protocol Visit with Emperor Haile Selassie at Blair House on 9 July, 0900 Hours

July, 9 0900 Hours

Document 275: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 8, 1969

Washington, July 8, 1969

During his meeting with the Emperor, President Nixon noted that Ethiopia received 60% of U.S. military funds available for Africa. The United States, however, recognized Ethiopia's problems and what it stood for and would continue to assist its development as a strong and independent nation. The Emperor expressed his concern about Soviet influence in Somalia, Sudan, and parts of the Arabian peninsula. The two leaders also discussed the situation in Nigeria and the Middle East.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Africa, Ethiopia, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Palmer.

Document 276: Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler), The Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Director of the Defense Communications Agency, Washington, July 17, 1969

Washington, July 17, 1969

Packard reviewed the Study Group Report on Kagnew Station, which recommended that the Navy assume responsibility for all communications and the Army phase out by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 72. In a memorandum at Tab A, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics reported that this would reduce manpower by 160 positions out of 1,800 and permit return of 1,070 acres to the Ethiopian government from a total of 3,400 acres.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-75-089, Ethiopia 1969. Secret; Special Handling Required; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals.

Document 277: Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, October 15, 1969

October 15, 1969

Rogers reported the assassination of Somali President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke on October 15.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 12, President's Daily Briefs. Unclassified.

Document 278: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 20, 1969

Washington, October 20, 1969

Kissinger informed the President that, according to intelligence, an army takeover in Somalia was not likely but there might be some tribal fighting. All leading candidates to succeed assassinated Somali President Shermarke were pro-Western.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 64, Memoranda to the President, October 1969. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

Document 279: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 21, 1969

Washington, October 21, 1969

Kissinger reported that elements of the Somali army and police had seized power from Prime Minister Egal's elected government. For the United States, the most important issue was the survival or collapse of ditente in the Horn. If Somalia returned to bellicose irredentism, tensions would rise throughout the area, including Kenya and Ethiopia.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 287, Memoranda to the President, October 1969. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The memorandum, an unsigned copy, is marked “ret'd Oct 24, 1969.”

Document 280: Intelligence Note No. 747 From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, October 21, 1969

October 21, 1969

The note discussed the coup in Somalia--its motivation, leadership, and implications.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 Somalia. Secret.

Document 281: Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 28, 1969

Washington, October 28, 1969

Morris recommended approving an attached draft State telegram to the embassy in Mogadiscio instructing low-key recognition of the new military government in Somalia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Somalia Republic, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. Haig checked “Approve cable" for Kissinger. At bottom is written, “s/s informed (Brown) cable cleared by Watts - 10/29, 5:45 PM' per CF.”

Document 282: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 28, 1969

Washington, October 28, 1969

Kissinger informed the President, who had expressed concern over former Prime Minister Egal's welfare, that Egal was under house arrest. Kissinger also noted that that little was known about the new government or its intentions.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Somalia Republic, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. At the bottom Nixon wrote, “Maybe (hopefully) they are like the Greek Colonels.” Next to his note is stamped, “Nov 6 1969.”

Document 283: Telegram 180 From the Embassy in Somalia to the Department of State, January 27, 1970

January 27, 1970

Ambassador Hadsel reported on his meeting with President General SIAD of the Supreme Revolutionary Council, during which he indicated U.S. willingness to cancel its phase-out of AID programs and described U.S. encouragement of private investment activities. Hadsel told SIAD that recognition of North Vietnam and Somali flag ships carrying cargo there could create significant problems. SIAD sought to brush away any implication that Somalia might be dominated by the Soviets through military and economic assistance programs.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970--73, POL Somali-US. Secret; LIMDIS. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Rome and CINCSTRIKE.

Document 284: Memorandum From the Secretary of the Army (Resor) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard), Washington, March 19, 1970

Washington, March 19, 1970

Resor recommended that consolidation of facilities at Kagnew Station be deferred indefinitely and assignments left unchanged.

Source: Department of Defense, OASD/ISA, 73A, 1975, Box 18, Ethiopia 000.1 -- 1970. Secret; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals. Two enclosures are not published.

Document 285: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 2, 1970, 4:00 p.m.

Washington, April 2, 1970, 4:00 p.m.

Ambassador Azhari, in a farewell visit with Secretary Rogers, stated that ditente would continue as would Somali flag vessels trading with North Vietnam. While the financial benefits of the latter were negligible, the trade continued as a matter of national sovereignty and prestige. The Secretary noted that Congress had laid down very explicit instructions with regard to aid to countries engaged in such trade.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL ETH-Somali. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Edward Holmes (AF/E).

Document 286: Telegram 56735 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy, April 16, 1970, 2241Z

April 16, 1970, 2241Z

The telegram reported that Assistant Secretary Newsom had informed Italian Ambassador Ortona that the shipping issue required the United States to terminate its aid to Somalia. Concerned that Somalia might rupture diplomatic relations as a result, Newsom had expressed the hope that the Italian ambassador to Somalia would counsel moderation.

Source:National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL Somali-US. Secret. Drafted by Holmes, cleared in EUR/AIS, and approved by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Newsom. Repeated to Mogadiscio.

Document 287: National Intelligence Estimate 75/76-70, Washington, May 21, 1970

Washington, May 21, 1970

In Ethiopia, the Emperor was restraining dissidents such as students, bureaucrats, and young intellectuals, but a military coup was always a possibility. Kagnew Station was not now directly threatened. Should the Emperor die, the successor government would likely continue to look to the United States as its primary backer. Somalia was unstable, leftist, and susceptible to Soviet influence. Sudan also was leftist, but involved in a civil war. U.S. influence in Somalia and Sudan was minimal. Soviet interest in the area was growing.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, DDI Files, Job 79R-01012A, Box 391, Folder 2. Secret.

Document 288: Telegram 1208 From the Embassy in Somalia to the Department of State, Mogadiscio, May 28, 1970, 1115Z

Mogadiscio, May 28, 1970, 1115Z

Ambassador Hadsel reported that he had informed General SIAD that U.S. bilateral assistance would terminate as of June 1, 1970. Hadsel believed this would further strain U.S.-Somali relations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, STR 10 VIETN. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Addis Ababa. Also repeated to Nairobi, Rome, and CINCSTRIKE.

Document 289: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, June 6, 1970

Washington, June 6, 1970

This memorandum, which was not forwarded to the President, reported the termination of economic aid to Somalia and the possibility of resulting damage to diplomatic relations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Somalia Republic, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for information. At Tab A is a memorandum from acting Secretary of State Elliot Richardson on the termination of U.S. aid. Attached but not published was a note, dated June 12, indicating that Kissinger's memorandum and the attached memorandum from Richardson to the President were not forwarded to the President “in accordance with current instructions re: priorities" (See Document 10).

Document 290: Telegram 1395 From the Embassy in Somalia to the Department of State, June 15, 1970, 1100Z

June 15, 1970, 1100Z

The telegram reported that Foreign Secretary Arteh had informed the Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission that the June 6 aide-memoire providing 1 year to phase-out projects was appreciated. However, Somalia preferred to assume responsibility for the projects as soon as practicable.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) Somali, POL Somali-US. Confidential. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and Rome.

Document 291: Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 26, 1970

Washington, June 26, 1970

Wright provided all the known details on the seizure of the American freighter, The Midnight Sun, by a Somali naval vessel. He believed the seizure was a fluke. Embassy officials were attempting to get in touch with the appropriate Somali officials.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Somalia Republic, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. Wright attached a draft memorandum to the President that was not forwarded and is not published.

Document 292: Telegram 1514 From the Embassy in Somalia to the Department of State, June 28, 1970, 0940Z

June 28, 1970, 0940Z

U.S. Chargi Dennis, who met that morning with the Director General of the Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reported on the situation regarding the seizure of the The Midnight Sun.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33-6 Somali-US. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE and COMIDEASTFOR.

Document 293: Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 2, 1970

Washington, July 2, 1970

Wright's progress report on the The Midnight Sun outlined both the “good side" and the “bad side" of the situation. While there was as yet no publicity and Somali officials had not yet officially charged the ship with violations, U.S. officials had still not determined what would be necessary to gain the release of the vessel and its crew. Most worrisome was the fact that to Somalis it must appear there was good reason to believe they had intercepted an American spy ship.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Somalia Republic, Vol. I.No Classification Marking. Sent for information.

Document 294: Telegram 111621 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia, Washington, July 13, 1970, 2208Z

Washington, July 13, 1970, 2208Z

This joint Department of State-Department of Defense telegram informed the Embassy that the Navy's Kagnew Station consolidation plan was being reviewed. If approved, it would not be implemented until Fiscal Year 72-73 due to lack of funds.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 ETH-US. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Captain Hilscher (DOD/ISA); cleared in DOD, INR/RCI, AF/E, AF/I; and approved by Holmes. Repeated to Asmara and CINCSTRIKE.

Document 295: Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 31, 1970

Washington, July 31, 1970

Wright reported that the The Midnight Sun had become the subject of press interest due to an Evans and Novak column in The Washington Post that attributed the seizure to steadily rising Soviet influence in Somalia and East Africa.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Somalia Republic, Vol. I. Confidential.

Document 296: Telegram 1856 From the Embassy in Somalia to the Department of State, August 4, 1970, 0920Z

August 4, 1970, 0920Z

The Embassy reported that the Somali Government had decided to release the “Midnight Sun" as a gesture of goodwill even though it had “blatantly violated internal and territorial waters.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33-6 Somali-US. Confidential. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE and COMIDEASTFOR.

Document 297: Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff, Washington, August 5, 1970

Washington, August 5, 1970

Kennedy stressed the need for a study of problems in the Horn of Africa. He noted that Kissinger had shied away in the past, but since the area consumed the lion's share of African military and economic aid and was home to the single most important U.S. facility in Africa, Kagnew Station, it was important to prepare a general policy.

Source: National Security Council Files, National Security Study Memorandum Files, NSSM 115. Secret. Attached is an undated draft memorandum from Kissinger to the President, as well as an undated draft National Security Study Memorandum. Neither of the attached documents was signed and forwarded.

Document 298: Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the Secretary of the Army (Resor) Washington, August 11, 1970

Washington, August 11, 1970

Packard turned down an Army request to retain the status quo at Kagnew Station and directed consolidation on the basis of the Navy plan.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-067, Ethiopia 1970. Secret; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals.

Document 299: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, August 12, 1970

Washington, August 12, 1970

Kissinger reported the release of the The Midnight Sun and its crew. A personal message from General SIAD to President Nixon could not be delivered as Russian-provided coding machines did not function properly.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Somalia Republic, Vol. I. Confidential. A stamp on the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.”

Document 300: Telegram 138074 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia, the Consulate in Asmara, and Kagnew Station, August 24, 1970, 2344Z

August 24, 1970, 2344Z

This joint Department of State-Department of Defense message reported that Kagnew would reduce personnel levels by 200 in the next 9 months in addition to numbers from planned consolidation. This was in accord with the Ethiopian Government's desire that the U.S. presence near Asmara be diminished.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 ETH-US. Secret; LIMDIS. Drafted by Hall (AF/E); cleared in draft in NSA, ASA, PM, INR/DDC; cleared by DOD/ISA, AF/E, AF/P, OSD/A, Joint Staff/J-5; and approved by Moore. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE.

Document 301: Telegram 3448 From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State, Addis Ababa, September 3, 1970, 0900Z

September 3, 1970, 0900Z

The Chargi reported that the Ethiopian Foreign Minister welcomed the proposed personnel reductions at Kagnew Station.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 ETH-US. Secret; LIMDIS. Repeated to Asmara, CINCSTIKE and Kagnew Station.

Document 302: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 25, 1970, 2:00 p.m.

Washington, October 25, 1970, 2:00 p.m.

In his meeting with Nixon, Selassie pleaded his case for increased military assistance. The President reassured the Emperor that the U.S. understood who its friends were and promised to study the military situation, giving full weight to Selassie's statements.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 278, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, Oct - Dec 1970. Secret; Exdis.

Document 303: Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the Secretary of the Navy (Chafee), Washington, October, 27, 1970

Washington, October, 27, 1970

Packard agreed to withhold the consolidation of communications plans at Kagnew Station pending the outcome of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-requested study of September 16, 1970.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-067, Ethiopia, 1970. Secret; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals.

Document 304: Telegram 2653 From the Embassy in Somalia to the Department of State, November 3, 1970, 1110Z

November 3, 1970, 1110Z

The ambassador stated that when plans for the Diego Garcia base were announced, the U.S. should expect a strong negative reaction from the Somali Government, condemning the action as a colonialist, imperialist venture designed to subvert the freedom of African states.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 744, Country Files, Africa, Somalia Republic, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis.

Document 305: Telegram 208803 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia, December 24, 1970, 0130Z

December 24, 1970, 0130Z

The telegram reported that during a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Newsom, Somali Ambassador ADDOU asked what aid might be given if Somali flag vessels discontinued trading with North Vietnam and Cuba. Newsom responded that even before the change in government in Somalia the U.S. bilateral aid program was scheduled to end after Fiscal Year (FY) 72 and it was not possible to make any promises.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 Somali-US. Confidential. Drafted by D.H. Shinn (AF/E); cleared in AF/E, and AID/AFR/ESA; and approved by Newsom. Repeated to Rome, Addis Ababa, and Nairobi.

Document 306: Airgram A-11 From the Embassy in Somalia to the Department of State, January 17, 1971

January 17, 1971

The Embassy stated that the four U.S. policy objectives in Somalia were economic development, ditente in the Horn, true non-alignment, and the strengthening of ties to the West.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 Somali-US. Confidential. Only the summary is published.

Document 307: Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 20, 1971

Washington, January 20, 1971

Kissinger told the President that Selassie was correct in stating that his country's security situation had deteriorated over the past several years, but neither Somalia nor the Sudan was capable of mounting a sustained attack. Kissinger believed the Emperor feared that the United States intended to terminate its military assistance program (MAP), but MAP actually would continue as payment for Kagnew Station and as long as the Emperor was alive. Kissinger also reported that the ambassador in Addis Ababa had been instructed to deliver an oral message from the President to the Emperor informing him that the President understood his misgivings about Ethiopia's long-range security and fully intended the United States to continue its significant military assistance program over the coming years. The President wished the Emperor to know that he was personally interested in Ethiopia's security and had instructed the Executive Branch that Ethiopia would continue to have a priority claim on the resources available for military assistance to Africa.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Africa, Ethiopia, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. The memorandum is stamped: “The President Has Seen.” Another copy of the memorandum at Tab A, also undated and marked “Action" rather than “Information,” is at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 292, Memoranda to the President, October 1970.

Document 308: Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 21, 1971

Washington, January 21, 1971

Wright gave Kissinger an update on the Ethiopian Security Situation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Africa, Ethiopia, Vol. I. Sent for action. “Also a [unclear] assessment of what to do when Haile Selassie dies - make another NSSM.” He crossed most of this out and wrote to the side, “See it is in NSSM.” Below, he also wrote, “Great job - MARSHALL!" Tab A is document 309. Tab B is not published.

Document 309: National Security Study Memorandum No. 115, Washington, January 25, 1971

Washington, January 25, 1971

The NSSM directed a review of potential issues affecting U.S. interests in Ethiopia, Somalia, and the French Territory of Afar and Issa (FTAI).

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 316, National Security Council, National Security Study Memoranda, July 1970 - Sept 1971. Secret.

Document 310: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 24, 1971

Washington, February 24, 1971

In a conversation with Newsom, Somali Ambassador ADDOU reported that Somalia had virtually lost its independence to the Soviet Union. General SIAD remained suspicious of the United States, but ADDOU urged keeping communications open.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 2 Somali. Secret.

Document 311: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 8, 1971

Washington, March 8, 1971

Somali Ambassador ADDOU told Assistant Secretary of State Newsom that the United States was doing very little to improve relations with Somalia. Newsom commented that the United States wanted good relations but saw no indication this was shared by the Somali Republic.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, POL Somali-US. Secret. Drafted by Newsom.

Document 312: Study Prepared in Response to NSSM 115, Washington, March 15, 1971

Washington, March 15, 1971

The study discussed the political and economic background for relations with Ethiopia and Somalia, the requirements for maintaining Kagnew Station for another five years, and the significant importance of Ethiopia to U.S. interests as compared to Somalia.

Source: National Archives, NSC Institutional Files, NSSM Files, NSSM 115. Secret. Prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa. Pages 1-11 only are published.

Document 313: Memorandum From the Vice Director, Joint Staff (Freeman) to Secretary of Defense Laird, Washington, March 18, 1971

Washington, March 18, 1971

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that Kagnew Station be retained, consolidation be reconsidered, and an 18-month period be authorized when Diego Garcia was completed in March 1973, to assess the feasibility of moving some Kagnew Station functions to that location.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-197, Ethiopia 1971, Box 63. Secret. The attachment is not published.

Document 314: Policy Planning Paper for Somalia, May, 1971

May, 1971

This paper was transmitted from the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia under cover of Airgram A-13, drafted by Acting Secretary of State Johnson, May 17, 1971. Johnson stated that the paper constituted an official statement of U.S. policy towards Somalia. Objectives included ditente in the Horn, true non-alignment, ties with the West, U.S. access to ports and airports, oil exploration, and restriction of Soviet efforts in the area.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 Somali-US. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Holmes and approved in AF.

Document 315: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 19, 1971

Washington, June 19, 1971

Eliot reported that three vessels, a derrick and pipe laying barge, and a cargo barge, all U.S.-owned, had been apprehended by Somali authorities off the Somali coast while en route from Louisiana to Bahrain. Consular access had been denied. This was the fourth incident involving American vessels since February 1970 and had considerable potential for harming U.S.-Somali relations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Somalia Republic, Vol. I. Confidential.

Document 316: Item Prepared by Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff for the President's Daily Briefing, Washington, June 22, 1971

Washington, June 22, 1971

Wright reported that there still had been no consular access to the Americans on board the vessels seized by Somalia. The ships' owners were “hopping mad" and believed there was a lack of urgency on the part of the United States. The owners had been in contact with George Bush at the United Nations who, in turn, had contacted the Department of State.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 743, Country Files, Africa, Somalia Republic, Vol. I. Confidential.

Document 317: Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brewster) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 2, 1971

Washington, July 2, 1971

Brewster reported that consular access to the seized vessels had been gained on June 23, the crew was well treated, and four craft were in protected anchorage. There was no indication as to when the crew and vessels might be released.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33-4 Somali-US. Confidential.

Document 318: Telegram 121360 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia, July 7, 1971, 0051Z

July 7, 1971, 0051Z

The Department instructed Ambassador Hadsel to delay his end-of-assignment departure until the release of the crew and vessels was certain. If the ambassador were to depart prior to the release, it might seem to indicate that the U.S. Government was becoming less interested in resolving the problem.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33-4 Somali-US. Confidential. Drafted by Shinn; cleared in AF/E, AF/EX and PER/CA; and approved by Moore. Repeated to Accra and Nairobi.

Document 319: Telegram 1407 From the Embassy in Somalia to the Department of State, July 14, 1971

July 14, 1971

Ambassador Hadsel reported that during his farewell call he had been assured by President SIAD that the vessels would be released very soon, perhaps that weekend, despite the deep feeling of resentment on the part of Somalis over U.S. ships violating Somali laws. The ambassador considered this to be a definitive assurance of action.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33-4 Somali-US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Jidda, Bonn, London, Nairobi, Panama, Paris, Rome, USUN, CINCSTRIKE, COMIDEASTFOR

Document 320: Telegram 127073 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Somalia, July 14, 1971, 2224Z

July 14, 1971, 2224Z

While the assurances given were encouraging, the Department wanted Ambassador Hadsel to remain at his post until the amount of the fine was known and all problems had been resolved.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33-4 Somali-US. Confidential; LIMDIS. Drafted by W.B. Coote (AF/E) and approved by Newsom.

Document 321: Telegram 1424 From the Embassy in Somalia to the Department of State, July 15, 1971, 1545Z

July 15, 1971, 1545Z

Hadsel transmitted a diplomatic note stating that the vessels would be released on payment of the fine, plus expenses or damages claimed by port authority, and warning that further violations would have grave consequences. All concerned parties were satisfied with result and the ships should depart on July 18.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 33-4, Somali-US. Confidential; priority. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Jidda, Bonn, London, Nairobi, Panama, Paris, Rome, USUN, CINCSTRIKE and COMIDEASTFOR.

Document 322: Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer), Washington, July 22, 1971

Washington, July 22, 1971

Packard suggested continuing to seek ways to phase-down Kagnew facilities whenever feasible.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-197, Ethiopia, 1971, Box 63. Secret.

Document 323: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, January 4, 1972

Washington, January 4, 1972

Newsom informed Rogers that Secretary of Defense Laird, without consulting interested sections of the Department of Defense, decided in a budgetary move to eliminate the Army Security Agency (ASA) at Kagnew Station by June 30, 1972.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15-10 ETH-US. Secret. The attachment is not published.

Document 324: Telegram 3084 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia, January 6, 1972, 1850Z

January 6, 1972, 1850Z

The Department reported contact with the Department of Defense, which agreed to hold action on Army Security Agency (ASA) termination pending an interagency working group review. The Ambassador was instructed not to raise the issue with the Ethiopians. If asked, he should state that he had not been officially informed of any such reduction. However, the costly Kagnew operation was a likely candidate for economy.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 ETH-US. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Drafted by Melone; cleared in AF/E, PM, AF, AF/RA, OASD/ISA, OASD/I-V, INR/DDC, and S/S; and approved by Newsom. Repeated immediate to Asmara.

Document 325: Telegram 6540 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia, January 12, 1972, 0054Z

January 12, 1972, 0054Z

This joint Department of State-Deaprtment of Defense telegram confirmed that Kagnew would begin to phase-down its activities. The Country Team was asked to forward its assessment of the Ethiopian Government reaction.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15-10 ETH-US. Secret; LIMDIS; Priority. Drafted by Bader and Melone (AF/E); cleared in AF/E, AF/RA, A/OC, PM/ISO, INR/DD, OASD/ISA, JCS; and approved by Newsom. Repeated to JCS, USCINCEUR, Asmara, Addis Ababa, COMIDEASTFOR, DIA.

Document 326: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., Washington, February 18, 1972

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. #6, January - June, 1972. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified].

Document 327: Telegram 32156 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia, February 25, 1972, 0110Z

February 25, 1972, 0110Z

This joint Department of State-Deaprtment of Defense telegram reported that a final decision had been made to reduce operations at Kagnew station, including appropriate staff reductions. The ambassador was authorized to inform the Ethiopian Government.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15-10 ETH-US. Secret. Drafted by Melone (AF/E) and Hilscher (OASD/ISA); cleared in AF/P, AF/RA, PM/ISO, DSAA, OSD/ISA/PP, CASD/I, JCS/J5, OASD/PA, OASD/I&L, OC/DLO; and approved by Coote (AF). Repeated to JCS, USCINCEUR, COMIDEASTFOR, CINCUSNAVEUAR, Asmara, CNO, CSA, CSAF, CMC.

Document 328: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 20, 1972

Washington, March 20, 1972

Kissinger informed the President that Selassie had called in Ambassador Adair and expressed deep distress at the Military Assistance Program (MAP) cut, stating that it came “as a great blow to him.” He said he had felt for some time that it was desirable that he meet with President Nixon to discuss U.S. assistance to Ethiopia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 751, Presidential Correspondence, 1969-1974, Ethiopia, Selassie Corres. Confidential. Sent for information. The memorandum is stamped, “The President Has Seen.”

Document 329: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 25, 1972

Washington, April 25, 1972

Kissinger informed the President that Defense could come up with an additional $1.5 to $2 million in Military Assistance Program (MAP) funds for Ethiopia without cutting any other country programs. At Kissinger's recommendation, the President signed a letter telling the Emperor that because of his desire to respond to the Emperor's needs he had managed to increase the current year's program.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 751, Presidential Correspondence, 1969-1974, Folder Ethiopia Corres. Selassie. Secret. Sent for action.

Document 330: Memorandum From Fred Rondon of the National Security Council Staff to Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff, Washington, July 18, 1972

Washington, July 18, 1972

Rondon recommended killing the NSSM 115 study as the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) had quieted down, Kagnew had been reduced from 1,500 to 900 personnel, and arms modernization had proceeded despite Military Assistance Program (MAP) cuts.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Fiels, NSC Institutional Files (H-files), Box H-181, NSSM 115. Secret. Attached, but not published, was a July 18 memorandum to Jeanne Davis from Rondon and Kennedy, initialed by both, asking her to inform the agencies that NSSM 115 and NSSM 142 were no longer active.

Document 331: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 27, 1972

Washington, July 27, 1972

Following the resumption of diplomatic relations with Sudan, Kissinger recommended that the President sign an attached letter to President Nimeri, expressing his interest in Sudan and his gratification at the resumption of relations.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 295, Memoranda to the President, Jan - Oct 1972. Confidential. Sent for action.

Document 332: National Intelligence Estimate 75/76-72, Washington, October 4, 1972

Washington, October 4, 1972

The estimate concluded that the situation in The Horn, an area of chronic tensions and instability, was more favorable than it had been for many years, but much of that was transitory. The stability of governments and policies depended greatly on the quality and strength of rulers, and there was certain to be some turmoil over succession in Ethiopia, the most important country in the Horn

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 361, Subject Files, NIE, Part 3. Secret.

Document 333: Research Study Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, Washington, December 20, 1972

Washington, December 20, 1972

This study of “Somalia: The Soviet Presence" assessed the USSR's position in Somalia, Soviet interests and objectives in the Horn, and prospects for Somali-Soviet relations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL Somali-USSR. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Only the abstract is published.