The scope of this volume is limited to the political crisis that began in
Pakistan in March 1971 with the government's efforts to suppress Bengali demands for
virtual autonomy in East Pakistan and concluded with the establishment of the state
of Bangladesh at the end of the year. The limited time frame covered by the volume
enabled the editor to compile the record of the Nixon administration's response to
the crisis in considerable detail. The crisis was managed largely out of the White
House by President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry
Kissinger, with the support of the National Security Council staff. The focus of the
volume is on the management of the crisis by Nixon and Kissinger. The editor
selected documentation to trace the evolution of the United States response to the
crisis from Nixon's initial reluctance to become involved to his "tilt" toward
Pakistan which was highlighted by the despatch of the aircraft carrier Enterprise to
the Bay of Bengal to act as a restraint on India in the war that had developed
between India and Pakistan as a result of the crisis. Nixon's response to the crisis
in Pakistan was conditioned in part by the concern that he and Kissinger had to
protect the emerging opening to China, which had been facilitated by Pakistani
President Yahya Khan. The volume documents that concern, as well as the assurance
offered to China that the United States would protect China from the Soviet Union if
China took military action against India in support of Pakistan. The record of the
Nixon administration's management of the crisis in South Asia thus also bears
importantly on United States relations at the time with China and the Soviet Union.
In that respect, the volume should be read in conjunction with Foreign Relations,
1969-1976, volume XVII, China, 1969-1972; volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970-
October 1971; and volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1971.