The Easter Offensive, and its ramifications, represents the most significant
event in Indochina for U.S. policy in this period, and documentary coverage of
the event dominates the volume, concentrating mainly on what happened in North
and South Vietnam, policy formulation and decision making in Washington, and the
negotiations in Paris. Only a very small number of documents relate to events
and policy in Laos and Cambodia, and then only as they relate to events and
policy in Vietnam.
Documents in this volume examine the link between force and diplomacy in U.S.
national security policy toward the Vietnam war. In the period the volume
covers, force drove diplomacy. Only by recognizing this can the process by which
America’s Vietnam war policy was formulated and implemented be fully understood.
Controlling the process was a small circle of men, led by President Richard M.
Nixon, and which included the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger; the President’s Deputy Assistant for National
Security Affairs, Major General Alexander M. Haig; and a few National Security
Council officials trusted by Kissinger.
Sources for this volume include messages and memoranda that illuminate the
decision-making process in a bureaucracy. They can be found in Nixon’s papers,
in Kissinger’s papers, in military and diplomatic records in the National
Archives, and in other repositories. Transcripts of Nixon’s taped conversations
with senior policy advisers, as well as a collection of transcripts of
Kissinger’s telephone conversations, provide an additional level of detail. A
third collection, less well known than the other two but almost as significant,
is that of Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
includes diary excerpts and telephone conversations. This volume, therefore,
documents the implementation of U.S. policy toward Vietnam during the Easter
Offensive more thoroughly than ever before.