Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

83. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, May 20, 1965, 0630Z.

1830. From Bundy.

1. This has been a day of much movement, but conclusions are hard to find.

2. Most important event is capture of Radio Santo Domingo by Imbert. This evening he agreed again with Bennett that station should be run by OAS. Moreover he agrees with us that OAS umbrella should shelter firm U.S. management. He has promised to announce this decision at ten Thursday² morning. Effective use of RSD may be decisive in the coming week. We all believe that now is the time for Don Wilson³ to come. He should be here Thursday without fail and he should be ready to stay awhile. He is not needed tonight because station is still on the blink.

3. Next most important event is rapid Imbert advance in area north of LOC. This advance has no final strategic value to Imbert, because it does not touch real rebel stronghold. But it lifts morale far beyond its real meaning, and there is no Guzman solution in sight tonight that would not be rejected out of hand by Imbert and Loyalist military. This does not mean that Guzman solution is impossible. I continue to believe it makes more sense than any other. But I do not think it can be concluded at an acceptable cost until Imbert and company find out that their small victories north of LOC have no lasting value. They must learn again that rebels will probably remain in control of heart of city which is heart of country. Imbert forces cannot dislodge them and our forces will not—if it can be avoided.

4. Further block to early settlement—but not to a later solution—is reported death of Rafael Fernandez Dominguez⁴ in attack on Imbert held palace. This will shock Bosch deeply, though Guzman has taken it calmly. Utterly cynical rebel assertion that U.S. shot him in the back is seen for what it is by Guzman, but Caamano is on the air making as much emotional noise as possible. Unless Commies killed him in Spanish war style, Fernandez died soldierʼs death he partly sought, and three U.S. Marines were wounded resisting rebel action about the same time. For a hot fire fight front and back are silly words. But rebels will be stirred, and Guzman will be rightly reenforced in his growing conviction that the men downtown are in no mood for reason.

5. Meanwhile Solomon and company are at work, and the country is not coming apart.

6. In this situation I think we probably need a carefully staged pause. No solution appears possible now, but we should soon have on the side of peace the following: (a) time (b) the end of the northern battle, and (c) Radio Santo Domingo. Both Imbert and rebels should learn in coming days that neither of them is going to win a war. RSD should be preaching peace; Solomon should be practicing good works; by continued firmness Palmer should be able to prove that the U.S. is the one real power on the scene.

7. This pause can be signaled by our return or by our ostentatious settling in. On either basis we strongly believe we should be authorized to begin judicious briefing of press and equally judicious contacts with other personages here. We can spread message of peace and reconciliation to all, if we are authorized to do so. It is time.

8. Meanwhile this evening we gave Guzman draft documents sent forward in our 1824,⁵ and we also discussed present shape of cabinet. He kept documents for study and he apparently wants to send Bosch both of them. We will stall on this pending your advice because private document is pretty hot. On cabinet Guzman showed usual tendency to backslide a little toward familiar PRD friends, and usual tendency to do better when pressed. Details follow in separate telegram.⁶ I floated notion of brief delay in reaching final solution, on ground that both sides were in a bad mood for compromise. He did not quarrel but he did ask that any return of Washington team be accompanied by noises which would leave him in business. I reassured him that Guzman solution remained our choice.

9. It remains to report Guzman–Amiama contact. First meeting was correct and there will be another Thursday morning at ten. We think the two men respect each other. We think they also have a long way to go before their minds really meet. We continue to think that their conversations can only do good, and we will press them to keep on. But we will not use our biggest guns to seek immediate paper agreement between them unless you tell us to—if only because Amiama will not agree to serve under Guzman at this stage. This agreement is still my strong hope, but all concerned must be softened by a little time before it will be possible. Specifically, Amiama will accept only if his comrades in arms agree, and tonight they see no need for what they call a “surrender to Bosch.” Moreover Amiama will certainly have a view of his own on critical question of Army Chief of Staff and we strongly doubt that he could accept Lora Fernandez. Vance thinks de Leon or Valdes may still be key here.

10. So let us make haste slowly and let us explain why.

11. Vance generally concurs.

Bennett

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. V, 5/19/65–5/31/65. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 3:20 a.m. and passed to the White House,DOD for McNamara, and CIA for Raborn at 3:57 a.m.
2. May 21.
3. Deputy Director, United States Information Agency.
4. Lieutenant Colonel in the Dominican Army with strong allegiances to Juan Bosch; a leader of the younger officers.
5. Document 82.
6. Telegram 1866 from Santo Domingo, May 21, lists Guzmanʼs proposed cabinet members, Dr. Ramon Ledesma Perez for President, Hector Garcia Godoy for Foreign Affairs, and Tomas Pastoriza for Agriculture, among others. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. V, 5/19/65–5/31/65)