65. Editorial Note
At 4:05 p.m. on May 12, 1965, President Johnson telephoned Raborn and recounted the chronology of meetings on the Dominican Republic leading up to the decision to land U.S. Marines. Johnson asked Raborn if he had been informed of the intensifying problem in the Dominican Republic prior to his swearing-in as the new CIA Director and Raborn replied, “yes.” The President asked if McCone, Helms, and others were surprised by the Dominican crisis and Raborn responded, “No, sir.” The President asked, “They knew this?” Raborn replied, “Yes, sir. They were alerting the entire intelligence community by established means of this.” President Johnson said, “Now if this was that explosive, and if they knew it, we have got to set up a better means of notifying me.” Raborn said, “I agree.” President Johnson said there needed to be “a better means of interpreting to me or preparing me for [them] because quite frankly I donʼt want to blame anybody, I want to take the blame, Iʼm big enough and broad enough and man enough to take anything, but I sure do want to know it.” Raborn said he agreed and would work to find a solution to this problem. Toward the end of the conversation President Johnson asked Raborn for a complete chronology of intelligence on the Dominican Republic prior to U.S. intervention. Raborn replied that such a document (see footnote 4, Document 64) had just been delivered to Valenti. President Johnson said he would review it. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and William Raborn, Tape F65.23, Side A, PNO 1 and 2)
In a May 12 memorandum to the President received at 6:05 p.m., Bundy recounted that he had met earlier in the day with CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence Ray Cline who was informed of the Presidentʼs [Page 153] dissatisfaction with the current system of getting information to him. Bundy and Cline agreed to try a new method. The President would receive “all really good” intelligence by a faster ticker which would be delivered to him via his secretaryʼs office. In addition, twice a day the President would receive a more general assessment, once in his evening checklist and again in a morning summary ready at 7:30 a.m. in the Situation Room. (Ibid., National Security File, McGeorge Bundy Memos to the President, Vol. X)