Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

55. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, May 3, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Meeting on the Dominican Republic—May 3, 1965

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Mann, Mr. Greenfield, Mr. Crockett, Mr. Vance, General Wheeler, Mr. Helms, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Gaud, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Moyers, Mr. Valenti, Mr. Chase

Attached at Tab 1² is a list of decisions taken at the meeting. The following points were also made although it should be noted that this may not be a comprehensive report in view of the fact that I was out of the meeting room on several occasions.

1. The Military Situation—The group agreed that, with the line of communications established and many troops in place, the military situation was in relatively good shape. General Wheeler said that we will probably not have to go beyond the 14,000- or 15,000-troop level.³

2. Latin American Reaction—Mr. Mann said that the Latin Americans are going to give US a lot of trouble and went on to make the following points with respect to the Latin American mentality on this sort of operation. First, over the years, we and the Latin Americans, in a number of documents and in a variety of forums, have expressed a general belief in the principle of non-intervention. At the same time, the Latin Americans, for many years, have recognized the necessity for collective defense against attacks on the Hemisphere. Second, the basic problem is that Latin American theology does not reflect the fact that aggression does not have to be armed military attack; it can also come in the form of subversion. Thus, with unpleasant memories of Marines in mind and not really accepting the idea of subversion as aggression which must be resisted collectively, the Latin Americans tend to adhere to the traditional line on intervention and think that we are engaged again in gunboat diplomacy. Third, there are, of course, some sophisticated Latin Americans who know what the score is. Privately, they say “good show” but, publicly, they give US no support. The problem here is that secret support does US no damn good. Fourth, the sophisticated Latin Americans, who wish US well, probably did not like to see US dilute our evacuation fig leaf and switch emphasis to the anti-Communist argument.

It was noted that Secretary Rusk had seen and the President would be seeing Betancourt in an effort to gain support for the U.S. position in the OAS.⁴ It was also noted that one point we are trying to make to the OAS is that the Communists, in trying to subvert the Dominican Republic, are the ones who are intervening.

3. Information Program—Mr. Greenfield said that we must do something about proving the Communist intervention in the Dominican Republic; he noted that the press, with Castro in mind, can accept the argument that a few organized Communists can make a big difference in a small country. All we have to do is prove that there really are some hard-core Communists in the Dominican Republic who are trying to subvert the country in an organized meaningful way.

The group agreed that this is a serious problem and that a task force should be set up to deal with it.⁵ In searching about for new ideas, Mr. Mann suggested that we interrogate rebels as they come out of the zone⁶ while Des FitzGerald mentioned that he thinks he can find some still pictures of rebels wearing Fidel Castro caps.

Mr. Vance said that DOD was getting pictures of the evacuation every day. These are real human interest items. Mr. Greenfield said that he would be very interested in getting copies.

4. Balaguer —The group discussed the approach to Balaguer and indicated that there were still some questions about the people listed by him as lieutenants. In this regard, see the State paper at Tab 2.

5. Information Activities in the Dominican Republic—Secretary Vance reported that the President wants a detailed report on all the informational aspects of the Dominican problem. For example, how many leaflets are dropped? What are they saying? How many radio frequencies are we broadcasting on? Who is listening? What is the impact? As a general point, Mr. Bundy emphasized that the President has a continuing and real interest in this dimension of the Dominican problem and that we should attempt to keep him fully informed on our activities in this area.

6. The Junta—The group discussed the desirability of separating the U.S. from Wessin. Mr. Mann felt that we are not particularly happy with Wessin but that we cannot now go too far in the direction of dumping him.

GC

Tab 2

Washington, May 3, 1965

Paper Prepared in the Department of State ⁷

BALAGUER

Davidson⁸ called Balaguer in New York on Sunday,⁹ shortly after noon. Balaguer answered the second question first: He is ready to go to the Dominican Republic when it is felt his presence there will serve a constructive purpose.

Balaguer did not wish to answer the second [first ?] question over the telephone and according to Davidson, on his own initiative decided to come to Washington. He arrived at Davidsonʼs home at 7:00 p.m. last night and will remain there at least throughout today.

Davidson reports that Balaguerʼs main contact with the current situation is the elder General Caamano, father of Lt. Colonel Caamano, the madman of the rebel forces.

Military Grouping Suggested by Balaguer

Col. Caamano, Jr.	}	Rebel Representatives
Col. Hernando Ramirez
Maj. Giovanni Guttierrez
Col. Alvarez Alguin
Col. Juan Lara Fernandez
Present Junta (Good career men)	}	Present Junta all acceptable
Major Venicio Fernandez Perez	}	Counter Revolutionaries Force
Major Dominguez—AIF—San Isidro
Col. Librador Andujar
Col. Felix de la Mota—Santiago de Cuba

Balaguer has what seems to be a rather unrealistic plan for establishing an interim government in the Dominican Republic. He says that he would put his weight behind implementing the plan at anytime we give the go ahead and can assure him that non-rebel military forces would cooperate. Presumably he had counted on the elder General Caamano to ensure cooperation of the rebel military forces through his son, Lt. Col. Caamano.

The plan would go like this:

1. He would want advance written resignations from former President Bosch and Vice President Tamayo which would be presented to as many members of the 1963 Bosch Congress that could be convened.

2. The 1963 Congress would then be recalled to receive and discuss these resignations.

3. Immediately thereafter, a provisional President would be designated. Balaguer suggests the President of Supreme Court or anyone else acceptable to the Congress.

4. At this stage an early date would be set for general elections.

5. Congress would then adjourn and meet again at the pleasure of and on a request from the provisional President.

6. Salaries for all Congressmen that could be located would be paid effective immediately.

Balaguer wants this formula to bring the country back to constitutionality in a way that would cool the passions and emotions of many who are now in the forefront of the action. All forces would be calmed and reassured, according to Balaguer. Balaguer feels that following this procedure would also head off a confrontation between the U.S. and the Dominican people who are seriously concerned over our present role, having been misled to believe that we are supporting the forces of military repression.

The elder Caamano is apparently in regular contact with his son. Davidson reports that they spoke by telephone twice on the evening of May 2 from Davidsonʼs residence. Young Caamano told his father that he is fighting for principles and ideals. He wants to return to constitutionality—free elections—an opportunity for the people to oust corrupt leaders and vote for the candidate of their choice. Young Caamano reports, according to Davidson through the old General, that there is greater and growing anti-U.S. feelings among the young and idealistic men who make up the rebel forces. Young Caamano tells his father he has 50,000 followers who will fight the U.S. Marines to the end.

Crockett has avoided speaking directly with Davidson since Balaguer arrived in Washington but is committed to call him “sometime later today.”

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Gordon Chase, Meetings on the Dominican Republic Planning Group. Secret; Eyes Only; No Distribution. Prepared by Chase on May 4.
2. Attached but not printed.
3. According to a JCS history of this intervention, on May 2 the JCS approved the deployment of an additional Marine battalion and the remaining five battalions of the 82nd Airborne Division. When these units arrived in Santo Domingo May 3–4, U.S. strength ashore stood at 12 maneuver battalions, approximately 21,000 men. Because Cuban MiG–17s, 19s, and 21s could cover U.S. air transport routes and even reach Santo Domingo, the JCS on May 6 decided to supplement the F–100s at Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico, with faster F–104s. (The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. IX: 1965–1968, Part II, by Walter S. Poole, Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 1985, pp. 464–465)
4. See Document 56 and footnote 5 thereto.
5. According to an attached list of actions to be taken, Adams (State), Califano, and Valenti among others would be members of this task force, whose job was to build “as full and well documented a case as can be developed to support charge that the communists have taken over the revolution in the Dominican Republic.”
6. The international neutral zone of safety set up in Santo Domingo on May 1.
7. Secret. Drafted by Crockett.
8. A pseudonym for Abe Fortas.
9. May 2.