Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

324. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Trueheart) to the Director (Hughes) and Deputy Director (Denney)¹

Washington, August 16, 1968.

SUBJECT

• ARA/CIA Meeting, August 15, 1968

PARTICIPANTS

• ARA—Messrs. Oliver, Vaky and Morris
• CIA—Messrs. Broe, Horton and Phillips
• INR—Mr. Gardner

[Omitted here is discussion on Bolivia.]

Cuba

There was a considerable discussion of what our next moves toward Cuba should be. The Agency referred to a paper that it had submitted to the Department in April² and which, according to Mr. Vaky, was still on the Secretaryʼs desk. In this paper, a copy of which is attached, the Agency discussed the possibility of approaching Cuban leaders around Castro to assure them that the U.S. had no wish to abrogate or wipe out the gains of the Cuban revolution and that it was prepared to cooperate with these leaders and indeed support them in any post-Castro regime, if they were prepared to cooperate covertly with CIA to provide information and perhaps to take timely action that would expedite the removal of Castro as a regime leader.

Messrs. Oliver and Vaky indicated that they felt some of the language of this proposal required modification but that it might provide a basis for discussion. It was felt especially that references to a post-Castro regime or the suggestion of Castroʼs removal were not appropriate.

Phillips, who runs the Cuban branch in DDP/WH, said that matters were reaching the point that CIA really had to know how our policy toward Cuba was going to develop. Right now the issue was both confused and becalmed. Mr. Oliverʼs speeches were being interpreted by some as opening up the possibility of Cuban-U.S. rapprochement. There was a world-wide impression that secret negotiations were in fact going on between Cuba and the United States.³ The domestic economic and political situation in Cuba was worse now than it had been any time under Castro (Phillips stated here that he never had been one of those who had depreciated the strength and endurance of the Castro regime) and actually the biggest thing that Castro had going for him at the present time was the wide spread impression among second-echelon Cubans that he was negotiating some sort of political settlement with the United States.

[1 paragraph (10½ lines of source text) not declassified]

What, Phillips wanted to know, did the Department wish to be done with this facility? Should we attempt to open up and pursue a dialogue or should we close it down immediately? Oliver said that at the moment a freeze should be put on any further talk and that it merely be indicated to the Cubans that the channel would be kept open for their use if they so desired.

Returning to the question of the wide-spread rumors that the United States and Cuba were in negotiations, Phillips asked what he might say if in fact he were approached by a member of the Cuban DGI and were asked if negotiations in fact were going on. Oliver replied that we should deny that negotiations were taking place, but that we should add that the ball was in the Cuban court and that channels for negotiation existed.⁴

Mr. Vaky wanted to know if the question put by Phillips meant that the Agency intended to take the initiative in approaching Cuban intelligence, or whether CIA merely meant to remain passively prepared with an appropriate response in case it ever was approached by the Cubans with a query of the sort mentioned. Phillips replied that the Agency intended to await a Cuban initiative. Gardner said that if in fact rumors and reports of negotiations were working as strongly in Cubaʼs favor as Phillips had indicated, and if in fact we wanted to scotch reports that these negotiations existed, the method of denial just agreed upon seemed excessively demure. Mr. Vaky suggested that perhaps it would be better to instruct station chiefs in Latin America to see it through their own means that denials of the negotiations were effectively made in their own countries. The meeting ended without further concrete suggestions being made. The creation of a small study group with State, Defense and CIA participation to consider the question of what exactly we should do next about Cuba was made but no definite decision was reached.

It was agreed that another meeting should be held to review this subject and what had been said about it in the current meeting. It was recognized that any decisions about changes or developments in our policy toward Cuba would have to be referred to a higher level.

1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA/CIA Weekly Meeting Files. Secret. Drafted by Richard F. Gardner on August 16.
2. Attached but not printed.
3. In the Washington Post, July 18, Drew Pearson reported allegations of U.S. “diplomatic overtures to Castro towards resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba.” ARAʼs suggested guidance prepared that day by Sayre and FitzGerald for the noon briefing was that “No consideration is being given to resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba.” The guidance referred to a March 15 statement by Oliver in Miami, reiterating U.S. policy on Cuba: “We are not aware of any indication by Fidel Castro that he would like to resume diplomatic relations with the United States. On the contrary, as recently as February 1968 Castro is quoted by a foreign journalist as saying: ‘this kind of peaceful coexistence is of no interest to us—our quarrel with American imperialism is total and insurmountable. As to us, we have no contacts with the U.S. and have no desire for any.’” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 73 D 191, Misc. Correspondence, FitzGerald, July–Sept 1968)
4. According to an August 6 memorandum for the files, Arlene Gould of Life en Español called on Bowdler that afternoon and asked if he would like to meet with Cuban UN Delegation member Jesús Bowdler responded: “I told her I did not wish to meet with Sr. Jimenez; if the Cubans are interested in making an official contact, other channels are available to them. With respect to the recent newspaper stories about U.S.-Cuban talks, I told her I was not aware of any such talks and that our position on the subject was clear.” ( Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Vol. IV, 1965–68)