Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

321. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 85–68

Washington, June 27, 1968.

CUBA: Castroʼs PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OVER THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO

Conclusions

A. Castroʼs problems have taken a turn for the worse over the past year. A severe drought has depressed sugar production and agriculture generally. Living conditions have become more stringent because of reduced food supplies and a variety of other factors, including new attempts by Castro to overcome his economic problems by forcing the population to work harder. There has been an increase in popular discontent and in the number of small, local disorders.

B. Nonetheless, we see little prospect that economic adversity will significantly weaken Castroʼs position over the next couple of years. A return of more favorable weather, already in prospect, would in itself somewhat relieve domestic pressures. Even if economic conditions were to deteriorate further, Castro would still have the advantages of charismatic appeal, political skill, and ultimately, a formidable military-security apparatus.

C. Although there probably will be fluctuations in the level of future Soviet aid to Cuba, we think it unlikely that the USSR will permit the Cuban economy to approach a critical condition. This will be so even if Soviet-Cuban tensions continue to develop.

D. We doubt that either Castroʼs economic difficulties or his contentious relationship with the USSR will cause him to turn toward the US. He will, however, seek to expand his trade with other non-Communist countries. There will be an increasing reluctance by such countries to maintain Castroʼs diplomatic and economic isolation, though his limited financial credit will restrict his trade with them.

[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NIEs, 85, Cuba. Secret; Controlled Dissem; No Foreign Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on June 27.