Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

278. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, July 14, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Recognition of Cuban Government-in-Exile

We have consistently maintained the position that it is not in the US interest to recognize a Cuban government-in-exile. The most formal public expression of our views was made by Assistant Secretary Martin in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees on May 22, 1963. He gave the following reasons for our stand:

1. Recognition of a government-in-exile would give those in Cuba who are struggling against communism, or who might be disposed to turn against the regime, the idea that they are being disregarded and that they will have no role to play in determining how Cuba will be governed.

A fundamental premise of our policy is that the Cuban people themselves will decide how they will achieve and organize their freedom and that those now within Cuba must have the major share of that responsibility.

2. The problem of finding a government capable of uniting a majority of the exiles is a most difficult, if not impossible task.

3. Our consistent policy has been to recognize governments-inexile only when they have direct constitutional connection with the last constituted government of the country, usually when they have actually exercised power in the country just prior to being forced out.

4. We still recognize the Castro regime as the Cuban Government (although we have broken diplomatic relations) and as such, responsible for its international obligations, including the protection of US citizens and the recognition of our rights under the Guantanamo Treaty. To recognize a government-in-exile might put those rights in legal jeopardy.

In addition to these publicly stated reasons, the following other considerations are pertinent:

1. There is a better than even chance that a government-in-exile would fall under the control of old-line, discredited Cuban politicians who constitute a numerous, aggressive and often well-financed element of the Cuban exile community. Such figures have very little, if any, support within Cuba. Our experiences in the 1961–1962 period with the Cuban Revolutionary Council—the nearest thing to a government-in-exile—are a poor augury for relations with an even more formal body.

2. If an acceptable alternative to Castro should arise within Cuba as a result of internal developments and should establish itself physically in some form as a provisional government, our ability to recognize it would be made much more difficult if we were already in relations with a government-in-exile.

3. A government-in-exile would claim Cubaʼs seat in the OAS. We would have to support its being seated. There are Latin American Governments, such as Mexico and Chile, which would not recognize the exile government and oppose its participation in the OAS. This would place serious strains on the inter-American system. The exile government would probably also try to obtain representation in world bodies. Few, if any, of our Western European allies would recognize the government or support its replacement of Castro representatives in these organizations. This could prove highly embarrassing to us.

4. Recognition of a government-in-exile would put great pressure on the US Government to support its efforts to take military action against the Castro regime.

Other than preventing Castro from bringing suit in the United States and claiming sovereign immunity in connection therewith, about the only advantage to be derived from recognition of a Cuban exile government would be to remove the legal obstacles to giving exile groups financial and material support for their activities against the Castro regime. Given the preponderant strength of Castroʼs military forces in relation to what the exile government could muster, our decision to support the exiles would only make sense in the context of a broader determination on our part to take direct action against the Castro regime.

In my opinion the foregoing considerations very clearly add up to our maintaining, in the absence of a clear decision to move directly against the present regime, the negative stand on recognition of a Cuban government-in-exile.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/LA Files: Lot 66 D 65, Cuba File. Secret. Drafted by Bowdler and cleared by Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs Marjorie M. Whiteman.