26. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State1
1128. Joint State/Defense message. Molina Urena, appeared at Embassy shortly before 4 pm, accompanied by gaggle of some 15 or 20 whom he introduced as his principal political and military advisers. [Page 69] (FonMin Lovaton reportedly had already taken refuge in foreign embassy and collapse some other leading military already reported.) Cols. Hernándo Ramirez and Caamano were with him. Following security practice I have instituted, I required all weapons to be checked at entrance.
Molina Urena, nervous and dejected, was trying hard to carry himself as constitutional President and failing miserably. While all emoted democratic principles and some sought breathe fire, it was clear they realized forces arrayed against them were superior and they said they prepared negotiate settlement.
In a meeting lasting almost one hour, various members of group asserted their people still prepared resist, but they felt their action necessary in interest preventing further bloodshed. I made clear our emphatic view senseless shedding of blood must end, at same time reminding them that it was their action on Saturday2 which initiated this fratricide and called forth counter-reaction. I recalled to them US had loyally supported Bosch to end of his government and beyond and had made clear its emphatic disapproval of his overthrow. That had happened, however, more than eighteen months ago. Latest effort to restore Bosch was obviously unsuccessful and at some point one had to start anew. I made clear to them we were talking in similar terms to both sides and, while meeting was going on, word was brought in that navy-air force bombardment had ceased. I suggested it was high time they approach other side for talks.
Both in full group and in private conversation with Molina and one or two civilian cohorts, I underlined and reiterated there was no question Communists had taken advantage of their legitimate movement, having been tolerated and even encouraged by PRD. I noted that in spite of fact PRD democratic party, they had in effect given Communists free rein, especially through military distribution of arms to civilians in large numbers, their tolerance of widespread looting, and physical mistreatment of innocent persons. I said there was much talk of democracy on their part, but this did not impress me as road to get there.
At one point I told Molina Urena, with whom I have always had good personal relations, I was sorry for him as regards the way all this had turned out, but that he could not deny serious Communist infiltration and influence in recent events. His answers and those his colleagues were specious and unconvincing, although I found little give in their position and no willingness admit such was case. I recounted incidents to him on local TV over weekend of Castro-type “barbudos” spouting pure Castroism. He said I was trying to talk details. I replied [Page 70] to him I wanted to make clear my government considers this kind of detail of great importance.
During meeting message came re danger posed for American citizens in La Romana through action rebel forces in handing out arms to civilians. I called this to groupʼs attention as example of just what we were talking about. They indicated concern and offered use marine helicopter to go to La Romana and stop it. This has however, been worked out through Police Chief Despradel.
As regards their request that we dissuade Wessin from crossing bridge and get air force to call off bombing, I reminded them Embassy staff had been successful four times yesterday in getting air force to hold back and had thought early this morning truce had been worked out. They had, in fact, tried to take advantage of each situation. Then I came down strongly on disgraceful incident at Hotel Embajador where American lives were wantonly placed in peril this morning.3 Was this an example of democracy in action?
During meeting, Martinez Francisco called back (Embtel 1118)4 asking to speak to Molina and saying he was going to make strong effort with him to give up. They had long talk by phone, contents of which not discussed with us.
I declined courteously proposal made by Molina that I attend negotiations along with Dean of DipCorps and representative of church. I said I had no authority to participate, and that US view was accord should be reached by Dominicans talking to Dominicans. I said we looked forward to early elections, hoped they would be entirely free, and that perhaps they could be supervised by OAS if Dominicans wanted it that way.
Meeting finally dragged to close with Molina leaving accompanied by small group, and several others, principally military, lingering as though they trying to avoid going out again into cruel world. There was some evidence navy-air force group ready to talk with them and I urged them to get together. We have not yet heard results.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CAR Files: Lot 69 D 158, Dominican Republic, 1965. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to CINCSO and CINCLANT for POLADs and COMCARIBSEAFRON and DOD. Passed to the White House and CIA.↩
- April 24.↩
- At about 7 a.m. on April 28 a shooting incident occurred in the evacuation area at the Hotel Ambassador when rebel patrols entered the grounds on a false rumor that one of their opponents, Rafel Bonilla Aybar, an anti-Bosch journalist, was among the evacuees. The patrol departed after firing several hundred shots. No evacuees were reported injured.↩
- In telegram 1118 from Santo Domingo April 27, 1820Z, Bennett reported that he had just spoken to Captain Mario Pena Taveras, leading member of the revolt, and Martinez Francisco, Secretary General of the PRD. Bennett recounted that he had told them in part that the “USG wants cease-fire to give opportunity to form government which can effectively govern country.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP)↩