256. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson1

On March 6 we sent the Secretary of State a memorandum asking for a strong plan to warn “the Cubans and their Soviet friends” against any interference with our high-level surveillance in Cuba. The Department has now come back with a plan which is intelligent as far as it goes. In essence it is that we should send a diplomatic warning to the Cubans by way of the Czechs,2 and follow this up by certain covert statements which will reach Cuban ears and show that we are entirely serious.

The Department thinks we should not go straight to the Russians, and after discussing the matter with Ambassador Thompson,3 I now find his arguments persuasive.

I do think that one further element is needed—and that is an appropriate public warning from you at some appropriate time—perhaps in answer to a question at an early press conference. If you agree, I will see to it that such a question comes up.4

McG. B. 5
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Overflights, Vol. II, 3/64–7/67. Secret; Sensitive.
  2. The warning was issued on March 27 to Czech Ambassador Duda, who was given two diplomatic notes for Cuba, one of which concerned the overflights. Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert W. Adams emphasized to Duda that “we want to make sure that there is no misunderstanding about our continuing position on this matter.” (Memorandum of conversation; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 73 D 191, PS 8–5, Gitmo Protests and Fishing Boat Incident) A copy of the protest note is ibid., Central Files 1964–66, AV 15 Overflights Problem—Public Relations, 1964.
  3. See Document 253.
  4. The approved option is checked.
  5. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.