234. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell1
President: Hello.
Russell: Yes sir.
President: Dick, weʼre going to meet again at 4:30.
Russell: Thatʼs right now.
President: Yeah. I wanted to talk to you before I went into the meeting. Theyʼre meeting downstairs. Now hereʼs the—nobody wants to do much. They think that the first place these fishermen ought not even have been picked up, that it was a mistake. That they over the limits, but we ought to have told them to get on back home and not make a big incident out of it, because not anything to be gained from it, and we ought to let him show his hand, whether this is in concert with Khrushchev, and what all it means, before we act irrational. Thereʼs an opposing viewpoint, thatʼs pretty well the viewpoint of Rusk and McCone, and I would say, Bobby Kennedy. He wants to turn everybody loose and let them go on home. McNamara feels like the sentiment in this country is such that weʼve got to do more than that, and that even though we would stand acquitted in the eyes of the world and maybe some of the liberal papers in this country, that we probably ought to do two things—declare the independence of that base by saying weʼre going to furnish our own water … and we donʼt want your damn water, and to hell with you. And number two, tell the people that are on there that they can pledge allegiance to us and live there, the 600. And the other 2500 to go on back and weʼre going to quit financing, weʼre going to operate the base independently so our country can be secure and so we operate it independently, and itʼs going to hurt you more by this action than hurts us, and we just donʼt need you people. Now thatʼs his feeling, heʼs about the only one that feels that way. Thatʼs my feeling, I think we ought to wrap ‘em up.
Russell: Thatʼs mine.
President: I think theyʼll say weʼre cruel, and these people been loyal to us for two or three generations, been working there, we just firing them outright without anything on their part, because Castro did [Page 581] this. USIA thinks it will get a good deal of sympathy from the rest of the nations, and—
Russell: Well, thatʼs their professional attitude. These nations ainʼt as silly as we attribute them to be, as we seem to think they are. And while theyʼre envious as hell of us, when they get down to where their self interest is involved and when we get hurt, their self interest is injured, theyʼre not nearly as bad as everybody makes out like they are. This Panama thing will demonstrate that beyond any doubt, if our people will just sit tight, give them the facts, say here it is now, youʼve got a stake in this. Same thing is true here in Cuba, they donʼt want Castro to prosper, none of the leaders do, theyʼre thousands of the little people who are Communist do, but theyʼre not going to raise any hell about it. Khrushchev will blow up like hell. Comrade Mao Tse-tung will come in with a philippic of some kind, but the world as a whole will say well thatʼs very logical position to take. You got to know that you can protect this, and Khrushchev pulled them out all at once, which he could do, if heʼd stopped them all one morning, and youʼd hadnʼt even had an hourʼs notice, you would need them, but now youʼre giving yourself the hourʼs notice. And youʼre preparing against the probability that he would do another asinine thing by simply declaring that no Cuban national can enter on the base. Youʼve got to be ready for that. But I know—
President: What do you think? I donʼt like to see them so split, so divided State, Defense, CIA. What do you think the attitude of the country is, the Senate? Are they indignant about cutting this water off. I donʼt guess as many of them feel as strong as Goldwater does, but I guess a good many of them feel—
Russell: No, they donʼt. But thereʼs a great many of them, they donʼt know exactly what they want done, Mr. President, because they donʼt know what can be done, but they want something done.
President: Thatʼs right, ainʼt much you can do, but this—Thatʼs right.
Russell: They donʼt know just exactly what to do. Theyʼre not in favor of any war, I donʼt think. I donʼt believe 10% of them would vote for that right now, under these circumstances. But theyʼre just tired of Castro urinating on us and getting away with it. They donʼt like the smell of it any longer and they just want to sort of show that we are taking such steps as are within our power without involving the shedding of a lot of blood, thatʼs my analysis of the sentiment in the Congress. And I think in the country, course it would be mighty easy to whip them up to where theyʼd be ready to go to war over it if you cut loose, and banded it up, instead of playing it in low key like is being done, but I approve of the low key play, but I think thereʼs a latent feeling there, that it may not explode right now, but one of these days, [Page 582] they are going to say, well weʼve just been a bunch of asses in this country, continually just back down and give away and say excuse me every time we come in collision with one of these little countries because theyʼre small and particularly Communist countries. And when that valve blows, now somebody is going to get hurt. And nobody will know just when the boiler is ready to give on it, but thereʼs a slowly increasing feeling in this country that weʼre not being as positive and as firm in our foreign relations as we should be, and that we just lean over backwards, that weʼre worried more about our image than we are about our substance, and that weʼre backing down. Now that feeling is in the country, just how far itʼs gotten, I donʼt know. A demagogue with any strength could blow it up. I donʼt know of anyone whoʼs got enough strength to do it, people donʼt trust Goldwaterʼs judgment, lot of them like his independence, and his—
President: You think a lot of people going to think youʼre hotheaded when you just fire a bunch of innocent humans.
Russell: I donʼt think so, I donʼt believe that even the Times and the Post could stir up 5% of the people about this. I would make it perfectly clear that this is regrettable, that our association with these people has been pleasant and mutually profitable over a period of years … but they were within the power of Castro and not in our power, and that we have to make this base independent, and we hope that in happier days, our pleasant relations with them could be renewed. Iʼd sure throw that in there, youʼll get every one of them where heʼd be a potential assassin to Castro. Yes, Iʼd certainly put it in there that way, that our relations with these people have been mutually pleasant and profitable, that Castro, he had control of them. He could stop them any morning, and not a one of them could come and we couldnʼt afford to be placed in that uncertain position. We had to rely on our resources.
President: If heʼs going to cut off our water, tomorrow he can cut off our people.
Russell: Pardon?
President: If today he can cut off our water, tomorrow he can cut off our people.
Russell: Sure, sure. He can stop them everyone at the gate, where not one could come in without a momentʼs notice. We just we canʼt operate that important establishment in the unpleasant atmosphere, and as regrettable as it is weʼll have to make other arrangements for the time being, and hope that in better days when the Cuban people and the American people are permitted to fraternize as they have in the past, and as we are anxious to do today, that we hope to be able to renew this.
President: Iʼd planned. I think Iʼm going to make some kind of a statement on it, at least authorize the press to, after we have our meeting [Page 583] this afternoon,2 because I think theyʼll want to hear something after working all day.
Russell: I think youʼre going to have to say something.
President: Then I think Iʼm going home for the weekend. Do you see any reason why I shouldnʼt?
Russell: No, I do not.
President: I think thereʼs every reason to kind of ignore him, go on and make your statement and then go on, not hang around to—
Russell: I agree, donʼt think thereʼs any reason why you should.
President: Okay, goodbye.
- Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Richard Russell, Tape F64.11, Side B, PNO 4. No classification marking. Johnson placed the call. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.↩
- At a 6:35 news conference that evening, Press Secretary Pierre Salinger read a White House statement indicating that the President had instructed the Department of Defense to make the Guantanamo base self-sufficient. The statement cited that “the reckless and irresponsible conduct of the Cuban Government,” remained a threat to peace and warned against “further provocations.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–1964, Book I, p. 273) See Document 235 for discussion regarding the statement.↩