218. Minutes of Meeting1
MINUTES OF THE IRG/ARA MEETING ON SITUATION IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Ambassador Crimmins began with a review of the Dominican Republic situation, considered in two broad aspects. The first was an analysis of the present situation, and the second was a look at future prospects.
He summed up his current analysis as follows: although the Government has been stronger as a result of the May municipal elections, it has also failed to exploit its improved position. The general movement seems to be that of a gradual downward decline, which is slow enough, however, that the Governmentʼs stability is not likely to be threatened before the 1970 elections. He estimated the odds as considerably better than even that the Government will survive through the 1970 elections. Such a survival he saw as representing tremendous psychological value to the country and the population.
Among the various elements, the military is strongly pro–Balaguer. The personal ambitions of certain officers are the source of some conflicts; and General Wessin supporters still exist but their numbers are not increasing. President Balaguer considers Wessinʼs support as static. The opposition to the Government continues to be flat-out and thorough, but also uncoordinated and uneffective. The PRD has been expanding its contacts with communist-led and Wessin forces. Although the PRD under its present radical leadership will continue to seek issues on which to unify the opposition to Balaguer, no such issues exist as yet. Overall opposition is disunited and weak.
The Social Christians, who were strong in the recent elections, are under pressure from their younger elements to begin organizing for 1970 and to undertake across the board opposition to the government.
The Communist Party continues in the disarray shown over the last two and one half years. Although the communists have a limited terrorist capacity, they do not themselves constitute an effective political force.
[Page 535]On the right, Wessin has no chance in electoral terms. Balaguer may permit him to return soon in order to speed the process of deflating his electoral campaign which enjoys little support. Other right wing elements are implacably anti-Balaguer.
The economic situation is neither good nor bad. The effects of this yearʼs drought are being overcome and agricultural production should rise about 6%. The overall economic growth rate in ʼ69 should be between 5 and 6%, and in 1972 should also attain 6%. The latter estimate is largely based on a $150 million ferro-nickel investment by Falcon-bridge of Canada which should come on stream in 1972 and provide significant foreign exchange relief to the economy. The years 1970–71 are the difficult ones, with a particularly heavy debt service burden also emerging in 1969.
The general investment climate is unstable largely due to the force of the protectionist spirit of those influencing the President. Should the Dominican Republic pursue enlightened policies in 1970–71, there is a fair chance of a 5–6% growth rate. No one should underestimate, said Ambassador Crimmins, the economic incompetence of the Government. It is oriented to the past and has no concept of the development process. It has to be pushed and hauled to make intelligent decisions.
However, even though Balaguer is not too enlightened, both we and the Dominican Republic owe him much. Taking into account the difference in the outlook today and that of September 1966, much of the improvement must be credited to Balaguer. His governmentʼs conduct has been essentially democratic.
With regard to the future, the Ambassador felt that Balaguer is moving toward a decision to run again for the usual reasons that incumbents find compelling. Although his decision is not yet final, he is moving in this direction.
A second Balaguer term, according to the Ambassador, would jeopardize our hopes for real economic development because of his lack of instinct for and knowledge of the measures required for development. Balaguer will not announce any decision before early 1970. We can expect however, if his decision is made earlier, it will be reflected in exacerbation of our running battles with him in development areas. In Balaguerʼs absence Augusto Larra would be the likely Reformista candidate. Wessin has no chance of winning. On the left, it is still not clear whether the PRD would fill the candidacy or who it might be. Although predictions on this are risky, Bosch is not likely to run. Garcia Godoy is trying to form a coalition but this is a hard thing to pull off. He would have problems with the military and with the right. The 1970 elections are still too close to 1965 for us to witness the normal play of political forces in the Dominican Republic. The ʼ65 tensions will probably not be dissolved before the 1974 elections.
[Page 536]The problems we will face in 1969 will derive partly from the impending elections and partly from what he described as the “incredible belief” of the Dominicans that the USG has a voice in every political act in the country. Even if our stance in the elections were totally neutral, this fact would not be believed by the Dominicans. This in itself constitutes a problem.
Ambassador Crimmins then answered several questions. He identified the Mayor of Santo Domingo as a possible new face in politics and Antonio Guzman of the PRD as a better prospect than most as a candidate. He noted that a Balaguer decision to run might be the issue over which the right and left could unite. It would certainly produce an immediate increase of conspiratorial action from both the left and right. Balaguerʼs chances of surviving such conspiracy, he said, were slightly better than even. His second term, however, would be plagued by continued efforts to overthrow him and his administration.
There is growing awareness within the Catholic Church of the need for structural change, but the conservative majority still holds back the young liberals. It is still a strong influence in the Campo, where it is partly Social Christian oriented and partly conservative.
Regarding the military, he thought it would intervene if Bosch were elected but probably would not, at least initially, should Garcia Godoy be elected.
He noted the unique Dominican sensitivity to U.S. domestic politics, particularly within the PRD. A Nixon election might give the PRD a feeling that there is no hope to overcome the conservative forces in the Dominican Republic, allied with those of the U.S., and therefore move it to take some drastic action. At this point, however, it is incapable of sufficient violence to overthrow the Government.
For the 1970–74 period, he felt there are some leaders in the center and center left factors who could provide adequate leadership despite the serious lack of human resources.
The National University is in terrible shape, with a low level of competence and continuing political turmoil. The best prospect at this time for U.S. help to the universities lies with the Catholic University of Santiago.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files: Lot 70 D 122, IRG/ARA IRG meetings were routinely attended by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and other representatives from ARA,AID, DOD, and the White House.↩