1. In response Department's request following is Embassy's initial
listing of suggestions for actions at Washington level which would have
useful impact in existing circumstances:
A. Aid/Economic
1. Readiness to deal quickly and flexibly with negotiating problems as
they may arise during Embassy-GODR
conversations on new assistance package.
2. Promptest possible processing sixteen million SA loan and subsequent dollar disbursements.
3. Accelerated conclusion of bid and AID/W studies of Tavera Dam project, with object of earliest
possible announcement of bid and AID
decision to finance (assuming establishment of feasibility). (Ambassador
would like briefing on current Washington status and prognosis of
studies during his consultations.)
4. Early consideration of special treatment for DR in allocation of sugar shortfalls, bearing in mind
electoral stability factors as well as economic balance of payment
factors. (We realize normal timing of allocations may not permit
pre-electoral impact and certainly cannot be finely adjusted to meet
tactical stability needs. At same time, we would want Washington to
consider desirability making early statement USG intention take sympathetic attitude toward DR, a statement which would have
considerable impact.)
5. Prompt and flexible treatment DL
applications.
6. Largest possible FY–68 and 69 DG
allocations.
B. Political Military
1. Consideration, on contingency basis, of possible invitation to
Balaguer for state visit.
2. High-level, stability-bolstering statements in support of
constitutional government in DR, to be
made on appropriate occasions to be identified by Embassy.
3. Favorable consideration of request by Dominican Armed Forces for grant
assistance on military soft goods.
4. Continued and, if necessary, increased surveillance of potential
Golpista elements now in US (e.g.,
Wessin, Pancho Aguirre).
5. Contingency preparations for departure controls on Wessin, should
Balaguer so request.
6. Holding line on issuance visas to notorious Trujillistas, whose
presence in US would be prejudicial to
US interests in DR, and continued and, if necessary,
increased surveillance of those already in US.
Crimmins
1 Source: National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 2
DOM